
GopigM - 



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THE LIFE 



OF 



prince <Btto tion 38i0mardt 



BY . / 

FRANK PRESTON STEARNS 

AUTHOR OF " SKETCHES FROM CONCORD AND APPLEDORE," " LIFE OF TINTORETTO, 
" MODERN ENGLISH PROSE WRITERS," ETC. 



T5 




PHILADELPHIA AND LONDON 

J. B. LIPPINCOTT COMPANY 

1899 







Copyright, 1899, 

BY 

J. B. Lippincott Company. 

TWO COPIES RECEIVED. 






^ 1SH 




Electrotvped and Printed by J. B. Lippincott Company, Philadelphia, U.S A. 






TO 

PROFESSOR EDWARD T. REICHERT 

OF THE 

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA 



THE GAME OF LIFE 

The life of man is like a game of chess, 

The which he plays according to his art ; 
Winning or losing, he does nothing less 

Than to obey the dictates of his heart. 
Himself against himself, he ever sets 

His pawns, knights, castles in a brave array ; 
His soul the stake he on the issue bets, — 

Too high a prize to risk in thoughtless play. 
Honor and conscience do the white men guide 

Desire and his self-love the red direct 
An angel and a demon on each side 

O'erlook the game, — for its result elect. 

If thou wouldst win and not thy fortune rue, 
Subdue thyself, yet to thyself be true. 



PREFACE 



Bismarck's memoirs, although his advanced age is some- 
times perceptible in them, contain a mine of wisdom for the 
practical statesman ; and yet they are not in the true sense an 
autobiography, for they are not a record of the man's own 
life. Likewise there are valuable incidents in Dr. Busch's 
voluminous sketches of the German chancellor ; but Dr. 
Busch's acquaintance with his employer only began in 1870, 
and he makes no attempt to explain Bismarck's policy or 
how he accomplished his mighty work. Mr. Lowe's larger 
English life of Bismarck is a dignified study of the subject, 
but it was published many years before his death, and is 
written too much from the English Tory and monarchical 
stand-point to please American readers. Von Sybel's his- 
tory of the foundation of the new German empire contains 
the only adequate statement of Bismarck's statecraft between 
1862 and 1870; but the period comprising the last twenty- 
five years of his life was hardly less important than that which 
immediately preceded it. What Americans now require is a 
clear statement of the character of the man, the principal 
events of his life, and an explanation of his policy as related 
to the historical events of his time. This is what I have 
undertaken to give in the present volume. 

In order to do Bismarck justice, however, we should divest 
ourselves for the time of our national antipathy to royalty. The 
name of king is hateful to Americans, as it was to the ancient 
Romans, and with good reason ; but in order to do justice to 
Bismarck and recognize him as he was, we must endeavor to 
place ourselves in the position of a man who was born and 

7 



PREFACE 

brought up with the idea that loyalty to his sovereign was an 
ethical principle, and who, even after he had somewhat out- 
grown this belief, found it useful as a basis — perhaps the only 
basis he could find — on which to raise the political super- 
structure of his own life's work, the elevation of Germany to 
its proper position in the family of nations, and its liberation 
from those evils from which it had suffered for centuries, 
owing to its interminable subdivisions and its liability to 
foreign intrigues. 

I think it will be admitted that so grand and difficult an 
undertaking, and one accomplished in so short a space of 
time, could in all probability have only been carried through in 
the manner that it was ; and this probability is largely increased 
by the fact that during the succeeding twenty years of Bis- 
marck's administration he is credited with not having made a 
single important political blunder. If he had joined the revo- 
lutionists in 1848 and rendered himself conspicuous as an 
opponent of royalty, it is impossible to imagine how he could 
have accomplished it. 

The notion that Bismarck was a sort of political Mephis- 
topheles, which originated long since with a sensational 
writer for the Edinburgh Review, becomes dissipated in the 
light of historical investigation like mist before the sun. His 
worst enemies have never been able to prove a single dis- 
creditable act against him in his public or his private life. 
His remark that Dr. Busch would write the secret history of 
his time must have been ironical, for no secret history of 
Bismarck's diplomacy has come to light. He was sometimes 
violent and domineering, but never for personal ends. He 
appears always in the light of a disinterested statesman, 
whose whole thought and activity are concentrated on what 
he considers the welfare of his country. 

F. P. S. 



CONTENTS 



CHAPTER I PAGH 

The Bismarcks ......... i i 

CHAPTER II 
v The Revolution of Forty-Eight . . . . 31 

CHAPTER III 
Frankfort and St. Petersburg . . . . . .49 

CHAPTER IV 
Minister-President . . . . . . . .86 

CHAPTER V 

SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN . . . . . . . . IOO 

CHAPTER VI 
The Campaign of 1866 118 

CHAPTER VII 
Bismarck enlarges Prussia ....... 142 

CHAPTER VIII 
The North German Confederation 154 

CHAPTER IX 

v The Franco-German War 187 

9 



CONTENTS 

CHAPTER X PAGB 

The Siege of Paris . . . . . . . .214 

CHAPTER XI 
The Iron Chancellor 247 

CHAPTER XII 
1873 to 1876 — Intrigues of Von Arnim .... 270 

CHAPTER XIII 
The Russo-Turkish War and the Congress of Berlin . 303 

CHAPTER XIV 
Socialism and the Tariff . 322 

CHAPTER XV 
Keeper of the Peace 350 

CHAPTER XVI 
Frederick III. and William II 380 

CHAPTER XVII 
Nearing the Goal 412 



THE LIFE 



OF 



CHAPTER I 

THE BISMARCKS 



Pomerania lies between Brandenburg, the Baltic, and 
Prussia proper. It is rather a dreary waste, with little to 
recommend it either to the common traveller or the student 
of history. The soil is sandy, and, like the adjacent Hol- 
stein, better suited to grazing than agriculture. Long reaches 
of pasture-land are dotted with small hamlets and peasants' 
cottages, and broken up by occasional patches of woods and 
more extensive, game-preserves. Its chief advantage consists 
in a healthy and bracing climate, which, with an habitually 
cloudy sky, makes toil pleasant to the laborer, and has built 
up a race of men as strong and vigorous as those of the 
Scotch border-land, a tract which it closely resembles. It 
was originally a portion of the old Vandalic territory, and is 
still inhabited largely by their descendants, who have a dialect 
of their own, and until the reforms of Von Stein were mostly 
in the condition of serfs. Through the centre of Pomerania 
flows the Oder, which near Stettin is joined by the Biese, a 
smallish river on whose bank are situated the town and castle 
of Bismarck. 

It would be natural to suppose that the name Bismarck 
had been derived from the river Biese, but this does not 
appear 'jo have been the case. It should be a warning to the 

ii 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

fine-spun arguments of archaeologists to learn that the earliest 
spelling of the name on record — early in the thirteenth cen- 
tury — was Bischofsmark, or mark of the bishop, nearly all 
Germany being divided at that time into marks or marches, 
and the Bishop of Havelberg being in authority over the dis- 
trict where the castle of Bismarck stands. It is a very old 
castle, belonging to the great days of the German empire, 
perhaps as early as the tenth century, and must have been 
inhabited by the Bismarck family long before the earliest 
record of them. We do not even know what their surname 
was, which, like that of the Hohenzollerns, was exchanged or 
fell into disuse after residing at the castle. The name of the 
Hohenstaufens (Weiblingen) has been preserved to us by 
Ghibelline tradition, though the family became extinct with 
Conradin. 

In those early times of political integration men improved 
their fortunes chiefly by valor on the battle-field and discre- 
tion in the hour of victory, qualities for which the Bismarck 
family would seem to have been always distinguished. To 
judge by their descendants, they were powerful and athletic 
men, such as would carve their way to fortune with the edge 
of the sword, and maintain it against all comers. There are 
some historical evidences of this, especially of a Nicholas von 
Bismarck, whose father left the family castle about the time 
when Dante was chief magistrate in Florence, and removed 
to the city of Stendal, where he and his son became impor- 
tant in civil affairs. Nicholas especially dominated for a time 
over Stendal and the adjacent districts, but was finally driven 
out of Stendal to seek his better fortune in the service of the 
Margrave of Brandenburg. This resulted in the Bismarcks' 
removal from Pomerania ; and Nicholas, for his valuable as- 
sistance in peace and war, received from the Margrave the 
estate and castle of Bergstall, one of the largest baronial fiefs 
in the Altmark, as the Prussians continue to call it. We do 
not, however, hear of other notable Bismarcks from this time 
forward, though the family continued to hold its position, and 
was represented in all the great German wars dowr. to the 
time of the French Revolution. They were tyrannically 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

treated by the Elector John George of Hohenzollern, who 
dispossessed them of the valuable property of Bergstall, and 
removed them to a much inferior piece of property during 
the latter part of the sixteenth century. 

In spite of this unjust affront, they continued to serve the 
Hohenzollern family with true mediaeval loyalty. We find a 
Colonel von Bismarck in the army of Duke Bernard of 
Weimar, at the defeat of Nordlingen; after which he returned 
to Brandenburg to fight under the Great Elector, and came 
through the whole period of the Thirty Years' War without 
injury, so far as we know. Between 1570 and 1650, how- 
ever, three branches of the Bismarck family had perished, — 
a witness to the terrible ordeal of that period, — though in 
what way we are not informed, and only the present Schon- 
hausen line survived to represent the family. Crevese and 
Schonhausen are the two estates which the Elector John 
George had, with a bonus of two thousand thalers, presumed 
to consider an equivalent for the Bergstall property. It is 
stated that he also made a present of an hundred florins 
apiece to each of the ladies, to console them for their change 
of residence ! x Frederick William I., in like manner, attempted 
to console the relatives of Lieutenant Katte for the execution 
which depended entirely on his own will. 

Prince Bismarck's third grandfather married a lady of the 
Katte family early in the eighteenth century, and the Prince's 
great-grandfather was a contemporary of Frederick the Great 
and much in favor with him, but, unfortunately, was killed in 
1742 at the battle of Czaslau, where Frederick defeated the 
Austrians with inconsiderable loss. He was a colonel of 
hussars, and we may judge him to have been the ablest of 
the Bismarck family in recent times until the present Prince. 
The most distinguished connection of the family, though the 
Bismarcks of our time are not descended from him, was 
Lieutenant-General Ziethen, the great hussar commander of 
the Seven Years' War, whose daring exploits and hair-breadth 
escapes have become a household legendary store among the 

1 Hesekiel's Biography, p. 27. 
13 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

Prussians. The Germans consider him to have been fully 
the equal of Murat, and there is an attractive statue of him 
by Schadow in Dessau Piace at Berlin, — a rather slender 
man, in a dreamy, nonchalant attitude, as if life were a matter 
of indifference to him. So it probably is to the bravest kind 
of men. 

We cannot discover anything in the Bismarck genealogy 
which would lead us to expect the appearance of a first-class 
genius in the family. Prince Bismarck's own father, Carl 
Wilhelm Ferdinand von Bismarck, born in 1771, was a man 
of rather imposing personal appearance, with refined features 
and a forehead that reminds one of Goethe, but left no record 
which distinguishes him in any way. As Kaunitz said, Nature 
has to rest before producing a great statesman. Carl Wil- 
helm served in the king's body-guard for a time, but we do 
not hear of him as taking an active part in the defence of his 
country against the French. His one distinction is that he 
chose a most excellent wife. Three months before the battle 
of Jena he was married to Louisa Wilhelmina Menken, not 
of a noble family, but, what was much better, the daughter 
of Privy Councillor Menken, and in all respects a superior 
woman. Councillor Menken was a man of ability, of liberal 
tendencies, and much trusted by Frederick the Great in his 
last years. It is from this direction, evidently, that Prince 
Bismarck derived his diplomatic talent, and, perhaps, his intel- 
lectual ability. Carl von Bismarck saved his young wife from 
the anxiety of his presence at the battle of Jena, and lived 
thenceforth a rather retired and very domestic life, chiefly given 
to the oversight of his estates, of which he had two in Pome- 
rania, besides his head-quarters at Schonhausen, — and to the 
shooting of ground game. His children were many, and 
their birthdays extended over the space of twenty years. 
Otto was the fourth in order, but his eldest brother died in 
infancy, so that he became his father's second son, a position 
among noble German families which commonly requires of a 
young man either to earn his living as a soldier, or to make 
some unusual exertion if he wishes to secure a place for 
himself in the great world. 

14 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

OTTO VON BISMARCK 

Great events are the stars which preside over the birth of 
remarkable men. There is every reason why they should 
have this stimulating effect, and sufficient instances are known 
to bear witness to it. Webster, the defender of the constitu- 
tion, was born while the Constitution of the United States 
was under discussion, and most of the great men of the nine- 
teenth century came into existence during the wars of Napo- 
leon. Bismarck was the last and most important of these. 
He first saw the light on the first of April, 1815, when all 
Europe was in an uproar. Napoleon had been welcomed 
back to France, and received in Paris with enthusiasm ; the 
Vienna Congress had dissolved itself in haste, and armies 
everywhere were in motion. The effect of this on some 
women might have been slight enough ; but the Frau Louisa 
Wilhelmina von Bismarck was a person to recognize its sig- 
nificance, and it may have had a determining influence on the 
future of her second son. As events have proved, a more 
unfavorable circumstance for the fortunes of the Bonaparte 
family could not have happened than the advent of Otto 
Edward Leopold von Bismarck. The Frau von Bismarck 
could not be blamed if she felt a hostility towards the French ; 
for in 1806 she had only been saved from the insults of 
Napoleon's soldiers by a stout oaken door at Schonhausen, 
which still bears the marks of their violence. If Otto von 
Bismarck bore any ill will towards the French as a nation, 
this is sufficient to account for it. 

He was not, however, brought up at Schonhausen, for his 
parents removed the following year to the estate of Kniephof, 
in the vicinity of Naugard, Pomerania, and not very distant 
from the old castle of Bismarck, where the family had ac- 
quired its knightly character seven or eight centuries before. 
There was no place for Count Carl Wilhelm in the rejoicings 
and congratulations after the return of the Prussian army 
from Paris, and his high-spirited wife must have felt this 
keenly. They lived in retirement for the next seven years or 
more, during which time Otto grew to be a strong, vigorous 

*5 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

boy in the bracing air of Pomerania, with a liking for domestic 
animals, woods, and country life which never left him. The 
Pomeranians are the tallest men and accounted the bravest 
soldiers in the German army, and Bismarck, both in mind 
and physique, was a typical example of them. 

He inherited his father's figure and his mother's mental 
endowment, as well as the vigorous and clear-sighted intelli- 
gence of the old Privy Councillor Menken. His mother was 
a master of the game of chess, as well as a fine linguist and a 
reader of the best literature. She possessed sufficient insight 
into character to discover that her son Otto was well suited 
for the profession of a diplomat, and destined him at an early 
age for his future career. It is probable that there was more 
of the Menken than of the Bismarck in him. 

It would be well if we could know more of Otto's child- 
hood, and the manner in which his mother brought him up, 
but we never shall unless he has left some record of it him- 
self. The Prussians believe in severe discipline, and it is this 
which gives the slight stiffness to their manners, and the Frau 
Louisa Wilhelmina was no exception. When Otto was ex- 
actly six years old she placed him in charge of Dr. Plamann, 
who kept the strictest school in the city of Berlin. He after- 
wards confessed that this was the severest portion of his life. 
His elder brother, fortunately, was with him, also a bright and 
vigorous boy, and was no doubt much of a help to him, but 
there were no entertainments, such as make school-life pleasant 
to English and American boys. They could not go out to 
walk except in charge of an instructor, like the pupils in a 
convent ; and to a child so full of life and energy as young 
Otto this was very oppressive. He suffered from home- 
sickness, a mental malady which some children never become 
acquainted with. Though not fond of his studies r he made 
excellent progress, was liked by his companions, and at the 
age of eleven years and six months he entered the Friedrich 
Wilhelm Gymnasium to prepare for the university. 

German gymnasia are secondary schools of instruction, and 
something more than that. The name would seem to be 
badly selected, unless it refers to the unclothed condition of 

16 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

the youthful mind at that time of life. The graduate of a 
gymnasium is supposed, however, to be thoroughly versed in 
Greek, Latin, mathematics, and such modern languages as his 
parents may designate for him, and altogether as well equipped 
as a junior in our best colleges. He then goes to the uni- 
versity and commences the study of his profession, taking 
parallel courses in history, philosophy, art, and literature. In 
this manner time is saved, and the youth is not thrown upon 
his own resources at too tender an age, before he knows 
properly how to care for himself. 

Otto troubled himself about his Latin and Greek only as 
much as was necessary to pass the examinations. All through 
life he cared little for such things as were not of practical use 
to him. In the modern languages he made better progress, 
and was always an assiduous reader of history, the true 
foundation of good statesmanship. Besides the regular cur- 
riculum, his ambitious mother inflicted on her sons French 
and English tutors during the summer vacation, so that there 
was practically no cessation to their studies. No expense 
was spared for their education, and they were as carefully 
guarded against evil influences as the sons of wealthy Atheni- 
ans in the time of Plato. 

The Frau von Bismarck was much given to theological 
reading, and felt the influence of the great wave of religious 
liberality which swept over Europe and America between 
1820 and 1840. She was a warm friend and devoted admirer 
of Dr. Schleiermacher, of Berlin, who was not more remark- 
able for his profound scholarship than for the eloquence of 
his discourse. No German theologian of the century has ex- 
ercised so extended and long-continued influence in America 
as Schleiermacher, and the prudent liberality of his views has 
largely contributed to the moulding of such minds as Chan- 
ning, Beecher, and Phillips Brooks. At his mother's desire, 
Otto was confirmed in the church of the Trinity at Berlin, at 
Easter in the year 1830, an event whose importance the dis- 
tinguished clergyman did not live to recognize, but which 
may have had a decided influence on the future of his young 
neophyte. The path in religion pointed out by Schleier- 
2 i 7 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

macher and his mother was the one which Bismarck followed 
throughout life, as his frequent conversations on religious 
topics bear witness. With creeds and theological tenets he 
did not concern himself much, but his faith in an all-wise 
ruler of the universe remained unshaken through all the 
physical and metaphysical scepticisms of the nineteenth cen- 
tury. It is true that after his diplomatic service began Bis- 
marck did not often attend church, but there were always 
religious books on his table, and he carried them on his cam- 
paigns to France and Bohemia. One of Napoleon's most 
sensible remarks was, that, as a rule, it was best for every 
man to adhere to the religion in which he was brought up, 
and Bismarck exemplified this. 

Obstinate and unruly school-boys often make able men, 
but are always narrow-minded. It is because they cannot see 
both sides of a subject that they act as they do. Young Bis- 
marck's conduct at school was such that he rarely required 
correction, and never severe punishment. We like this better 
than that more perfect behavior which results from too strict 
a consideration for form, — the behavior of the martinet. Dr. 
Bonnell, who was one of Otto's instructors for whom he 
acquired an enduring affection, and in whose family he re- 
sided from his sixteenth to his eighteenth year, has said of 
him that he was a thoroughly amiable and unaffected boy, 
showing a decided preference for domestic life, not given to 
roaming about at night. His only fault was that he was 
rather domineering and exacting with servants, as sons of 
the nobility too often are. He made few friends at school, 
but those few he retained through life. This may have been 
because he did not often find in others those substantial 
qualities on which lasting friendship is based. At Kniephof 
he learned to ride and shoot, as a matter of course. He was 
always a daring horseman and an expert swimmer, besides 
being a good fencer and dancer. He was not, however, so 
fond of these amusements as to neglect more serious business 
for them. Gymnastics he never cared for. He grew up tall, 
but a rather slender figure, and it was not until middle life 
that he broadened out as we now see him in his pictures. He 

iS 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

was much attached to a great Danish dog which his father 
purchased for him at this time, and which became his constant 
attendant for many years. 

GOTTINGEN 

Having graduated from the Berlin gymnasium with honor, 
Bismarck wished to go to Heidelberg, where there is always 
a large corps of Prussian students ; but his mother, who had 
long since obtained control of all the family affairs, preferred 
Gottingen for him. It is sufficient evidence of her strong 
will that sho could thus prevail over the wishes of her strong- 
willed son. It is said that she objected to Heidelberg for fear 
Otto might contract the habit of beer-drinking there, for 
which she had an especial dislike ; x but she could assign a 
better reason than that, since Gottingen is in Hanover, where 
the purest German is spoken, and this for a diplomat was also 
of importance. 

Otto went accordingly to Gottingen in May, 1832, and re- 
mained till November, 1833, studying law, and whatever else 
he had time or fancy for. He went alone, and, what seems 
strange, was wholly unacquainted with his fellow-students. 
Inexperienced and left to his own devices, for the first time in 
life, with an exceptionally active mind and full of Pomeranian 
energy, he plunged from one mishap or blunder into another. 
His record at the university was a turbulent one, not unlike 
that which Schiller describes in his account of Wallenstein. 
He had already fought his first student's duel, a very boyish 
affair, in Berlin ; and one morning, being laughed at in the 
streets of Gottingen for his rather eccentric attire, Otto in his 
confusion or disgust knew of no better alternative than to chal- 
lenge the whole party. This, however, had consequences that 
could not have been foreseen. The second of the Hanoverians, 
who called on young Bismarck to arrange a meeting, found so 
little ill will and so much good humor in him, that he was 
strongly attracted towards him, and offered to bring about a 
reconciliation, which was accordingly done. The Hanoverian 

1 Hesekiel's Biography, p. 98. 
19 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

soon afterwards became Bismarck's chum, and, being older 
and more experienced, persuaded him to leave the Bruns- 
wick corps, to which Otto then belonged, and to join his 
own, since there was no regular Prussian corps at the uni- 
versity. Thus early did Bismarck evince his indifference to 
party attachments. 

The Brunswickers, however, were highly offended, and 
their leading man challenged him to fight with the schlager, 
from which Bismarck escaped with a few blows, and his oppo- 
nent with a cut in his face. Of course, the Brunswickers were 
not going to let him off on such terms as this, and Otto was 
challenged successively by all their ablest swordsmen. It 
was a miniature of his after- experience as a statesman with 
the great powers of Europe. Bismarck is credited with having 
fought twenty duels with the schlager during the first year, 
and in every instance but one he had the advantage over his 
antagonist. In his encounter with a student named Bieder- 
wig, whom he afterwards greeted on the floor of the Reichs- 
tag, the latter's sword-blade broke as Bismarck was parrying 
his attack, and gave him a slight cut on the cheek. A con- 
vention of experts, however, decided that such an accident 
did not constitute a victory for Biederwig, though the gentle- 
man himself always held a different opinion. In this way 
Bismarck became the champion of the Hanoverians, and, 
though only eighteen, he became the admired and most 
dreaded fencer of the university. It is the fair explanation of 
his duelling experience, which otherwise might be difficult to 
account for. Though of an aggressive nature, he was not 
quarrelsome, but rather conciliatory. 

It is a peculiar custom, this schlager duelling of German 
students, and seems to take the place with them of those 
athletic games which the Saxon race so much delight in. It 
was only at a later period that English foot-ball was intro- 
duced .at Heidelberg. Though their encounters rarely result 
in a more serious injury than a permanent scar on the face, 
these scars are so common that they would almost seem to 
be the mark of an educated German. From the earliest 
times the Germans have been given to such rude tests of 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

personal courage, and there is no doubt a certain advantage 
in them. Schlager-fighting trains the nerves and hand for 
the more serious emergencies of life, and is as useful to the 
surgeon or lawyer as it is to the soldier; but the idea of 
sending one's sons to college to be marked in this manner is 
not very pleasant, and perhaps it would be quite as well if 
German students found some other method of proving their 
manliness. 

The pistol duel, with which Bismarck was connected in 
January, 1833, was in no wise to his discredit. An English- 
man, named Knight, had fallen out with a young German 
baron, and they had arranged for a deadly encounter. At 
the last moment the baron's second disappointed him, and 
Bismarck was asked to fill his place. This he did from that 
sentiment of loyalty to his countrymen which is the best 
virtue in early life ; and he showed on this occasion that 
masterful trait in his nature arising from a clear perception 
of the case before him, and readiness to act according to his 
thought. The principals were too nervous to hit each other 
at the first fire, and Bismarck, who had purposely lengthened 
the distance between them, proposed a cessation of hostilities, 
which all parties were glad enough to agree to. Such affairs 
of honor, however, were contrary to the laws of the university, 
and the participants in it were severely punished; the rector 
allotting Bismarck for his connection in it eleven days of 
solitary confinement, though public opinion spoke loudly in 
his favor. At another time he was accorded four days' con- 
finement for having associated with an illegal organization, 
but what this was we are not informed. 

Among the friends that he made at Gottingen were Dr. 
Windhorst, afterwards his most active opponent in the Reichs- 
tag, and John Lothrop Motley, the historian of the Dutch 
Republic. There were other Americans there at the time 
with whom he became friendly, and assisted in the celebration 
of the Fourth of July with pleasant international courtesy. 
He has himself recorded his acquaintance with Motley in a 
letter to Oliver Wendell Holmes, dictated in March, 1878, as 
follows : 

21 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

" I met Motley at Gottingen in 1832 ; I am not sure if at the 
beginning of Easter Term or Michaelmas Term. He kept com- 
pany with German students, though more addicted to study than 
we members of the fighting clubs. Although not having yet mas- 
tered the German language, he exercised a marked attraction by a 
conversation sparkling with wit, humor, and originality. In the 
autumn of 1833, having both of us migrated from Gottingen to 
Berlin for the prosecution of our studies, we became fellow-lodgers 
in the house No. 16 r Friedrich Strasse. There we lived in the 
closest intimacy, sharing our meals and out-door exercise. Motley 
by that time had arrived at talking German fluently ; he occupied 
himself not only in translating Goethe's poem 'Faust,' but tried 
his hand even in composing German verses. Enthusiastic admirer 
of Shakespeare, Byron, Goethe, he used to spice his conversation 
abundantly with quotations from these his favorite authors. A per- 
tinacious arguer, so much so that sometimes he watched my awaken- 
ing in order to continue a discussion on some topic of science, 
poetry, or practical life, cut short by the chimes of the small hours, 
he never lost his mild and amiable temper. Our faithful com- 
panion was Count Alexander Keyserling, a native of Courland, 
who has since achieved distinction as a botanist. ' ' * 

This is an invaluable letter, for it throws light on the 
deeper thought and feeling of Bismarck during his academic 
years. Motley would not have found pleasure in discuss- 
ing Shakespeare and Goethe with him, if Bismarck had not 
also been a man of ideas. They were evidently kindred 
spirits. 

Bismarck escaped his second incarceration by suddenly 
changing from the University of Gottingen to the one at 
Berlin, where he continued his study of law with Sarigny, the 
Ulpian of Germany. Sarigny's lectures on the Roman law, 
however, did not interest him. He cared little for the an- 
cients or their methods, and lived wholly in the present time. 
Although seemingly neglectful of his college duties, he never- 
theless accomplished a good deal of work, and in the spring 
of 1835 passed the rigid Prussian examination for admission 
to the bar, — an exceptional age, and a severe mental ordeal. 

1 Holmes's Life of Motley, p. iS. 
22 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

He seems to have disliked lectures, and preferred studying 
alone, with the occasional help of a tutor. 

BARRISTER AND SOLDIER 

Through the influence of his family Bismarck was imme- 
diately appointed an examiner in one of the intermediary 
courts of Berlin, where he found active employment during 
the year 1835-36 in taking the testimony of witnesses. Ac- 
cording to the practice of the civil law the evidence in court 
is not elicited by the counsel on either side, but by state 
examiners, and after they have finished, the counsellors are 
also permitted to make inquiries. This has the advantage 
over the common law of preventing witnesses from being 
brow-beaten and otherwise imposed on by unscrupulous 
lawyers who often entertain the jury at the witnesses' ex- 
pense; but in exceptional cases it has the disadvantage of 
allowing the government too great an influence over judicial 
proceedings. Bismarck distinguished himself in this new 
avocation by his pertinent and searching questions, and the 
slight impatience of his manner was ameliorated by an evi- 
dent personal interest in the witness. He here became ac- 
quainted with human nature as it appears in the substrata 
of society, which is sometimes hidden altogether from those 
who are fortunately born, and learned to know men and 
women as they really are at heart more clearly than he could 
have done in any other way. He was particularly impressed, 
as he afterwards related to Dr. Busch, by a woman who was 
required to sign a certain document, but absolutely refused 
to do so, although he, and the judge as well, tried all their 
powers of persuasion upon her. 

In the same year he was introduced at court, where his 
commanding figure and the strong stamp of his face attracted 
the attention of royalty itself. His future patron, William I., 
was then commander of an army corps, and it was thought 
that if he only had a chance to distinguish himself he would 
make a celebrated general. These two men, afterwards so 
indispensable to each other, met and parted without the least 
anticipation of their future relations. Prince William was 

23 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

devoted to the army, and Bismarck to the law ; but his expe- 
rience at court was excellent discipline for him, after the neg- 
ligent ease and freedom of German student life. Old Dr. 
Johnson said in regard to his interview with George III., " It 
does you good to talk with your king : one cannot become 
angry with the king." 

In 1836 Bismarck exchanged his Berlin office for the posi- 
tion of referendary at Aix-la-Chapelle, a government position 
which afforded him small pay, and work of even a smaller 
description ; but it was considered important that he should 
become acquainted with the government system of bureau- 
cracy and the details of its administration. It is likely that 
Frau von Bismarck had a hand in this, though she was now 
in failing health and lived in retirement for the most part at 
Schonhausen, for Aix was the resort of French, English, and 
Hollanders, with whom Otto might be expected to improve 
his knowledge of those languages. So, at least, it turned 
out, for we find him making English and French acquaint- 
ances there ; reading Hamlet and Richard III., — the last, per- 
haps, from a curiosity to learn what Shakespeare would make 
of such a hideous character. The close neighborhood of the 
Rhineland, which, with its old castles, romantic scenery, 
wines, and dreamy atmosphere, seem like an enchanted region 
to the inhabitants of prosaic Prussia, was an allurement that 
attracted Bismarck strongly. " How much time," he said 
afterwards, " I wasted in my youth, strolling, drinking, dan- 
cing, and flirting on the Rhine !" Unhappily he was obliged 
to pay for this youthful Elysium by an equal period of sad- 
ness and melancholy afterwards. It was a midsummer 
night's dream, in which folly and delusion were mingled with 
delight. It was from Aix that he made his first journey to 
England, and was cautioned, after landing in London on Sun- 
day morning, for whistling in the streets. The solemnity of 
the English Sabbath did not impress Bismarck favorably, but 
he noticed the great advantage which the country had de- 
rived by its exemption from the ravages of war. 

Hesekiel suggests that Bismarck did not leave Aix of his 
own free will, but whatever happened there could not have 

24 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

been very serious, for he still remained in the government's 
service. The following year (1838) we find him at Potsdam 
engaged as a referendary, and at the same time doing service 
as a private in the Jager (riflemen) battalion of the Royal 
Guard, which had formerly been Bliicher's guard also in the 
French campaigns. To see the Jager battalion drill at Pots- 
dam is a spectacle like the Strasburg clock. In 1839, how- 
ever, Bismarck removed again to Greifswald, where there was 
an agricultural academy, for the purpose of learning better 
how to manage the paternal estates, which he foresaw would 
soon require his personal attention. Here also he united the 
duties of a soldier with those of the civilian, thus completing 
his two years of service to the Prussian state. In this way 
he finished the circuit of his accomplishments, and might step 
forth now into the great world a complete and well-rounded 
man, illustrating the words of the poet, — 

" Who takes his hand from the ploughing, 
The kingdom is not for him. ' ' 

The great world, however, was still far enough off from 
Otto von Bismarck. His happy student life, the splendor of 
the Berlin court, and the festivities of the Rhineland were a 
dream of the past never to return. At Potsdam he again 
met his brother Bernhard, who had served four years in the 
dragoons and now also accepted office as a referendary ; and 
it was about this time that the two brothers discovered that 
the family exchequer was wellnigh empty. Their chess- 
playing mother had not proved a wise manager of the Bis- 
marck estates. It may have been good policy to spend lib- 
erally on her children during their years of education, but 
she was also given to agricultural experiments and expensive 
improvements which did not bring the return she expected. 
A visit to the Pomeranian properties of Kniephof and Jarche- 
lin satisfied Bernhard and Otto that the time had come for 
them to interfere. They accordingly went to their father and 
laid the case plainly before him. They persuaded him that 
the only way to relieve the financial embarrassment of the 
family was to make over the Pomeranian estates to his sons 

25 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

for good and all. This was acceded to, and Kiilz, which was 
quite equal to the two other properties, fell to Bernhard's 
share, while Otto received Kniephof and Jarchelin. Frau 
von Bismarck died in 1839, leaving her children well equipped 
for the race of life, but still near the foot of the ladder. Her 
husband followed her six years later, having lived to witness 
the revival of prosperity in the hands of his energetic sons. 

Bernhard von Bismarck was a man of ability, and would 
have given the family a national distinction if he had not been 
overshadowed by his more brilliant brother. He did well at 
Kiilz, and later in life became a member of the King's Privy 
Council. Otto now began work in earnest, and applied the 
knowledge he had learned at the agricultural college to till 
the soil of Pomerania in a practical manner. He was present 
in many places and feared in all. His expression as applied 
to ineffectual work, " Noch lange nicht genug" J has become a 
proverb in Germany. Gradually the condition of his two 
properties began to improve. Better crops were raised ; order 
and economy enforced ; small obligations liquidated. The 
condition of the tenants was also looked after. When Otto 
found that they were working on Sunday in order to make 
up for extra hours in his service, he ordered that they should 
till their own ground before they attended to his affairs, and 
he found himself the gainer by this arrangement in the good- 
will with which they afterwards worked for him. It was not, 
however, the life that Bismarck was intended for by destiny. 
The harness of his daily routine galled him as it might a 
Pegasus. The management of a farm requires as much 
thinking as the management of a railroad, but of a very dif- 
ferent kind. His mental activity had to find an outlet in 
some other direction. " If you plant an acorn in a flower- 
pot," says Goethe, " either the oak will die or the flower-pot 
will break." Neither were his prospects for the future encour- 
aging. He had left the government service, not in disgrace 
certainly, but without such official commendation as might 
encourage him to think of it again. Would he always have 



By no means sufficient.' 
26 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

to continue in his present mode of life ? Hesekiel says of his 
Kniephof days : 

"When Bismarck, at the age of twenty-three, in the most press- 
ing circumstances, without credit or capital, undertook the conduct 
of the wasted estates, he evinced prudence and activity, and, as 
long as bitter want pressed upon him, he found solace in agricult- 
ural activity ; but when, by his means, the estates began to rise in 
value, and everything went on smoothly, and he was able to rely 
upon able subordinates, the administration gave him less satisfac- 
tion, and he felt the circle in which he moved too contracted for 
him. In his youthful fancy he had formed a certain ideal of a 
country Junker ; hence he had no carriage, performed all his jour- 
neys on horseback, and astonished the neighborhood by riding 
twenty to thirty miles to evening assemblies in Polzin. Despite 
of his wild life and actions, he felt a continually increasing sense 
of loneliness, and the same Bismarck, who gave himself to jolly 
carousals among the officers of the neighboring garrisons, sank, 
when alone, into the bitterest and most desolate state of reflection. 
He suffered from that disgust of life common to the boldest officers 
at certain times, and which has been called 'first lieutenant's mel- 
ancholy.' The less real pleasure he had in his wild career, the 
madder it became ; and he earned himself a fearful reputation 
among the elder ladies and gentlemen, who predicted the moral 
and pecuniary ruin of ' Mad Bismarck.' " x 

This was Bismarck's Wertherian period, which developed 
itself according to the peculiarity of his nature. It has been 
more than hinted that he also had his Charlotte, not the wife 
of another man, but an unmarried woman, who did not appre- 
ciate him. He made one more visit to the Rhineland, and one 
only. The gay Fraulein, who admired him as a government 
official, with prospects of promotion, was not well pleased at 
the idea of burying herself in the country. Bismarck re- 
turned to Kniephof with his spirits at a very low ebb, not 
realizing that he had made a fortunate escape, and that he 
was yet to find a much better helpmate. To a nature so 
ardent and intense such an experience brings a strong reac- 
tion, — a disgust of life, an indifference to self, and a contempt 

1 Life of Bismarck, p. 109. 
27 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

for human nature. To the rejected admirer the world for a 
time seems upside-down, the sunshine a mockery, and happi- 
ness an illusion. Bismarck went to Paris, went to London, 
and thought of more distant journeys. He revelled with the 
officers of the neighboring garrison ; pistol-shots were heard 
in the night at Kniephof; nobody could predict what Bis- 
marck would do next. 

A man so full of energy, and with the wine of youth in his 
veins, has to let off steam in some manner or he will explode. 
We do not hear that Bismarck ever injured a human person, 
— except in his schlager-duelling, — and the tales about him 
were probably very much exaggerated after he became dis- 
tinguished. The faults of great men are ever looked at 
through a magnifying-glass. Certain it is that Otto von Bis- 
marck came out of this moral fermentation perfectly sound in 
mind and body, whereas a few years of genuine dissipation 
will commonly abbreviate a man's life before he is fifty. 

In the midst of it all he astonished the prophesiers of his 
future ruin by an act of heroism which has become historic. 
Going with his groom and others one morning to a neigh- 
boring horse-pond, the banks of which were somewhat pre- 
cipitous, the groom's horse stumbled and suddenly pitched 
its rider into deep water. Either the man could not swim or 
he lost his presence of mind, and was in evident danger of 
being drowned. Bismarck, alone among those present, went 
to his rescue. Tearing off his sword and coat, he plunged 
in, and, though at one time they both disappeared, and Bis- 
marck was in great peril from the convulsive struggles of the 
groom, he finally succeeded in bringing him to land. The 
on-lookers do not appear to have offered their assistance, 
though by forming a chain in the water it would seem as if 
they might have done so effectively. 

Bismarck, having learned the duties of a private soldier, 
applied for and obtained in 1842 the commission of a lieu- 
tenant in the Landwehr battalion stationed near Kniephof, 
and in 1843 he exchanged this position for a command in 
the Uhlans at Graiffenberg in Pomerania. His military duties 
were not so exacting but that he was able to continue the 

28 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

oversight of his estates. A Prussian nobleman considers a 
practical knowledge of military affairs as an essential part of 
his education, and in the evening of his life Bismarck ex- 
pressed his regret in a letter to the emperor that he had not 
made military science his profession instead of diplomacy. 
We are unable to trace, however, any decided inclination 
during his early years for the career of a soldier; though we 
cannot but think, with his rare presence of mind, decisiveness 
in action, and mental ingenuity, he would have become one 
of the famous captains of the century. Inclination shapes 
our lives quite as much as mental endowments, and in this 
field he would have encountered a rival of a genius quite 
equal to his own, while among diplomats he was facile prin- 
ceps. It is doubtful if the perpetual restraint of army life 
could have long been endured by a nature so impulsive, irre- 
pressible, and full of original designs. As it happened at 
Kniephof, Bismarck was repeatedly summoned before his com- 
manding officer, either for breach of discipline or neglect of 
duty, and this would have seriously interfered with his chances 
of promotion. With his powerful physique and immense vi- 
tality he was also endowed with a nervous system more sen- 
sitive than that of the average woman, and though his head 
was one of the coolest, this might have proved a disadvantage 
to him on the field of battle. 

Thus he continued farming, drilling, hunting, drinking, and 
reading for a number of years, — not a model life by any 
means, but an exceptional one, which somehow suited Otto 
von Bismarck, and proved more fruitful than many a model 
life has been ; though we could not advise our young friends 
to imitate it. In 1844 his sister Mai wine became betrothed 
to Oscar von Arnim, who had been his friend at the Friedrich 
Wilhelm Gymnasium and had remained so ever since. This 
was a great satisfaction to him, and his letter of congratula- 
tion to her has a playful affectionateness which suggests the 
coming of brighter days. His father died in 1845, leaving 
his estates equally divided between Bernhard and Otto, — 
an unusual practice, rendered still more so by his willing the 
ancestral residence of Schonhausen to his younger son. It 

29 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

may be surmised from this that he realized Otto's exceptional 
ability, and looked to him as the one who would give distinc- 
tion to the name of Bismarck. 

Some time in 1847 Otto von Bismarck became acquainted 
with the young lady who was to be his future wife. She 
belonged to the Prussian family of the Puttkamers, time- 
honored in the service of the state, and her given names were 
Johanna Frederica Charlotta Dorothea Elinore. 1 She was not 
beautiful, but what is much better, a pleasant, sensible person. 
From the first she seems to have appreciated him, which is 
also important in such cases. This is evident from the fact 
that Herr Ernst von Puttkamer did not understand Bismarck 
at all, and at first disapproved of the match. The wild life 
of the country squire may not have been so much of an 
objection as his unconventional behavior; but the man who 
was to conquer kingdoms was not to be defeated by a Putt- 
kamer. Only a woman who is true to her heart can see into 
the future. Fraulein Johanna knew her man and stood by 
him with creditable firmness. It was a love-match on both 
sides, — not a common occurrence where large properties are 
at stake, — and the parents were finally persuaded to give way. 
Bismarck was married to her on July 28, 1847. Their wed- 
ding journey included a visit to Switzerland and Northern 
Italy, and at Venice they accidentally met and were enter- 
tained by the King of Prussia, Frederick William IV. Ernst 
von Puttkamer and his wife never had occasion to regret the 
marriage of their daughter. 



1 These long personal appellations have a charm for the German nobility 
which others know not of. 



SO 



CHAPTER II 

THE REVOLUTION OF FORTY-EIGHT 

Great political convulsions produce men of equal magni- 
tude. Napoleon was the fearful offspring of the first French 
revolution ; Bismarck the colossal child of " forty-eight." 
Metternich foresaw and predicted the revolution of 1848, but 
hoped to defer it to a later time by a repression of all the 
tendencies which he thought might lead towards it ; but by 
this policy he only helped to precipitate it. 

While the first French revolution was confined to France 
and was a great success, the revolution of 1848, extending 
from Warsaw to Lisbon, proved a failure. In only one country 
at least did the seed which was sown by it come to be har- 
vested, and that country was Prussia. Everywhere else the 
reaction that followed upon it produced a condition of affairs 
less favorable to the development of liberal institutions than 
the conditions that preceded it. Yet the heroes who died for 
it under the walls of Rome, in the plains of Lombardy, and 
in the valley of the Danube did not fall wholly in vain. 

The revolution possessed a different character in different 
countries. In France, where it originated, there was less oc- 
casion for it than anywhere else. The government of Louis 
Philippe was mild and liberal. The position of the king dif- 
fered only from that of a president in the title and hereditary 
right. It was Thiers's history of the first empire and the 
lack of an aggressive foreign policy which upset the Orleans 
dynasty. The revolution was inaugurated by the socialists 
and taken advantage of by the Bonapartists. France is now 
substantially republican, but in 1848 republicanism was con- 
fined to Paris, Lyons, and Marseilles. The election of Louis 
Napoleon as president was an ominous event, which plainly 
foreshadowed the second empire. 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

In Italy there had been for centuries sufficient cause for 
revolution, and looked at broadly it was a hopeful sign that it 
should have succeeded, even for a single year. The tem- 
poral power of the pope was looked upon as a perpetual evil 
by Macchiavelli ; and if he thought so it certainly must have 
been. Yet we must give Pius IX. the credit of having been 
the first to inaugurate reforms, and the frivolous assassination 
of his nuncio was a commencement of bad augury for the 
revolution. Sardinia and Tuscany were well governed, and 
the people of those states expressed little desire for a change 
of form ; Naples was badly governed ; and the Austrian por- 
tion of Italy, after its quasi-independence under Napoleon, 
was continually fermenting under a rule which felt no interest 
in its welfare beyond the collection of taxes. 

In Austria proper the complaint arose from a bureaucracy 
of such long standing that the government machine had come 
wholly into the possession of a limited number of families, 
who provided for their relatives in comfortable offices of 
which the outside public could obtain no share. The pro- 
fessional and commercial classes suffered from a burden of 
feudatory privileges like those of France in the eighteenth 
century, though not to the same extent. The Hungarians, 
who had proved the shield of Austria in the Napoleonic wars, 
had been deliberately oppressed by Metternich, from a cow- 
ardly anticipation of what they might demand in return for 
this. They were governed almost entirely by Austrian 
officials, obliged to use the German language for all public 
business and forms of legal procedure, and could only obtain 
redress for their supposed grievances through the bureaucracy 
of Vienna, a dubious and wearisome method of procedure. 
What the people of Hungary wanted was to manage their 
own affairs ; but the revolution there commenced with a 
wanton act of cruelty also, which prejudiced the thinking 
world against it. 

The people of Prussia and the smaller German states 
wished for constitutional government and a fulfilment of the 
broken promises of 1813. Besides this, the desire for national 
unity, and the political theory which looked for a republican 

32 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

government as the most direct means of effecting this, stood 
ready to take advantage of any situation which might seem 
favorable for the attainment of its wishes. Everywhere in 
1848 there were three distinct revolutionary elements, — con- 
stitutional government, republicanism, and socialism. In 
France, however, Bonapartism was substituted for the first of 
these, and in all countries except Hungary the socialistic 
element preponderated over the republican. In Germany 
there was little true republicanism, for the reason that the 
class of people who form the solid material of republican in- 
stitutions — those who see their objects at shooting distance — 
perceived plainly that for the present a republic was imprac- 
ticable there. They accepted the socialists as allies for the 
time being, but they did not aim beyond a constitutional 
monarchy. 

It was socialism that handicapped the revolution in France, 
Italy, and Austria, and prevented its success. The struggle 
of 1848 had neither the grandeur nor the disinterestedness 
which gave a terrible momentum to the revolution of 1789. 
It was largely a warfare of class against class ; and, though 
this was justified to a certain extent, it was what evidently 
interfered, like a frost, to prevent its proper fruition. Otto von 
Bismarck would seem to have perceived this at the outset, 
and to have taken in the political situation at a glance. 

There is ample evidence of his always having been inter- 
ested in political affairs, — that he was a public-spirited man. 
His discussions with Motley may have been largely on this 
subject. The one was a democratic monarchist, and the ot;her 
an aristocratic republican. For that matter,' there are plenty 
of people in America who are less accessible than the Ger- 
man and English nobility. French and Italian noblemen are 
different, and much, of course, depends on the individual. 
Bismarck's military associates at Kniephof considered him 
much of a liberal. We find him, in 1846, soliciting Oscar 
von Arnim for his company to attend a meeting of the Society 
for the Improvement of the Working Classes at Potsdam. 
As early as 1843 Bismarck was a candidate for nomination as 
a delegate to the Provincial Diet of Pomerania which met at 
3 33 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

Stettin, but he does not appear to have desired this. Two 
years later he was elected, although Prussian politics at that 
time were more underground than on the surface of events. 

In 1846 he began to take hold in earnest. There was a 
rumor in the air that a great crisis was at hand. Everybody 
felt it, and, as usual at such times, there was a requisition for 
serious and determined men. The king had summoned a 
national assembly to meet in the White Chamber at Berlin in 
February, 1847, and Bismarck was active among the electors 
of his district, and made no secret of his desire to represent 
them. He would go, however, as a conservative candidate, 
pledged to support the throne above all ; and as for other 
matters, he would do what he considered for the best interest 
of the nation, without special regard to party lines. Bis- 
marck rode much about the country on his horse Caleb, in 
the autumn and winter of 1846, explaining his views on 
politics to all who were willing to listen. The electors were 
satisfied with his views, but did not select him for their dele- 
gate. He was chosen, however, as a substitute, when some- 
thing happened to prevent the regular delegate from attending 
at the White Chamber. What a chance this was ! 

There is no enemy equal to an imprudent and over-zealous 
friend. Bismarck's first German biographer, by introducing 
his own political opinions where he should have contented 
himself with an explanation of those of his hero, has pro- 
duced an impression of ultra conservatism on Bismarck's 
part, which has continued to the present time. He has suf- 
fered more in this manner than from all the hostile attacks of 
French and Austrian journalists. In his remarks on the 
revolution of 1848, Hesekiel shows himself a narrow and 
intolerant partisan of absolute monarchy, who, like Metter- 
nich, can see nothing in the demands of the Prussian people 
for a constitutional government, but the spirit of insubordina- 
tion and the lust of power. It is to be feared that he has 
done very slight justice to Bismarck's position in 1847, 
which was at first like that of a mediator between contending 
factions, repressing the extravagance of the revolutionary 
party, but ready to accept such propositions or changes in 

34 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

the existing political status as might be prudent, practical, 
and conservative. He was comparatively a young man among 
those about him in the Diet, but he appears already as 
the most clear-headed and resolute figure in the Prussian 
state. 

Otto von Bismarck was always superior to party. He rec- 
ognized political parties exactly for what they are worth, and 
his unvarying success has been due to this cause in a greater 
degree than to any other. He stood on the high ground of 
national patriotism, which is above all parties, and this has 
prevented his running into those extravagances by which 
political parties are shipwrecked. A political party may be pa- 
triotic, but it is always selfish, and, except on those rare occa- 
sions when a whole nation rises to its feet, it always represents 
the interests of a class. Bismarck was from 1867 till 1878 
the leader of the German National Liberals, which under his 
guidance remodelled Central Europe. His impartial attitude 
towards general politics cannot be better explained than by 
the following extract from a letter which he wrote in 1861 : 
" Nor do I see, moreover, why we should recoil so prudishly 
from the idea of popular representation, whether in the Diet or 
in any customs, or associative parliament. Surely we cannot 
combat an institution as revolutionary which is legally estab- 
lished in every German state, and which we Conservatives 
even would not wish to see abolished, even in Prussia. In 
national matters we have hitherto regarded every moderate 
concession as valuable. A thoroughly conservative national 
representation might be created and yet receive the gratitude 
of the Liberals." The true statesman is he who not only 
can see both sides of a question, but can weigh both sides in 
the balance, and decide where to apply his force when the 
time for action arrives. 

We hear of Bismarck as having belonged originally to the 
Junker Par tei in Prussia, but no explanation accompanies this 
statement which might help us to a conception as to how the 
Junker Partei is constituted, and what it desires to accom- 
plish. As a matter of fact there is no such political party, 
but the younger sons of noblemen form a class by themselves, 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

usually proud and indigent, whose only prospects in life are 
to be found through service in the army or civil positions 
under the government. That they should be the most con- 
servative of conservatives is, therefore, to be expected. Bis- 
marck was not a true Junker, though he was frequently called 
so in 1847, for his sufficient patrimony placed him above the 
necessity of seeking office as a means of livelihood. We all 
begin life, however, from the family stand-point, and it was 
inevitable that Bismarck should begin it as a conservative. 
Another young German of those days, a man of rare ability, 
was destined to take the opposite side, to be imprisoned, and 
as an exile in America to become one of the foremost states- 
men of the western hemisphere. If Bismarck had been born 
in the same position as Carl Schurz he might have taken a 
similar course, though, perhaps, not have gone quite so far; 
and if Schurz had been a Junker, he also might have sup- 
ported the government. Late in life they met together at 
Schonhausen and discussed old times with mutual respect 
and admiration. It was fortunate for Bismarck and for Ger- 
many that he took this course in 1848, for otherwise he could 
never have gained the confidence of the king, which was 
essential to his future success. 

THE DAYS OF MARCH 

Violent revolutions are bad, and to be avoided if possible. 
The loss of life and waste of property which they cause are 
not so much to be regretted as the disturbing effect which 
they have on public affairs, the unsettled state of public feeling 
which they produce, and the reaction which is sure to follow 
them. Sometimes, however, they are not to be avoided. The 
slow, gradual transformation of society which has been going 
on in Germany for the last hundred years is much more effect- 
ual, accomplishes its work with much less friction, and is 
more likely to be enduring than those spasmodic efforts at 
reform which meanwhile have taken place in France. 

To understand the position of Frederick William IV. and 
his advisers during the days of March it should be consid- 
ered that they were not only obliged to resist a pressure from 

36 ^ 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

within the capital, but a more distant and equally real pressure 
from without. Max Miiller speaks in sincere praise of Fred- 
erick William IV., whom he knew personally, but he was a 
man of too retiring a nature, too much given to literature and 
philosophy, to make a very effective king. He might have 
been more distinguished as a professor or in the pulpit. A 
timid deference to Metternich and the Tsar had become ha- 
bitual with him, yet he struggled somehow through the storm 
of 1848, and though he appeared at one time as the forcible 
repressor of the revolution, and afterwards as the leader of it, 
we need not, therefore, consider him inconsistent. The story 
of his being seen by Bismarck reading Shakespeare in the 
forest, with a stag watching him from behind, is one of the 
prettiest in all the annals of royalty. 

Bismarck soon found himself in a small minority in this 
assembly. The revolution of forty-eight was not inspired by 
the noble impulse for rational reform and philosophic govern- 
ment with which the revolution of 1789 began. Before 1789 
socialism had not been thought of. It was a development of 
the revolution, — as Madame de Stael said, an invasion of the 
barbarians, — owing to the general prostration of governmental 
power. In 1848 it was a deliberate and well-developed theory, 
and asserted itself, not in the spasmodic manner of the Reign 
of Terror, but with a persistent energy which made it much 
more dangerous. There can be no doubt of what a majority 
of the Prussian people wanted, and that was a parliamentary 
government like that of England, but the socialistic element 
was also strong. 1 The meetings of the Diet were occupied 
with long-winded harangues full of patriotic sentiments, but 
without much practical consideration of the application of 
means to ends. Bismarck soon discovered that the assembly 
was composed of such diverse and chaotic elements that no 
ultimate good could come from it, and that the only prudent 
course was to support the government without reservation. 



1 During the March revolution of 1848 a mob collected in front of the royal 
palace in Berlin, shouting the French war-cry, " Liberty, equality, and frater- 
nity," to which the king sent the reply, " Infantry, cavalry, and artillery." 

37 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

Nothing alarmed him so much as the tendency to socialism, 
for he knew, as every clear-sighted person must, that socialism 
could only end in anarchy and the utter ruin of civilization. 
The personal attacks on the royal family angered him, for 
though the ceremonial of court life was distasteful to him, 
and he had not as yet made acquaintance with Frederick 
William, he knew the royal family to be worthy people, and 
he resented these reflections upon their character as a man of 
spirit always will in such cases. The worst of democracy and 
popular elections is the advantage it gives to calumny as a 
political weapon, which is very effective among the illiterate, 
and always has less weight in proportion to a man's intelli- 
gence. 

Bismarck, though inexperienced in parliamentary debate, 
soon became the leader of defence. He was too rapid a 
thinker to be a very good speaker, and he never cultivated 
the graces of oratory, but his cool-headed and determined 
manner was not without its effect. He replied to the bursts 
of patriotic eloquence by a well-considered statement of the 
legal aspects of the question, which could not but have weight 
with those in the Diet of his own profession. The platform 
he stood on was rather a shaky one, but he made the most 
of it. It was no other than the divine right of kings, a plat- 
form which at that time might be considered on its last legs, 
and which now exists no longer. The divine right of kings 
seems absurd enough in America, but during the Middle 
Ages it formed a solid basis of political right, and answered 
much the same purpose that a national constitution does at 
present. It was, in fact, an unwritten covenant between a 
sovereign and his subjects, and was as much an obligation 
upon the former to do what was right, as it was for the latter 
to fulfil whatever their sovereign considered it best to do. 
This, of course, left a large margin to the personal interest or 
caprice of the prince; but its influence on such men as Saint 
Louis and Barbarossa cannot be questioned ; and without it 
there would have been nothing but temporary expediency 
and the right of the strongest. It was essentially a Ger- 
manic principle, and was more efficacious in Germany than 

33 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

in other countries. It was on account of the disregard of it 
in England that the Magna Charta was extorted from King 
John ; and in Italy, where it never obtained a foothold, the 
numerous crimes of small potentates may readily be accounted 
for by the insecurity of their position. It is not to be supposed 
that this moral covenant was strictly observed in Germany, 
but German mediaeval history has a much more humane and 
benevolent tone than that of England or France, and political 
executions were rare in it. 

Although the Prussian people in 1848 were mainly in the 
right, and Bismarck and the king mainly in the wrong, the 
position which Bismarck assumed had a sound legal basis. 
The divine right of kings was a right de facto, and would 
continue to be until either the king had retreated from that 
position or had been driven from it by a permanent revolu- 
tion. The constitutional agreement between the English Par- 
liament and William of Orange was brought forward in debate, 
and Bismarck replied, " The English people were then in a 
different position from that of the Prussian people at present ; 
a century of revolution and civil war had invested it with the 
right to dispose of a crown, and bind up with it conditions 
accepted by William of Orange." This was a valid argu- 
ment ; for as a new proprietary right can only be acquired by 
adverse possession for a prescribed length of time, so the loss 
of a similar right can only happen by a similar dispossession. 
The change in public opinion could no more effect it than 
public opinion in America could change the Constitution of 
the United States by a single election. 

The German people were inexperienced in parliamentary 
government, and their first attempts at it were awkward and 
ineffective, as might have been expected. The Diet at Berlin, 
after speechifying, discussing, and amending for about three 
months, wound up its proceedings with a series of demands 
and resolutions, some of which were needful and to the point, 
but others so impracticable that it is not to be wondered that 
Frederick William and his cabinet decided to reject them 
altogether. The work of the Diet was not good enough to 
pass muster, and was returned to be done over again, like an 

39 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

ill-constructed piece of furniture. The Prussian people would 
not believe this, and it caused great irritation, destined to re- 
sult the following year in the only revolt that has ever taken 
place against the Prussian government. 

After his return from his wedding journey, — and no pleas- 
anter excursion can be imagined, 1 — Bismarck settled down to 
matrimonial life at Schonhausen, where he could watch the 
events at Berlin from a closer stand-point than at Kniephof. 
There his eldest child, Mary Elizabeth Johanna, was born in 
August, 1848. He added the name of Schonhausen to the 
family appellation of Bismarck, though it has not become 
customary to use it except on official documents. That his 
early married life was happy and contented we learn from the 
letters to his wife when absent from her on public business, 
of which there was plenty in store for him. Marriage and an 
active profession was all that Bismarck needed to balance his 
natural forces. After this we hear nothing more of his mad 
frolics and other eccentric behavior, though he always con- 
tinued to be unconventional outside of court circles. Count 
Herbert was born at Berlin in December of 1849, and William 
Otto Albert at Frankfort in 1852. These were his only chil- 
dren. Frau Johanna von Bismarck became distinguished as 
an exemplary housekeeper and a skilful manager of her hus- 
band's estates during his long periods of absence. The hams 
she cured were supposed to be the best in Germany, though 
the name of Bismarck perhaps served as a spice to their 
flavor. 

Bismarck's utterances during the days of March, 1848, are no 
more to be seriously considered now than the profane exclama- 
tions of a shipmaster when his vessel has gone ashore in a fog. 
He remained mostly at Potsdam, in order to learn what events 
were taking place, and to serve the government if called on ; 
but no call came for him. It continues to be a disputed point 
to this day how the collision between the troops and the in- 
surgents took place in Berlin. The order to clear the streets 
was attributed to Prince William, afterwards Emperor Wil- 

1 Switzerland and Northern Italy. 
40 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

liam, who went to England in exile for some months in con- 
sequence, but this has been denied by a competent authority. 1 
The case was similar to the Boston massacre in 1774. It was 
necessary that a collision should occur, in order to disinfect 
the movement of its socialistic element and give the constitu- 
tional party untrammelled freedom of action. The troops re- 
mained masters of the streets, but not of the city, and, worn 
out with fatigue, were finally obliged to retire. The king 
dismissed his ministers and approved the organization of a 
citizen guard, chosen from the better and more reliable class, 
to preserve order in Berlin. It was an affecting spectacle, 
when the corpses of those who had been killed in the barri- 
cades were brought to the court-yard of the Schloss, and the 
king and queen surveyed them and bowed their heads before 
them. Three days later the victims of the revolution were 
buried in a common grave in the Friedrichshain, accompanied 
by a funeral procession of twenty thousand people, to which 
Frederick William paid his respects, decorated with the black, 
red, and gold of the revolutionists. Historians may call this 
weakness, vacillation, or whatever they please ; but it was the 
best policy he could have adopted, for it showed the people 
that, after all, they and the government were one. 2 A con- 
stitutional convention was appointed to meet on May 22. 

The behavior of this convention, to which Bismarck de- 
clined an election, was such as to justify the government in 
more rigorous measures. Knives were drawn on the more 
moderate and conservative delegates, in order to compel them 
to vote for the most extravagant resolutions. A large party 
urged a declaration of war against Austria, in order to assist 
their democratic brethren in Vienna, and the wrangling was 
so fierce, over questions like the annulling of patents of no- 
bility, that no progress could be made. 3 No enduring govern- 

1 Professor William Miiller, of Tubingen. 

2 It is only fair to state that Bismarck could never see this, and never became 
reconciled to the revolution. In his memoirs he attributes the conduct of 
Frederick William IV. to mental and physical frailty. If so, it was a fortu- 
nate frailty for Prussia. 

3 The presiding officer of this convention was one Herr Unruhe, or Mr. 
Unrest, a name singularly appropriate to the occasion. 

41 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

ment has yet been founded in such a manner, and it was not 
long before the saner portion of the convention became con- 
vinced of this. The storming of the city arsenal by a disor- 
derly mob created supporters of the monarchy by the ten 
thousand. The liberal ministry resigned, and was replaced 
by a more conservative one. The convention was prorogued 
to meet again in November at Brandenburg, and General 
Wrangel, a popular veteran of the War of Liberation, was 
summoned to Berlin with a strong force to preserve order, 
for which the citizen police had been found ineffectual. 
Meanwhile Bismarck was busy in his own way, — on the 
street, in the gallery of the convention, in the palace, watch- 
ing events and writing his opinion of them for the news- 
papers, especially the Kreaz Zeituitg, like a common reporter. 
As his letters were unsigned, they can only now be guessed 
at from the vigor and decisiveness of their style, but it is fair 
to presume that they exercised a decided influence on the 
public mind. The adjourned convention met on November 
27, but, as a majority of the members absented themselves, 
no business could be transacted. A few days later a sufficient 
number of socialists and republicans appeared to constitute a 
quorum ; but after entering a protest against the transference 
from Berlin, where they could be supported by the mob, they 
disappeared again, and the convention adjourned sine die. As 
the popular assembly had failed to bring forth the constitu- 
tion, Frederick William now proposed one drawn up by his 
own ministers. 

The revolution was successful and went just far enough, a 
creditable fact for all parties concerned. Nothing more was 
heard of the French war-cry, — liberty, equality, and frater- 
nity. Frederick William granted the Prussian people a much 
more liberal constitution than the Magna Charta which was 
extorted from King John. Its fundamental principles, how- 
ever, were the same : the right to levy taxes and to enlist 
soldiers was vested in an assembly called the Landtag, elected 
by the people ; but the king retained an absolute veto on 
all changes of the laws or of the constitution. An upper 
chamber of notables, similar to the House of Lords, was to 

42 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

reconsider the action of the Landtag in certain cases, pass 
judgment on constitutional changes, and legislate on all mat- 
ters appertaining to the nobility. This, certainly, was not a 
very liberal constitution, for it provided no means for con- 
trolling the executive action ; but the difference between an 
absolute veto and a two-thirds majority is not so very great ; 
for where public opinion is nearly unanimous it will generally 
accomplish its object, even in an old-fashioned monarchy. 
If the Prussian army had fraternized with the insurgents in 
1848 as the French army did in 1792, the Hohenzollern 
dynasty would have come to an end, at least for a term of 
years. 

Much more important than the Prussian fiasco was the 
national convention which assembled at Frankfort, to consider 
measures for the establishment of German unity. In this 
assembly were gathered the most notable men in Germany, 
outside of the royal families, and some of them more distin- 
guished than any monarchs of their time. Simson, the jurist, 
afterwards president of the North German Reichstag, was 
one of its prominent members. There were poets, philoso- 
phers, lawyers, and historians. A more dignified assemblage 
could not be imagined, and yet all its labors came to naught, 
as Bismarck predicted, because they were not supported by 
any material force. It was a convention on paper, and carried 
no more authority with it than an unsigned writ of habeas 
corpus. 

They were too high-minded for the people, and too far re- 
moved from practical affairs for the princes. It was an omi- 
nous mistake that they should have selected for president 
Henry Gagern, frequently called Jupiter Gagern from his im- 
posing figure, grandiose features, and thundering voice; the 
most popular orator in Germany, but whose speeches were 
not of such material as would convince an audience like the 
Roman Senate. Bismarck, in his slashing way, called Gagern 
" the watering-pot of phrases." 

The Frankfort Convention spent over a year on its work, 
and elaborated a constitution much after the pattern of the 
unwritten constitution by which England is now governed. 

43 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

It was to have an all-powerful national assembly, a chamber 
of princes for the sake of appearances, and an emperor at the 
head who would possess as little authority as Queen Victoria, 
Frederick William IV. was offered the honor of this precari- 
ous position, and a deputation of members, including Gagern 
and Simson, went to Berlin to confer with His Majesty. All 
Germany was breathless with interest while the King of 
Prussia and his ministers consulted on its acceptation ; and 
great was the disappointment when the offer of the convention 
was rejected. Frederick William, however, could do nothing 
less ; for its acceptance would have placed him in antagonism 
not only to the smaller princes of Germany, but to the Em- 
peror of Austria, and would inevitably have involved him in an 
unequal conflict, where he would have had to depend on his 
own resources, without any assistance from the wise men of the 
Frankfort Convention. In fact, it was much to be feared that at 
the first sound of the bugle they would disappear like foxes in 
their holes. A marked majority of the new Prussian assembly 
passed a resolution recommending the king to accept the 
imperial crown, but he declared that it would only make him 
the servant of the revolution. Bismarck, who had been 
chosen a member of the first Prussian Landtag, made a 
speech on the occasion, in which he objected to the imperial 
title on legal grounds. The Frankfort Convention, he said, 
proposes that the king should surrender the crown which he 
had inherited from his ancestors, and receive in place of it 
one which bore the stamp of popular sovereignty, and which 
he would hold merely in fief from the people of Germany, 
who might afterwards revoke the gift whenever they thought 
fit. The Frankfort crown seemed to him too much like a 
tinsel affair, and he could not advise the acceptance of so 
dubious a present. 

The revolution in Germany did not find such able leaders 
as Mirabeau and Danton. Simson and Gagern were talkers 
and thinkers, not men of action, and the German people are 
slow to turn aside from their daily mill-round. Yet the fine 
oratory at Frankfort was not without its influence on the 
time. It served like a breeze to waft the destiny of the Ger- 

44 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

man people on its appointed course. A fresh impulse had 
been given to the aspiration for national unity, and Bismarck 
may have noticed that the proposition brought before the 
convention which caused the most animated discussion was 
whether the Austrian empire should be included as a whole 
in United Germany, or only the two German provinces of it. 
The Austrian delegates declared that either their empire must 
be accepted in its completeness or excluded altogether. Here 
was a problem for any future statesman who hoped to accom- 
plish national unity to reflect on. 

Bismarck relates an amusing interview which he had with 
Jupiter Gagern on behalf of Frederick William IV. in order 
to effect some kind of a bargain or compromise with the 
party or group of which Gagern was the leader. General 
Manteuffel, who was then in the ministry, brought the two 
together and then left them to fight it out. Bismarck says, 
" As soon as Manteuffel was gone, I commenced to talk on 
politics, and explained my whole position in a very sober and 
business-like way. You should have heard Gagern. He put 
on his Jupiter face, lifted his eyebrows, bristled up his hair, 
rolled his eyes about, fixed them on the ceiling till they all 
but cracked the plaster, and talked at me with his big phrases 
as if I had been a public meeting. Of course, that got noth- 
ing out of me. I answered him quite coolly, and we remained 
as far apart as ever." When Bismarck told this story x he 
could not remember whether it was in 1850 or 185 1, so that 
it is impossible to place it exactly in the events of that time ; 
but it contradicts those biographers who assert Bismarck's 
ultra conservatism during the revolutionary period, for in that 
case the king would not have employed him as a mediator 
with the opposition. The anecdote also discloses Gagern's 
lack of practical sense in dealing with men. 

In the winter of 1849-50 Bismarck went to live in Berlin, 
and occupied the first story on Dorotheen Strasse, No. 37, 
and there his son Herbert was born in December, and the 
boy was christened in February by a Lutheran pastor in the 

1 November 18, 1870. Cf. Busch. 
45 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

orthodox Prussian manner. Bismarck's letter to his sister, 
Frau von Arnim, and others this year are more filled with 
domestic affairs than the politics which seemed to absorb him. 
His political work was disinterested enough in one sense, for 
he received no remuneration for it, and the income from his 
estates only enabled him to live in a very modest way with 
two establishments, one at Schonhausen and the other at 
Berlin. His parliamentary duties were but a small portion of 
his daily business, and his chief entertainment was an even- 
ing hour in a beer-saloon, where a number of Conservatives 
were in the habit of congregating. 

It was at another establishment of the kind that Bismarck 
committed the only act of violence for which he is held 
responsible. A saucy Radical, or Socialist, came into the 
beer-garden evidently for the purpose of bucking the tiger. 
He soon commenced to talk politics, and indulged in some 
very offensive expressions in regard to the royal family. 
Thereupon Bismarck informed him that if he did not leave 
the room he would break a beer-glass over his head, and as 
the man continued obdurate he kept his word. The Radical 
was not seriously injured, and appears to have received small 
sympathy from the by-standers, but it is barely possible that 
such a blow might prove fatal. 

There is no phase of this many-sided revolution so diffi- 
cult to understand as the Convention of Erfurt. The impe- 
rial offer of the Frankfort delegates had in no wise been solic- 
ited by the King of Prussia, and yet the act was considered 
by foreign courts, especially Austria, as a dangerous prece- 
dent for which he was directly responsible. Prince Schwar- 
zenberg, who had succeeded to Metternich's policy, and was 
himself an inferior kind of Metternich, informed the smaller 
German governments that the exclusion of Austria from 
German affairs was a subject not to be considered, and that 
the Frankfort Diet must be restored under Austrian suprem- 
acy. This was a diplomatic attack on Prussia, and Frederick 
William attempted to offset it by establishing a league of 
German princes in which Prussia would become the military 
and diplomatic leader. The kings of Saxony and Hanover 

46 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

supported this plan, but Bavaria held aloof from it. A con- 
vention of delegates was convened at Erfurt to consider the 
subject. Bismarck was present, and his keener intelligence 
foresaw that the result of the movement would be to place 
Prussia, though really at the head of the confederation, in a 
position subordinate to the votes of princes, like the Elector 
of Cassel and the Grand Duke of Baden. It was now that 
he showed himself the true statesman. Though a conserva- 
tive delegate, he was expected to support the project, but he 
turned against it and expressed his opposition plainly and 
boldly. The leadership of Prussia in such a confederation 
would not be a real leadership, but one so fettered as to make 
the direction of its affairs intolerable. His first principle was 
that the independence and integrity of the Prussian monarchy 
must be maintained. If such a confederation of princes could 
be established it would possess no enduring vitality. German 
nationality must be achieved in some other manner. 

In fact the Erfurt Convention and the Frankfort Conven- 
tion would seem to have been supplements of each other, 
the one representing the wishes of the people, and the other 
constituted under popular influence by a number of isolated 
governments. Each was a fraction by itself, and only by the 
union of the two could German nationality be accomplished. 
The adoption of either plan would have placed the Prussian 
government at the mercy of an uncertain influence, and could 
only have resulted in Prussia breaking through the legislative 
net-work by a sudden revolution to its former position. Bis- 
marck was rejoiced when the intervention of Austria over- 
turned the Erfurt Constitution. Prince Schwarzenberg pro- 
claimed the restoration of the Frankfort Diet, and invited 
all the German powers to send delegates to a meeting there 
on the 1st of September. Frederick William IV. and Count 
Brandenburg refused to do this, and issued a circular pro- 
testing against the re-establishment of the Diet. The Em- 
peror of Austria accordingly threatened the withdrawal of 
diplomatic relations, and was supported in this by the King 
of Bavaria. For a short time German affairs assumed a war- 
like appearance, but the questions at stake were too ephem- 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

eral to carry either government to such an extreme. Both 
sides appealed to the Tsar Nicholas, who decided in favor of 
the old Frankfort Diet, but without granting any special favor 
therein to Austria. Thus the revolution in Germany sud- 
denly came to an end. The Erfurt Convention had at least 
served like a bogus railroad to prevent an Austrian hegemony, 
and Bismarck gained in prestige what he may have lost in 
favor with the Prussian Ministry. 

The polity of the Roman Republic, the best government of 
ancient times, was worked out through a protracted struggle 
between patricians and plebeians. So the present constitu- 
tional government of Prussia, and of all Germany, resulted 
from the obstinate struggle between the king and the people 
in 1848. It will be observed that of all the European revolu- 
tions at that time this was the only one which was not carried 
too far, and was the only one which bore good fruit. The 
Parisians, who expelled Louis Philippe with so much ease, 
were soon obliged to accept a military government in his 
place. The Athenian democracy, which Mazzini and Gari- 
baldi established in Rome, was suppressed by a French army, 
and Pius IX. returned to establish a Roman despotism for 
twenty years longer. The King of Sardinia's support of the 
revolt in Lombardy cost him his crown, and the Hungarian 
revolution was suppressed with a severity which left that 
unfortunate country little to hope for in the future. Prussia, 
however, had made a distinct step in advance; and yet it was 
a step on a dangerous path. As the Berlin papers said, she 
" was on the constitutional," and so much the better for her 
good health and internal condition ; but she was surrounded 
by jealous rivals, who viewed this change in her form of gov- 
ernment with slightly disguised hostility, and were eager to 
find a pretext for interference in Prussian affairs so as to pro- 
duce a counter-revolution, and a return to the previous politi- 
cal condition. 



48 



CHAPTER III 

FRANKFORT AND ST. PETERSBURG. 

Fortunate are the people who are strong and numerous 
enough to establish national unity. Without this there can 
be no lasting independence, and without independence no supe- 
rior national development. The world is becoming crowded ; 
nations press against one another, and their population in- 
creases so that it everywhere is straining to find an outlet. 
Those that are not strong enough to maintain themselves in this 
continual struggle become absorbed by others, and disappear 
as independent communities. At the same time the spirit of 
nationality has never been so daring and self-assertive, so that 
every small branch of the Aryan family is ambitious to attain 
it, These are the centrifugal and centripetal forces of Europe. 

The numerous French invasions of Germany from the time 
of Louis XIV. to that of Napoleon I. had sufficiently devel- 
oped the need of a closer consolidation of the German states 
and national interests. Austria, lying most remote from 
France, was the only German community sufficiently powerful 
to offer a substantial resistance to the ambition of French 
rulers ; and the interest of the Austrian government in prov- 
inces situated on the Rhine was wholly a philanthropic one, 
an element which cannot safely be counted for much in inter- 
national affairs. Though the aggrandizement of France was 
always something of a menace to the Austrian empire, this 
would not become serious so long as the French confined 
themselves to the left bank of the Rhine. 1 Frederick the 
Great formed a league with the Protestant German states for 
their better protection against both France and Austria, but 

1 It is only fair to say in justice to the French that, as the Rhine was the an- 
cient boundary of Gaul, they have always felt that they had an immemorial right 
to it, though such a right could not be considered legal or international. 
4 49 



this was broken up by the first French revolution. So Alex- 
ander Hamilton made use of the history and condition of 
Germany as one of his strongest arguments in favor of our 
national government. He says in the Federalist, No. 19: 
" The history of Germany is a history of foreign intrusions j 
and foreign intrigues ; of requisitions of men and money dis- 
regarded or partially abortive, or attended with slaughter and 
desolation, involving the innocent with the guilty; of general 
imbecility, confusion, and misery." Again, in No. 22, he 
says: "German empire is in continual trammels from the 
multiplicity of the duties which the several princes and states 
exact upon the merchandises passing through their territories, 
by means of which the fine streams and navigable rivers with 
which Germany is so happily watered are rendered useless." 
This condition continued, with some amelioration, during the 
nineteenth century, until it was brought to a close by Bis- 
marck's new German empire in 1871. So long as the Holy 
Alliance endured there was no danger to Germany from for- 
eign invasion, but the Diet established at Frankfort for the 
regulation of customs duties and the settlements of differences 
between German states could accomplish little, for the simple 
reason that it possessed no material means with which to 
enforce its decisions. The conflicting interests of so many 
small commonwealths were not easily reconciled, and the pro- 
ceedings of the Diet were characterized by interminable dis- 
cussions and a " masterly inactivity." This much may be 
said, however, in favor of Metternich, that he honestly desired 
to maintain peace in Europe, and that his policy towards other 
governments was always conciliatory. So long as he guided 
the power of Austria the King of Prussia could depend on 
friendly consideration, but after 1848 there was a change in 
the attitude of Austria which was felt both by the represent- 
atives in the Diet and by the Prussian ambassador at Vienna. 
The causes of this were twofold. 

In the first place, Austria had emerged from the revolution 
with victorious banners. Hungary and Lombardy had been 
placed under military government, and the concessions wrung 
from the emperor by the Vienna mob were easily cancelled by 

50 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

his abdication and the inauguration of his son, Francis Joseph, 
who was too young to resist the tide of reaction even if he 
desired to. The adoption of a constitution in Prussia was 
looked upon in Vienna and St. Petersburg as a confession of 
weakness, and at the same time produced a feeling of estrange- 
ment like that which results from a change of political parties. 
The sudden rise of Louis Napoleon was considered an ephem- 
eral event, and henceforth Austria and Russia were to deter- 
mine the destinies of Europe. 

Near the close of his life Talleyrand pointed out that there 
was a strong tendency to a closer political organization in 
Germany, which either Austria or Prussia would be likely to 
take advantage of, and which might prove detrimental to the 
interests of France. Hegel, a South German, born in Stutt- 
gart, but who in middle life was called to the University 
of Berlin, preached the doctrine of national unity boldly and 
vigorously from 1820 to 1830. He found many proselytes 
and successors among philosophers and historians, and the 
professorial class exercise an influence on public opinion 
in Germany like that of the newspapers in England and 
America. Such instruction could not fail to have its effect on 
a people intellectually vibrating with the music of Beethoven 
and the poetry of Goethe and Schiller. One of the peculiar 
phenomena of the revolution was a national assembly of three 
hundred and twenty delegates, chosen by popular suffrage 
independently of the governments of the German states, 
which met at Frankfort with deliberate intention of replacing 
the old German Diet and inaugurating a new German em- 
pire. The high-minded and patriotic men who composed this 
organization evidently did not take into account that their 
deliberations could have no actual value without the support 
of a military force, and when they finally offered the imperial 
crown to Frederick William of Prussia, disregarding the 
Austrian government, which at the time had its hands full 
with the Hungarian rebellion, the honor was unhesitatingly 
rejected. Only men experienced in public affairs know how 
dangerous it would have been for the King of Prussia to have 
accepted a title which would not only have brought him into 

51 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

direct conflict with the Emperor of Austria, but with most of 
the smaller German princes. The king and his ministers per- 
ceived plainly enough that such a result could only be reached 
through a European convulsion. The event, however, had a 
significance which cast a long shadow into the future. It was 
the handwriting on the wall, which served to warn the duo- 
decimo monarchs of Germany, as well as the Emperor of 
Austria, of a danger to their absolutism which they might 
some day be obliged to encounter, and the method they 
adopted to strangle this baby Hercules was an instance of 
that short-sighted political narrowness which often brings to 
pass the very result which it desires to prevent. Nothing 
could be further from the unambitious mind of Frederick 
William IV. than to assert a superiority over the kings of 
Saxony, Bavaria, and Hanover, but this did not prevent him 
from becoming none the less an object of suspicion to them. 

The Frankfort Diet resumed its sessions on May 30, 185 1. 
General von Rochow was the Prussian delegate, and Bis- 
marck accompanied him in the position of secretary, — much 
the same as a secretary of legation. In the course of the first 
year, however, von Rochow resigned, weary, perhaps, of the 
dulness and monotony of the Diet, and recommended Bis- 
marck for his successor. The king readily acted on this sug- 
gestion, for it had come to be rumored in Berlin that there 
was no better man for any kind of business. The position, 
which in the hands of another might have been little more 
than an empty form, was soon infused by Bismarck with all 
the character of his sturdy nature and penetrating intelli- 
gence. 

Bismarck seems to have found from the first a hostile atti- 
tude in the Diet towards Prussia, and it is more remarkable 
that this was quite undisguised. The mythical story that he 
asked the Austrian delegate for a light for his cigar at a 
meeting of the Diet has been reduced by Bismarck's own 
statement (and that of his biographer) to a private interview, 
in which the Austrian delegate received him smoking, and 
offered him neither cigar nor chair. Bismarck took a cigar 
out of his own pocket, asked the other for a light, and made 

52 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

himself comfortable. After that, however, the conference 
could come to nothing; the slight almost amounted to a 
direct insult, and the campaign of 1866 may be said to have 
originated at that moment.^ Subsequently Bismarck was so 
roughly treated by the Austrian delegate, that he challenged 
him to fight. This policy was steadily maintained by the 
Austrian court for the following sixteen years. 

The leaders of this new movement of the Austrian cabinet 
were Prince Schwarzenberg and Count Buol Schauenstein. A 
more shallow, empirical policy than theirs could not easily be 
imagined, and in the result it brought Austria to the verge of 
ruin. Among other motives, they would seem to have been 
actuated by personal ambition and a vainglorious spirit. It 
was not difficult for them to find allies among the German 
states. Saxony had been deprived of half its territory by 
Prussia, in return for the French alliance of 18 13. Hanover 
and Nassau were under English influences, and England had 
been the ally of Austria for more than two centuries. Bavaria 
was Catholic, and was inclined towards Austria on the score 
of religion. By means, of a majority vote these states hoped 
to discipline Prussia, and control the Diet wholly in their 
own interest. 

It is a shrewd statement that, no matter how autocratic a 
monarch may be in theory, he is practically surrounded by 
barriers which it requires a strong man to overleap. 1 The 
youthful Francis Joseph could hardly have been expected to 
overleap the barriers with which this court party surrounded 
him, and as he grew older he evidently lacked either the 
ability or the will to do so. The first important consequence 
of this policy was the Italian campaign of 1858. Count 
Cavour was not a statesman to be blind to what was eoine 
on around him, and the isolated position which the Austrian 
cabinet thus made for itself served as a tempting bait to the 
ambition of Napoleon III. Austria might control the Diet 
at Frankfort, and regulate the customs duties in a way un- 
favorable to Prussian industry, but Lombardy was lost in con- 

1 E. J. Lowell, in The Eve of the French Revolution. 
53 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

sequence. The French emperor would not have dared to 
attack a united Germany, for he could not have done so 
with any prospect of success. 

Bismarck's attitude at the Diet was firm and dignified, but 
appears to have been conciliatory. At least his letters have 
this tone, and he could not otherwise have served the gentle- 
spirited Frederick William, who shrank from anything like a 
collision. Nevertheless, there was always the same compact 
majority against everything that Prussia wanted, as Bismarck 
said himself during the campaign of 1870. 1 He went on a 
special embassy to Vienna in 1852, and had a personal con- 
ference with Schwarzenberg and Francis Joseph himself, but 
he was met there with the same overbearing spirit as at Frank- 
fort. They thought they were masters of the situation, and 
intended to make the most of it. He wrote to his wife from 
Vienna : 

" In business, however, there prevails great nonchalance ; either 
people don't want to arrange with us, or they think we look upon 
it as more important than appears to them. I fear that the oppor- 
tunity of coming to an understanding is gone, which will prove a 
bad result for us ; for it was thought that a very great step towards 
reconciliation was taken in sending me, and they will not soon send 
another here as desirous of coming to an understanding, and who 
at the time can deal so freely." 

The same sentiments were expressed in a report from Count 
Bernsdorf, the Prussian ambassador, to the king, from Vienna, 
on the nth of February, 185 1 : 

" According to Schwarzenberg' s plan, no notice is to be taken of 
any objection from the minor states. Prussia is to assist in this, — 
that is, to drop her allies, and with her own hand help form a Direc- 
tory in which she would always be in the minority, and which 

1 The Saxon-Austrian premier, Von Beust, says in his Memoirs (i. 313), "I do 
not deny if my appointment had been made previous to 1S66, I could have been 
more useful, especially in regard to German affairs. I am sure that I would 
have succeeded in preserving Austria 1 s dominant position, and in averting dis- 
asters like those of 1 866." This innocent confession from one of Bismarck's 
chief opponents is the best vindication of Bismarck's policy. 

54 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

would be of great advantage to her bitterest enemies. Russia is 
expected to support Austria. The two powers, which a short time 
ago were ready to fight Prussia on account of violation of the treaties 
of 1 815, now urge a reckless abolition of those treaties. If the ques- 
tion concerned the transferrence of the executive into the hands of 
the two great powers alone, this would be a progressive step for the 
attainment of which it would be worth while making considerable 
sacrifice. But rather than establish a many-handed Directory, in 
which Austria would not share the power with Prussia, but with the 
lesser states, it would be decidedly better for Prussia to return to 
the old Confederate Diet." * 

The despatches of a foreign ambassador are intended to 
convey the exact truth, for otherwise they would be of no 
value to his government. In Bismarck's circular note to the 
German courts of January 24, 1863, he said: 

"Before 1848 it had been unheard of that questions of any mag- 
nitude should have been introduced in the confederation without 
the concurrence of the two great powers previously being secured. 
Even in cases where the opposition had come from the less power- 
ful states, as in the matter of the South Germany fortresses, it had 
been preferred to allow objects of such importance and urgency to 
remain unfulfilled for years rather than seek to overcome opposition 
by means of a majority. At the present day, however, the opposition 
of Prussia, not only to a proposal in itself, but in reference to its 
unconstitutionality, is treated as an incident undeserving of notice, by 
which no one is to be restrained from pursuing a deliberately 
chosen course to any extent whatever." 

This is a memorable document. Nothing could be clearer 
or more explicit as a description of the political situation. 
Voting seems like peaceful and harmless business ; but when 
it takes place on certain definite lines, and continues so year 
after year, the minority will always resort to arms if they can 
do so with the probability of success. The condition of 
affairs was the more galling to Prussian patriotism because 
the Austrians had never been found a match for the Prus- 
sians on the field of battle ; and though the Austrian empire 

1 Von Sybel's German Empire, ii. 101. 
55 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

held a much greater population than Prussia, the German 
portion of Austria was not much larger than Bavaria. Bis- 
marck attempted a reconstruction of the Diet, by which dele- 
gates would be chosen pro rata instead of according to the 
system then in vogue. This would have placed Prussia in a 
more advantageous position, and the absurdity of so large a 
kingdom being offset by the vote of Saxony or Baden must 
have been apparent to every one. Bismarck probably did not 
expect his plan to succeed. Too much stress cannot be laid 
on the point that previous to 1848 no proposition was intro- 
duced into the Diet by either of the great powers without a 
previous consultation with the other. In this way their con- 
flicting interests were harmonized before the smaller German 
states could have a chance to pass judgment upon them. 

How dangerous was the path that constitutional Prussia 
was likely to tread we may judge from the outcome of the 
Hessian revolution of September, 1850. The house of Cas- 
sell had been a pestilent disgrace to Germany for nearly a 
hundred years. The Elector of Hesse, who sold the lives of 
his subjects to the British government during our War of 
Independence, is reported to have had over a hundred ille- 
gitimate children. 1 Napoleon abolished the state entirely, but 
after his downfall the electoral family was restored to its rights 
and properties by the Congress of Vienna. When the re- 
action came, in 1849, the reigning Elector of Cassell formed an 
ultra-conservative ministry, with a Count Hassenpflug at the 
head of it, a man formerly prosecuted for forgery, and univer- 
sally mistrusted by the Hessians. He immediately proceeded 
to such arbitrary actions that the people arose in wrath against 
him and expelled him from the state. King Frederick Wil- 
liam, not liking such an unprincipled neighbor, and, perhaps, 
also actuated by a sense of right and justice, supported the 
Hessian people, and expressed a wish to have the Elector 
form such a ministry as would be acceptable to his subjects. 
Schwarzenberg, however, insisted that the Elector should be 
supported, right or wrong, and that Hassenpflug should be 

1 See E. J. Lowell's account of him in The Hessians in America. 

56 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

restored to power. Prussian and Austrian troops were mobil- 
ized, and for a few weeks war seemed imminent. The result 
could hardly have been unfavorable to Prussia, but Fred- 
erick William's courage could not be brought to the sticking 
point. In a moment of weakness he accepted the mediation 
of the Tsar Nicholas, and a conference was held at Warsaw. 
Contrary to the whole course of Russian diplomacy, Nicholas, 
instead of conciliating the Prussian government by a com- 
promise, threw his whole power into the Austrian scales. 
Hassenpflug was recalled ; the unfortunate Hessians were 
saddled with Austrian troops after the Metternich method, 
and obliged to endure such humiliation that many of them 
emigrated to Prussia. Schwarzenberg had played with loaded 
dice; there was evidently a bargain between Nicholas and 
himself; and it seems incredible now that an Austrian chan- 
cellor should have deliberately consented to the aggrandize- 
ment of Russia at the mouth of the Danube. Nicholas 
already had the invasion of Turkey in his plans, and the Cas- 
sell affair was one of the steps which led ultimately to his 
own humiliation. 

The liberation of Schleswig and Holstein had been fairly 
accomplished by their own troops and the Tenth Prussian 
Army Corps, but the intervention of Russia and Great Britain 
brought it to an untimely end. Great Britain might have 
some reason to fear the aggrandizement of Prussia in this in- 
stance, but the interest of the Tsar could not possibly coin- 
cide with this, and his course would seem to have been insti- 
gated by hostility to constitutional government. Schleswig 
and Holstein had never been placed on an equal footing with 
the other provinces of Denmark, but rather governed after 
the manner of conquered territory. They seem now to have 
been subjected to a more shameful treatment than the Hes- 
sians. The historian, Wilhelm Miiller, says : " No land in all 
Europe was abused and trodden under foot with such cynical 
brutality as Schleswig, and every German with a spark of 
honor in him, while cursing a diplomacy which in the nine- 
teenth century still treated the people like cattle, and exe- 
crating a system of government which could dispose in 

57 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

that wholesale way of so many German souls, blushed for 
shame and rage when he heard the name of Schleswig- 
Holstein." 

" Individuals," says Froude, " have suffered by millions in 
this world, but the community which permits the injustice to 
be perpetrated is finally obliged to atone for it to the last 
drop of blood that has been shed." So it is with nations. 
The brutal oppression of the Hessians and of the people 
of Schleswig-Holstein met with a more speedy atonement 
than has often happened in such instances, and resulted 
in a European convulsion which extended from Paris to 
Constantinople. 

Such were the subjects which Bismarck had to reflect on 
during the monotonous sittings of the Diet at Frankfort. 
What conclusions he formed on them can only be judged by 
his subsequent course. His position required him to keep a 
close watch on his tongue and pen ; but his letters at this 
time breathe a spirit of calm confidence which show that his 
faith in the future of Germany, and especially of Prussia, had 
the character almost of a religious belief. The greatest actors 
in the world's history have always been strong believers, and 
Bismarck's assertion during the campaign of 1870 has been 
recorded by Dr. Busch, that but for his faith in God and im- 
mortality he could not have remained at his post a single 
day ; but he added, " I live in an age of unbelievers." His 
post of duty had not yet become a dangerous one, nor had 
the cares of his position begun to worry him, and we find in 
his letters from Frankfort plenty of calm, healthful enjoyment, 
especially enjoyment of nature. His ardent love of nature is 
much in Bismarck's favor. As Emerson says, the sighing of 
the pine-tree has a meaning which only the pure can under- 
stand. Bismarck always preferred a ramble in the woods to 
an evening at the opera. He was fond of solitary excursions, 
as many a great man has been before him. He went alone to 
Riidesheim on the Rhine, to spend the night and swim in 
the great river. As the evening was warm (August, 1 85 1), he 
went in bathing by moonlight, and floated down the river to 
the Rat Tower, " where," he says, " that wicked old bishop 

53 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

came to his end." 1 He luxuriated in the sea-bathing at Ostend, 
and was always very fond of water, either fresh or salt. He 
made visits to old Metternich at Johannisberg Castle, and 
listened to his old stories about Napoleon and Alexander I. 
Metternich's stories were not much to be trusted, and Bis- 
marck appears to have come to that conclusion, for he did 
not afterwards speak of Metternich with any great respect, — 
a remarkable diplomat, but not a constructive statesman. 
Metternich, on the other hand, would seem to have recog- 
nized Bismarck's genius, and to have delighted in his society. 
'Bismarck's letters to his wife from Frankfort, and also from 
Hungary, are the finest literature of their kind; not senti- 
mental, but warm-hearted, considerate, and clear-sighted, and 
written in language, whether you call it German or English, 
not easily excelled. He had only been married three years, 
and more than half the time had been separated from her by 
the necessities of his political life. His descriptions of natural 
scenery remind one of Byron. They properly belong to this 
period, and we meet with little of them in his later writings, 
which are too business-like and diplomatic to be particularly 
entertaining. 

The loneliness of his situation at Frankfort and indifference 
of the people about him lead him to reflect on his past life, 
and in a letter to his wife, July 3, 185 1, he says : 

"I cannot understand how a man who considers his own nature 
and yet knows nothing of God, and will know nothing, can en- 
dure his existence, from mere contempt and wearisomeness. I 
know not how I could formally support it ; were I to live as 
then, without God, without you, without my children, I should 
not indeed know whether I had not better abandon life like a dirty 
shirt ; and yet most of my acquaintances are in that state, and live 
on ! If I ask of an individual what object he has in living on, in 
laboring and growing angry, in intriguing and spying, I obtain no 
answer. Do not conclude from this tirade that my mood is dark ; 



1 The Rat Tower could never have been the habitation of a bishop or any 
person but an anchorite. It appears to have been an old Roman tower, con- 
verted, perhaps, into a granary. 

59 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

on the contrary, I feel like a person who looks of a fine September 
morning on the yellowing foliage ; I am healthy and cheerful, but 
I feel some melancholy, some longing for home, a desire for forests, 
ocean, wilderness, for you and my children, mingled with the im- 
pressions of sunset and of Beethoven." 

Bismarck sits in his study, penning long epistles to his 
wife, with his great Danish dog looking solemnly at him 
across the table. He repents of the idleness and frivolity of 
his youth ; he finds little satisfaction in his diplomatic honors, 
true trait of a veracious nature ; he longs for the society of 
his wife and children ; to see the sunset from his own home, 
and for a little of Beethoven's music. Such was the man of 
" blood and iron," of whom an English magazine hack, with 
these letters before him, wrote in the Edinburgh Review in 
1869, after affirming that Bismarck's political ideas were not 
in accordance with the nineteenth century, and that his career, 
though brilliant, would undoubtedly be a brief one : 

" He knows how to flatter his interlocutors by assuming an air of 
genuine admiration for their talents ; they leave him charmed by 
his condescension, whilst he laughs at the fools who took his fine 
words for solid cash. His contempt of men is profound ; he dislikes 
independence, though he probably respects it. There is not a 
single man of character left in the ministry or the more important 
places of the civil service." 1 

Truly this writer's soul must have been as arid as the desert 
of Gobi. We wonder if he could appreciate Beethoven, and 
preferred the society of his own household to wandering about 
at night. It is safe to presume that this judgment on Bis- 
marck came into his head after he had taken up his pen, and 
it is a fair example of the mendacious criticism to which great 
men are exposed in our time. Surely it is these literary gad- 
flies, and not the Napoleons and Bismarcks, who are the 
tyrants of the nineteenth century. Bismarck's chief sin con- 
sisted, of course, in his being a Prussian. If he had been an 

1 We trust the reader will weigh this last sentence as he would a dubious 
piece of money. How does the reviewer know so much? 

60 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

Austrian premier, and the battle of Sadowa had been an 
Austrian victory, he might have been glorified to an equality 
with Palmerston and Disraeli. The remarkable part of it is 
that editors should publish such contributions and readers 
believe them. Those who enjoyed personal interviews with 
Bismarck did not find him to be either a flatterer or a 
cynic. 

Legislative assemblies are often dreary enough, especially 
to a man of active temperament and executive ability. Bis- 
marck analyzes the customary proceedings of the Frankfort 
Diet in a caustic and amusing manner. He writes to Frau 
von Bismarck : 

" I am making enormous progress in the art of saying nothing in 
a great many words. I write reports of many sheets, which read as 
tersely and roundly as leading articles ; and if Manteuffel can say 
what there is in them, after he has read them, he can do more 
than I can. Each of us pretends to believe of his neighbor that 
he is full of thoughts and plans, if he would only tell ; and at the 
same time we none of us know an atom more of what is going to 
happen to Germany than of next year's snow. Nobody, not even 
the most malicious sceptic of a democrat, believes what quackery 
and self-importance there is in this diplomatizing." 

In a similar strain Bismarck spoke of the Frankfort Diet 
twenty years later. He was no political pedant, to be charmed 
with a show of empty formalities. We find, all throughout 
his life, that nothing had an interest for him except what was 
real and veritable, such things as might bring some good to 
Prussia, to himself, or to some other person. Can anything 
be more irksome to such a man than learning the art of saying 
nothing in a great many words? Yet Bismarck went through 
this Frankfort discipline diligently and effectively, as a soldier 
marches day after day under a hot sun on a dusty road. To 
do whatever he undertook with Prussian thoroughness and 
precision, that, evidently, was his motto. 

His letters from Hungary are intensely interesting, for they 
afford such a clear and graphic account of that half-European, 
half-Oriental land, with whose fortunes so many Americans 

61 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

have sympathized. He went there not long after the revolu- 
tion had been crushed out, and found a melancholy condition 
of affairs, Tartar-like bands of robbers patrolling the country, 
so that it was dangerous to venture far from the cities without 
a military escort. Many of these may have been Kossuth's 
disbanded soldiers, and no wonder ; but not a word escapes 
Bismarck in regard to politics, for, as he says, his letters will 
certainly be opened before they reach their destination. He 
likes the Hungarians, however, and admires their country. 
" If you could be here for a moment," he says, " and could 
see the silvery stream of the Danube, the dark mountains on 
a pale red ground, and the lights twinkling up from Pesth, 
Vienna would sink in your estimation as compared with it. 
You see I am also an enthusiast for nature." It would seem 
as if he might also have been a landscape painter. 

This was in the summer of 1852, and one year later German 
politics and the quiet proceedings of the Diet were cast into 
shadow by the threatened invasion of Turkey by Russia, and 
the rumor of an alliance between France and England, a 
novelty in international politics unheard of since the Crusade 
of Richard Cceur de Lion. The impression current in 
America at that time that the object of the Tsar was to 
obtain an appanage for the Grand Duke Constantine was an 
erroneous one, arising from insufficient knowledge of Oriental 
affairs. Wars between Russians and Turks have much the 
same character as the Crusades. 1 The Sclavonic inhabitants 
of Bulgaria and Servia have always been most grievously 
oppressed by the Turks, and the Russian people have felt 
this as the Germans did the oppression of Schleswig and 
Holstein. The Greeks also belong to their church, and are 
united to them at least by the bonds of religious sympathy. 
Moreover, a great nation whose commerce is restricted to one 
sea-port on the Baltic and another on the Black Sea cannot 
be blamed for desiring better advantages in this respect. 
Samuel Johnson, one of our finest Oriental scholars, satisfied 



1 The general in Tolsto'i's " Invaders" says to a lady, "Remember, I have 
taken an oath to fight the infidels." 

62 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

himself that the_Xj^ai£mJi£axjvas a popular war in Russia, 
and that Nicholas was not more responsible for the Crimean 
War than the Russian people were. On the other hand, if 
the Russian government should once obtain possession of 
Turkey in Europe, it would not be long before it obtained 
possession of Turkey in Asia, and thus create an empire of 
semi-civilized nations which would endanger the existence 
of all higher forms of civilization, in Europe at least. This 
is one of the possibilities of the future, and may assist in 
bringing forward that second decline and fall which Nei- 
buhr and other historians have predicted for the modern 
world. 

What an historical problem is this ! How difficult to decide 
the right and wrong, not to say the expediency, of it. Cer- 
tain it is that both parties to such a conflict will be sure to 
consider themselves in the right, and feel justified in opposing 
each other to a bloody issue. Nicholas believed that the time 
had come when Austria should reward him for his support 
in Hungary, in the Hessian troubles, and in the Schleswig- 
Holstein question. The Turkish problem concerned Prussia 
least of all the great powers, and though her king sent a luke- 
warm note of protestation, his opposition to the movement 
went no further. Nicholas, however, might have hesitated 
but for the character of the English ministry at that time, — 
the ministry of Lord Aberdeen, who was strongly opposed to 
foreign interference. Here we come upon an exceptional 
peculiarity of the English constitution, which causes its weak- 
ness in dealing with foreign affairs, and in the present instance 
served Nicholas in the way of a trap. The President of 
the United States may change or modify his policy, but he 
and his cabinet cannot be turned out of office within twenty- 
four hours. The King of Prussia may change his ministry, 
but his well-known character remains the same, as well as his 
pledges to other governments, and both can be counted on to 
a certain extent. It is not so in England, and that is the 
reason why a British alliance is worth so little to other 
nations. In the present instance Lord Palmerston rose in 
Parliament, and by a speech of two hours' duration over^- 

6} 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

turned the Aberdeen ministry. The aspect of events was 
wholly changed for Nicholas. 

Louis Napoleon's English alliance has been considered a 
master-stroke of policy, and it certainly does credit to his 
judgment. His motives, however, in this affair still remain 
unknown to us. It has been supposed that he wished to give 
prestige to the second empire by brilliant military achieve- 
ments ; and if so, he succeeded better than might have been 
anticipated. In the Crimean War the French army carried 
away all the honors. They turned the Russian position at 
the battle of the Alma, rescued the English army when it was 
surprised by the Russians in a fog, and captured the Malakoff 
Tower while the English were repulsed from the Redan. 
Whether Napoleon III. took broad, statesmanlike views of 
the situation it is difficult to say. Bismarck asserts that 
Napoleon III. was not the person to conceive great de- 
signs, — ignorant of many things, especially of geography, 
and a man likely to be plucked at an attorney's examination. 

In reading Louis Napoleon's " Life of Julius Caesar," it is 
easy to perceive what was running in his mind : Napoleon 
Bonaparte was the modern Julius, and in this he was not far 
wrong ; and Napoleon III. was to be the modern Augustus. 
To a certain extent he succeeded in this. He remodelled Paris, 
and made it not only the most elegant city in the world, but 
the most thoroughly constructed. 1 He divided with Louis of 
Bavaria the most judicious patronage of art since the sixteenth 
century, and his internal administration was so excellent as to 
cast a doubt on Bismarck's criticism of him. France was 
never in a more flourishing material condition than during his 
reign. 

It is evident, however, that Napoleon III. did not possess 
"the piercing judgment of Augustus," as Tacitus calls it. 
His foreign policy succeeded well for the first ten years, but 
after that proved a miserable failure. It is easy to see now 
that his Mexican adventure was ill-judged and badly carried 



1 The portion of Paris between the Seine and the church of La Madeleine 
may be expected to last two thousand years. 

64 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

out, — an imprudent attempt to graft monarchical institutions 
on the American tree, — but there were many who perceived 
this at the time. It seems as if a man with true political fore- 
sight could not have made such a blunder. Then his small 
political trafficking in 1866 was, if anything, still worse. It 
has been supposed that Napoleon III. was guided during the 
first half of his reign by his half-brother, the Due de Morny ; 
but of the Due de Morny we know too little to form a deci- 
sive opinion. 1 On the other hand, it is certain that he had 
the advantage of Cavour's advice. Minister Bancroft said to 
General Grant in Berlin, " The three great statesmen of our 
time have been Bismarck, Cavour, and Gortchakoff;" to 
which Grant added " Hamilton Fish." Whatever place may 
finally be assigned to Gortchakoff and Fish, Cavour certainly 
stands next to Bismarck. He was to Italy precisely what 
Bismarck has been to Germany, and, considering the means 
at his disposal, the results he accomplished were quite as re- 
markable. Both were actuated by the same motives, and 
based their action on the same political principles. That 
Napoleon III. was drawn into the Italian war by Cavour's 
influence is well known, though this was not, as has been 
represented in various popular magazines, contrary to Napo- 
leon's interest ; but Cavour was frequently in Paris before 
that, and it is certain that a corps of Sardinian officers accom- 
panied the French army to the Crimea ; but, unfortunately for 
Louis Napoleon, Cavour and De Morny both died before the 
Mexican expedition. 

During the Crimean War, Francis Joseph was in the rather 
comical position of a man who suffers from a pain which he 
is endeavoring to conceal. Schwarzenberg had made his bar- 
gain with the Russian government, and the Austrian emperor 
did not like to keep it. He was indebted for his throne to 
the Tsar Nicholas, but he did not like to pay for this by the 
Russian possession of Bulgaria. The Austrian people, who 
felt anything but gratitude towards Nicholas, as well as Aus- 

1 Bismarck's story of De Morny's French carriages and their sale at the embassy 
in St. Petersburg will be remembered. Bismarck said " he was unprincipled, but 
a very good fellow." 

5 65 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

trian mercantile interests, pressed powerfully for intervention. 
The Hungarians especially were in a great ferment. Still, 
Francis Joseph was reluctant to break his pledge, and the 
course he adopted was characteristic of the man. 

There was a period during the Crimean War when the allied 
armies suffered greatly from sickness, and the capture of 
Sebastopol appeared to be almost hopeless. If the army of 
relief which Nicholas despatched to the beleaguered city had 
not been buried alive in a snow-storm, the result might have 
been different. It was then that Francis Joseph and Count 
Schauenstein believed their opportunity had come. They 
intrigued in the German Diet to obtain an united German 
movement against Russia. Simultaneously French and Eng- 
lish envoys appeared to urge the intervention of Germany, 
and particularly of Prussia, in the interest of peace. Whether 
a generous slice of Poland was offered as a bait to Prussia in 
this transaction we do not know, but it is probable enough. 
It was now that Bismarck won his first diplomatic triumph. 
He perceived the snare, and opposed the movement for inter- 
vention with all the energy of his nature. He was assisted in 
this by those central German states on which Francis Joseph 
had previously counted; for their princes knew well enough 
that they had nothing to gain and much to lose in the event 
of a Russian war. Bismarck here established a principle 
which he ever afterwards followed consistently, — that Prussia 
should not fish in troubled waters, or interfere with the affairs 
of other nations so long as it could possibly be avoided. 
This was precisely the opposite of Louis Napoleon's policy. 

Francis Joseph, now baffled and thoroughly alarmed, con- 
cluded a defensive alliance with the Sultan, which proved of 
no value to either party, and only served to exasperate 
Nicholas against him. Bismarck no doubt noticed this in his 
observing way, and remembered it for a future occasion. The 
storming of the Malakoff Tower, which has never been ex- 
celled as a military feat, placed an end to the war, and the 
humiliated Tsar died of chagrin. His successor, Alexander 
II., the best of all the house of Romanoff, and not inaptly 
called by the Germans the Lincoln of Russia, naturally re- 

66 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

sorted to the traditional policy of an alliance with Prussia. 
Austria was now isolated in Europe, and Count Cavour was 
just the man to take advantage of the fact 

Bismarck's political activity, however, was not limited to 
the desultory proceedings of the Frankfort Diet. From 185 1 
to 1855 he was in such constant request at Berlin that, he 
says, in one year he travelled not less than ten thousand 
miles on German railways. Frederick William IV. wished 
continually to consult with him and use him for numerous 
small diplomatic negotiations, for which Bismarck had already 
proved his dexterity. In one instance the House of Peers 
had set itself obstinately against the policy of the Russian 
cabinet ; and Bismarck, not being directly connected with the 
king's council, was required to bring them to terms if he 
could possibly do so. He accomplished this so effectively 
that, although the leaders of the different cliques in the House 
remained firm, when the vote came up they found themselves 
deserted by their followers, who all went over to the govern- 
ment side. As a rule, however, Bismarck found that his 
advice was either unfavorably received or not acted upon 
afterwards, so that he soon came to wonder why he was so 
often consulted, until he perceived at length that this habit of 
asking the opinion of a variety of counsellors was a chronic 
infirmity of Frederick William, who could not understand the 
political situation, and was too indecisive even to allow his 
ministers to come to a conclusion for him. When pressed by 
Manteuffel to adopt a definite line of policy, he would appeal to 
Bismarck, Count Pourtales, or some other to sustain him in 
his opposition to it, and thus maintained a continuous ebb 
and flow of diplomatic intrigue at the court, which was ex- 
ceedingly harassing to all concerned. He treated his minis- 
ters, said Bismarck, as if he were a schoolmaster listening to 
recitations. 

Of course, under such conditions the ship of state could 
only drift with whatever tide was setting most strongly. 
Manteuffel may not have understood the situation clearly, but 
if he had done so he could hardly have succeeded in the 
hands of such a master ; and one consequence of it was that 

67 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

by using Bismarck as a foil against him the king produced a 
suspicious feeling between them which does not appear to 
have ever wholly abated. Bismarck, in his retrospect of these 
court cabals, seems rather severe in his judgment on both 
Frederick William IV. and Manteuffel ; for it should always 
be remembered that the king's health was precarious, and that 
he was gradually nearing the mental malady which ended his 
life. Manteuffel, also, was a faithful public servant, and if he 
did not succeed in penetrating the mists that rose up around 
Germany after the revolution of 1848, this proved, in the end, 
quite as well for Prussia and Bismarck himself. No wonder 
if Bismarck was impatient and vexed, after going repeatedly 
to Sans Souci to unfold his great designs before the king, only 
to find that the whole project had gone to water two days 
afterwards. Count Gerlach, who was Bismarck's most faithful 
friend during this period, speaks of Manteuffel at one time as 
unprincipled and untrustworthy, and not long after (in a fit of 
penitence) admits that only Manteuffel could hold the position 
of minister-president for more than four weeks at a time, and 
writes to Bismarck, " Because of my genuine love and esteem 
for Manteuffel, I should not like to assist in bringing about 
his fall." This of itself is sufficient to indicate the situation 
of affairs previous to the regency of William I., or, as he was 
then denominated, the Prince of Prussia. Bismarck's corre- 
spondence with Count Gerlach is as plain, straightforward, 
and disinterested as that with his wife. There is not a trace 
of personal ambition or personal animosity through the whole 
of it, but impatience enough at the manner in which Prussian 
affairs were being conducted, and plenty of exasperation against 
those who could not perceive what was plain enough to his 
own mind. Once, when he asked for leave of absence to 
visit his sick wife, Frederick William complained that Bis- 
marck cared more for his own family than he did for the 
destiny of Prussia. Bismarck was a royalist by profession, 
but no king-worshipper, and he has exposed the peculiarities 
and foibles of Napoleon III., Christian of Denmark, the King 
of Hanover, and even of William I. with a telling plainness 
of speech. 

68 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

On October 23, 1857, Frederick William IV. resigned the 
affairs of state to his more vigorous brother William, who 
acted thenceforward as regent of the monarchy. This, how- 
ever, did not immediately improve the political situation, at 
least according to Bismarck's notion of it. The regent sur- 
rounded himself with excellent counsellors, but they were 
divided in their judgment, and perhaps for the time being it 
was best that they should be. The princess, afterwards Em- 
press Augusta, imagined that she understood politics, and, 
being a person of energy and a brilliant talker, — very per- 
sistent withal in carrying her point, — she caused her hus- 
band and his ministers from first to last a great deal of an- 
noyance. Bismarck believed that she had articles written 
for the daily press to represent her views, which she after- 
wards placed on the regent's breakfast-table as an evidence of 
public opinion. She had certain prejudices which were in- 
eradicable. She liked the English and Austrians, but de- 
spised Louis Napoleon as a parvenu, and disliked the Rus- 
sians because they lacked elegant manners. As sometimes 
happens with her sex, she easily persuaded herself that her 
personal inclinations were identical with the interests of the 
Prussian state. As Bismarck had already become identified as 
a determined opponent of Austria, and believed in conciliating 
the Russian government as an offset to Austrian intrigue, he 
quickly fell under her displeasure, and remained an object of 
aversion to her during the rest of her life. In after-years, 
when Bismarck had entirely won her husband's confidence, 
William I. sometimes consulted with him in regard to his 
troubles with his wife, whom he more than once denominated 
as feuerkopf, — fire-brain. 1 

William I. does not appear to have trusted Bismarck in the 
beginning to the same extent that his brother did. Frederick 
William recognized the entire loyalty of Bismarck's nature, 

1 Bismarck says that during the revolution of 1 848 he was approached by a 
gentleman of the prince's household with a proposition that Frederick William 
should resign, that the Prince of Prussia should be set aside, and that the 
princess should become regent for her son, then eighteen years old. This must 
have originated with Augusta herself. 

69 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

and the frequency of their consultations shows that he had 
confidence in his judgment, although he could never resolve 
to adopt the policy which Bismarck advocated. The ex- 
pression attributed to him of a " red-hot reactionary" may 
have resulted from one of Bismarck's uncomplimentary bursts 
of frankness ; or Count Vitzthum may possibly have invented 
it. William I. proceeded more cautiously, and when he had 
once gained access to the secret springs of Bismarck's nature 
he trusted him implicitly ; nor was he ever disappointed in 
his man. Bismarck had expected that the regent would give 
him a portfolio in the ministry, and Bismarck's friends sup- 
ported him for this; but William, with rare good judgment, 
decided to send him to St. Petersburg, although Bismarck 
himself would have preferred to have remained at Frankfort. 
William said, however, that he considered the Russian mission 
as the most important post which he had to bestow, and 
added, " You do not belong to yourself alone ; your exist- 
ence is bound up with Prussian history, and you should do 
as I request you, even if it is contrary to your inclination." x 
The appointment was a fortunate one, for Bismarck learned 
in Russia how strongly both official and public feeling had 
turned against Austria there since the Crimean War, and this 
served him as a future base of diplomatic action, which he 
improved by a thorough knowledge of Russian court life and 
the more important personages concerned therein. 

Before leaving Frankfort, Bismarck met with an adventure 
which must have astonished him not a little, and may have 
had a certain share in determining the future policy of Prussia. 
Immediately after the announcement of his transfer to St. 
Petersburg he received a letter from a Jew banker named 
Levinstein, informing him of a lucrative speculation which he 
might find for his interest to consider. Bismarck paid no 
attention to the note, and a few days later Levinstein called 
on him with a card from Count Buol-Schauenstein, and re- 
quested a private interview. He then proceeded to explain 
the nature of the lucrative speculation, which proved to be 

1 Bismarck's Memoirs. 
70 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

nothing less than an offer from the Austrian government to 
represent the interests of Francis Joseph at the Russian 
capital for a salary of thirty thousand thalers a year. This 
was, of course, intended for a bribe, and Bismarck attempted 
to get a statement of it from Levinstein in writing; but the 
Jew was too sharp for him, and equally pertinacious in en- 
deavoring to effect a bargain ; so that Bismarck was finally 
obliged to lead him to the staircase and threaten to pitch him 
down headlong before he could get rid of his remarkable 
tempter. The exposure of this unblushing attempt would 
have created great scandal, and have excited strong indigna- 
tion in Prussia against the Austrian government; but Bis- 
marck prudently kept it to himself, only informing the regent 
of it on his way through Berlin. It may have proved a good 
card for Bismarck with his next sovereign. 

ST. PETERSBURG AND PARIS. 

The tendency of recent writers is to underestimate the im- 
portance and ability of William I., and to represent him as 
the inevitable shadow of royalty which accompanied Bismarck 
in all his undertakings. . General Hazen, in his report on the 
Franco-German war, speaks of the Crown Prince Frederick 
as if he were a man of more intellect and ability than his 
father. He may have been a more accomplished scholar, and 
he was certainly an admirable soldier ; but the diary which 
he has left, and his behavior in the Battenburg affair, make 
it only too evident that he lacked good political judgment. 
This was precisely what his father possessed, — good judg- 
ment in regard to men and practical affairs. It is not so im- 
portant that the chief magistrate of a nation should be a man 
of genius as that he should be a man of character, able to 
recognize character and genius in others. To penetrate 
character itself requires intelligence of the highest order. 

It should be remembered that during the first five years of 
William's sovereignty Bismarck was absent from Berlin, and, 
though in frequent communication with the king, the latter 
could hardly be supposed to have enjoyed the benefit of his 
counsel. It was during this time that William reorganized 

7i 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

the Prussian army, and with the assistance of Von Moltke per- 
fected that military machine which is universally admitted to 
be without its equal. As a tactician, Von Moltke has never 
been surpassed, even by Napoleon ; and whether William I., 
thorough soldier as he was, would have succeeded as a mili- 
tary leader we have no means of judging. But who was it 
that discovered Von Moltke ? Men of rare executive ability 
are not apt to be popular, and the quiet, reticent hero of 
Sadowa would not have been likely to attract the attention 
of a superficial potentate like Francis Joseph. Here, as in 
Bismarck's case, we recognize an innate similarity between 
the men which brought them together. There was no blind- 
ing vanity in William I., but rather a grand simplicity of 
nature which fitted him admirably for the part he had to play 
in this triumvirate. It was not only Von Moltke, but through- 
out the army and in all branches of the Prussian government 
he filled the highest offices with the best qualified men. At 
the battle of Sadowa he exposed himself so fearlessly as to 
excite Bismarck's alarm for the safety of his sovereign, 
though, as he afterwards remarked, " I had rather see him so 
than over-prudent." At Gravelotte, the most stoutly con- 
tested of the French battles, he assumed the chief command, 
although the movements on that occasion would seem to have 
been directed by a council of war held upon the field. His 
occasional differences with Bismarck are sufficient to indicate 
that William I. had a mind of his own. 

Among the hereditary rulers of the nineteenth century, 
Dom Pedro, of Brazil, was certainly the ablest and noblest, 
and next to him stand William I. and Alexander II. If man- 
liness, modesty, and good judgment deserve success, William 
of Prussia may be said to have deserved it, but he was also 
one of the most fortunate men of whom there is any record. 
Endowed with a magnificent constitution, he came to the 
throne at the age of sixty, and yet lived to take an active par- 
ticipation in the greatest events of his country's history. His 
temperance was such that he preserved his mental and physical 
vigor much beyond the average age of man. He was fortu- 
nate in the long life of his estimable wife, fortunate in his 

72 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

children. He never met with a reverse, and until the last 
year of his life was never acquainted with grief. There are 
incidents in history which seem like special providences, and 
no one knew so well as Bismarck how invaluable that life was 
to him and to Germany. Without its continuance he might 
not have been able to place the capstone on his edifice. If 
he had been obliged to deal with a visionary like Frederick 
III., or with the present incumbent, all his work might have 
gone to naught. 

The peculiar strength of the German and Russian foreign 
policy resides in the fact that their cabinet ministers study 
foreign affairs in the different capitals of Europe, and do not 
derive their knowledge of them at second hand. The British 
government, on the contrary, has a regular corps of foreign 
diplomats, who are transferred from one court to another, and 
rarely return to England until they retire from active service. 
An English premier rarely travels abroad, except on a pleasure 
excursion to Italy or Switzerland, and most of them have 
known little about the character and condition of foreign 
peoples. If Beaconsfield and Gladstone had comprehended 
Oriental politics, the former would not have sent Sir Louis 
Cavagnari with his escort of seventy Englishmen to be mur- 
dered at Cabul, and the latter would not have attempted to 
pacify the Arabs of the Soudan by moral influence and the 
help of Chinese Gordon. Such instances may be placed 
beside the Mexican speculation of Napoleon III. Bismarck 
remarked in regard to the Afghanistan muddle that treaties 
with semi-civilized nations were a waste of parchment. 

William I. inherited Bismarck from his brother as a precious 
legacy, which he was determined to make the most of. The 
latter had already made one or two visits to Paris, where he 
found Napoleon III. in quite a friendly mood towards Prussia, 
as was natural enough, since he was preparing for war against 
Austria. Early in January, 1859, he was designated as envoy 
to St. Petersburg, and set out for that frozen capital in mid- 
winter, prudently leaving his family behind him. His journey 
is memorable, because it seems to have originated the ill 
health which, combined with his excessive work, made Bis- 

73 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

marck's life henceforth a pcnitonti.il pilgrimage. The account 
of his journey is enough to terrify the stoutest traveller. The 
railway was not yet finished, and travelling by stage through 
the deep snow for several nights in succession, he could 
obtain no sleep. He wrote to his wife : " I was outside all 
night, and we changed from one to twelve degrees Reaumur. 
The snow was so deep that we literally remained sticking in 
it with from six to eight horses. In one instance we were .u\ 
hour in going twenty paces. It was impossible to sleep on 
account of the cold." When he reached the steam-cars he fell 
asleep at once, and remained unconscious for twenty hours. 

This could not but have evil consequences in a new and 
exceptional situation. Bismarck was ill all through his first 
season at St. Petersburg; suffered severely from rheumatism, 
and still worse from his doctors, who treated him to large 
doses of iodine, without the least regard to its effect upon his 
nervous system. This was the first beginning of that harassing 
insomnia which caused him so much misery during the 
Franco-German war, and from which he never altogether 
recovered. It was the first physical infirmity from which he 
ever suffered. With one of the strongest physiques and a 
constitution like seasoned oak, he was endowed by nature 
with nerves as sensitive as those of a Correggio or a Men- 
delssohn. Such a combination is exceptional. People with 
sensitive nerves have commonly sensitive, if not irritable, 
minds. Bismarck became irritable from insomnia and the 
wear and tear of business ; but originally he was as cool- 
headed and imperturbable as President Lincoln. During the 
stormy debates of 1S47 few of his opponents equalled him 
in sang" froid and good humor. In considering his life from 
this time forward, Bismarck's nervous condition should always 
be taken into account. As Wasson wrote in his admirable 
letters from Germany in 1873, he is a man for whom one has 
to make allowances. Even at Frankfort he was sometimes 
made dizzy by speaking in the Diet, so as to be obliged to 
go out into the open air; and it is a known physiological fact 
that when a man feels his nerves giving way within him he 
cannot control himself as he otherwise would do. 

74 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

The impression has been current, and even circulated by 
Bismarck's English biographer, that his life in St. Petersburg 
was rather a riotous one; that he drank slivovitch, and 
revelled into the morning hours ; and this notion has been 
added to by a rather external letter from the historian Motley 
concerning the entertainments in Bismarck's home at Schon- 
hausen. Motley had much of Macaulay's habit of heightening 
his statements by a catalogue of nouns, and it is remarkable 
that he should have visited Bismarck without having anything 
more interesting to say of him. Otherwise we have not been 
able to discover any better justification of this libel than Bis- 
marck's own statement, that it was at St. Petersburg where 
his constitution first began to fail him. On the contrary, 
there is good reason to believe that he lived a quiet, sober, 
and methodical life there. During the first nine months he 
suffered greatly from ill health, and was finally obliged to 
return to Pomerania for rest and relaxation. 

He studied Russian and mastered it, — no slight accom- 
plishment, — so that for several years he was the only person 
in the foreign office at Berlin who could speak and write the 
language. The troubles of thirty thousand resident Prus- 
sians, some of whom were always getting into difficulty, in a 
country where only barbaric power prevails, gave Bismarck 
business enough to attend to. Besides this, he maintained a 
large political correspondence with various Prussian states- 
men. Court parties and court ceremonies were equally labori- 
ous to him. He was obliged to work from eight to fourteen 
hours a day. He was glad of an opportunity to spend a 
quiet afternoon on the palace veranda at Peterhof with the 
empress dowager, a genial, motherly person, who was knit- 
ting some kind of light worsted work, and with whom he felt 
very much at home. He visited Moscow, and considered it 
the handsomest city in Europe, but, with customary prudence, 
made no reflections on Napoleon's expedition. During his 
second winter he wrote to his sister : " We have to attend a 
great many balls and fetes ; but they only begin at eleven 
o'clock, and we always leave at midnight." 

He was on a vacation at Rheinfeld when he wrote the letter 

75 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

of condolence to his brother-in-law, Oscar von Arnim, on the 
death of a boy fifteen years old, which has endeared Bismarck 
to the hearts of German women as much as his great exploits 
have exalted him in the minds of German men. That such a 
letter should have been published for the purpose of giving 
him popularity is out of the question ; and we cannot regard 
its publication as unfortunate, though the subject is rather a 
delicate one. It is, in truth, a confession of faith as genuine 
as it was spontaneous. He wishes he could go instanter to 
his sister and her husband, but concludes that his strength 
would not be equal to the journey. Then he says : 

" How do all the little cares and troubles which beset our daily- 
lives vanish beside the iron advent of real misfortune ! And I feel 
the recollections of all complaints and desires by which I have for- 
gotten how many blessings God gives us, and how much danger 
surrounds us without touching us, as so many reproofs. We should 
not depend on this world, and come to regard it as our home. 
Another twenty or thirty years, under the most favorable circum- 
stances, and we shall both have passed from the sorrows of this 
world ; our children will have arrived at our present position, and 
will find with astonishment that the life so freshly begun is going 
down hill. Were it all over with us so, it would not be worth 
while dressing and undressing." 

Bismarck rarely talked philosophy, and it is doubtful if he 
even attended Hegel's lectures at the university in Berlin. 
He certainly was not a disciple of Herbert Spencer or of any 
modern form of materialism, but believed that man has a soul 
in him, for whose well-being he is responsible. Mind to him 
did not mean " a collocation of cerebral processes," but an 
immortal spirit. So John Brown said in his Virginia prison, 
" Governor Wise, it is only for a few moments we remain on 
this earth, and there is a whole eternity beyond." Thus have 
heroic natures believed and prophesied in all times and 
countries. 

We do not hear of Bismarck as fond of hunting in his 
youth, though he may have done more or less of it during 
his bachelor Kniephof days. In middle life he took to it for 

76 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

the benefit of his health, and as a relief from the weight of 
responsibility which pressed more and more heavily upon 
him. He was an expert shot with a rifle, — an evidence of 
the keenness of his perceptions, — and could take the heads 
off of ducks floating on the water. In Russia he soon be- 
came distinguished as a hunter of bears, a mighty Nimrod. 
It was like the schlager fighting at Gottingen in his youth. 
Nothing requires more nerve than shooting a bear on foot, 
and there are few of our Western huntsmen who dare to at- 
tempt it. Unless the brute is mortally wounded at the first 
or second fire you are lost. Bismarck is credited with having 
killed three bears in rapid succession. " Once," he says, " I 
was in great danger from a bear which I could not see dis- 
tinctly, because he was covered with snow. I wounded him 
and he fell. I reloaded as quietly as possible, and shot him 
dead as he rose to his feet." Bears seem to be plentiful in 
Russia, and it is to be feared that they are a heavier incubus 
on the farmers than hares and foxes are in England. 

Smoothing down the Russian bear is the special business 
of a Prussian ambassador at St. Petersburg. Bismarck did 
not find this difficult, for the current was now running in his 
favor instead of against him, as at Frankfort and Vienna. 
Alexander was more than wise enough to profit by the mis- 
takes of Nicholas, and his mother's influence, also, was on 
the side of William I. Bismarck was just the man to pro- 
mote a cordial understanding and feeling of security between 
the two governments, for to whomsoever he dealt with he 
always gave the impression of a veracious nature. He once 
said, "I have never learned to lie, even as a diplomat." This 
may be doubted, though he may have thought so at that 
time ; but those who placed their entire confidence in him 
have never had reason to regret it. A Boston lawyer once 
inquired of a New York banker whether William Vander'bilt 
could be depended on to tell the truth in regard to his rail- 
roads, and the reply was, " How can he tell it ?" Bismarck 
was often placed in such situations. Surrounded by enemies, 
conspirators, and imprudent friends, how could he tell the 
truth ? His principle appears to have been to deal with 

77 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

others according to the measure in which they dealt with 
him. To those who trusted him he was frank and friendly, 
but woe unto those who tried to overreach him. He deceived 
Louis Napoleon ; but was not Louis Napoleon attempting to 
deceive him ? That is the only safe rule in politics or trade. 
The photographs of Bismarck, taken between 1865 and 1870, 
have all the appearance of a substantial, straightforward man, 
while the portraits of Metternich wear an expression of 
Mephistophelean cunning, and those of Louis Napoleon have 
the ingenious, suspicious expression of a man who lives by 
his wits. Bismarck's cranium was one of the largest, and his 
deep-set eyes looked out from under their frowning brows as 
if they were saying, " Tell me the truth now, or look out for 
yourself." The top of his head was almost a perfect dome, a 
fine subject for phrenology. 

The pay-day was now at hand, when the Austrian govern- 
ment was to receive the first instalment of the reward for its 
Schwarzenberg-Schauenstein policy. Almost on the day 
when Bismarck set out for St. Petersburg, the King of Sar- 
dinia's daughter was married to Prince Napoleon Bonaparte; 
the press of Turin began to talk of the wrongs of an outraged 
Italy ; and the Sardinian army was evidently being placed on 
a war footing. In reply to the request of Francis Joseph for 
an explanation, Cavour proposed a European conference to 
consider the condition of Italy. The Tsar Alexander showed 
his colors by supporting this proposal ; but there was nothing 
the Austrian cabinet dreaded so much as an exposure of 
their methods of fleecing the Italian provinces. War was 
consequently declared against Sardinia; but in this way 
Cavour obtained the appearance at least of a defensive atti- 
tude. 

Political intrigue usually goes hand in hand with official 
corruption, and in the campaign of 1859 we ^ no ^ an internal 
condition of affairs in the Austrian government that might 
well be compared to its foreign policy. In several divisions 
of the army whole companies were found on the pay-roll 
which had no actual existence ; enormous frauds were un- 
earthed in the commissary department, and much of the 

78 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

soldiers' equipment was discovered to be of the sort denomi- 
nated as shoddy in the first years of our Civil War. The Aus- 
trian emperor was in a rage, but so extensive were the pecu- 
lations that he found himself unable to punish the offenders. 
No wonder that such an army was repeatedly beaten, and the 
success of the French and Sardinians was evidently more 
owing to the weakness of their opponents than to the military 
skill of their commanders. In fact, it soon became apparent 
that the army of Napoleon III. had not improved in efficiency 
since the Crimean War. The ill-fed and badly commanded 
Austrian troops three times repulsed an attack on the hill of 
Solferino, which was finally captured by a quick scramble of 
the Zouaves. 

There was no reason why William "of Prussia should give 
Austria assistance, and the wonder is that he and his minis- 
ters did not take advantage of the situation to improve the 
position of Prussia in Germany. Bismarck would probably 
have done this. 

If William I. and his cabinet could have foreseen the im- 
mense advantage to Prussia from a liberated Italy, they might 
have pursued a different course, but their intention evidently 
was to prevent either party in the war from obtaining too 
great an advantage. After the defeat of the Austrians at Sol- 
ferino five Prussian army corps were mobilized and placed on 
the French frontier, so that, if they had been directed, their 
commander might have reached Paris before Napoleon. The 
movement was injudicious, and caused Bismarck great anxiety. 
It might have resulted in the evacuation of Lombardy and 
the loss of all the Sardinians had gained. Fortunately, how- 
ever, Francis Joseph undertook the management of the affair 
himself, and was easily outwitted by Cavour and Napoleon. 
The peace of Villafranca was hastily concluded, in order to 
prevent Prussia from acquiring too great importance in 
European affairs. The only advantage which Napoleon III. 
gained from the loss of twenty thousand lives was a narrow 
strip of territory on the Mediterranean, including the valu- 
able city of Nice. Napoleon prudently declined Kossuth's 
offer of an uprising of the Hungarians, as that would certainly 

79 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

have brought Russia into the field of action, with a general 
European convulsion. 

On July 2, 1859, Bismarck wrote to his wife: 

"Our politics are sliding more and more into the Austrian 
groove, and if we fire one shot on the Rhine the Italo-Austrian 
war is over, and in its place we shall have to see a Prusso-French 
war, in which Austria, after we have taken the load from her 
shoulders, will assist, or assist so far as her own interests are con- 
cerned. That we should play a victorious part is scarcely to be 
conceded. Be it as God wills ! It is here below always a question 
of time, nations and men, folly and wisdom, war and peace ; they 
come like waves and so depart, while the ocean remains." x 

William I. had no intention of provoking a war ; but if Bis- 
marck had been minister-president at this time it is possible 
that the whole Austrian-Prussian problem might have been 
solved with less friction and loss of life than afterwards hap- 
pened. Prince Hohenzollern, who had succeeded Manteuffel, 
was more of a dilettante than a practical statesman. 

An overdose of iodine was not the only medical blunder 
which Bismarck suffered from in St. Petersburg. In June, 1 859, 
he contracted a slight rheumatism, and this settled in his left 
knee, which he had injured two years before by a fall while 
hunting in Sweden. As he intended to return to Berlin for 
the summer months, and wished to start in good condition, 
he imprudently consulted a German doctor named Waltz, 
who had been recommended to him by the Grand Duchess 
of Baden. This physician prescribed a plaster, which he as- 
sured the Prussian envoy would cause no inconvenience, but 
would fall off of its own accord in a few days. The plaster 
contained cantharides, which will commonly raise a blister in 
less than half an hour ; and Bismarck, having gone to sleep 
with it upon his knee, awoke towards morning in most intol- 
erable pain. On attempting to detach the plaster a portion 
of the flesh came off with it, and it was some years before his 

1 Hesekiel's Biography, p. 284. 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

leg recovered wholly from the effects of this maltreatment. 
The doctor blamed the apothecary ; and on Bismarck's sending 
for the prescription the apothecary declared he had returned 
it to the doctor. Bismarck afterwards discovered that Waltz 
was the son of a confectioner at Heidelberg, and was known 
as an idle student, although he possessed the faculty of 
making himself agreeable to ladies of rank. Bismarck re- 
turned to Berlin by way of the Baltic, and, meeting a distin- 
guished surgeon named Pirogow on the steamer, consulted 
him in regard to his trouble, but was astonished enough 
when Pirogow advised him to have his leg amputated above 
the knee. The medical profession seemed to be in a conspir- 
acy against him, and some of his friends were of opinion that 
Dr. Waltz's poisoning was not without an object ; but Bis- 
marck himself thought differently. Arrived at Berlin, he 
was soon sufficiently improved by honest medical treatment 
to walk and ride again, although with some discomfort. 

In October Bismarck accompanied the crown prince to 
Warsaw for an interview with the Tsar Alexander; after 
which he went to St. Petersburg again, but was obliged to re- 
turn to Berlin in the following March (i860) for sound medical 
treatment, and sat there as a delegate in the House of Peers. 

The political situation in Berlin did not please him any better 
than during the last years of Frederick William IV. The 
ministry was divided, and the king indecisive. Prince Hohen- 
zollern was the nominal president, and continued to be until 
1862, but he had long since been outvoted, and Count von 
Schleinitz, an adroit courtier, who sided with the queen, 
wielded the greatest influence. Bismarck was invited to a 
cabinet meeting and asked for his opinion, which he gave 
only to find himself opposed at every point by Schleinitz, 
who had evidently prepared himself for the purpose before- 
hand. Bismarck was confident that the Prussian government 
would receive strong support from the Tsar if it only asserted 
itself in a spirit of manliness and independence. So long as 
Prussia followed in the Austrian channel, Alexander and 
Gortchakoff would distrust her. The queen and Schleinitz 
believed, on the contrary, that the greatest danger to the state 
6 81 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

was to be feared from a Franco-Russian alliance, and that it 
was important to maintain friendly relations with Austria, even 
at the cost of national self-respect, in order that Prussia should 
not become isolated. Von Roon, the Minister of War, and 
the one solid character in the cabinet, sided with Bismarck, 
but for the time being the queen and Schleinitz carried all 
before them. 

What Gerlach had been to Bismarck in his Frankfort days, 
Von Roon was to be henceforward, a friend implicitly trusted. 
He was also to Prussia what Carnot was to the first French 
revolution, the ablest military organizer of his time. In the 
autumn of i860 Bismarck returned to St. Petersburg again, 
and Roon helped him as a friend at court, who, believing in 
Bismarck's future destiny, served him more faithfully than he 
could have served himself. Many of his letters are dismal 
enough. The Landtag was ruled by the party of Progress, 
whose aim was to revolutionize Prussia after the English pat- 
tern, and obtain a ministry and a premier from their own 
ranks, without considering the difference between England 
and Prussia, and that the British Parliament, though nomi- 
nally a popular body, is in reality controlled by noblemen and 
wealthy land-owners. The attitude of the ministry was dis- 
heartening to patriotic Prussians, and discouraging to the 
German national sentiment ; so that the position of the gov- 
ernment was growing continually weaker and more embar- 
rassed. The violence of party feeling may be imagined from 
the fact that Edwin Manteuffel, Roon's chief supporter in the 
ministry, became involved in a duel with Twesten, a leader of 
the Progressists, and was placed under arrest for it. Von 
Roon wrote to Bismarck, July 24, 1861, " May God help us in 
future ! I can do little more than remain an honest man, 
work in my own department, and do what is sensible. The 
greatest misfortune, however, in all this worry is the weari- 
ness and languor of our king. He is more than ever under 
the orders of the queen and her accomplices." The marriage 
of the Crown Prince to the Princess Victoria of England had 
brought in a lively young recruit to the queen's forces, who 
was not long in making her influence felt. It was rumored 

82 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

at this time among the Hungarian exiles in America that the 
Crown Prince of Prussia had taken a wife whose will was 
stronger than his own. She was, in fact, almost the counter- 
part of her mother-in-law, and Prussia seemed to be verging 
on petticoat government. 

King William, however, was too much of a soldier to per- 
mit this order of affairs to continue indefinitely. His queen 
was a more brilliant talker, and, as Bismarck says, an abler 
critic, but William possessed what is so often deficient in 
gifted natures, and that is plain, practical sense ; and the inborn 
manliness of his nature was of itself sufficient to provoke a 
change in course of time. The coronation took place at 
Konigsberg, in old Prussia, on October 28, 1861, and Bis- 
marck, being in attendance, found reason to suspect from the 
queen's conversation that a radical divergence of opinion on 
state affairs already existed between the royal pair. On his 
return to Berlin, in the spring of 1862, he found that the 
queen's faction was no longer in the ascendant, but the king 
was still irresolute, and the confusion in his cabinet greater 
than ever. It was one of the phenomena of political exhaus- 
tion. 

Prince Adolph of Hohenlohe had succeeded Prince Ho- 
henzollern as president of the ministry in March, but he 
found himself unequal to the position, and frankly informed 
Bismarck that he would be glad to have him take it off his 
hands. Bismarck himself was dispirited and badly out of 
health ; although he had been summoned by the king, little 
attention was paid to him on his arrival. Fearing the evil 
opinions which might result from apparent idleness, he begged 
Count Bernstorff, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, either to pro- 
cure him an office or to accept his resignation ; and as a con- 
sequence of this determination he was immediately appointed 
ambassador to France. On the 1st of June he was received 
at the Tuileries. 

The sudden transfer of the incorruptible Bismarck from 
St. Petersburg to Paris created the liveliest excitement at the 
Austrian court. Francis Joseph could not fail to be con- 
scious that his policy during the Crimean War was considered 

83 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

base ingratitude by the son of Nicholas, and visions of a 
Franco-Russian alliance, in which Prussia would serve as the 
mediator, and perhaps as a broker of whole provinces, floated 
before the mind of Count Buol. Prince Richard Metternich, 
then ambassador at Paris, was immediately notified to make 
the most friendly advances to Louis Napoleon, and to offer 
him any form of alliance which would be compatible with the 
integrity of the Austrian empire. Napoleon, who could not 
understand the exact relation which existed between Bismarck 
and Count Buol, was evidently puzzled at this, and concluded 
that the readiest means of enlightenment would be to inform 
Bismarck and see what kind of a counter-move he would 
make to this proposition. So, on June 26, Bismarck was in- 
vited to Fontainebleau, where he and the emperor took a 
long walk together, and the latter began by discussing the 
advantages of an alliance between Prussia and France, to 
which Bismarck prudently replied that an alliance between 
two great nations must have a definite object, and could not 
be based on mutual friendliness, or even on the expectation 
of indefinite mutual interests. Napoleon then informed him 
of the Austrian proposals, evidently in the hope that Bismarck 
would suggest an alternative which would be more favorable 
to French interests. He was well aware that there was no 
way in which Francis Joseph could assist him to territorial 
annexations, except through a war with Prussia ; and with the 
Mexican expedition on his hands, he was in no condition to 
undertake that. If, however, he could assist Prussia to a 
stronger position in German affairs and obtain the duchy of 
Luxemburg for his trouble, much might be gained at very 
small cost. As Luxemburg belonged to the King of Hol- 
land by inheritance, Bismarck may have thought the same, 
but he declined to commit himself, and returned to Paris, 
leaving Napoleon III. as wise as he was before. 

Later in June Bismarck went to London, perhaps to allay 
suspicions of a Russo-Prussian alliance, and after that on a 
long expedition to the Pyrenees to recruit his health, which in 
the sequel was greatly improved by it. Late in August Von 
Roon wrote to him that the condition of uncertainty in Berlin 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

still continued; that the ministry was practically without a 
head, and that Bernstorff, who had been acting in that capacity, 
could not decide whether to remain or to take the English mis- 
sion ; that he believed the outcome, however, would be Bis- 
marck's appointment as minister-president. He added, " Con- 
cessions and compromises are not to be thought of; least of 
all is the king disposed towards them." Bismarck replied 
that he was ready to enter the ministry, or would be con- 
tent to remain at Paris ; but that he wished above all to 
know definitely what the king intended for him ; that he had 
long been separated from his family, and that his household 
goods were scattered in various places. In his whole corre- 
spondence with Roon there is not a trace of personal am- 
bition, and this may be taken as one reason why he succeeded 
where others failed. Only six days later he received the fol- 
lowing telegram from Berlin : 

" Periculum in mora. Depechez-vous. 1 

" L'oncle de Maurice, 

" Henning." 

" Henning" was the middle name of Moritz Blanckenburg, 
a nephew of Von Roon, and this form of notification is signifi- 
cant of the secrecy that was required, in those perilous times, 
for communications apparently simple in themselves. 

1 Bismarck's Memoirs, i. 203. 



85 



CHAPTER IV 

MINISTER-PRESIDENT 

On Bismarck's arrival at Berlin he was immediately sum- 
moned by the crown prince for an audience on public affairs, 
and, supposing that this was done with the knowledge of the 
king, he immediately complied, although he considered it 
prudent not to commit himself on important points to a sub- 
ordinate personage. It proved, however, an independent 
effort of the prince's to gain information, and came near ship- 
wrecking Bismarck's preferment ; for the king on hearing of 
it said, " You see, he is not to be trusted either," and it re- 
quired all the earnestness of Roon's nature to convince him 
of the contrary. Whether this episode was due to youthful 
imprudence, or to the long-headed calculation of Queen Au- 
gusta, is a problem which no evidence can help us to solve. 

Bismarck found the king in a most melancholy mood. He 
said, " I will not reign if I cannot do it so as to be answer- 
able to God and to my conscience ; and I cannot do that if I 
am to be dominated by the present majority in Parliament." 
This referred to the refusal of the Progressists to pass appro- 
priations for the maintenance of the army, and their openly 
declared intention of reducing the king's authority to a level 
with that of the Queen of England. This, of course, was 
revolutionary, and could only be met by a counter-revolution. 
Bismarck perceived this at a glance, and in the course of a 
lengthy interview succeeded in persuading William I. that 
such a course was not only honorable but necessary for the 
interests of Prussia, and therefore justifiable. The draft of a 
letter of abdication, which the king had on the table before 
him, was destroyed in Bismarck's presence. 

It is difficult for an American to sympathize with William I. 
in his struggle with the Prussian Landtag at this time ; but 
this much is certain : if the king had given way before the 

86 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

majority in the Parliament, Bismarck could never have ac- 
complished the great work of German unification. We see 
the course that history has taken, and we credit those actors 
in it who have been of service to mankind ; but it is useless 
to consider how things might have been otherwise. Only 
those who were living and present at the critical moment may 
have been able to judge of this. The Prussian Landtag in 
1862 cannot be fairly compared with the Assembly of the 
Third Estate in 1789. Prussia was suffering from no heavy 
grievances, and its representatives had no great wrongs to 
redress. The nation had always been well governed, accord- 
ing to the standard of the time ; it had freedom of speech, 
popular education, and freedom of the press ; its laboring 
classes already enjoyed the advantage of one agrarian revolu- 
tion, and were the most prosperous in Europe. If their wages 
were not so high as in England, their expenses were consid- 
erably less. The administration of internal affairs is of great 
importance in every country, but in Prussia foreign affairs 
were and are even more important than internal affairs ; for 
the very existence of the state depended on the conduct of 
them. This the Progressists could not and would not under- 
stand. They had no intention of creating a republic, but they 
wished to reform their government after the English pattern, 
in which, as Bismarck said, " the monarchy serves as a grace- 
ful cupola to the edifice of state rather than as its main sus- 
taining column." Woe to the country in our time that under- 
takes to imitate English institutions ! 

The United States and Great Britain enjoy exceptional ad- 
vantages from their geographical positions. American poli- 
ticians are just beginning to find out that international politics 
is a science by itself, and one which heretofore they have had 
small occasion to study. During the Civil War our foreign 
relations were so admirably managed by Secretary Seward 
that they scarcely attracted public attention ; but Seward 
spent nearly a year in Europe to make a special study of the 
subject, and was, moreover, a statesman of rare ability. So 
long as the British government maintains its supremacy at 
sea, its premiers can make blunders in foreign policy without 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

endangering the independence of England. It is quite other- 
wise on the continent of Europe, where nations and races are 
packed together like sardines in a box. There a diplomatic 
mistake has to be atoned for sometimes by succeeding gener- 
ations ; and of all European states Prussia holds the most 
difficult position, being surrounded by all the others, with an 
extended frontier to defend, for which its population was for- 
merly quite inadequate. The experience of Poland, Italy, and, 
in ancient times, of the kingdom of Antigonus, has shown that 
such nations are in danger of being divided up between neigh- 
boring states. It is, therefore, more important in Prussia than 
elsewhere that men should be at the helm of government who 
have had training and experience in foreign affairs ; and this 
can only be obtained, like a sound knowledge of foreign lan- 
guages, by residing a certain length of time in the capitals of 
other countries. Bismarck plainly told the leaders of the 
Progressists in the Landtag that they were not properly 
qualified to administer the affairs of government. " You 
wish," he said, " to remodel our constitution according to the 
English pattern ; but we have not the class of people in Ger- 
many to draw upon for practical statesmen that they have in 
England, where they are often bred to it for generations." 
Alexander Hamilton in America, and, thirty years later, 
Hegel in Germany, pointed out that, although the corruption 
in English elections was much to be deplored, it had the ad- 
vantage of maintaining in office a sufficient number of expe- 
rienced statesmen. This is also true of the United States 
Senate, without any bribery; but the Prussian Landtag in 
1862 was of a different complexion. The Landtag might be 
compared to the French Chamber of Deputies during the last 
years of the eighteenth century, when the French had obtained 
their liberty, but knew not how to make use of it. English 
parliamentary government is a growth of centuries, and can- 
not be imitated in a few years. It was a favorite saying of 
Bismarck that ""Germany, once in the saddle, would learn to 
ride ;" but it would first have to serve an apprenticeship. 
The object of the Progressists was not national, but particu- 
larist. Bismarck, intensely practical as he was, had always 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

the vision of a united Germany, powerful and respected by all 
nations, floating before his eyes ; and to this end his position 
as president, his devotion to the king, and even his Prussian 
patriotism only served as means. He was always more of 
a German than a Prussian, and this the Progressists were not. 
At the university Bismarck was republican, but he became a 
monarchist because he saw clearly that it was the only prac- 
tical course for him. If, instead, he had joined the Pro- 
gressists, he might not have been so prominent and influential 
as Twesten, Lasker, and other popular agitators. 

The conflict was not more between the king and the Land- 
tag than between the Landtag and the House of Peers. Ac- 
cording to the constitution, the right of raising taxes and of 
granting recruits for the army was vested in the Landtag, but 
the House of Peers was obliged to concur with its estimates 
before they could go to the king for approval. The Landtag 
wished to reduce the term of service from four to two years, 
and cut down the appropriations for the army accordingly. 
This, in the face of Louis Napoleon's piratical policy and the 
hostile attitude of the Austrian government, was altogether 
too great a risk, and the House of Peers returned the bill to 
the Landtag for reconsideration. The anger of the majority 
in the popular assembly was so much the greater at this 
action, because it was an exigency which they had never con- 
templated. After a stormy debate they absolutely refused to 
change the estimates, and thus a deadlock took place between 
the two legislative bodies, which left the government without 
legal means of raising taxes for its continued existence. The 
king offered as a compromise to reduce the army estimates 
by four million thalers ; but beyond that he declared he could 
not go. The Landtag treated his message with scorn. Then 
Bismarck declared in full Senate that he would govern without 
appropriations, and levy such taxes as the exigencies of the 
government required. Prussia was practically in a state of 
revolution. 

Such a condition of affairs had not been contemplated in 
the constitution, and there were no provisions that could be 
made to apply to it. Each side considered itself in the right, 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

and when Bismarck proceeded to make good his promise he 
was attacked with the most violent abuse by the Progressist 
newspapers, besides continually receiving letters with threats 
of assassination. He may have cared little for the invectives 
of his opponents, but he rightly concluded that inflammatory 
editorials were stirring up the minds of unbalanced men to 
desperate deeds. The Prussian constitution guaranteed free- 
dom of speech, but it had also provided that in times of great 
public excitement the ministry might exercise a censorship 
over the press. 1 Bismarck had this law enforced in a strin- 
gent manner. Public indignation could now find an outlet 
only in the Landtag, where the debate became continually 
more acrimonious. 

At this juncture Bismarck's determination carried his policy 
through against the opposition of the public, the parliament, 
the royal family, and the majority of his colleagues. It was 
a single will pitted against the spirit of the age. William I. 
was never known to retract a policy to which he had once 
committed himself, but Bismarck could only depend on his 
active support so long as he was within reach. On September 
30, 1862, the minister-president made a speech before the 
Committee on Appropriations which has become historical. 
He pointed out that the very configuration of Prussia, as it 
was then, necessitated a larger proportionate military force than 
that of other European nations. His expression was, " a suit 
of armor too large for the weak body ;" that for its future se- 
curity the Prussian military organization would have to be ex- 
tended over all German-speaking people ; and " that in order 
to secure this, they must place the greatest possible weight of 
blood and iron in the king's hands." This was the first inti- 
mation which Bismarck gave to the public of his future policy, 
and even his most devoted adherents were startled by it. 
" The suit of armor too large for the weak body," and the 
policy of " blood and iron," penetrated to every corner of 
Germany. 

1 Curiously enough, a similar censorship was exercised in the United States at 
this time. 

90 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

The king was at Baden-Baden with his wife, and the effect 
of this speech on the royal pair may be judged from the fact 
that the king immediately telegraphed his return to Berlin, 
and requested Bismarck to meet him on the way. When 
Bismarck found him, quite alone, in an ordinary first-class 
coupe, the king seemed wholly unnerved, and commenced 
with the pertinent question, " Where is all this going to lead 
us?" He then talked of revolutions, decapitations, — the fate 
of Louis XVI. and Charles I. Bismarck judged correctly 
that this mental condition was the result of the queen's influ- 
ence, and knew how to counteract it. He appealed to the 
king's esprit du corps as a soldier. " What do you wear a 
sword for, your Majesty ? Are you afraid to die an honorable 
death ? Your Majesty is bound to fight : you cannot capitu- 
late." Arguing in this strain, he soon dispelled the witchcraft 
meshes which had been woven about the old Hohenzollern ; 
and by the time the train reached Berlin, the king's mind was 
prepared not only to give his premier a confident support, but 
to show a bold front to the doubtful and more timid members 
of the ministry. 

Bismarck's position was not without danger from the stand- 
point of legal procedure. The Landtag had already passed a 
resolution, by 274 to 45, that the ministers were responsible 
with their persons and fortunes for unconstitutional expendi- 
ture. This meant for Bismarck, in case of failure, imprison- 
ment and confiscation. His friends even advised him to make 
over the estate at Kniephof to his brother, in order to prevent 
its alienation. To do this, however, would have been an evi- 
dence of weakness, and Bismarck knew the importance of 
preserving a confident tone to his own party and a bold front 
to his opponents. He played for the whole stake, — a Napo- 
leonic game, — and the more daring opposition papers had 
already predicted that he would yet be seen picking oakum 
in felon's clothes. 

The disaffection within the royal family reached the point 
of insubordination when on June 4, 1863, the crown prince, 
who had gone to Dantzic to hold a review of the regiments 
there, in reply to an address by the civil authorities, expressed 

91 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

his regret that the policy which his father had adopted was at 
variance with public opinion. Of the proceedings which had 
brought this about he knew nothing ; he was absent, and had 
no part in the deliberations which had led to such a result. 
Sentiments like these, published in the Dantzic Times and 
copied in the London Times, were calculated to encourage a 
more determined opposition, if not open insurrection. On 
being requested by letter to make an explanation of his con- 
duct to the king, the crown prince made the situation worse 
by tendering the resignation of his position in the army, 
asking his father's forgiveness, and at the same time persisting 
in his opposition to the ministry. 

William I. was furious, and Bismarck was obliged to sum- 
mon up all his diplomatic talent to prevent a violent rupture 
and such severe treatment of the crown prince as the king 
might afterwards repent of. " Let your Majesty decide noth- 
ing in anger," he said. 1 William I., therefore, accepted his 
son's apology, declined his resignation, and cautioned him 
to be more prudent in future. The return which Bismarck 
received for this magnanimous consideration was a letter from 
the crown prince, two weeks later, censuring the policy of the 
ministry in the strongest terms : he would entreat the king to 
permit him to take no further part in its proceedings. This 
was characteristic of the man, who, like his mother, had rather 
a brilliant mind, but lacked clearness in his ideas. He never 
had possessed a voice in the councils of state, but was re- 
quested to attend them for the sake of instruction in political 
affairs. An editorial in the London Times, which congratu- 
lated the Prussian people on having so important a cham- 
pion, — a prince whose consort supported him in his liberal 
views, — gave to this miserable affair an international im- 
portance. 

Strange to say, after the king's anger had once cooled 
down, he permitted his son to continue in this wayward 
course all through the summer; but this may have happened 
because at that season he enjoyed the protection of his 

1 This is Bismarck's statement, and it is all we shall ever know. 
92 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

mother's tongue. In August the crown prince had an inter- 
view with Bismarck at Gastein, where " he spoke of his late 
behavior as one conscious of a native want of independence, 
and full of veneration for his father ; modestly and gracefully 
tracing his error to its source in his imperfect political train- 
ing." Yet early in September he wrote Bismarck a chilling 
letter in which he declared himself the determined foe of the 
ministry. Bismarck obtained another audience with him 
which narrowly escaped ending in an explosion of temper ; 
and then the king took the matter seriously in hand. With 
Bismarck's assistance he made out a schedule of directions 
for his son's future guidance, by which he made him clearly 
to understand what his proper position was in the govern- 
ment, and the extent to which he might be permitted to criti- 
cise the ministry with due consideration for his royal father. 1 
The crown prince appears to have accepted this as a guide 
for his future conduct, and to have caused the ministry little 
further annoyance. 

How long this strange conflict would have continued be- 
tween a visionary majority and a practical minority, and what 
would have been the final issue of it, would be fruitless to 
conjecture. Perhaps it was fortunate for Bismarck that exter- 
nal politics came to his assistance, and by developing his 
diplomatic skill and enlarging his reputation, won for him the 
confidence of the Prussian people in his management of 
affairs. 

It was not long before his magnetic influence was felt in 
the foreign affairs of Prussia. He knew that all that was 
required to make the state respected abroad was a determined 
attitude and a well-disciplined army. 2 It was perhaps owing 
to his resolute position that the Hessians were encouraged to 
try conclusions again with their wicked old elector. It is not 
likely that Bismarck fomented the slight disturbances in Cassel 
during the winter of 1863, — he was much too busy at home, 

1 Bismarck's Memoirs, i. 358. 

2 In the light of subsequent events it is almost impossible to understand the 
suicidal attitude of the national assembly. Prussia evidently required an army 
equal in force to that of France or Austria. 

93 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

— but at their first appearance he sent a notification to Kur- 
Hessen that the interests of Prussia required that he should 
change his ministry, and mend his ways in other respects. 
Bismarck, like Richelieu, always began with an attempt at 
conciliation. If that failed, his blow was sudden and crush- 
ing. Kur-Hessen looked for assistance from Austria, but 
Francis Joseph could no longer obtain the intervention of 
Russia, and after Solferino he felt no desire to survey another 
battle-field. Kur-Hessen was obliged to submit, and if Bis- 
marck was now unpopular in Berlin, he was all the more 
popular among the Hessians. Nor could right-minded men 
all over Germany refuse him their respect for this summary 
act of justice. In England, on the contrary, as Kur-Hessen 
was related to the English royal family, the affair was repre- 
sented as a high-handed piece of Prussian tyranny. 

The Italian revolution had also produced its reflection in 
Poland. The insurrections in Russian Poland were hopeless 
from the beginning and easily suppressed. As Bismarck 
always maintained, the liberation of Poland could only be 
accomplished through a European convulsion. English edi- 
tors poured out their ink in virtuous indignation against 
Bismarck as the coadjutor of Russian despotism, — the real 
grievance being a treaty with Alexander, which they rightly 
suspected might cover more ground than the French and 
English cabinets had information of. Bismarck knew that 
England was too much concerned with the American ques- 
tion to run the risk of a European complication, and paid no 
attention to the remonstrances of the British government. 
Speaking of the Polish insurrection of 1863, Von Beust says 
in his memoirs : z _ 

" On the other hand, one must remember what Bismarck was at 
that time. The game, played with such brilliant success, of mis- 
leading the world by telling it sincerely in advance what he in- 
tended doing, was thus only in its first stage when both great and 
small states all looked on him as a restless spirit, possibly dan- 
gerous, but unlikely to remain long in power. By the general 

1 Vol. i. p. 221. 
94 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

public, with the exception of the ultra-conservatives, he was not 
only underestimated, but also thoroughly disliked. That was the 
time when, as he said to me during one of our conversations at 
Salzburg, people spat on the ground when he passed. Bismarck's 
unpopularity, however, was the least of the evils he had to contend 
against. A wise man does not value popularity highly, and a brave 
man never fears its reverse." 

The course of the Austrian government from 1863 to 1866 
can only be ascribed to an infatuation. The purblind Schauen- 
stein had been succeeded by an equally purblind Karolyi, 
who continued the anti-Prussian policy of his predecessors, 
despite the loss of Lombardy and the alienation of the Rus- 
sian court. There is reason to believe that Pius IX. and his 
Jesuit counsellor, Antonelli, had a hand in this, as it is well 
known that they exerted an influence on the French empress 
and her party previous to the Franco- German war. Prussia 
was the only Protestant power on the continent, and could 
Prussia once be placed in the vocative some progress, at least, 
would have been gained by the Church of Rome towards the 
re-establishment of its former supremacy. The Jesuits ex- 
pelled from Austria, France, and Spain during the middle of 
the eighteenth century found an asylum in the dominions of 
Frederick the Great, but after the wars of Napoleon they had 
returned to their former habitations, and were as active in in- 
triguing as ever. 

The anti-Prussian policy was fratricidal, and could only end 
by dividing the German house against itself. Even Machia- 
velli could have satisfied Francis Joseph on that point, but the 
Austrian emperor and Karolyi counted on the internal dis- 
sensions of Prussia, and felt confident of their majority in the 
Frankfort Diet. As Von Beust says, they considered Bis- 
marck the creature of a day, who would soon come to the 
end of his rope, and be replaced by a more pliant and con- 
ciliatory minister. They vainly believed that the majority of 
the Diet carried with it an authority equal to its pretensions. 
The victories of Frederick the Great were supposed to have 
been due to his exceptional genius, and it was not likely that 
the Prussians would find another general to match him. The 

95 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

Prussian army had not seen active service since 1815, while 
Austrian veterans had fought in Italy and Hungary. Foolish 
illusions, and not much to the credit of Francis Joseph, who 
counted as little on Prussian patriotism as he did on Von 
Moltke and the needle-gun. 

Von Moltke had assured Bismarck that he could crush 
Austria at a moment's notice : all that he required was a full 
complement of men for his regiments. Bismarck, therefore, 
assumed a bold attitude. He informed Count Karolyi that 
the present behavior of Austria towards Prussia was un- 
friendly, and if continued could only result in a suspension of 
diplomatic relations. The count replied that the Austrian 
government could not relinquish its traditional influence on 
the German states ; and with this cool assertion of superiority 
the negotiation ended -1 

This is Bismarck's own statement, and if correct, Karolyi's 
answer was evasive, and quite unlikely to promote a good 
understanding between the two governments. It is difficult 
to obtain the truth in regard to this international discussion, 
much of which was carried on by personal interviews, and is 
now unsupported by documentary evidence. We may suppose, 
however, that Professor Miiller, of Tubingen, would be likely 
to give an unprejudiced account of it; for if any portion of 
Europe can be considered neutral ground in politics it is the 
duodecimo kingdom of Wiirtemberg. As South Germans 
the Wurtembergers stand in a certain dread of Prussia, and 
their religion interferes with their being in complete sympathy 
with Austria, while their immunity from invasion prevents 
that hostility towards the French which is felt in Baden. 
Miiller's account of the negotiations between Bismarck and 
Karolyi agrees substantially with that of Bismarck's biog- 
rapher. We know, at least, what Bismarck's propositions 
were to the congress of princes which Francis Joseph sum- 
moned at Gastein in September, 1863, and they cannot be 
considered unreasonable, if any concessions were to be made 
at all to Prussia in the interest of peace and harmony. They 



1 Hesekiel's Biography, p. 341. 
96 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

were substantially : the agreement of Prussia and Austria to 
be required for every war not undertaken in defence of German 
soil ; the perfect equality of Prussia and Austria in the gov- 
ernment for the arbitration of federal affairs, and a national 
representation to the Frankfort Diet of representatives chosen 
by the different states according to the ratio of their popula- 
tion, with more extensive powers than those of the present 
delegates. In the Diet as then constituted, Prussia, which 
contained one-third of the population of Germany, had no 
more electoral power than Cassel, which contained about a 
twentieth, and Bismarck's proposed modification would give 
the largest state in Germany more consideration, though 
never necessarily a majority. It would be certain to break up 
the existing cabal, and make the formation of a new one more 
difficult than formerly. It was met by Count Karolyi by a 
counter-proposition, which had the character of a blind alley, 
leading nowhere in particular, and evidently intended as a 
pretext for delay. The result of this was that King William 
declined to attend the congress of princes at Frankfort 
the following August, which accordingly dissolved without 
coming to any definite conclusions. The importance of Prus- 
sia in German affairs was at last becoming manifest. 1 

The quarrel in the Diet was mainly a question of tariff, but 
there was also an unlimited number of interstate regulations 
to be considered from session to session, and on both these 
subjects Prussia was always found in the minority. The vast 
portion of the Austrian empire is mainly agricultural, and, 



1 A characteristic instance in Austrian diplomacy was the embassy of Von 
Beust to Bismarck at Baden-Baden, in order to persuade William I. to put in an 
appearance at the congress. Bismarck received him cordially, but said, signifi- 
cantly, " You have come to drag us to destruction." Von Beust then suggested 
that if William I. would only come to Frankfort for a single day and plead 
indisposition, the congress would probably adjourn on the day following, but 
Bismarck was not to be caught in such a trap as that. " What you say," he re- 
plied, "is probable enough, but not certain." Dr. Busch was on hand to note 
down the conversation, portions of which Von Beust afterwards repudiated as 
pure inventions of the enemy. Without questioning the sincerity of either 
party it is enough to say that a diary written at the time is better testimony than 
the memoirs of after years. 

7 97 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

though it was a disadvantage to the farmers, the government 
wished to maintain moderately high duties on imports on 
account of the revenue which it derived from them. The 
same was true of the smaller inland states, like Bavaria, Wiir- 
temberg, and Saxony. Prussia was the only large state 
which possessed an extensive commerce, and its people were 
inclined to free trade. In such cases there ought to- be a 
compromise if possible. The German navy, which was of 
some advantage to Prussia, but little enough to Austria, 
caused a great deal of dissension during the first session of 
the Diet after the revolution had subsided, and the majority 
voted to dispose of it the following year. Such grievances 
do not seem of themselves sufficient to justify the resort to 
arms, but continued during a term of years the evil increases 
at compound interest until they form an intolerable burden. 

Bismarck followed up his contemptuous treatment of the 
congress of princes by concluding with the French govern- 
ment a commercial treaty on behalf of Prussia, Mecklenburg, 
and a few smaller states, equally advantageous to both parties, 
but in direct violation of the authority of the Diet. This was 
practically nullification, and must inevitably have resulted in 
war between Austria and Prussia, or in the secession of the 
latter and the formation of a confederacy with the states that 
adhered to it. In his circular note of January, 1863, to the 
German states, Bismarck had said, " In order to bring about 
a better understanding I took the initiative and informed 
Count Karolyi that, according to my conviction, our relations 
with Austria must unavoidably change for the better or the 
worse. It is the sincere wish of the royal government that 
the former alternative should arise ; but if we should not be 
met by the imperial cabinet with the necessary advances as 
we could desire, it will be necessary for us to contemplate the 
other alternative and prepare for it accordingly ." The relations 
of Prussia and Austria were now changing for the worse, but 
Count Karolyi found his diplomatic grave at the Frankfort 
congress of princes, which, without the King of Prussia, 
proved to be like a cart left without its horse. His successor, 
Count Rechberg, showed a more conciliatory disposition to- 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

wards the Prussian state, and it is possible, though not prob- 
able, that he might have succeeded in averting the impending 
catastrophe, but for an event which unsettled the balance of 
power in Germany and introduced a series of changes of the 
grandest character. 



99 



CHAPTER V 

SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN 

The time of retribution was now approaching for the 
brutality of the Danes in their German provinces. Lord John 
Russell is credited with having said that he never knew but 
two persons who understood the Schleswig-Holstein ques- 
tion, and he evidently did not understand it himself. These 
duchies had never been an integral portion of Denmark, but 
were inherited by a Danish king some time during the Middle 
Ages, after the manner of landed estates. Their inhabitants 
spoke a broad kind of German, and always felt a lively an- 
tagonism towards their seafaring neighbors. Now, according 
to English and Danish law, political rights could be inherited 
by females, but according to the German law they could not. 
We have seen that in 1848 the male line of Danish sovereigns 
became extinct, and according to German usage the two 
duchies would revert properly to the Duke of Augustenburg, 
but the Danes very naturally did not agree to this. The 
London conference, which settled the question at that time, 
confirmed the new King of Denmark's possession of Schles- 
wig and Holstein, but on condition that they should not be 
incorporated in Denmark proper. The Duke of Augusten- 
burg never acquiesced in this decision, nor would the German 
people have submitted to it, had it not been supported by 
Russia and Austria. 

The new Danish king, Frederick VII., encouraged by the 
opposition of the English ministry to Bismarck, and em- 
boldened by the continued dissensions of Germany, had an 
act of incorporation for Schleswig passed by his parliament 
in the autumn of 1863, and was on the point of signing it 
when he suddenly died ; and this nullification of the London 
congress was completed by his successor, Christian IX., who 
soon discovered the difference between the professions of 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

Lord John Russell and the heart of the German people. The 
Schleswig-Holstein question suddenly became a popular 
movement, like the war of liberation in 1813. Max Miiller/ 
has given us in one of his essays an interesting account of 
the campaign songs that were sung for the liberation of the 
two duchies. 1 Even the moribund Diet at Frankfort was 
carried off its feet in the general enthusiasm, and, without 
considering the protest of the Austrian delegate, passed reso- 
lutions denouncing the action of the Danish government as a 
violation of the treaty of London ; and as this produced no 
improvement of the situation, on the 7th of December the 
Diet enacted a decree that the Kings of Saxony and Hanover 
should take possession of Holstein with a force of six thou- 
sand men each, and that the Austrian and Prussian govern- 
ments should maintain a reserve on the border of the province 
in case the Saxon and Hanoverian army should not succeed 
in repulsing the Danes. A more ineffectual and absurd ar- 
rangement could not well be imagined. 

" To be politically great," says Froude, " is to recognize a 
popular movement, and have the courage and address to lead 
it." What Bismarck's plans were before the Schleswig-Hol- 
stein question appeared on the stage will probably never be 
known. In the whirl of events which followed he may have 
forgotten them himself. We can perceive in retrospect that 
his one object was the elevation of Prussia from the depressed 
condition in which his country was suffering, and he made 



1 " German Honor and German Earth. 

" Spring, 1848. 

" There came soldiers across the Elbe, — 
Hurrah, hurrah, to the North ! 
They came as thick as wave on wave, 
And like a field full of corn. 
******* 
Good day, ye Holsten, on German soil ! 
Good day, ye Friesians, on the German sea, 
To live and to die for German honor, — 
Thus wanders and marches the host." 

A/titter's Chips, vol. iii. p. 134. 
101 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

everything else bend to this purpose. Great statesmen, how- 
ever, do not make definite plans, but suit themselves to cir- 
cumstances as they arise. They allow themselves to be ruled 
neither by circumstances nor by such plans as they have 
already formed, but hold an even course like a sea-captain, 
who pays more regard to the safety of his vessel than to the 
time which he spends upon his voyage. The statements that 
have been made, that Bismarck predicted the course of events 
between 1862 and 1866, are not worthy of credit, especially 
as they come from his political opponents. Count Vizthum, 
who was minister of Saxony to England during this period, 
says that the leader of the opposition in Parliament informed 
him that Bismarck came to London in 1862 to explain his 
future policy as minister-president to her Majesty's govern- 
ment, with such a statement of it as it would be easy enough 
to write ten years later. Memoirs are always poor historical 
evidence ; but how Count Vizthum could expect a fairly in- 
telligent public to believe such a transparent absurdity as this 
it is not easy to comprehend. It presupposes not only that 
Bismarck was a sufficient fool to divulge his plans in advance 
to the friends of his adversaries, but that the British ministry 
should have been equally foolish in divulging them to their 
own adversaries. Nicht moglich, as the Germans say. 1 

To solve the Schleswig-Holstein problem was Bismarck's 
immediate task, and it was like walking Niagara on the tight- 
rope, — one misstep, and he was gone forever. The people of 
Holstein held an enormous meeting, in which they offered 
themselves as subjects to the Duke of Augustenburg, whose 
title to the duchies was now under legal scrutiny. The 
question was, however, if the duke obtained possession, would 
he be able to support himself in the new state of Augustenburg 
against a Danish attack ? If not, Prussia, as his nearest 
neighbor, would inevitably be called upon to support him ; 
and what advantage would Prussia derive from the blood and 

1 In the same category maybe placed Lord Ampthill's statement that Bis- 
marck told him that he had " always managed to talk over, if not to convince, 
his royal master." Bismarck would never have made an English lord the re- 
pository of so undiplomatic a secret. The statement is malicious. 

102 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

treasure expended for his benefit ? Another problem was 
whether the Saxon and Hanoverian army could conquer the 
two duchies from Denmark, and if so, what benefit would 
Saxony and Hanover derive from their exertion ? Nothing 
for nothing is the principle in politics as in law. Bismarck 
doubted the success of either scheme. If the work was not 
done effectually at this time, it would remain an open griev- 
ance and a stumbling-block for Prussia in the future. He 
was determined to have the affair settled once for all. 

He negotiated with Rechberg, who appears to have been of 
the same opinion, though in fact there was only one course open 
to him. Bismarck told him that if Austria would unite with 
Prussia, well and good ; otherwise Prussia would undertake 
the affair alone. It was a game of " heads I win, tails you 
lose ;" and yet it could not be said that it was a game of Bis- 
marck's invention. The Diet (which was established for Aus- 
tria's benefit) had drawn Austria into a net from which there 
was no escape, except by playing this game for Prussia's advan- 
tage. In order to have a voice in the distribution of the con- 
quered territory the Vienna cabinet decided to join Prussia in 
an invasion of the two duchies, though Rechberg must have 
perceived his own fate before him from that moment. A force 
of fifty thousand men was considered necessary for the pur- 
pose, and this in itself shows how inadequate were the pro- 
visions of the Diet. The Danish army numbered between 
thirty and forty thousand. 

There was only one way in which such a campaign could 
end, with two great powers on one side and a small one on 
the other. The Danes screamed aloud to England for assist- 
ance, but high-toned denunciations of Bismarck in the London 
papers were the only succor they received. Nevertheless, the 
campaign was rather a difficult one. General Wrangel, who 
had fought against Napoleon in 1813, was commander of the 
allied forces, but the real leader of the Prussians was Prince 
Frederick Charles of Hohenzollern, one of the toughest fight- 
ers of the nineteenth century. 1 The national assembly re- 

1 It is to be regretted that his character as a man was not equal to his ability. 
He commanded in more than a dozen engagements, and always with success. 

103 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

fused to grant the necessary funds even for this patriotic war, 
but Bismarck paid no attention to that. The allies entered 
Schleswig, the more northerly province, driving the Danes 
before them. Finally the Danish commander made a stand 
at the two fortresses of Duppel and Fridericia, but Frederick 
Charles stormed the former, though considered impregnable, 
and the latter was evacuated. The allies then advanced into 
Jutland, and occupied the mainland of Denmark without 
much opposition. 

Napoleon III. may have concluded that so long as Prussia 
and Austria were united it was best for him to keep as quiet 
as possible, but the English ministry now interfered to pre- 
vent further bloodshed, and as the object of the war had been 
accomplished, there was no reason why this request should 
not be considered. Another London conference ensued, but 
came to no good. In fact, the Danes were their own worst 
enemies from first to last. It is surprising that Bismarck 
should have assented to the proposition that the two duchies 
should continue to be attached to the Danish crown, with 
permission to regulate their own internal affairs. Bismarck 
assented to it, but the Danish envoy would not. The Danes 
considered themselves inaccessible in their rock-bound islands, 
but Frederick Charles crossed Alsen Sound with his forces dur- 
ing the night of June 28 and succeeded in intrenching himself 
under the fire of the Danish batteries. During the course of 
the following day the Danes were defeated, their intrench- 
ments stormed, and they were driven back to the further ex- 
tremity of the island. The soldiers who performed these feats 
had never seen active service before, and it was evident that a 
Prussian was a Prussian still. Denmark was now reduced to 
Copenhagen and its adjacent islands. Christian IX. was com- 
pelled to sue for peace. 

This war, looked at from a distance, had the appearance of a 
cowardly oppression of the weak by the strong, and so it was 
considered in America at that time, but on close inspection 
we find in it a true popular movement corresponding to the 
conquests of Naples and Sicily by Garibaldi. Professor 
Muller states that Bismarck frowned upon it from the first, 

104 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

and this is not unlikely, for when such a movement begins 
there is no predicting what course it will finally take. Bis- 
marck's reticence, however, may have been like that of a man 
who sees an opportunity before him, on which he desires to 
wholly concentrate himself. It was predicted as soon as the 
war was finished that the victors would quarrel over the 
booty, and nobody was surprised when this came to pass. It 
is difficult to decide from the external facts of the negotiations 
which followed whether Bismarck wished to push Austria to 
the wall or not. He probably wished it, but might have 
hesitated if a common ground of agreement could have been 
discovered. It is doubtful if an arrangement satisfactory to 
the interests of both nations was possible. 

Meanwhile the useless Saxon-Hanoverian army had marched 
into Holstein without opposition. Bismarck insisted that as 
the Danes had now been driven out there was no occasion for 
its remaining there, and requested the two kings to withdraw 
their respective forces. As they did not acquiesce in this im- 
mediately, the King of Prussia concentrated strong bodies of 
troops on the borders of Hanover and Saxony, a threat which 
in due course of time proved effectual. Bismarck's propo- 
sition that the two duchies should be governed by a mixed 
Austrian and Prussian commission, while one province was 
occupied by Prussian forces and the other by Austrian, would 
seem to have been fair, but did not prove acceptable to the 
Austrian cabinet. The objection probably was that the Aus- 
trian troops thus employed would be shut in by the Prussians, 
and in case of war between the two nations would prove an 
easy capture. The claims of the Duke of Augustenburg were 
next considered. Bismarck, perhaps to gain time, employed 
a number of lawyers to look up his title, from which it ap- 
peared that he was heir to only a portion of the duchies, 
while the Duke of Oldenburg was heir to another portion, 
and that the King of Prussia also had a small claim. This 
was fine business for the lawyers, interesting business, and 
must have paid them well, but it did not help the solution of 
the problem. 

The people of Schleswig and Holstein, except the gentry 

105 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

of Lauenburg, declared for the Augustenburger, and he was 
accordingly invited to Berlin. It is supposed, with good 
reason, that if he had been willing to make an arrangement 
by which his army would become an integral portion of the 
Prussian army (like that of Brunswick, and, we believe, also 
Mecklenburg) he might have obtained the princely inheri- 
tance, but he was under the influence of Austria and the 
Frankfort Diet, and would agree to nothing which gave 
Prussia a political foothold in either Holstein or Schleswig, — 
thus losing his opportunity forever. 

Just before or after the battle of Sedan, Bismarck gave an 
off-hand account of his discussion with the Augustenburger, 
who was gallantly serving as an officer in the Bavarian army, 
on the Schleswig-Holstein proposals. " He might have done 
better for himself," Bismarck said, " if he had only been will- 
ing to make a few concessions. We wanted no more of him 
originally than the other princes conceded to us after the 
Bohemian campaign, but he was obdurate, — and I thanked 
goodness for it to myself, — and when I spoke of giving 
Prussia the right to Kiel harbor, he remarked that that was 
five square miles of water, a statement which, of course, I 
could not deny. He would make no military agreement 
with us, and so the negotiation came to an end without a 
result." It is likely enough that the Duke of Augustenburg 
was afraid to accept Bismarck's proposition lest it should in- 
volve him in difficulty with Austria, and he should become 
the centre of a conflict between two forces much beyond his 
power of control. If, however, he had taken his chances on 
the side of Prussia he might have done well for himself. 

The subsequent course of the Schleswig and Holstein set- 
tlement was like that of a river twisting and winding to find 
its way out from a mountainous country. It is tedious to 
follow it, and requires so much patience that we cannot but 
admire the endurance and assiduity of the diplomats who 
were engaged in it and struggled through it. It must have 
been specially trying to Bismarck, with his sleepless nights 
and a hostile parliament to contend with at the same time. 
He had, at least, gained something for Prussia by taking the 

1 06 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

question out of the Frankfort Diet and placing it before 
Francis Joseph in such a form that he must either accept or 
reject the Prussian proposals. Count Rechberg was replaced 
by Count Mensdorff-Pouilly, whose peculiar talent appears to 
have been that of procrastination. There could have been no 
advantage to Prussia in dragging out the negotiations to such 
a length, and the fact proves either that Bismarck was not 
desirous of precipitating a war or that he found in Count 
Mensdorff a wary and accomplished tactician. 

After some cautious skirmishing on both sides, in Feb- 
ruary, 1865, Bismarck sent a despatch to Count Mensdorff, 
in which, after taking notice of the fact that the Austrian gov- 
ernment had repeatedly asserted that neither of the pretending 
dukes (Augustenburg and Oldenburg) could support a claim 
to the whole of the two duchies, he goes on to explain the 
position of the Prussian government towards them as follows : 

" Both internally and externally considered, the constitution of 
the military system in that important country, which is our next- 
door neighbor, cannot but be of the greatest interest for us. It is 
an imperative duty to make the means of defence at the disposal of 
Schleswig-Holstein, especially on the sea, as useful as possible for 
Germany, and in commerce and trade Prussia and the duchies must 
naturally be most closely related to each other. No one can blame 
us if we regard these interests as of the first importance. We are only 
fulfilling a duty to Prussia and to Germany when we insist, before 
proceeding to any definitive decision, upon some guarantees for the 
security of these interests, and when we declare our unwillingness 
to be dependent upon the uncertain good-will of a future sovereign 
and his estates. ' ' x 

This communication may not have been unexpected, but it 
produced uneasiness and ill-feeling at Vienna. It showed 
only too plainly the inevitable drift of the Danish war, and 
that Bismarck had no intention of letting slip an opportunity 
which in its natural course would turn to the aggrandizement 
of Prussia. 



Von Sybel, iv. 56. 
107 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

" Prussia misjudges us," Mensdorff complained to Baron 
Werther. " You should not suppose that we envy you any 
aggrandizement ; only in that case we must obtain an equal 
equivalent for ourselves. This is indispensable in the present 
state of public opinion here." He then declared that the 
emperor had no partiality for the Augustenburger, who had 
several times broken his word to them. He then made a 
lengthy statement to Bismarck, which was little more than a 
reiteration of previous statements, ending with the conclusion 
that there was danger of open rupture between the two nations 
unless Prussia adopted the Austrian programme. " Our im- 
perative duty," said Mensdorff, " requires us to bring these 
negotiations to an end as speedily as possible." At the same 
time he proposed no adjustment of the question which could 
be satisfactory to the Prussian government. It is curious to 
see how both parties in this discussion make use of public 
opinion as a loop-hole of escape and as a last resort in argu- 
ment. Public opinion in Austria would not permit the 
aggrandizement of Prussia without an equivalent to Francis 
Joseph. Public opinion in Prussia could not allow the sur- 
render of Upper Silesia, which was the only equivalent which 
Austria could very well obtain ; * for an equal division of the 
Elbe duchies between the two nations would be too favorable 
geographically for Prussia. 

After a good deal more skirmishing, we find Mensdorff 
late in April proposing a united convention of the estates of 
Schleswig and Holstein, for the purpose of deciding their 
own political status. A discussion then ensued as to whether 
the delegates should be elected to the convention — which 
Bismarck approved on the ground of legality — according to 
the law of 1848, or the more liberal regulations of 1854; and 
Bismarck finally nullified the arrangement by advocating 
their election by universal suffrage. This was looked upon 
in Vienna as an amendment intended to defeat the motion, — 
and so it probably was. Nothing could be more hateful to 



1 One difficulty in the way of this was that the Silesians were Protestants and 
strongly objected to being placed under the Austrian government. 

108 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

Francis Joseph than the suggestion of universal suffrage. 
The Duke of Augustenburg still continued to reside in Hol- 
stein, and the joint motion of Austria and Prussia in the 
Frankfort Diet to have him ejected had been voted down by 
the smaller German states. Bismarck considered his with- 
drawal from the country essential to a fair election, but Mens- 
dorff deprecated the use of force, and would only agree to 
make an earnest protest to the duke for this purpose. 

After peace with Denmark had been declared, the govern- 
ment of the Elbe duchies had been placed in charge of an 
Austrian and a Prussian general as commissioners, who ad- 
ministered affairs in a dictatorial manner. As it was not con- 
sidered expedient that this should continue, a popular gov- 
ernment was organized, having its focus in Holstein for both 
states, and administered by a board of six councillors, while 
the commissioners retained a right of supervision, and served 
as a court of final appeal. This form of government was satis- 
factory to the people of Schleswig and Holstein ; but either 
the Austrian commissioner outwitted his Prussian colleague, 
or he was favored by public opinion, so that of the six coun- 
cillors chosen five proved to be partisans of the Augusten- 
burger. Thus the civil establishment of these two provinces 
was rapidly drifting into the Austrian channel, though the 
fortresses and military establishment were mainly under Prus- 
sian control. 

On May 29 King William held a grand council at the 
Schloss in Berlin, to consider the Schleswig- Holstein question, 
at which all of his ministers, as well as the crown prince, 
were present. The king presided and introduced the subject 
by remarking that the problem was a German as well as a 
Prussian question, and would have to be considered from both 
points of view ; that Prussia had made sacrifices in the late 
war which required compensation, and that Austria, with 
whom they had specially to deal, had never been left in doubt 
on that point. Bismarck followed, and called attention to the 
fact that previous to 1864 the relations between Denmark 
and Prussia had been sufficiently friendly, so that now the 
disadvantage of a hostile neighbor must be added to the 

IO9 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

loss of life and expenditure of money. Of the various plans 
proposed for the solution of the problem, only two seemed to 
him practicable. 

The first was that the two duchies should be surrendered 
to the Duke of Oldenburg, on condition that they should pay 
a war indemnity of eighty million thalers and place their 
military organization under the command of a Prussian 
general. The second was that Prussia should make a formal 
demand for the annexation of the provinces. This would 
probably result in a war with Austria ; but he believed that 
such a war was unavoidable so long as the Austrian gov- 
ernment persisted in its systematic policy of repressing the 
interests of Prussia. He considered the European situation 
was favorable for Prussia in the event of such a conflict, and 
if it was to come at all it ought to come soon. Von Moltke 
gave his opinion that annexation was the only salutary solu- 
tion for Prussia, and the crown prince supported the claim 
of the Augustenburger. 

It must be admitted that the only fair way to solve this 
complicated problem would have been for William I. to have 
surrendered Upper Silesia to Austria, and in return to have 
annexed the Elbe duchies. 

Unfortunately there was another question mixed up with 
this, — that of the hostile majority in the Frankfort Diet, which 
loaded it down like a phantom rider, and prevented a settle- 
ment. There was witchcraft in the broth. Even Bismarck's first 
proposition, which he had already advanced on February 22, 
was not unreasonable, — all circumstances considered, — though 
it afforded Prussia a decided increase of military power. The 
attitude of the crown prince was exceptional, and might be 
explained by his opposition to Bismarck, or by the influence 
of his English wife ; but in itself it amounted to a second 
Olmiitz, a surrender of every advantage which Prussia might 
have derived from a successful campaign. 

Such a consultation at Berlin would not seem likely to lead 
to a peaceable conclusion, and this feeling was increased by 
the continued residence of the Augustenburger in Holstein, 
and certain public agitations there, intended to advance his 

no 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

interests and supposed to be instigated by him. Accord- 
ingly, about the middle of July, Bismarck sent an ultimatum 
to the Austrian government, in which he said: 

"All negotiations concerning the future of the duchies are re- 
fused until authority is established there and all agitation done 
away with. When this is accomplished, Prussia will be ready to 
treat with Austria concerning the establishment of the Grand Duke 
of Oldenburg as sovereign. The candidacy of Augustenburg is en- 
tirely out of the question for us, so long as the hereditary prince 
persists in his attitude of usurpation." 

This brought Francis Joseph to his senses for the time 
being, and a meeting of the two monarchs, with their re- 
spective ministers, was hastily arranged for the 8th of August 
at Gastein in Upper Austria ; and there an agreement was 
concluded to the effect that Lauenburg should be ceded to 
Prussia for three million thalers, and that the rights of Aus- 
tria and Prussia in the remaining duchies should continue 
undetermined, though the government of Holstein was to be 
undertaken by Austria, and that of Schleswig by Prussia. 

It will be seen that nothing was positively decided by this 
arrangement except the disposition of Lauenburg. Count 
Belcredi, who had succeeded Mensdorff-Pouilly after the ro- 
tary fashion of the Austrian court, made another suggestion 
for Upper Silesia as a settlement of outstanding claims, but 
William and Bismarck would not listen to it. Bismarck had 
now the upper hand in the game, and played his cards ac- 
cordingly. General Manteuffel, who stood next to the min- 
ister-president in the king's estimation, was appointed gov- 
ernor of Schleswig, and General Gablenz, an equally astute 
official, was nominated for Holstein by Francis Joseph. The 
evident intention of the two monarchs was to preserve the 
peace, if possible ; but it was plain that the arrangement could 
not last, and the question everybody in Germany asked was, 
What will be the next scene in this political melodrama ? 

The stories that have been circulated in regard to an under- 
standing at this period between Napoleon III. and Bismarck 
have no documentary foundation, and are improbable in them- 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

selves. There was no necessity for such an understanding. 
The fact was that Bismarck was better informed in regard to 
French affairs than Napoleon himself. Von Moltke's spies 
had been everywhere through French territory, and had dis- 
covered that the grande armee was a chimera, — that Napoleon 
was not possessed at this time of a hundred thousand effi- 
cient troops, although he supposed that he had nearly twice 
as many. A portion of the French army was still in Mexico ; 
enlistments had been discontinued for the sake of economy, 
and gross frauds had been practised similar to those in the 
Austrian army previous to 1859. Bismarck knew that Napo- 
leon was not in a position to take the offensive, and it was this 
fact which made him so bold. 

Unfortunately for the nephew of the great Napoleon, the 
latter had written in his memoirs, " France is nothing without 
Belgium and the Rhine," and this statement was to Louis 
Napoleon like the words of a gospel. He had accomplished 
much, but this still remained to fill the measure of his glory. 
There has always been a sentimental opinion among the 
French that they have a right to the boundaries of ancient 
Gaul, but it is not the same description of right as that which 
Frederick II. claimed to lower Silesia, which had been given 
to his ancestors by the treaty of Westphalia and unjustly with- 
held from them by the Austrian emperors. It is impossible to 
consider such claims when they go behind the Dark Ages, — 
that long period of anarchy and confusion from which modern 
Europe emerged. Napoleon III. had slight chance of accom- 
plishing this final object so long as an alliance between Aus- 
tria and Prussia was possible. What he might have done 
safely enough, as Bismarck remarked afterwards, 1 " was to 
have taken possession of Belgium. He had nothing to fear 
except from England, and not much there." So long as the 
liberal ministry were in power at Westminster the British 
government would not have been likely to interfere with him, 
nor could the British government have expelled the French 
from Belgium without the co-operation of some continental 

1 Bismarck in the Franco-Prussian War. 
112 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

power. The Belgians speak French, and it requires an expe- 
rienced foreigner to distinguish a citizen of Brussels from a 
Parisian. The province would have been five times as valu- 
able to France as Rhenish Prussia, but Napoleon did not see 
this opportunity. His eyes were fixed on the German quar- 
rel, which he hoped to take advantage of to get possession 
of Luxemburg and Cologne. 

After the Gastein convention Bismarck was rewarded with 
the title of count, which, at least, placed him on an equality 
with most of his colleagues. To men of the grand sort such 
honors are small compensation. It did not help to remove 
the difficulties before him, and the following winter (1866) 
was the toughest of his life. He felt the impending conflict, 
and all Germans felt it, as we felt the same thing in America 
during the last months of Buchanan's administration. The 
Progressists in the National Assembly gave him more diffi- 
culty than ever, — men infatuated with an idea, and that an 
impracticable one : intoxicated with it as they might have 
been with brandy. They would pass no appropriations, and 
Bismarck was in the same position as Julius Caesar when he 
borrowed of every banker in Rome in order to obtain the 
consulship. It did not require a Bismarck to foresee that 
such a course was ruin both to himself and to the king unless 
he should meet with complete success. The royal family 
perceived this, and opposed him as energetically as the Na- 
tional Assembly. The queen may have been influenced by 
her near relationship to the Augustenburger, but this was not 
likely to have affected the crown prince. 

The king, however, remained firm, and Bismarck received 
strong support from Von Moltke, the chief of staff, and Von 
Roon, the scarcely less distinguished minister of war. These 
were the men whom William I. trusted before all others, and 
they knew those state secrets which were not divulged even 
in the royal family, and which Bismarck counted on for suc- 
cess. His consultations with Moltke and Roon in the garden 
adjoining his house in Berlin during the spring of 1866 de- 
cided some of the most important events of modern times. 

The great marshal and the great chancellor never became 
8 113 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

warm friends, and yet they acted together for the most part 
in such perfect concert that it might have been supposed that 
they had only one purpose and one mind. 

Meanwhile the situation in Holstein and Schleswig was be- 
coming gradually worse. The Holstein nobility seem to 
have disliked the Austrian government, and many of them 
signed a petition to William I. to have the province incorpo- 
rated with Prussia. Bismarck may have instigated this, but 
they certainly would not have done it at his bidding. At the 
same time the Austrians encouraged demonstrations for the 
Augustenburger, and when the wife of his eldest son went on 
a journey through the province ovations were tendered to her 
at the railway stations, with expressions of the liveliest political 
sympathy. 1 This contagion spread over the border of Schles- 
wig, but did not develop there to any considerable extent; 
a fact which indicates that it was encouraged by General 
Gablenz, the Austrian commander in Holstein, and repressed 
by General Manteuffel, who commanded in Schleswig. Both 
sides were intriguing, and the advantage was in favor of 
Austria, but this very fact gave Prussia a diplomatic advan- 
tage. The petition of a few nobles came to nothing, while 
the agitation in favor of the Augustenburger continued. 

The Altona incident may be taken as an example of the 
whole affair. The leaders of the Augustenburg party ar- 
ranged for a grand mass-meeting at Altona, in Holstein, for 
the 23d of January, 1866, at which noted speakers from 
Frankfort, Hesse, and Bavaria were to be present. The pros- 
pectus of the meeting was openly circulated in both duchies, 
and General Manteuffel notified General Gablenz that it was 
contrary to the treaty of Gastein, and requested him to inter- 
fere to prevent it. Gablenz promised to do this, but after- 
wards permitted the rally to take place on condition that no 
definite resolutions should be adopted by the assembly. This 
technical point was adhered to, but several of the speakers 
made violent attacks on the Prussian government, and the 



1 Von Sybel, iv. 291. 
114 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

meeting dissolved with three rousing cheers for the Duke of 
Augustenburg. 1 

To Bismarck this was like a challenge to fight. Not only 
the convention of Gastein had been openly disregarded, but a 
high Prussian official had been hoodwinked in order to carry 
out this revolutionary scheme. Bismarck wrote to the Prus- 
sian ambassador at Vienna three days later with the request 
that he should bring his statement to the notice of Francis 
Joseph : " The Altona meeting has been held under the pro- 
tection of the Austrian double-eagle, and has been permitted 
to make exactly the same attacks upon Prussia that the 
Frankfort Confederate Diet ventured to make, and on ac- 
count of which the free city received a rebuke from Austria. 
Prussia cannot suffer Holstein to become in this way a home 
of revolutionary sentiments, nor that pledge to deteriorate 
which was confidently placed in Austria's hands at the Gas- 
tein treaty. Such occurrences as these," continued the de- 
spatch, " cannot help weakening and subverting that feeling 
which his Majesty has long and fondly cherished, — the 
conviction that the two German powers naturally belong 
together." 

The manner in which Mensdorff treated this frank and 
manly despatch was characteristic of Austrian diplomacy. 
He represented to Werther, the Prussian ambassador, that he 
was greatly concerned at the Altona incident, was dissatisfied 
with the conduct of Gablenz, and had already sent a reproof 
to him for his action on that occasion. Having administered 
this sop to William I., a week later he sent a despatch to 
Bismarck which contained the following statement : 

" Prussia has, in making her complaint about the Altona meet- 
ing, evidently forgotten that it was her own government that once 
rejected the proposal of Austria to bring forward in the Confedera- 
tion a motion prohibiting all such meetings throughout Germany. 
Austria recognizes her duty only so far as to preserve the substance 
of the treaty undiminished. Moreover, the conduct of the Austrian 
government in Holstein depends only upon its own promptings, etc. 

1 Von Sybel, iv. 303. 
"5 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

The same independence is also recognized and conceded to the 
royal Prussian government in Schlesvvig." 

This asserted in substance that while Francis Joseph ex- 
pected Prussia to respect the convention of Gastein, he in- 
tended to administer the affairs of Holstein according to the 
understanding of the Frankfort convention of 1864, or, prac- 
tically, in any manner that suited his interest. The despatch 
was at once an assertion of the Gastein treaty and a repudia- 
tion of it, and proves conclusively that if the convention was 
a temporary makeshift on the part of Bismarck, it was not 
considered more seriously by the Austrian government. If 
Bismarck had been intriguing in Holstein, Mensdorff was 
quite ready to meet him half-way in that line of business. 
We do not hear of any complaint of Bismarck in this contro- 
versy, and it is quite possible that the petition of the Holstein 
nobility was a mere offset to the incipient stages of the Au- 
gustenburg agitation. General Manteuffel, whose character, 
in spite of his name, vies with that of Von Moltke, governed 
Schleswig in an exceptional manner, and if there was a party 
to the Gastein convention who wished for peace, and sincerely 
desired to observe it, it was the old King William I. Men of 
his time of life are not inclined to go to war, and his reluc- 
tance to do so is admitted by Bismarck himself. 

What an opportunity this would have been for Cavour ! But 
Cavour was sleeping in dull, cold marble, and his successor, 
the wily La Marmora, was a man of a different stamp. He 
played fast and loose with Bismarck, and, feeling himself 
indispensable, tried to obtain more than the lion's share. 
Bismarck would hear of no claim beyond Venetia for Italy as 
the reward of a successful campaign ; the Italian Tyrol was not 
to be thought of. Then La Marmora intrigued at the Aus- 
trian court, hoping to frighten Francis Joseph by the threat 
of a Prussian alliance. Then the Roumanian revolution 
occurred, and he advised with Louis Napoleon as to the pos- 
sibility of an exchange of Venetia for Roumania on the part 
of Austria. Napoleon thought this might be possible, and 
issued a circular note to the powers ; but here the Tsar Alex- 

116 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

ander interfered and set down his foot that the thing should 
not be done, — he would first go to war. Bismarck was well 
aware of all this, endured it, and worried through it all as a 
lawyer does with a lucrative but unreliable client ; and when 
La Marmora discovered at length that he could not have his 
cake and eat it too, he came round to Bismarck's position ; and 
on April 8, 1866, an offensive and defensive alliance between 
the Prussian and Italian governments was signed by Bismarck 
and the Italian envoy at Berlin. This may be considered the 
commencement of the war between Prussia and Austria. 



117 



CHAPTER VI 

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1 866 

Negotiations with Italy involved also negotiations with 
Napoleon III., whom Bismarck might otherwise have left as 
much out of his account as he did the English ministry. 
There was a perpetual alliance between the Italian and French 
governments, and Victor Emmanuel held to it with a chival- 
rous fidelity which shames the diplomacy of his premier. He 
would take no step forward without asking Napoleon's ad- 
vice, so that consulting the French oracle came to be like 
consulting the oracle of Delphi. As a consequence every 
move on the Berlin chess-board which affected the govern- 
ment at Florence produced an almost immediate counter- 
move at Paris. According to all accounts Napoleon was 
amiability itself; he approved of the cession of Venetia to 
Italy, and the retention of the two duchies by Prussia, with- 
out suggesting any special compensation for France and him- 
self; but Bismarck was too well acquainted with Louis Napo- 
leon to place any great confidence in this. On one occasion 
Napoleon hinted to Baron Goltz, the Prussian envoy, that a 
slight consideration for his good-will would be acceptable, 
and Goltz explained to him the difficulty of changing the 
German frontier, though a matter immaterial to Prussia, on 
account of the strong national sentiment in Germany, and 
Napoleon replied, " You have done your country a great ser- 
vice in clearing up any misunderstandings in that respect." 
Bismarck's despatch to Goltz of February 20 speaks, at all 
events, in no uncertain tone : 

"Although I quite agree with your Excellency that after a rup- 
ture with Austria had already taken place we could hardly secure 
the support of France upon other than very onerous conditions, yet 
it seems to me as difficult as it would be dangerous to take such 

118 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

measures as might induce the emperor to make a declaration that 
would in any way offer us certain guarantee. If the views of the 
emperor are to be looked upon as a definite factor in our political 
calculations, they must be formulated with due authority. We can- 
not be satisfied with promises that are simply morally binding ; and 
even if the emperor could be induced to declare in definite form 
his possible intentions, it would be only with the understanding 
that the king would also be willing to do the same." ' 

This shows conclusively that up to that date no territorial 
bargain had been transacted with Napoleon III. ; nor is there 
any evidence that one was made afterwards. Bismarck's last 
interview with the " disinterested friend" was at Biarritz the 
preceding October, and in his lengthy report of it to the king 
there is not a definite statement of Napoleon's that any one 
can take hold of, except a plain disavowal of any intention to 
take possession of Belgium. 

Louis Napoleon does not appear in Bismarck's report either 
as a sagacious man or a person of much force. He after- 
wards, however, volunteered a shrewd suggestion that the 
Schleswig-Holstein problem was not a sufficient excuse to 
place before the world for going to war with Austria ; that the 
Prussian government should appear to be actuated by a more 
important principle. This placed Bismarck in the position of 
a man who is obliged to show his hand in order to prevent 
distrust, and who, if he committed himself, would either be 
obliged to adhere to some specified plan or incur the odium 
of a broken agreement. His reply was, that the Prussian 
government desired a reorganization of German affairs which 
would make Germany independent of the Austrian empire and 
Austrian influence; that he wished to form a confederation 
of the North German states, with their military affairs in the 
control of Prussia, and a South German confederation, with 
Bavaria for its military leader. Such a plan was well adapted 
to secure the French emperor's approval, for Bavaria had been 
the ally of Napoleon I. and Louis XIV. ; her proclivities were 
antagonistic to Prussia, and the Frankfort confederation would 

1 Von Sybel, iv. 82. 
119 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

be replaced by three distinct political unities. Bismarck, 
however, was better informed in regard to the internal affairs 
of Bavaria, and had reason to believe that in a national emer- 
gency he could count on the support of her government. 

Although the French minister of foreign affairs, Drouyn 
de l'Huys, had informed Baron Goltz that France required 
no compensation worth mentioning, yet when the treaty 
of the alliance between Italy and Prussia had been signed, 
Napoleon began to fear that the latter might derive too 
good a bargain from it. The forces on either side were 
very nearly equal, and if the Prussians were better soldiers 
than the Austrians, the Austrians were better than the 
Italians ; but the geographical position of Austria placed that 
country between two fires, and he may have remembered, 
also, that the Prussian troops were armed with breech-loading 
rifles, a weapon in which he himself had great confidence. 
He therefore reopened the negotiations with La Marmora in 
regard to a peaceable cession of Venetia, which he thought 
might now be obtained, in return for the withdrawal of Italy 
from the Prussian alliance. He believed that in this way 
Prussia, also, might be forced to cede Silesia to Austria, and 
be compensated for this severe loss by the annexation of 
Schleswig and Holstein. As it was certain that William I. 
would never give up Silesia without a bitter struggle, this 
plan evidently included an alliance between France and Aus- 
tria for that purpose, the result of which, it was anticipated, 
would be a crushing defeat for Prussia and the loss of her 
territory on the west bank of the Rhine. Fortunately for 
both Italy and Prussia, there was a king behind La Marmora 
who had never yet broken his word, and who considered a 
political alliance as a sacred obligation. La Marmora replied 
accordingly that he considered it a matter of duty and national 
honor not to break loose from Prussia, especially as the Prus- 
sian government was preparing for war, and had declared to 
the powers that it would invade Austria if Austria attacked 
Italy. Victor Emmanuel maintained the same position, even 
after the offer of Venetia had been made, without taking 
Silesia into consideration. Such was the difference between 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

these two sovereigns ; but the plan of Napoleon was a 
chimerical one, and might have finally resulted in the union 
of South Germany with Prussia against France, as in 1870. 

Before the war began there was still another slight pacific 
ruffle on the troubled waters of German diplomacy. Baron 
Gablcnz, a brother of General Gablenz, and a member of the 
Berlin Chamber of Deputies, thought he had hit upon a plan 
for solving the Schleswig-Holstein question and preventing 
the impending conflict. It was, in brief, that the two duchies 
should be formed into a state under the authority of a Prussian 
prince; that Prussia should pay five million thalers for the 
harbor of Kiel, and the duchies twenty millions more for a 
war compensation ; that Austria should have the supreme 
command of the South German troops, and Prussia of the 
North German forces. 1 This would seem to be the most 
sensible course yet suggested, and General Gablenz advised 
his brother to submit it to Count Mensdorff. Thus fortified, 
Baron Gablcnz went to Vienna to consult Mensdorff, who 
promised that the Austrian cabinet would consider his propo- 
sition seriously if he would first obtain the King of Prussia's 
approval. The baron hurried back to Berlin. It was the 1st 
of May, and eighty thousand Austrian troops were already 
assembled, on the frontier of Silesia. Bismarck had no hopes 
of peace, but he spoke favorably of Gablenz's plan to Wil- 
liam I., who cordially approved it. Gablenz returned to 
Mensdorff, who this time referred him to Francis Joseph 
himself. " There must be some reasons why these satisfac- 
tory propositions were not made before they could be no 
longer of service," said the politic emperor, and there the 
matter ended. Could better proof be obtained of the unwill- 
ingness of the Austrian court to come to a reasonable agree- 
ment? 2 

Amid all this wilderness of barren and unprofitable diplo- 
macy, there is one voice that sounds clear and true, — the 

1 Von Sybel, iv. 247. 

2 Von Beust says (Memoirs, i. 324), " Although Mensdorff severely condemned 
all the despatches that aggravated the situation and prepared the war, he was 
weak enough to sign them." 

121 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

voice of Bismarck. He occasionally hedges in his state- 
ments, as a diplomat may, but they are always worth having, 
and more often he goes frankly and directly to the point. 
Take, for instance, this passage from his directions to Baron 
Goltz in regard to a possible arrangement with Napoleon III.: 

"The lack of honesty towards Austria, of which France would 
possess the means of convicting us at any moment, would not only 
cost us the confidence of Austria for a long time to come, but would 
as well bring upon us the condemnation of the people and the 
governments throughout Germany. It would excite great distrust 
of us in the mind of England, who would see herself indirectly 
threatened through us upon that side where she is fond of counting 
upon our help in the event of a great conflict. It would also cool 
down our relations with Russia. We should be isolated from the 
other powers and dependent upon France alone. ' ' I 

It was no cynic of human nature like the Edinburgh re- 
viewer that wrote such a statement, but one who knew that 
the only sound basis of politics, as of mercantile affairs, is 
honesty and mutual confidence. His photograph, taken at 
this time, gives the impression of a determined, clear-sighted, 
and veracious man. The cautious crow's-foot in the corner 
of his eye shows that he is capable of dissimulation, but the 
manly expression forbids our mistaking him for a trickster. 
One element, at least, we can always eliminate from Bismarck's 
motives, and that is personal ambition. He admits, in one 
of his letters, that he is sometimes swayed by personal feel- 
ing, but this admission is in his favor. If a man has personal 
ambition he shows it as a boy, either in his studies, his exer- 
cise, or in a desire to perform exceptional feats. We hear of 
nothing like this in Bismarck's youth. He was always inter- 
ested in politics, and often wearied his boon companions at 
Kniephof with long dissertations on political subjects ; but 
though, as one of the landed gentry, his entrance into political 
life was an easy one, he made no effort in that direction until 
the public excitement in 1847 roused him to unusual exer- 

1 Von Sybel, iv. S3. 
122 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

tion. When his king called him, he answered, " I am ready ;" 
but in his letters he always speaks with the same nonchalance 
of his appointment to the Diet at Frankfort, his mission to 
St. Petersburg, and, finally, his elevation to the highest po- 
sition in the state. He does not appear to have cared for 
money, except to supply the needs of his family, and his life 
at Schonhausen and Varzin was that of a quiet country gen- 
tleman. 

I have always held this opinion of Bismarck, and I was 
greatly pleased to find it confirmed by the statement of Baron 
Von der Pfordten, the wisest of Bavarian ministers, in 1866, 
and the one man outside of Prussia who seems to have under- 
stood the Berlin sphinx. Although an opponent of Bismarck 
to a certain extent, he could not help respecting him. " They 
make a great mistake," he said to Prince Reuss, " who at- 
tribute personal ambition to Bismarck. He is the incarnation 
of the Prussian state. He is no opponent of Austria on prin- 
ciple ; on the contrary, he would be glad to join hands with 
her, but always on the condition that she will not forever be 
placing obstacles in the way of a justifiable Prussian policy. 
This is a thoroughly German idea, and just for this reason I 
place confidence in that man who is its chief representative." * 
Von der Pfordten had listened to Bismarck's discussion of 
the German problem, and believed in his plans ; and this 
kernel of Prussian sentiment in Bavaria at that time is signifi- 
cant, and proved of great importance in the events that 
followed. 

Such was the judgment of an enlightened Bavarian, and we 
can place it beside the action of a mean, bigoted Communist. 
As compared with the first portion of the nineteenth century, 
the latter half has shown a decided tendency to social de- 
moralization. James Russell Lowell was confident that he 
perceived it, in both Europe and America, twenty-five years 
ago. He judged of it by the literature which people were 
reading, and from the conversation of people whom he met. 
It has shown itself in various ways, but in none so distinctly 

1 Despatch of Prince Reuss, April 10, 1866. 
I2 3 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

as in the tendency to assassination. During the eighteenth 
century and the first half of the nineteenth assassination was 
hardly known. There were two attempts on the life of Napo- 
leon, which is not surprising, considering the excitement of 
those times ; but since 1S50 two Presidents of the United States 
and a President of the French Republic, as well as a number 
of minor officials, have been assassinated, and attempts have 
been made on the life of almost every sovereign in Europe. 
Such a condition of affairs was never known before in Christian 
countries, not even during the sixteenth century. In fact, the 
men who perpetrated these outrages were not Christians, but 
atheists, the natural product of the atheistic philosophy of 
the present day. It is the result of infinite self-conceit, of a 
man becoming a god unto himself. Such were the characters 
of Wilkes Booth and Guiteau, though they did not belong to 
the Communists. To assassinate a Caligula or a Commodus, 
monsters of depravity, is honorable ; but he who assassinates 
a man of good character like the Tsar Alexander, because he 
represents a different set of political principles from the as- 
sassin, becomes a Caligula himself. The Nihilists are the 
cobras of modern society. 

Charles Cohen, the would-be assassin of Bismarck, has 
been spoken of as a high-minded but fanatical youth ; but I 
can discover nothing in him but a base and degraded soul, 
the fit companion of Booth and Ravaillac. He belonged to 
the Internationals, and no doubt was urged on to the busi- 
ness. So much may be said in extenuation for his crime. It 
was on the 7th of May, 1866, that he came up behind Bis- 
marck on the Unter den Linden and fired two shots at him. 
One of these went through Bismarck's coat, and the other 
may have missed him as he turned round. He sprang at 
Cohen, but before he could reach him the latter fired another 
shot, which is supposed to have glanced off Bismarck's ribs. 
He fired once or twice again while he was in Bismarck's 
clutches, and yet Bismarck escaped without even a trouble- 
some wound. It was reported in Vienna that Bismarck was 
protected by a shirt of mail, and if so, he showed remarkable 
foresight ; but his friends have denied this, though the fact 

124 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

was no discredit to him. Cohen had provided himself with 
a dose of poison, which he swallowed soon after being taken 
to prison. Bismarck's escape seemed miraculous, and did 
much to establish popular confidence in him, while the Prus- 
sian people realized how nearly they had lost so valuable a 
man. There were few persons of note in Berlin who did not 
call to congratulate him that evening. 

The startling sensation which went through Europe at the 
criminal attempt of this ruffian soon subsided in the exciting 
events that followed. La Marmora's reply to Napoleon III. 
was politely received, but its effect must have been irritating 
to an exceptional degree ; for it placed the emperor in the 
position of a man who had been caught cheating at cards. 
Neither was the news from Berlin such as to afford him con- 
solation. As Bismarck saw the game before him more and 
more clearly, he became more confident and obdurate. Bene- 
detti, who had become celebrated as Louis Napoleon's man 
of business, wrote to him in May from Berlin that the chief 
obstacle to an understanding was the sentiment of the whole 
Prussian nation, which firmly opposed surrender of the small- 
est portion of German soil, either their own or of any other 
state. " I know of no one," he wrote, " besides Count Bis- 
marck, that has any idea of the possibility that the cession of 
territory to France might lie in the interests of Prussia, and 
even he would consent only to a change that would more or 
less improve the line of the frontier." Bismarck was wise 
enough to be willing to make a small sacrifice for the sake of 
a great good ; but this public sentiment in regard to the invio- 
lability of German territory is another evidence of the strong 
current that was running in favor of German national unity. 

Napoleon had now been foiled by his own weapons, and 
the " disinterested friend" determined to play a bolder and 
more reckless game. Emissaries from Pius IX., who was 
now becoming greatly alarmed for the States of the Church, 
were at work with the empress, and Eugenie gave her femi- 
nine opinion that in case of Italian success there was grave 
danger that the influence of Victor Emmanuel would supplant 
that of her husband in " the orient." At the same time an inci- 

125 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

dent occurred which greatly assisted in facilitating Napoleon's 
sudden change of base. Thiers, the French Warwick, who 
undid Louis Philippe, made a speech in the French assembly 
which might be characterized as the essence of political mean- 
ness. He denounced the alliance between Prussia and Italy as 
likely to strengthen both nations ; France had the first position 
in European affairs, and the way for France to be strong was 
to keep other nations weak. Italian unity was as dangerous 
as German unity would be. The aim of Prussia evidently lay 
in the direction of German consolidation. It was the duty of 
the French government to prevent Italy from taking part in 
the cursed war which was then approaching. 

Louis Napoleon has never been credited with such a cyni- 
cal statement as this, and, in truth, his previous policy had 
been of a much more liberal character ; but if he had insti- 
gated Thiers's speech it could not have better served his pur- 
pose. The applause from the opposition benches was drowned 
by the supporters of the government, and this declaration of 
French superiority was telegraphed all over the world. In 
order to attest the project he had been fostering so zealously, 
Napoleon now proposed a peace congress to settle the affairs 
of Germany in a manner agreeable to other nations. He com- 
municated his plan to Lord Clarendon, the English foreign 
minister, who, as party feeling in London was running strong 
against Prussia, readily assented to it. 1 Alexander and Victor 
Emmanuel also expressed their assent, and it may seem sur- 
prising that Bismarck should have done so ; but there was 
nothing he would have liked better at this time than to 
expose the political programme of Austria in contrast with his 
own before a congress of the great powers. Exactly how 
the congress was expected to rearrange German affairs re- 
mains in doubt. Napoleon must have sketched out a plan of 
some kind for Clarendon and La Marmora. It is certain that 
Italy would not have consented to it without the cession of 

1 It was at this time that the New York Nation spoke of Bismarck as the 
most reckless political gambler that ever sat at the helm of state, and predicted 
that he would be duped by Napoleon III., — a reflection of English public 
opinion. 

126 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

Venetia, and equally certain that Austria would have required 
compensation for this. That Napoleon proposed to have 
Silesia restored to Austria, and Prussia compensated with the 
kingdom of Saxony, is a Prussian supposition, which still re- 
quires confirmation. The Austrian reply to the circular note 
was characteristic ; it was that Austria would take part in the 
congress only on condition that none of the powers repre- 
sented should be expected to cede territory which had been 
guaranteed by existing treaties. This was, of course, a nulli- 
fication of the original project, and killed it dead. 1 No won- 
der if Count Belcredi, the successor of Mensdorff, dreaded to 
face Bismarck before an international congress. 

It was now the last of May, and trade in Germany was at 
a stand-still. The political atmosphere was sultry and oppres- 
sive, like the death-like calm which precedes the tornado. 
People wished the war would begin, rather than remain in 
this state of suspense. Von Moltke argued that every day's 
delay was to the advantage of Austria, but certain diplomatic 
formalities had to be gone through with before the challenge 
to arms was made. It is amusing to read at this stage of 
proceedings how each party tried to cast the responsibility of 
hostilities on the other. Neither wished to appear before the 
world as the aggressor. " Hypocrisy," said Wendell Phillips, 
" is the homage which vice pays to virtue." In the seven- 
teenth century princes and cabinets did not trouble themselves 
much about such formalities, and Louis XIV. marched his 
troops into Strasburg without a day's warning. As a matter 
of fact, the war was the result of a mutual understanding, and 
its responsibility went back to the first Frankfort Diet after 
the revolution of 1848. The true responsibility of it rested 
with Prince Schvvarzenberg and his imperial pupil. It had been 
gradually coming on ever since Bismarck had asked the Aus- 
trian delegate for a light for his cigar, — a light which at length 
produced a terrible conflagration. 

Louis Napoleon cuts a sorrowful figure during these last 

1 Von Beust says Austria declined the congress proposed by Napoleon III., or, 
what amounted to the same thing, accepted it with such restrictions that it never 
came to pass. Memoirs, i. 290. 

127 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

days of peace. His intrigues at the court of Vienna were 
incessant, but the exact form which they took will never be 
known. Baron Goltz discovered that interviews between 
Napoleon and the Austrian envoy at Paris were of daily 
occurrence, and it was reported to Bismarck from Rome that 
the French ambassador was as frequent a visitor at the Vati- 
can. At the same time the Duke of Saxe-Coburg also showed 
Bismarck a letter from Count Belcredi, in which it was stated 
that Francis Joseph had arrived at a complete understanding 
with Napoleon III., and if Prussia went to war she would have 
to deal not only with Austria but with France. Professor 
Miiller says, " It is uncertain what Napoleon was to acquire 
in accordance with this carefully guarded treaty, but it is not 
likely that Austria, which has not scrupled in times gone by 
to sacrifice German territory, would have hesitated to cede 
the left bank of the Rhine, if by so doing she could defeat 
her hated rival." 1 Von Sybel's statement, that finally Prince 
Napoleon telegraphed to the King of Italy that Bismarck had 
made a secret agreement with Francis Joseph — a telegram 
which Victor Emmanuel immediately reported to Count Use- 
dorn at Berlin, and which Bismarck pronounced an infernal 
lie — is by no means incredible, but needs to be supported by 
documentary evidence. 2 

It is interesting to note the successive steps by which Prus- 
sia and Austria reached a collision. On June I Belcredi ap- 
pealed to the Diet at Frankfort for a final settlement of the 
Schleswig-Holstein question. Bismarck then declared that 
this was contrary to the Gastein convention, and an order was 
sent to Manteuffel to march his troops into Holstein and form 
a government there in conjunction with the Austrian com- 
mander, according to the status previous to Gastein. Gablenz 
refused to co-operate with Manteuffel and retired to Altona. 
Manteuffel marched in with twenty thousand men and estab- 
lished a government of his own, and Bismarck issued a circu- 
lar to the German princes, a far-reaching act of statesmanship, 



2 Muller's Political History, p. 331. 
2 Von Sybel, iv. 473. 
128 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

in which he outlined the proposition of a German national 
union, based on popular suffrage, with Prussia for its military 
leader. In regard to this circular he wrote to the Duke of 
Saxe-Coburg : 

" The propositions contained in the outline are in no case ex- 
haustive, but are the results of the necessary consideration of various 
influences with which a compromise must be made, intra muros et 
extra. But if we can bring even these to their actual realization, 
then one portion, at least, will be accomplished of the task of ren- 
dering harmless that net of historical boundaries which runs through 
Germany ; and it is unfair to expect that one generation or one 
man, even my most gracious sovereign, should in a day make good 
what generations of our ancestors have in the course of centuries 
spoiled." 

The essence of Bismarck's plan consisted of the following 
points : 

("Exclusion of Austria; creation of a confederate marine; di- 
vision of the military command, Prussia taking the north and 
Bavaria the south ; a parliament to be elected by the people on the 
basis of a universal suffrage, and which should have the functions 
already specified above and sharply defined ; and, finally, the 
regulations of the future relations with German Austria by means 
of a special treaty. ' ' ' 

The present organization of Germany was established sub-, 
stantially on this basis. 

At that time, however, it was a revolutionary act. On the 
nth of June the Austrian delegate moved in the Diet at 
Frankfort that the whole army of the confederation should be 
mobilized in order to bring Prussia to terms, and on the 14th 
the Diet, by a vote of nine to six, declared war against Prus- 
sia. The only princes who supported Prussia in this emer- 
gency were the Dukes of Oldenburg, Mecklenburg, and of the 
Saxon duchies and Luxemburg ; but the free cities also, ex- 
cept Frankfort, took the same side, and the people of North 

1 Von Sybel, iv. 484. 
9 * 2 9 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

Germany showed their political tendencies in an unmistakable 
manner. The chambers of Cassel, Nassau, and Darmstadt 
refused to appropriate money for the campaign. In the Han- 
over assembly a resolution was passed in favor of neutrality, 
and the people of Leipsic petitioned the King of Saxony to 
follow a similar course. Bismarck issued a manifesto to the 
governments of Saxony, Hanover, Cassel, and Nassau, prom- 
ising them, if they would dismiss their forces and remain at 
peace, that their rights and the integrity of their territories 
would be respected. 1 

The war of 1866 closely resembled in its political bearing 
the war which had just been finished in the United States. In 
both instances the nucleus of strife originated in the political 
fallacy that a sovereignty can exist within a sovereignty. Even 
Abraham Lincoln, who denied the right of secession and was 
always true to his principles, spoke in 1859 of Massachusetts 
as " a sovereign State." Four years of bloody warfare were re- 
quired to knock that notion in the head. " Sovereignty," said 
Bismarck afterwards in the German Reichstag, " is a unit and 
must remain a unit, — the sovereignty of law." The Austrian 
motion in the Diet for the mobilization of forces was, in fact, 
unconstitutional. It properly required a committee of inves- 
tigation to inquire into the facts of the case and make a report 
on the subject before it could be legally adopted ; but it was 
part of Bismarck's strategy to allow it to pass with a simple 
protestation on the part of Prussia, for he was right glad to 
have the old confederate government place itself on record in 
that way. 

There is a story which came to me through a Prussian 
naval officer that on the evening of June 15, 1866, Bismarck 
was at a small party in Berlin, when a royal messenger entered 
and delivered a letter to him. As he was writing the reply a 
young lady said to him, " Let me read, Count Bismarck, what 
important thing you are writing," and he covered the paper 
with his hand. When the messenger had left the room Bis- 

1 This should be borne in mind in connection with Bismarck's course of 
procedure after the war was finished. 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

marck rose and said quietly to the company, " I trust it is for 
the best, but to-morrow we fight." x 

An investigation of the genesis of war in civilized countries 
might prove a more profitable study than the present discus- 
sion of free trade and protection. Von Hoist has done some- 
thing towards it in his elaborate analysis of the slavery 
question in America. Generally speaking, wars are sent to 
mankind for their political sins, and, as a rule, it is the right 
that conquers, though, as in private families, the innocent 
suffer with the guilty. It must be admitted that the wars 
which have taken place since 1855, with the exception of the 
Servia-Bulgarian and Greco-Turkish wars, have been greatly 
to the advantage of civilization. If we consider the ancient 
world, it is evident from the victories of Pyrrhus over the 
Romans, even such as they were, that if the Greeks had not 
degenerated after that time they would not have become the 
tributaries of Rome. If the Italians had remained as brave 
as they were in the time of Marius, it is not likely that their 
country would have been overrun by Goths and Vandals. 
The Saxons were conquered by the Normans because they 
had become sluggish and effeminate ; and if the Poles had 
possessed an efficient government, with a well-disciplined 
army, in the last century, it is not probable that their country 
would have been divided up among neighboring states. The 
Prussian idea is that it does every man good to be a soldier ; 
and Sumner's theory that a first-rate military organization 
tends to promote warfare between nations is not supported 
by facts. Two vigorous rival nations like the French and 
English, always likely to misunderstand each other, cannot 
exist side by side without some sort of military organization ; 
and if one increases it, the other must do so likewise. The 
army of Frederick the Great maintained peace in Europe for 
thirty years, a longer period than had ever been known be- 
fore. War is, after all, not so very much worse than peace. 
A week in one of our largest city hospitals is nearly equal to 



1 According to Hesekiel, Bismarck received the royal order in his own garden 

about midnight. 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

a battle-field ; and the fishermen who are drowned every year, 
the railway navvies who are killed, and the other casualties in 
dangerous employments constitute a startling sum total. It 
is said that in China men and women throw themselves into 
the rivers every night to avoid starvation. People rarely 
starve to death in prosperous America, but thousands lose 
their lives every year in the effort to gain a living. War 
takes away from men the fear of death, and every one who 
dies makes room for some other in this crowded world, and 
the life of a soldier is better than that in a cotton-mill. 

"He alone deserves his freedom and his life 
Who daily conquers it in strife." x 

What Garibaldi was to Cavour, Von Moltke was to Bis- 
marck. Without Bismarck the most famous general of his 
time might never have been heard of beyond the limits of 
Germany; but without Von Moltke, Bismarck might never 
have accomplished those great plans which continually urged 
him onward. Among military inventors Von Moltke stands 
next to Napoleon and Frederick, and it is admitted that both 
as a strategist and as a tactician he has never been surpassed. 
No other general except Napoleon has won such decisive 
victories, and even the hero of Austerlitz might have been 
surprised at the capture of an army of one hundred and thirty 
thousand men. Whether he could have accomplished such 
feats as Wellington at Waterloo, Frederick at Leuthen, or 
Napoleon in his Italian campaigns, cannot be determined, for 
he never found himself placed in like emergencies. 

Von Moltke had not at this time developed that system of 
tactics for which he will always be remembered, — a method 
of deploying troops so as to capture his adversary, as it were, 
in a net. The strategy of his campaign in 1866 can best be 
appreciated by considering the complications which it in- 
volved, and the absolute certainty with which his dispositions 
effected their purpose. He had six different armies to deal 
with, varying from twenty thousand to two hundred and fifty 

1 Faust, Part ii., Act v. 
132 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

thousand men. The main Austrian army, under General 
Benedek, was extended from Cracow to the right bank of the 
Elbe, in Bohemia. Prince Clam-Gallas protected the valley of 
the Iser, a branch of the Elbe, with a force of sixty thousand 
men, much too weak for the purpose. The Bavarian army 
of forty-five thousand men was mobilized on the Danube. 
The Darmstadt-Nassau-Wurtemberg army of nearly fifty 
thousand men occupied the valley of the Main ; and the 
Hanoverian army of twenty thousand men threatened Bran- 
denburg on the west. Within seven weeks after the declara- 
tion of war these enormous forces were either captured or 
dispersed by the Prussian troops. 

Moltke's first object was to corner the Hanoverian army 
and render it innocuous. He conjectured that its commander 
would endeavor to form a junction with the Austrians, and, 
having the advantage in celerity, directed a force of ten thou- 
sand men to Eisenach, to take possession of the route to 
Bavaria. A similar force was directed from the Rhine against 
Hesse-Cassel, which served the double purpose of capturing 
the obstinate old Elector and preventing a junction between 
the Hanoverians and the army on the Main. General Falken- 
stein, with a single army corps, marched up the Main, de- 
feated the army of the confederation, and drove it back into 
Wurtemberg. Another Prussian army corps marched into 
Saxony, and, having taken possession of Dresden and Leipsic, 
proceeded to operate against the forces in Bavaria, apparently 
with orders to avoid an engagement, if possible. Although 
Von der Pfordten considered Austria an essential ingredient 
in German nationality to counterbalance Prussia, the Bavarian 
government acted at this time in a rather indecisive manner, 
and evidently preferred to avoid a collision with Prussia, if 
possible. 

Von Moltke also judged correctly that General Benedek 
would remain on the defensive. His plan of campaign has 
been compared to the Waterloo campaign, but it is more like 
that of Marengo. Following in the steps of Frederick the 
Great, he directed Prince Frederick Charles, with the right 
wing and centre of the main Prussian army, to enter Bohemia 

133 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

from the north, while the crown prince with the left wing 
marched parallel to it on the east side of the Giant Mountains. 
According to this plan, in case General Benedek should in- 
vade Silesia it was expected that the crown prince's army- 
would be able to sustain the attack until Prince Frederick 
Charles should come to his rescue. This, however, was not 
considered likely; and if the Austrian forces remained in Bo- 
hemia they would be obliged to concentrate somewhere on 
the line of the Elbe, in which case the crown prince would 
fall upon their flank, as Desaix did at Marengo. Such a 
plan, if carried out successfully, would prove fatal to the 
Austrian cause. 

The numbers engaged on each side were nearly equal, — 
that is, about two hundred and fifty thousand men. On the 
27th of June Prince Frederick Charles entered Bohemia. 
There was a slight conflict at Hiinerwasser, and a pretty stiff 
battle at Miinchengratz with Clam-Gallas, in both of which 
the Prussians were successful. The battles of Nachod, Ska- 
litz, Burkersdorf, and Schweinschadel were gallantly won by 
Prussian generals of division, but General Gablenz defeated 
the Prussians at Trautenau. He might have defeated them 
again at Burkersdorf but for an unfortunate despatch to re- 
treat from General Benedek. It does not require much 
knowledge of military affairs to realize the immense mischief 
which such orders might occasion. General Benedek was a 
splendid fighter, and was credited with having saved the 
Austrian army from a rout at Solferino. He was given the 
chief command in 1866 according to a popular demand, but 
it is stated that he did not consider himself fitted for the posi- 
tion. In contrast with his categorical method let us compare 
the following extract from Von Moltke's directions to the 
crown prince and Prince Frederick Charles : 

" If the initiative is taken on our part an occasion may easily 
arise for attacking the enemy in separate bodies with superior num- 
bers, and for following up the victory in another direction from 
that assigned. But the uniting of all the forces for the decisive 
blow must always be kept in view. The commanders-in-chief 
must, therefore, from the moment they come face to face with the 

i34 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

enemy, act according to their own judgment and the requirements 
of circumstances ; and at the same time they must always consider 
their relations with the other army associated with them." ' 

Why could not Napoleon have given a similar order to 
Grouchy in the Waterloo campaign? An American who 
called on Von Moltke during the siege of Paris found nothing 
in his room but a table, a chair, and a map of France. It was 
by this constant simplification that he attained such breadth 
and clearness in his ideas. 

In three days the Prussians had won five battles equal to 
those of Frederick in the second Silesian war. The Berliners 
were wild with joy, and Bismarck suddenly became the most 
popular man in the country. Such is human nature, and such 
the effect that may always be depended upon as the result of 
military success. Bismarck had calculated on this only too 
exactly. Long since, in his consultations with the king, he 
had said, " We must repose our confidence in the ancient 
spirit of Prussia, — in its military spirit." William I., Bis- 
marck, and Von Moltke went at once to the scene of action, 
for they knew that the great crisis had now arrived, — a turn- 
ing-point in the history of Europe. On the 2d of July they 
reached the head-quarters of Prince Frederick Charles, near 
Gitschin, and at a council of war it was decided to attack the 
Austrians, who were posted beyond Sadowa, on the following 
day. Communication was established with the crown prince, 
who promised to reach the field of battle by noon. 

The Austrian officers had become satisfied in the recent 
encounters of the superiority of the needle-gun, and advised 
General Benedek against continuing the war, but the emperor 
encouraged Benedek to fight where he stood, and at the same 
time promised him the support of the army in Italy, which 
had already defeated the Italians at Custozza on the 24th of 
June. Benedek had collected over two hundred thousand 
men between Koniggratz and Sadowa, and held a strong po- 
sition on a range of hills south of the latter place. He had 
the advantage of Von Moltke by nearly eighty thousand men, 

1 Von Sybel, v. 1 20. 
135 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

and he hoped to crush him before the crown prince could 
arrive on the ground. 

The battle of Sadowa, fought on the 3d of July, is an oft- 
repeated tale. Never since the conflict between Bajazet and 
Timour had such large forces been opposed to each other, 
and yet the loss of life was not nearly equal to that at 
Waterloo, Leipsic, or Gettysburg. The Austrian soldiers, 
encouraged by the presence of a commander in whom they 
had confidence, maintained the fight from early morning till 
one o'clock, and their desperate rushes against the Prussian 
lines explained the tactics by which Benedek expected to win 
the game. This was an imitation of the French tactics of 
1859, an d» like- the attack by columns, is wholly ineffectual 
against repeating fire-arms. Fransecky's division of Branden- 
burgers and Magdeburgers suffered so severely, however, from 
these attacks that every seventh man in it was either killed or 
wounded. Every one has heard of Bismarck's solicitude for 
the old white-haired king, who sat on his horse like a marble 
statue, unmindful of the shells which flew screaming past 
him, and how Bismarck's keen eye was the first to discover 
the approach of the crown prince's army. 

By this time most of Benedek's generals of division were 
fighting the battle on their own account, and without much 
regard for the commands of their superior. This was another 
natural consequence of Schwarzenberg's policy, and there 
could be no worse condition for an army in which to receive 
an unexpected attack. The crown prince, as fearless as his 
father, directed his forces perpendicularly to the Austrian 
right wing, which was almost immediately thrown into con- 
fusion. If Benedek had ordered the retreat at once, and pro- 
tected it in person at the head of his reserves, he might even 
then have preserved his army for another battle. Instead of 
doing this, he wasted his reserves in a vain attempt to recover 
the captured positions ; so that when the final break came his 
decimated regiments had no chance to reorganize. The re- 
treat soon became a rout, and full twenty thousand Austrians 
were taken prisoners. It has been estimated that if the crown 
prince had followed up his advantage with an energy equal to 

156 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

that of Gneisenau at Waterloo, the greater portion of the 
Austrian army would have been captured. 

The honor of the victory belongs specially to Von Moltke, 
who planned the movements of both Prussian armies, and 
held his regiments in hand during the battle like men upon a 
chess-board ; and next to him to General Fransecky, who sus- 
tained the severest attacks of the day without asking for the 
reinforcements which he knew were not to be had. Von 
Sybel states that the king took command in person ; but if he 
had actually directed the movements of the army, Bismarck 
would not have warned him against exposing himself to 
danger. Bismarck, as he tells us himself, went to rest that 
night under a shed by the roadside. 

It was not only a victory of Prussia over Austria, of the 
needle-gun over the musket, but, as in the time of Frederick 
the Great, it was a victory of efficient government over mis- 
government; of reality over sham ; of plain dealing over pre- 
tension ; of progress over stagnation ; of free schools over 
ignorance ; of Protestantism and religious freedom over Ca- 
tholicism and intolerance ; of modern ideas over mediaeval 
traditions ; and, one might almost say, of veracity over dis- 
simulation. Among those who were killed on the hills of 
Sadowa might be recounted the Prussian party of progress, 
which never, at least, showed its head again conspicuously. 
Progress was discovered to be in the direction which Bismarck 
had pointed out, and in the place of the Progressists arose a 
new party in all parts of Germany, the National Liberals, who 
gave Bismarck and his plans an enthusiastic support until 
the great work he had undertaken was fairly accomplished. 

In 1808 Napoleon wrote to his brother Joseph, " To win a 
victory is nothing ; to know how to make use of it is every- 
thing." Bismarck knew this as well, and he recognized the 
fact that Sadowa had upset the balance of power in Europe, 
and that there would be nothing but confusion until it was 
re-established upon an enduring basis. He realized that his 
severest struggle had yet to come ; that every court in Europe 
would be filled with jealousy at the advantage which Prussia 
had gained, and that his work now must be to prevent this 

i37 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

from taking the form of a European coalition which would 
wrest from Prussia her momentary supremacy. To consoli- 
date that power and render it as impregnable as possible 
was the sufficient labor of a lifetime, and to this he now 
dedicated himself. The destiny of Prussia, however, was, as 
we have seen, always associated in his mind with the destiny 
of Germany as a whole. They were two similar ideas, one of 
which included the other, and, as with President Lincoln 
after the war for the Union, the interests of the states that 
had been subjugated were as serious a concern with him as 
those of Prussia itself. The statesman who sees deep into 
the future is not likely to be elated by success, and in the day 
of triumph Bismarck was the one cool head among those 
about him, who knew how to restrain the eagerness of friends 
and guard against the machinations of enemies. 

The civilized world was electrified at the news of Sadowa, 
and Napoleon III. was astounded. He could not have been 
more so if a mine had exploded in the Tuileries. He had 
been playing with fire till his fingers were burnt. The oppo- 
sition in the Chamber of Deputies knew enough of what was 
transpiring to be aware that he had encouraged Prussia in 
this bold stroke, and would be sure to fling it in his teeth. 
Let him turn as he would, the defeat of the Italians and the 
negotiations with Count Belcredi for the cession of Venetia 
were the only support he had to grasp at, and this was fragile 
enough. England was just now occupied with one of her 
frequent party revolutions, and the Tsar was as imperturbable 
as a Russian bear. The French Minister of Foreign Affairs 
is supposed to have advised a bold game of bluff, — a rather 
dangerous game to play against Bismarck, as Drouyn de 
l'Huys discovered afterwards to his cost. Count Lavalette, 
on the contrary, warned Napoleon that his army was in no 
condition to encounter the victorious Prussians, and that he 
had better keep on the shady side of fortune. 

Bismarck was not surprised, though William I. may have 
been, on the 5th of July to receive a telegram from Napoleon 
III. offering his services as a mediator, and requesting, in the 
interests of European peace and harmony, that they should 

13S 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

explain how they proposed to make use of their good for- 
tune. Von Sybel's statement, that the king, on reading this 
despatch, made a memorandum of the terms of peace with 
Austria, which agreed substantially with those which were 
finally adopted, does not accord with Bismarck's own ac- 
count, — namely, that he was obliged to make his utmost exer- 
tions at this time in opposing a project for the annexation of 
northern Bohemia. 1 It was decided to meet the advances of 
Napoleon in a friendly spirit, but his interference in German 
affairs was to be politely discouraged. The king wrote an 
autograph letter to his dear brother of France, and a despatch 
was sent to Baron Goltz to observe a respectful but firm at- 
titude towards the French government. Von Beust believes 
that Napoleon would have pursued a more decisive policy at 
this critical moment but for a painful malady from which he 
was suffering, though he admits at the same time that there 
was a strong party, headed by Prince Napoleon, who were 
opposed to this. 

Meanwhile Venetia had been surrendered to France by the 
Austrian government, in the hope that Napoleon could use it 
as a make-weight to detach Italy from the Prussian alliance, 
and thus enable Francis Joseph to withdraw a hundred thou- 
sand soldiers for the defence of Vienna. To the astonish- 
ment of both parties concerned, this move produced exactly 
the opposite effect from what was expected. Victor Emmanuel 
had lost all confidence in his former ally, and had already 
decided in his own mind to have nothing more to do with 
him. In spite of the persuasions of La Marmora, the adroit, 
facile man to whom the disaster of Custozza had chiefly been 
owing, the King of Italy sent a prompt declination of the 
province of Venetia to Napoleon, and ordered his generals to 
invade Venetia and take every advantage of the fortunate 
change in affairs. 

The truth was that Bismarck, guided by his clear sense of 



1 Bismarck wrote : " It is I who have the thankless task of pouring water into 
the foaming wine, and of pointing out the fact that we do not live alone in Eu- 
rope, but with three neighbors." 

139 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

the situation, had fairly turned Italy around on its axis, and 
the Italians themselves were fully conscious of this. There 
was some competition in the carrying trade of the Mediter- 
ranean between Italy and France, but the antagonism in 
material affairs was very slight. In what might be called im- 
material affairs, however, in regard to the temporal power of 
the pope, there was broad enough ground for disagreement. 
Louis Napoleon served a double purpose in sending Oudinot 
to suppress the Roman republic in 1849 ; it was for his interest 
that the republic should be suppressed, and he also won over 
to his party the strong moral influence of the Catholic clergy. 
From the earliest times it had been the policy of the popes 
to keep Italy divided, in order to prevent the growth of any 
political power which might neutralize their own. The anath- 
emas which Dante hurled at Boniface VII. were succeeded 
by the cold-blooded analysis of Machiavelli, whom the terrors 
of the Inquisition could not prevent from attributing the mis- 
fortunes of his native country to the temporal power of the 
popes. It is true that for some centuries the spiritual au- 
thority of the popes was the main protection of Italian inde- 
pendence ; but this had ceased to be of any avail long before 
Machiavelli's time, and political intrigue had taken its place. 
Memories of the grandeur of the Roman empire were still 
cherished among the Italians, and Mazzini, the Italian apostle 
of regeneration, had preached that Italy never could be lifted 
out of the mire except through national unity. Whatever he 
had been in the past, the pope now appeared as an obstacle 
to Italian progress, while Bismarck seemed like an agent 
divinely ordained for the purpose. It was only a Protestant 
power that could cordially co-operate w r ith the Italian king 
and his cabinet, and between Prussians and Italians there was 
neither material rivalry nor mental antagonism. Hegel and 
other German writers on politics were studied by Italian 
statesmen during the period of reorganization in 1870, and 
the influence of German ideas on the present Italian govern- 
ment is plainly perceptible. Italy is the natural ally of 
Prussia. 

Thus the Venetian manoeuvre proved a failure. Neither 

140 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

could Napoleon III. prevent the Prussian army from ad- 
vancing on Vienna. The Austrian government, emboldened 
by Napoleon, asked for a truce, but made no offers for peace. 
Von Moltke pushed aside the army of Benedek, who had 
been superseded by the Archduke Albert, and besieged it in 
Olmiitz. An attempt to rouse the Hungarians completely 
failed. They would only come to the support of the govern- 
ment under the guarantee of a state constitution. Finally, 
when the outposts of the Prussians came within sight of 
Vienna, the emperor applied to William I. for a cessation of 
hostilities. Bismarck now desired moderation, but in this 
wise conclusion he found himself opposed by the king, who 
considered his terms of peace humiliating to Prussia, while 
Von Moltke and most of the generals urged an attack on 
Vienna. William I., however, was finally won over by the 
crown prince, who suddenly found himself on the same ground 
as Bismarck, and gave the minister-president a magnanimous 
support. 1 

1 Bismarck's account of this affair in his Memoirs makes a charming incident, 
creditable to both, but especially to the crown prince. 



141 



CHAPTER VII 

BISMARCK ENLARGES PRUSSIA 

In the negotiations that followed after Sadowa, the inter- 
vention of Napoleon, although it caused Bismarck continual 
anxiety, was actually of service to him in the way of miti- 
gating the severity of the Prussian conditions. Neither did 
his cool head neglect the opportunity of notifying the Tsar in 
regard to passing events. Napoleon's action naturally caused 
an irritation in St. Petersburg, which was not without its in- 
fluence in Vienna. Finally, on the 26th of July, the prelimi- 
naries were agreed upon at Nicolsburg, though the actual 
treaty between Prussia and Austria was not signed for more 
than three weeks later. The indemnity required of Austria — 
about twenty-five million thalers — was comparatively insig- 
nificant, and the Danes in Northern Schleswig were allowed 
to decide by a free ballot whether they should belong to 
Denmark or Germany. For the rest, Austria was to with- 
draw from the German confederation and from all inter- 
ference in German affairs. Venetia was to be surrendered 
to Italy, of course, and with it a strip of territory was re- 
quired to rectify the boundaries of Silesia. Saxony was 
obliged to pay a small indemnity and place its fortresses in 
the hands of the King of Prussia. Napoleon was unable to 
obtain the right for Saxony to join the South German Con- 
federation, which was part of his programme; but he suc- 
ceeded in preserving for King John his territory intact. 
Whoever has read Bismarck's memorial to William I. on 
July 27 must realize that he was the one who is properly to 
be credited with moderation, and that the opposition against 
him was such as only a strong man could have overcome. 1 

For the rest, the South German states were required to pay 

1 Von Sybel, v. 339. 
142 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

an indemnity — probably that which Austria was unable to 
pay — and form a military confederation under the leadership 
of Bavaria. In regard to Nassau, Hanover, and Cassel, with 
its obstinate old Elector, Bismarck kept his promised word. 
The reigning princes were to be deposed and their territories 
incorporated in Prussia, but the reigning families were to 
retain their estates, or, as happened in the case of Hanover, 
receive a monetary compensation. Darmstadt was to be 
divided into two portions, of which Prussia was to absorb 
the northerly part. The other North German states were to 
form a close confederation with Prussia, having the King of 
Prussia for their military commander. 

Thus the two portions of Prussia were united, and the 
nation as a whole strengthened. We have seen how inef- 
fective the forces of the smaller German states proved during 
this campaign. In fact, North Germany was to become 
Prussia, and with a population of nearly thirty-five millions — 
seven times as great as in the Seven Years' War — it could 
bid defiance to any power in Europe. The division of Ger- 
many into three parts was calculated to remove the appre- 
hensions of Louis Napoleon in regard to the balance of 
power; though Bismarck foresaw, as he afterwards stated, 
that South Germany would finally attach itself to the Prussian 
confederation as a piece of iron is attracted to the magnet. 
William I. wrote to his nephew, the Tsar, who expressed grave 
apprehensions lest Bismarck's bold stroke should prove inju- 
rious to the monarchical principle, a very manly letter, in 
which he said : 

" I was obliged to regard the sentiments of my people and my 
army, and to adopt such measures as would insure the country 
against the return of a state of things similar to that through which 
we have just passed. To leave to those sovereigns a portion of 
their territory would have occasioned a dismemberment of the 
states that would have been more distressing to the inhabitants than 
anything else. 

"You fear a German parliament and revolution. Believe me, 
nothing has done more harm to monarchical principles in Germany 
than the existence of these small and powerless dynasties, who pro- 

i43 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

long their life at the expense of national interest, who perform their 
duties as sovereigns very unsatisfactorily, and who compromise the 
reputableness of monarchical principles just as a numerous and in- 
digent nobility bring reproach upon the dignity of the aristocracy. 
Public opinion is thoroughly convinced that these small monarchies 
naturally and necessarily stand in opposition to national interests. 
In the event of a fresh crisis the decadence of national institutions 
would have occasioned the most serious dangers." * 

It is interesting to view this subject from the monarchical 
stand-point, and King William's statement has the cogency of 
a sincere belief that the work he was doing was for the good 
of Germany. Bismarck discovered soon after that it was not 
the monarchical principle which troubled the Tsar so much 
as the desire to obtain a share for himself in the surprising 
good fortune of his royal uncle at Berlin. 

Great men who act in harmony with universal laws accom- 
plish many things indirectly and unintentionally which are of 
advantage to the human race. The successors of Alexander 
the Great established an immense trade between Europe and 
India which never came to an end until the discovery of the 
South Cape ; and Caesar's conquest of Gaul may be said to 
have opened a door for civilization to walk into Northern 
Europe. So Bismarck's attack on Austria was at least as 
great an advantage to that empire as to Prussia itself. The 
defeat at Sadowa was the finest piece of good fortune that had 
ever happened to Francis Joseph. What advantage to him 
or to Austria was the Frankfort Diet or the German con- 
federation ? No revenues were derived from it, and it gave 
him no assistance in the Italian war of 1859, while it must 
have caused him continued anxiety and perplexity. It was 
merely the advantage of a name and of a certain facility for 
political intrigue, — two very dubious advantages. The con- 
tinual change of ministry in the Vienna cabinet from 1859 
to 1866 was an outward manifestation of the confusion which 
reigned within. Austria was placed in a false political posi- 

1 Von Sybel, v. 449. 
144 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

tion, — like a man who enters politics without any actual talent 
for them, — and as soon as this came to an end the empire and 
its rulers suddenly found themselves at peace internally and 
at harmony with the rest of the world. Bismarck was never 
more far-sighted than when he told Count Karolyi categori- 
cally in 1862 that Austria's centre of gravity was not in Ger- 
many, but at Buda-Pesth. 

The immediate condition after Sadowa was discouraging 
enough. The treasury was empty, and the government had 
no credit. The pay of the highest officers was in arrears, and 
Von Beust was not even remunerated for the expense of his 
embassy to Paris. An attempt to borrow several millions 
from the Catholic Church resulted only in the gratuity of one 
hundred thousand dollars for the care of wounded soldiers. 
The affairs of private individuals were not much better than 
those of the government. An expectation of revolution in 
Hungary, the insubordination of the Croats, and the Prussian 
occupation of Bohemia had reduced traffic to its lowest and 
most inevitable conditions. Force had always been required 
to hold the empire together, and its discordant elements 
seemed on the point of disintegration. 

In this crisis a wise counsellor came to the assistance of 
Francis Joseph, and this was King John of Saxony. Edu- 
cated in an hereditary antagonism to the Prussian govern- 
ment, King John was nevertheless one of the best Germans 
of his time, and during his life Saxony was in a very flour- 
ishing condition ; as, for that matter, it still continues to be. 
He was a king in the old Homeric sense, and it was said of 
him that he had rather go without his own breakfast than 
that the meanest of his subjects should suffer for it. 1 He had 
long been aware of the evils from which Austria was suffer- 
ing, and knew more about them than Francis Joseph could 
know. He now went to him, and said, as we may suppose, 
" I wish to lend you my best man. Von Beust is the right 
person to bring order for you out of this chaos." What argu- 

1 He was often to be seen at the university attending lectures on history and 
literature, so plainly dressed that only those well acquainted with his face could 
recognize him. 

10 145 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

ments he used on the occasion have not transpired, but no 
doubt King John added some plain remarks on the necessity 
of an honest and efficient public service. 

It is interesting to notice the transmigration of French lib- 
eral ideas to Saxony through the alliance with the first Napo- 
leon, and their further transplantation to Vienna by Von Beust. 
It was only a Saxon or Bavarian statesman who could have 
accomplished this in the right way, so opposed was it to all 
the traditions of Austrian statecraft. We cannot enter here 
into the details of the complicated but harmonious system 
which Von Beust evolved out of what might be called the 
dregs of Metternich. Let it suffice to say that he satisfied 
the Hungarians with a well-devised local government, and 
with an equal representation in the Imperial Diet ; he pacified 
the Czechs with a different system, which united them more 
closely to the central power, and arranged for the Croats and 
other ignorant Sclavonic tribes a government suited to their 
intelligence. These different systems he united in a compre- 
hensive government machine, which, considering the diverse 
materials of which it is composed, has worked in an admir- 
able manner till the present time. In all departments of the 
state he introduced such economy and efficiency that the 
Austrian government, from being one of the most corrupt 
and tyrannical in Europe, became so improved during his 
ministry that its superior was not to be found among consti- 
tutional monarchies. A thorough liberal in religion, he intro- 
duced religious toleration, and the Jesuits, who had been 
expelled by Prince Kaunitz one hundred years before, and 
had returned again under the dogmatic regime of Metternich, 
were once more sent about their business. In this he was 
assisted by a popular uprising against priestcraft in general, 
and the Austrian church became nationalized in the same 
manner that French Catholicism had been long since. 1 

Thus by Bismarck's diplomacy and Von Moltke's victory 
Venetia and Italy were liberated ; Germany received a consti- 



1 An American resident at Innsbruck said to me in 1869, " The day of the 
priests is done in Austria." 

146 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

tutional government ; Jesuitism was suppressed, and Francis 
Joseph permitted to enjoy the remainder of his life in peace 
and tranquillity. The Hungarian exiles were recalled, and 
Hungary received greater advantages than were demanded in 
1848. Bismarck may be credited with having a direct hand 
in the liberation of Hungary, for he wrote to Baron Goltz in 
regard to Napoleon's offer of mediation that the Hungarian 
constitution ought to be one of the conditions of peace. 1 
Whether he did this because it would please the Hungarians, 
or because he thought it would weaken Austria and make 
her government more dependent on Prussia, must remain a 
matter of opinion. There was small room for sentiment in 
Bismarck's politics, though we sometimes meet with touches 
of it ; but he evidently believed in the modern principle that 
language and race should decide nationality as far as pos- 
sible. That the Croats and Galicians should become inde- 
pendent in this manner was plainly impracticable. 

During all this time Napoleon III. was twisting and writh- 
ing like a man who is trying to escape from some kind of a 
trap. After his autocratic intervention on July 5, and his 
indignation at the King of Italy on the 8th, he sent for Baron 
Goltz on the nth and talked to him in a pitiful strain of the 
services he had rendered the King of Prussia, and of the 
friendly feeling he had for him. If Prussia and Italy, he said, 
were to persist in their opposition they would expose him to 
deep humiliation. However, he did not expect any cession 
of territory, but only to have his wishes respected in the con- 
clusion of peace. On the 13th again he notified Goltz that 
some cession of territory on the Rhine would be indispen- 
sable, perhaps the boundaries of 18 14, to efface the memory 
of Waterloo. Goltz had been an admirer of the empress, and 
she also had an interview with him, — much like a lovers' 
quarrel, — in which she argued the case for France with femi- 
nine vehemence. 2 The French court was divided into oppos- 

1 Von Sybel, v. 288. 

2 The episode of the Prussian secretary of legation at Washington may be 
remembered in this connection. Attractiveness to the fair sex is considered one 
of the qualifications of a continental envoy. 

147 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

ing factions, and the emperor, in his frail health, was dragged 
this and that way by them. Drouyn de l'Huys, bold and 
confident, imagined himself a second Bismarck, and that he 
could accomplish great things if he only had free rein. He 
was supported in this by the empress, who was instigated by 
the emissaries of the pope ; for now that Victor Emmanuel's 
alliance with France was exchanged for one with a Protestant 
power, Pius IX. could see plainly that his temporal authority 
depended on a slight support. On the other side, Lavalette 
and Prince Napoleon saw the situation more clearly, and 
greatly dreaded stirring up such adversaries as Bismarck and 
Von Moltke, whom they recognized for what they really 
were, — two geniuses, such as only appear once or twice in a 
century. 

Prince Napoleon, the son of Jerome, and the only member 
of the Bonaparte family who resembled the great Napoleon 
in appearance, is credited with having shown the white feather 
at the Crimea, but in the present emergency, and consistently 
until the surrender at Sedan, he chose a position which 
showed good political judgment so far as the affairs of France 
were concerned. He even went so far as to seek an audience 
with Baron Goltz, and to do what he was able in the way of 
furthering a speedy settlement between Prussia and Austria. 

'"If you do not enter Vienna,' he said, significantly, * the em- 
peror will willingly favor you in your other conditions.' Then he 
wrote a memorial to the emperor, in which he said, ' We must expect 
that if Herr von Bismarck is threatened by France at his back, he 
will play out his last high card and come forth no longer as a Prus- 
sian, but as a German, and will call out the ardent passions of all 
Germany by proclaiming the imperial constitution of the revolu- 
tionary parliament of 1849. In what a position would he thus 
place us ! What would then be our motive for engaging in a war 
against Prussia and all Germany?' " x 

It is noteworthy that Bismarck used this same argument to 
the Tsar Alexander four weeks later. It contains the pith of 

1 Von Sybel, v. 296. 
148 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

the matter, and is a rare contrast to Thiers's statement that 
the way for France to be strong was to keep her neighbors 
weak. The Parisians might call Prince Napoleon " Plon- 
plon" or whatever they pleased, but there were few among 
them who showed such good judgment. The French editors 
kept up a continual clamor at this time, creating as much con- 
fusion as possible, instead of allowing the dust to settle so that 
people could see the political prospect clearly. Newspapers 
seem occasionally like a necessary evil. The emperor finally 
agreed to Bismarck's terms of peace, and then, just as they 
were to be signed, he sent Benedetti to make new demands 
for territory on the Rhine. 

On his return to Berlin, Bismarck went through the ova- 
tions customary on such occasions with the stolidity of a non- 
commissioned officer on parade. He had too many cares on 
his mind to respond freely to the popular enthusiasm. 4 He 
had settled accounts with Austria for a time, but France, 
Italy, and Russia still remained to be considered, as well as 
the relations of Prussia with the South German states, and 
the organization of a North German confederation. The 
manner in which he played off the governments of these 
countries against one another in the negotiations that fol- 
lowed, and without any real duplicity on his own part, is 
remarkable enough. He received a donation from the indem- 
nity fund of three hundred thousand thalers, or less than half 
as much as was voted by the British Parliament to the Duke 
of Wellington for defeating two of Napoleon's marshals. 

Ten days after the conclusion of peace at Nicolsburg, 
Benedetti appeared in Berlin with a formulated demand from 
the French government for territory on the Rhine. This was 
made in writing, and included Rhenish Bavaria, Rhenish 
Hesse, and the fortress of Mainz, as well as the boundaries 
of 1 8 14, with a favorable outlook in the direction of Luxem- 
burg for the future. 1 The demand, though imprudent, was 
not so very unreasonable, since the districts named had for 
twenty years been included in French territory ; but even if 

1 Miiller's Political History, p. 357. 
149 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

Bismarck could have persuaded William I. to agree to it, the 
result must have been a serious antagonism between Prussia 
and Bavaria, which could only be healed by compensating 
Bavaria in some other direction. In fact, the Prussian gov- 
ernment had no right to surrender Bavarian territory, 1 and 
that Napoleon should have demanded it was a natural but 
clumsy blunder, for it placed a card in Bismarck's hand which 
he could play with telling effect at any future time. In re- 
spect to Bismarck's reception of Benedetti, the account given 
by Von Sybel, who was well acquainted with Bismarck, is 
more likely to be correct than the brusque treatment attrib- 
uted to him by others. The laconic " Good, it is war, then," 
does not form an essential part of Prussian history ; neither 
does the statement that Napoleon would be obliged to go to 
war in order to save his throne, which would indeed make 
him appear in a ridiculous light. Benedetti threw out a hint 
of this kind at the close of the interview, but on his own re- 
sponsibility, not as coming from Napoleon. Otherwise the 
interview was a lengthy one, though Bismarck firmly and 
decisively refused to entertain the French proposals. " If 
you force us into a war," he said, " we will make peace with 
Austria and the South German states, and invade France 
with six hundred thousand men, and we will take Alsace and 
Lorraine away from you." This was the end of the game of 
bluff, and also the end of Drouyn de l'Huys's political career. 
He sent in his resignation a few days after Benedetti's return 
to Paris, and has never been heard from since. 

After this General Manteuffel was despatched to St. Peters- 
burg, in order to smooth down the Russian bear. Manteuffel 
was a soldier-statesman of the old Prussian school, and much 
more conservative than Bismarck himself. He was just the 
man to sympathize with Alexander in his reactionary moods. 
The Tsar received him rather coolly, and stated that, in spite 
of his friendliness for King William, he was much displeased 



1 Bestowing a piece of the Rhineland on the house of Wittelsbach was a 
shrewd device in the Congress of Vienna, for it wholly changed the traditional 
policy of Bavaria. 

150 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

with Bismarck's revolutionary proceedings. The deposition 
of a king and two grand dukes was a dangerous innovation, 
aimed directly against the divine right of kings, and calcu- 
lated to undermine the royal authority in all countries. An 
interview with Gortchakoff led to a similar discussion, which 
the Russian minister suddenly changed to a conversation on 
the peace of Paris and the Russian restrictions on the Black 
Sea. Manteuffel judged from this exactly where the shoe 
pinched, and sent a telegraphic summary to Bismarck, who 
now appeared as firmness itself. " We have agreed," he said, 
" to grant favorable conditions to Wurtemberg and Darm- 
stadt, out of consideration for Russia, but we can give no 
attention to scruples. Pressure from abroad will drive us to 
the proclamation of the imperial constitution of 1849. If 
there is to be a revolution, we shall prefer to make it our- 
selves." At the same time he gave Manteuffel to understand 
that when the right occasion arose for abrogating the Black 
Sea restrictions Prussia would be ready to support her northern 
ally. Friendly letters between the king and the Tsar con- 
cluded the Russian difficulty. 

The South German states had now to be dealt with, and 
here the French demands of August 5 served Bismarck as a 
two-edged sword. The king wished to annex Bavarian Fran- 
conia, — the region from which the Franks formally set out to 
conquer Gaul, — but Bismarck was prudently opposed to this, 
because it would aggravate the ill feeling of the Bavarians 
towards Prussia, and arouse an antagonism which might not 
subside for a hundred years. He accordingly used Bene- 
detti's proposals as an argument with William I. in favor of a 
more conciliatory policy, and with the Bavarian court for the 
purpose of obtaining a military alliance. 

The peace preliminaries between Prussia and Austria had 
left the South German states wholly independent, but it had 
practically left them defenceless, and they now began to realize 
this. The Grand Duke of Baden, who was personally friendly 
to Prussia, saw plainly enough that Napoleon III. could now 
take possession of his country without opposition. No por- 
tion of Germany had suffered so much from French invasions 

151 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

as Baden, and he applied at once for admission into the 
Prussian confederation. Bismarck proved to him that such 
a departure would tend to aggravate their relations with 
France, and be contrary to the understanding with Austria 
and Russia ; but he intimated that there was another method 
by which the desired result might be attained. 

The meeting between Bismarck and Von der Pfordten was 
a memorable one. There was no German statesman whom the 
Prussian minister respected so much. He explained to Von 
der Pfordten the king's ultimatum for Franconia, and for a 
war indemnity of thirty million florins. Then he showed him 
the proposition of Napoleon III., signed by Drouyn de 
l'Huys, for the surrender of Rhenish Bavaria to France, and 
offered him his choice between the cession of Franconia and 
an offensive and defensive alliance with Prussia. It is easy to 
imagine Von der Pfordten's decision, and it is said that the two 
prime ministers embraced each other after the German fashion. 
The same arrangement was concluded with Baden ; and Wiir- 
temberg, lying between the two states, followed as a matter of 
course. The " puffy" old Duke of Darmstadt, who depended 
for his immunity on the friendship of the Tsar, and for his 
income from the gambling hells of Hesse-Homburg, was also 
brought to a realizing sense of his dependence on Prussia by 
Napoleon's proposals of August 5. 

This was Bismarck's master-stroke, for it gave William I. 
the command of all the German forces, excepting those in 
Austria. Von Beust has denounced it in his Memoirs as an 
infraction of the peace preliminaries and the treaty of Prague, 
which was signed ten days later, without the least suspicion 
on the part of the Austrian or French governments of Bis- 
marck's military convention. He compares Bismarck to Mac- 
chiavelli, and calls it a piece of unheard-of duplicity. Von 
Beust did not realize, apparently, that Napoleon's territorial 
demands after the signing of the preliminaries had upset the 
political basis on which the peace conditions were grounded ; 
that if the South German states were in any way dissatisfied 
with the conditions of the treaty of Prague, they had suffi- 
cient time to enter their protest against them. There was 

152 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

nothing in the treaty which precluded the South German 
states from making alliances wherever they could find them; 
and though the alliance of Prussia differed from other mili- 
tary alliances in placing the South German troops under the 
command of Prussian officers, this was considered essential, 
in order that they should be properly instructed in Von 
Moltke's tactics, and so that the German army could act to- 
gether as a whole. The best evidence of the success of this 
policy is that the Crown Prince of Saxony, who fought 
against Prussia at Sadowa, was soon after placed in com- 
mand of a whole army corps of the confederation ; nor is it 
credible that Bismarck exerted undue pressure on the South 
German states in this matter, for in that case their ministers 
could have easily blocked his game by notifying Louis Napo- 
leon. 1 

The peace of Prague, with whose terms we are already 
familiar, closed the last scene in this great historical drama. 



1 " In 1849 was the time to do what Bismarck did in 1866 in the South 
German governments, — to treat the Italian states with consideration, but to in- 
sist on their binding themselves by treaty to a state of dependence on Austria." 
— Von Beust, i. 361. 



153 



CHAPTER VII 

THE NORTH GERMAN CONFEDERATION 

The chief obstacle to parliamentary government in Ger- 
many lies in the national characteristic which is called par- 
ticularism. " Every German," said Bismarck, " has an idea 
of his own, which he holds on to like a nugget of gold." 
This prevents their fusing together in political parties, as the 
English and Americans do, and it is natural that the better 
educated they are the more prominent this peculiarity ap- 
pears. The old map of Germany — large states and small 
states, states separated by other states, and states within 
states — was a very good picture of the German mind. The 
tendency of national unity has been to diminish the number 
of political parties in Germany, but they are still numerous, 
and their description is bewildering. At the same time the 
Germans have a national impulse, — an idea of their destiny as 
a nation,— and this unites them at times, so that they seem to 
act almost like one man, after which, having accomplished 
the special work in hand, they relapse into particularism 
again. This is especially true of the Prussians. 

After the peace of Prague, Bismarck found his country- 
men in this unified condition. The National Assembly passed 
his budget with but few dissenting votes, and when a com- 
mittee from the House waited on the king to announce this 
fortunate event, his Majesty remarked that he hoped that the 
preceding disagreement between himself and his people would 
never happen again. It never has happened since, and this 
goes far to prove that the era when Bismarck first accepted 
the presidency was a revolutionary one, a bloodless conflict 
between the people and their government, in which the gov- 
ernment for once was in the right, and exceptional measures 
were justifiable. 

The army appropriations, although somewhat increased, 

i54 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

passed both Houses without difficulty. The Prussian gov- 
ernment does not communicate state secrets to the National 
Assembly, but enough of the attitude of Napoleon was gen- 
erally known to stir Prussian patriotism to its depths. Great 
confidence was felt in Bismarck's political wisdom, and the 
current of popular prejudice was now in his favor, as in the 
struggle with Austria he was obliged to contend against 
it. 

The National Assembly made short work of the annexation 
of Cassel, Hanover, Nassau, Lower Darmstadt, and Frank- 
fort; for the conservatives wished to do this in order to 
strengthen the government's military power, and the oppo- 
sition because they expected to recruit their ranks with dis- 
satisfied delegates from those states. In this matter Bismarck 
appeared to great advantage in comparison with a numerous 
body of members, who advocated the incorporation of all 
North Germany in the Prussian state, without regard to the 
fear of God or the opinion of the world at large. Nothing 
could be more unprincipled than such a proposition, and Bis- 
marck answered it in a telling speech, in the course of which 
he said : x 

" So far as our confederate allies are concerned, we have had 
only few, and those were weak ; yet not only our duty, but also 
wisdom, bids us to keep our word even to the smallest of them. 
The more unsparingly Prussia shows that she can sweep her enemies 
from the map of Germany, the more exact must she be in fulfilling 
her promises to her friends. It is precisely in South Germany that 
the belief in our political honesty will be of great importance." 

The sovereigns of those petty states, of whom William I. 
wrote to the Tsar that they were as injurious to the monarchi- 
cal principle as an indigent nobility was to the cause of aris- 
tocracy, could not complain that Bismarck had not warned 
them in time what the consequences would be of giving their 
support to Austria ; but he now proved himself better than his 
word in offering them a liberal pecuniary compensation for 

1 Von Sybel, v. 494. 
155 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

the loss of their titles and landed estates. The Landtag was 
indisposed to grant this, though the revenues from the an- 
nexed territories would more than compensate for it in the 
difference between a national system and a provincial system 
of government, and Bismarck was obliged to exert all the in- 
fluence he could bring to bear in order to carry the measure 
through. Great sympathy was felt for the King of Hanover, 
on account of his blindness ; but this treatment was much 
more considerate than the first Napoleon's had been on similar 
occasions in disposing of conquered territory. 

The organization of the North German confederation, which 
differed but little from the Prussian state itself, introduced a 
new element into German politics, that of universal suffrage ; 
and in this Bismarck was opposed not by the Progressists, 
but by some of his most faithful supporters in the National 
Assembly. Seven years later Dr. Frederick Kapp, author of 
" The Hessians in America," and secretary of the Prussian 
Landtag, spoke of it as the iron chancellor's one serious mis- 
take. Bismarck's belief was that if the laboring classes felt 
that they had a direct influence in the government, they 
would be more loyal, patriotic, and contented for it, and 
would serve to counterbalance the influence of those local 
politicians who were always looking to sectional advantages. 
In the old Germanic theory of government the king, the no- 
bility, and the commons were compared to the three sides of 
a triangle, which mutually support and restrain one another. 
It was supposed that the nobility and the commons would be 
sure to restrain the king from extravagant and tyrannical ac- 
tions ; that the king would unite with the commons to restrain 
the rapacity of the nobles ; and that the king and the nobility 
would be able to prevent popular revolutions. It may have 
been this mediaeval idea to which Bismarck reverted in his 
mind; but the laboring classes form in reality a fourth division 
of the body politic, which have to be considered in a different 
way. The modern world differs essentially from the mediaeval 
in its accumulation of wealth and the consequent opportunity 
for luxurious living. The tiller of the soil in the Middle Ages 
might envy the social advantages of the baron, but it was a 

156 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

hopeless envy, for he knew it would be impossible for him to 
fill the same position. At the present day the case is dif- 
ferent: men care little for titles if they can only obtain means 
for luxurious living and the education of their children. It 
is this which makes socialism so dangerous at the present 
time, and will make it more dangerous in the time to come. 
Thus far Bismarck's suffrage law has not answered his expec- 
tations, but its ultimate effect still remains to be unfolded. 

The organization of the North German confederation was 
not a difficult task, since it merely applied the principles of 
Prussian polity to a few smaller states. Delegates to the 
North German Reichstag were elected on the 12th of Feb- 
ruary, 1867, and on the 24th they met together in the king's 
palace at Berlin, where William I. opened the assembly with 
a congratulatory speech full of confidence in the future of 
Germany, and with great expectations of German civilization. 
A number of unfriendly delegates from Saxony, Hanover, 
and Darmstadt made this legislative body more difficult to 
deal with than the Prussian Landtag had proved to be, but 
after seven weeks' discussion the government constitution was 
adopted with a few simple changes, and the assembly dis- 
solved. 

In the general congratulations of this period we hear of 
only one dissatisfied person, and that was the Crown Prince 
of Prussia. From being a firm adherent of constitutional 
methods during the storm and stress of Schleswig-Holstein, 
he suddenly changed his tone and now appeared as the advo- 
cate of arbitrary power. He informed Bismarck that there 
were too many kings in Germany, — his father was the only 
real king, — and the others ought to be reduced to the dig- 
nity of grand dukes. When Bismarck suggested that it might 
be difficult to persuade them to agree to this, he replied that 
they must be made to agree to it. 1 Bismarck may have con- 
cluded that the crown prince's duties as commander of the 
second army did not give him sufficient occupation. 

1 Von Sybel, however, does not give his authority for this conversation, 
though it agrees with a later statement in the crown prince's diary. 

157 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

After all other affairs had been satisfactorily arranged, a 
peculiar difficulty arose in respect to the settlement with 
Saxony. On the occasion of Von Beust's retirement from the 
Saxon ministry King John wrote him a cordial and gracious 
letter of regret, expressing his appreciation of Von Beust's 
long service in the Saxon government, and of his valuable 
assistance during the perilous period through which the state 
had lately passed. This letter Von Beust afterwards inju- 
diciously published in Vienna, where it served to make him 
popular, but at the same time aroused a hostile feeling to 
King John at the Prussian court. Von Beust had been the 
ablest and most outspoken of the opponents of Prussia at the 
Frankfort Diet, and this letter was considered in the light of 
an incendiary document calculated to excite ill feeling be- 
tween Prussia and the South German states. The King of 
Saxony was, therefore, called to account for it, and bluntly 
informed by Bismarck that he should consider himself fortu- 
nate not to share the fate of the King of Hanover. As the 
irritation excited by Von Beust's letter subsided after a time; 
as the Prussian demands were also mitigated ; and as King 
John had public opinion everywhere on his side, the negotia- 
tions were finally concluded by Bismarck with the payment 
of a moderate indemnity and the transfer of the Saxon for- 
tresses. 

THE LUXEMBURG INTRIGUE. 

Napoleon III. realized, after the refusal of his demand for 
more territory in August, that Bismarck was not the man to 
be caught with chaff or intimidated by threats. He saw 
plainly enough that if he was to obtain any portion of Rhen- 
ish Prussia or Bavaria he would have to do it by force of 
arms. He began at once to reorganize the French army, and 
recalled the troops which were supporting Maximilian in 
Mexico. Meanwhile a design occurred to him, or to his 
counsellors, by which he might make an entering wedge into 
Prussian territory by a little expenditure of French gold. The 
duchy of Luxemburg, situated between Lorraine and Rhenish 
Prussia, belonged by hereditary right to the King of Holland, 

153 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

but as a part of the German confederation it had since 1849 
been garrisoned by Prussian troops. Napoleon now thought 
of purchasing the King of Holland's right, if the Prussian 
government would only agree to withdraw its gaVrison, and 
then Benedetti was again despatched to Berlin to sound Bis- 
marck on the subject. 

There are conflicting statements in regard to the negotia- 
tions which followed. Professor Miiller affirms that Bismarck 
treated the proposal in a dilatory manner, — that is, he deferred 
it from time to time by such pretexts as are customary in diplo- 
matic circles. Benedetti afterwards claimed that he drew up a 
treaty, at Bismarck's dictation, between Prussia and France, 
which included the purchase of Luxemburg from the King of 
Holland, and the consolidation of Belgium with France, in re- 
turn for an offensive and defensive alliance. If Benedetti al- 
lowed himself to be fooled in this manner he was a most unskil- 
ful ambassador, for the possession of Belgium by Napoleon 
would have irritated the British government very greatly, and 
have alarmed the King of Holland still more. The latter would 
hardly be inclined to yield his rights in Luxemburg to a power 
whom he would be obliged to face on the Rhine and Scheldt. 
This was supplementing Luxemburg with a right which would 
be likely to defeat the project, and it is certain that if Bismarck 
agreed to it at any time, the fact was not mentioned by the 
King of Holland in the subsequent negotiations. The ap- 
proval of his sovereign was a side-door through which Bis- 
marck could always retreat from any temporary agreement. 
It is by no means improbable that Benedetti afterwards made 
up the story about Belgium in order to excite prejudice 
against Prussia in Holland and England ; but, as the case 
stands now, there is no way of determining anything about 
it. Napoleon's adherents, and a number of German writers 
also, have always insisted that Benedetti was brutally de- 
ceived. 

The action of the Prussian government, as soon as the 
matter came before the world, was prompt and decisive 
enough. In February, 1867, the subject was communicated 
to the King of Holland by the French ambassador, and he at 

i59 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

once agreed to the proposition, provided Napoleon would 
guarantee his country against Prussian encroachment. This 
was also for Napoleon's interest, and as Benedetti had given 
out the impression in Paris that Bismarck was ready to fall 
into line, Baron Goltz was notified that if Prussia would with- 
draw the troops which garrisoned Luxemburg the existing 
tension between the two governments might be considered at 
an end. 

Bismarck, however, promptly and decisively declined to do 
this, and a resolution introduced into the North German 
Reichstag to the effect that neither Luxemburg nor any other 
German territory should be ceded to a foreign power was car- 
ried through with enthusiasm. How dangerous the game 
was which Napoleon was playing maybe judged from the fact 
that a strong party in Berlin, with Von Moltke at its head, 
advocated war with France as the only effectual method of 
stopping the political machinations from that quarter. Bis- 
marck, however, saw another method of playing check to 
Napoleon again, and considered it too soon after the Austrian 
campaign to depend on the cordial support of the South 
German states. 

Between these two parties the king finally decided in favor 
of peace. That he should have been averse to war at his 
time of life is not surprising, though he no doubt considered 
peace the wiser course. 

The convention of great powers which decided the political 
relations of Belgium and Holland in 1839 had guaranteed in 
that treaty the independence of Luxemburg. Bismarck was 
aware of this, and he now appealed to the governments of 
Austria, Russia, and Great Britain to carry out its provisions. 
This speedily resulted in a conference at London, to which 
Napoleon III. and the King of Holland were invited, nor 
could they decline to send representatives. The French 
envoy argued that Prussia had already violated the treaty by 
maintaining a garrison in Luxemburg ; but the conference 
finally decided that the King of Holland had no right to dis- 
pose of the duchy as if it were his own personal property, 
and William I. was requested to withdraw his troops from it, 

160 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

which was accordingly done. Von Beust's attempt at a 
compromise, by proposing that the strip of French terri- 
tory, from five to ten miles in width, which was ceded to Bel- 
gium after Waterloo, should be restored to France, only 
served to arouse great indignation among the Belgians. The 
neutrality of Belgium was guaranteed for the future, but 
Luxemburg was permitted to enter into the Zollverein, or 
German customs union. 

This was in May, 1867, and Louis Napoleon had been out- 
witted three times within ten months. The French court 
was furious, and Napoleon III. openly declared that Count 
Bismarck had hocussed him. Why he should make such a 
confession, for which no one would be likely to pity him, can 
only be explained by his wishing to excite the Parisians to a 
higher pitch of animosity against Prussia. However, the 
international exposition, which was designed to attract public 
attention from the mistakes of 1866, and give the appearance 
of external magnificence to the hollow shell of the Second 
Empire, was now coming on, and Napoleon was obliged to 
repress his resentment until after that had passed. All the 
crowned heads of Europe must be invited to it, as well as 
their prime ministers, and such a love-feast as they must have 
had there does not often happen in this world. 

It was more like a battle-field than a love-feast. They were 
all more or less in danger of assassination, and no one knew 
this better than Bismarck. It has been affirmed that he did 
not wish to go, not so much from fear of death as from the 
chance of having his plans all brought to naught by the stray 
bullet of a fanatic. Then the idea of making himself agree- 
able to a man whom he cordially despised, like the French 
emperor, must have been highly distasteful to him. The 
whole business was full of pretence and hypocrisy, — a grand 
piece of political clap-trap. No one would suspect Napoleon 
of conniving at unlawful machinations against the persons of 
his enemies, but it was not impossible that some desperate 
Bonapartist might try to immortalize himself in that manner. 
The lot fell, however, to the Tsar Alexander, who was shot 
at and missed, by a Polish exile, while riding in the pro- 
11 161 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

cession, — an event not likely to startle him into a more favor- 
able policy towards French annexation on the Rhine. Bis- 
marck rode beside Gortchakoff in the procession, and had 
ample opportunities to discuss points of mutual interest in 
the policy of their respective governments. 

The secret arrangement between William and Alexander 
has never been revealed, and probably never will be, but the 
fact that such was made, some time between 1867 and 1870, 
is not to be questioned. It is referred to indefinitely in Hese- 
kiel's biography of Bismarck, which was published previous 
to the Franco-German war, and referred to by Alexander in 
the telegram sent to William I. on hearing of the Austro- 
German alliance, " Your Majesty seems to have forgotten the 
promises of 1870." Dr. Frederick Kapp said in 1873, 1 " Bis- 
marck's great move which upset Napoleon's calculations was 
the bargain he made with Gortchakoff. He said, ' If you will 
leave us to deal with France now, we will show you a good 
turn in the time that is coming.' " This mutual arrangement 
was carried out to perfection, so that Von Beust, though he 
noticed Gortchakoff's coolness towards him and Napoleon, 
was even led to believe that Russia was favorable to an alli- 
ance between France and Austria. The Tsar had no objec- 
tions against setting a trap for the author of the Crimean 
War to fall into, provided this also agreed with the interests 
of the Russian empire ; but if he was to serve as a protector 
to Prussia in the war, he expected recompense for it. In 
what shape was he to receive this ? 

It could not have been simply a revocation of the Black 
Sea restrictions. That by itself would not have been enough. 
Von Beust asks, " Why should the Tsar depend on Prussia 
for a revocation of the treaty of Paris, when Austria offered 
to arrange this for him in 1867?" The reason is plainly be- 
cause Austria could not bid high enough for the Tsar's 
friendship. Alexander was not a Solomon, but he was too 
wise to join a coalition against Prussia, which would finally 
result to his own disadvantage. No wonder that Gortchakoff 



1 In conversation with the writer. 
162 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

was cool towards Von Beust. It is clear from Dr. Kapp's 
remark that in 1873 Bismarck's debt to the Tsar had not yet 
been liquidated in spite of the Black Sea reversion. Alex- 
ander has been popularly credited with being a peace-loving 
Tsar, but it was natural that he should desire to regain the 
ground which his father had lost ; also, perhaps, to liberate 
the Christian states which are situated between the Balkans 
and the Danube from Turkish rule. It would not have been 
for Austria's interest to encourage this programme. It was 
Louis Napoleon's fatal delusion that he could persuade Alex- 
ander to withdraw from the Prussian alliance. 



BUILDING THE REICH. 

Bismarck returned to Berlin after the exposition to take up 
his work again of strengthening the German confederation. 
His policy now was a defensive one ; to establish a central 
government for the German people which should not only rest 
on a firm basis, but prove advantageous and give satisfaction to 
the component parts of this extensive system. This was his 
first principle, and his second was to avoid foreign complica- 
tions. At what time he became interested in the writings of 
Alexander Hamilton is uncertain, but it is known that he 
held them in very high estimation, and had a professorship 
established in one or more German universities, for instruction 
in the federative principle of government, as elaborated by 
that rare American genius. It is even affirmed by his friends 
that Bismarck considered Hamilton the greatest statesman 
of the last hundred years; and it is certain that the federal 
principle is the only one by which national unity can be 
made to harmonize with local and sectional interests. We 
may begin to appreciate the debt which we owe to Hamil- 
ton in America, when we consider that both Germany and 
Austria have been reconstructed, and in a manner regen- 
erated, by the principles which he enunciated. France and 
Italy, being homogeneous nations, do not require its appli- 
cation, but who can doubt that Gladstone would have suc- 
ceeded better in dealing with the Irish question if he had 

163 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

been willing to accept a lesson from statesmen on this side 
the Atlantic ? ' 

Bismarck, like a good architect, did not attempt to build 
his edifice too rapidly. For this reason he had left the Schles- 
wig-Holstein question still open until a favorable moment 
should come for its final settlement. It will be remembered 
that by a provision of the treaty of Prague the people of 
North Schleswig were permitted to decide by a majority vote 
whether they should belong to Denmark or to Prussia. The 
question was not a very important one, for the province is 
small and its inhabitants chiefly farmers. There seems to 
have been all through this period a peculiar obstinacy in the 
Danish government, which was the cause of serious losses to 
the state, — in the present instance, with the Copenhagen cabi- 
net refusing to accede to Bismarck's proposition that the 
voting should take place under the auspices of a mixed 
Prussian and Danish commission. The Danish government 
insisted that the people of North Schleswig could do their 
own voting without any assistance from Prussia ; to which 
Bismarck coolly replied that the voting should not take place 
except under well-regulated conditions. 2 

This gave the French emperor another opportunity to inter- 
fere, — in behalf of the oppressed Danes. He was politely 
informed, however, that the stipulations of the peace of Prague 
only concerned Prussia and Austria, and that there was no 
occasion for his taking further interest in the subject. 

Bismarck's next move was to conclude a commercial treaty 
with the South German states. After the first excitement of 
Sadowa and the military alliance, a reaction had set in at 
Munich and Stuttgart against Prussia. The Bavarian nobility 

1 Dr. Kapp once said, " I look upon Hamilton as a greater statesman than 
Bismarck. When I first went to New York I wanted to know about American 
politics, and I was advised to read Jefferson ; but I soon found that all those 
Tammany fellows were quoting Jefferson, so then I changed to Hamilton, and 
then I discovered where the Uniled States government came from." Jefferson 
was always opposed to centralization. 

2 Which side was right in this discussion is uncertain, for we do not know the 
Danish account of it ; but Bismarck's demand would seem to have been rea- 
sonable. 

164 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

were connected by marriage and other social ties — always a 
powerful factor in political organizations — with the Austrian 
nobility and gentry. At the same time the priests, acting 
under orders from the Vatican, started up an anti-Prussian 
agitation among the common people, so that Americans trav- 
elling in Bavaria were surprised at the violent antipathy to the 
North German confederation, not knowing the source from 
whence it arose. It was natural that the appointment of 
Prussian officers to important commands in the military 
service should give offence ; though this was indispensable if 
the army was to be reorganized in an efficient manner. Von 
der Pfordten, who always remained faithful to what he con- 
sidered the true interests of Germany, and who had among 
other trials the giddy young king to deal with, found it diffi- 
cult to maintain his ground. 

In Baden, on the other hand, there was an active move- 
ment favorable to Prussia, and Bismarck found no difficulty 
in having the whole army of the Palatinate placed under the 
command of a Prussian general, who was only responsible to 
the Grand Duke. He likewise obtained the appointment of a 
Prussian professor at Heidelberg to lecture on the French Rev- 
olution, the wars of Napoleon, and the federal system of govern- 
ment as applied to national unity. In Wurtemberg public sen- 
timent was like the man who could not agree with his neigh- 
bors. The Swabians were always at odds with the Bavarians, 
but disliked the Prussians even more. Situated close to Swit- 
zerland, they had imbibed much of the spirit of the freedom- 
loving mountaineer, — an influence plainly perceptible in the 
verses of their national poet, Schiller. They were, perhaps, 
less favorably inclined towards the Prussians out of opposition 
to the people of Baden, and this feeling extended as well to 
the nobility and to the government. According to the treaty 
of Prague the South German states were permitted to form a 
confederation of their own, if they preferred to do so, and 
Von der Pfordten made some tentative negotiations with this 
end in view. It was found, however, that Baden much pre- 
ferred to join the North German confederation, and that the 
Wurtembergers were quite as reluctant to place their military 

165 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

force at the disposal of a Bavarian general. Professor Miiller, 
himself a Wiirtemberger, says : 

"A confederation embracing not more than eight or nine mil- 
lions, and set between three great powers, would be unable to 
stand on its own feet and pursue an independent policy. It would 
be sure to become the sport of foreign intrigue, — now begging 
favors in Paris or Vienna, now asking succor from Berlin, and dis- 
appearing with the first storm that swept the face of Central 
Europe." 

It was openly declared in the Wurtemberg assembly that 
if the kingdom was to be coalesced with any political body it 
should be with a strong power like Prussia, and not with a 
weak one like Bavaria. There was good sense in this, such 
as any one could understand, and it showed the inevitable 
tendency in which German politics were drifting. 

Bismarck perceived that events were taking such a shape 
as he would like to have them, but he knew that time was 
required to ripen this movement in the South German gov- 
ernments, and that any decided interference on his part might 
only result in the gathering of green fruit. Meanwhile he 
had a cure in hand for the unsettled condition of their affairs, 
and this was a commercial treaty. The three inland states, 
separated by hundreds of miles from the sea, were obliged to 
depend on their neighbors for the transportation of imports. 
Baden could obtain this traffic through France, but likewise 
possessed the power of exacting a duty from the other two. 
Bavaria could import through Austria, but by a longer route, 
and necessarily with more expense. Bismarck could obviate 
this difficulty by conferring on the South German states the 
same advantages of the Zollverein enjoyed by the North 
German confederation. Already on June 3 he had held a 
conference with Von der Pfordten, Varnbuler, and the Baden 
minister at Berlin, in which he proposed the adoption of uni- 
form measures for imports and the regulation of national cus- 
tom-houses for all the German states excepting Austria. Such 
an advantageous measure was eagerly snapped at, and on Bis- 
marck's return from Paris it was agreed that the southern 

166 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

states should send delegates to the North German parliament, 
in number according to the ratio of their population, who 
should vote on all commercial questions which came before 
the house, but not on political questions. 

Here was German national unity established in respect to 
military service and commercial rights, and yet it could not 
be said that the peace of Prague had been violated or that the 
South German states had not acted of their own free will. To 
constitute Germany a nation there only remained to empower 
the representatives of Wurtemberg, Bavaria, and Baden with 
full authority to vote on all subjects that came before the 
Reichstag, and to give the formality of a title to the whole. The 
French might growl at this, and the Bavarian nobility howl at 
Bismarck, but every merchant and shopkeeper in Munich and 
Stuttgart was now a Prussian at heart, and the industrial 
classes of South Germany were rapidly forming a solid pha- 
lanx to resist foreign interference. The industrial interests of 
these states did not differ essentially from those of Prussia, 
but in the old Frankfort Diet, with delegates appointed by 
the sovereigns, there was less opportunity for a free expression 
of opinion. 

The elections in 1867 showed a cordial endorsement of 
Bismarck's policy. The Conservatives retained their usual 
strength in Prussia, while the opposition lost more than thirty 
seats, which were mostly won by the National Liberals, and 
it was noticed that the representatives from the annexed dis- 
tricts of Hanover, Cassel, and Schleswig-Holstein belonged 
nearly all to this new party. With three legislative bodies, 
the Prussian Landtag, the North German Reichstag, and the 
National Customs Union, to deal with, Bismarck had his 
hands more than full of legislative business, and how he 
could have carried it through seems wonderful enough. 

This second North German Reichstag might be compared 
with the earlier sessions of the American Congress, before 
partisan spirit and trade politics had debased and cheapened 
our legislative currency. It was composed for the most part 
of patriotic men, who gave their time and strength for the 
good of their country, and who met together to establish, in 

167 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

all sincerity, the foundation of a new era in German history. 
Nevertheless it was rather a difficult legislative body to deal 
with for this very reason. Von Beust considered the English 
and Belgian the only successful parliamentary governments 
in Europe, because in those countries there are two political 
parties, either of which is ready and able at any time to as- 
sume the management of public affairs. In the German, 
Austrian, and Italian parliaments such parties do not exist, 
for they would have no opportunity to assume the direction 
of affairs. As they have no opportunity for executive action, 
so there is no party discipline, — little or no subordination of 
the individual. The more high-minded men are, the less 
willing they are to subordinate their opinions to the judg- 
ment of others, and the more ljkely to resent external inter- 
ference as an infringement of personal liberty. The earnest 
desire of the Reichstag of 1868 to do their work in the most 
thorough and effective manner resulted in a continuous cross- 
fire of amendments and counter-amendments to every meas- 
ure which was proposed, and this not only seriously impeded 
the progress of public business, but sometimes resulted in 
perverting the character of the legislation in such a way as to 
defeat the very object for which it was intended. There was 
a constant tendency, especially among the National Liberals, 
for parties to resolve themselves into separate groups, and the 
smaller the group the more uncompromising and difficult to 
reason with. It was only a Bismarck or a Gladstone that 
could finally have succeeded in dealing with such a political 
body ; the latter by his oratorical skill and rare tact in har- 
monizing conflicting elements, and the former through his 
logical understanding of the situation and his inflexible deter- 
mination to make others perceive this also. Bismarck was 
the Olympian schoolmaster of the Reichstag. 

One of the first questions which came before the North 
German assembly was a measure in regard to the deposed 
King of Hanover, who was well known to be making use of 
the gratuity of the Prussian government to support a Hanove- 
rian legion in France with the funds he had thus been supplied 
with, and his adherents could congratulate themselves on the 

168 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

fact that Prussia was providing them with the means to make 
war against the North German confederation. Bismarck had 
inquired of Queen Victoria, who very properly took an interest 
in the fortunes of her relative,what sum would be sufficient for 
the exiled king to live on an equality with an English prince, 
and she had replied that a hundred thousand pounds a year 
would be enough. 1 Bismarck had exceeded this somewhat, 
but prudently had retained in the Prussian exchequer the 
principal from which this income was derived. Besides the 
support of a body of troops in France, it was notorious that 
certain German newspapers were subsidized by the ex-king to 
stir up an agitation against the new confederation. 

Bismarck, in his appeal to the Prussian Landtag for funds 
to remunerate the deposed sovereigns, had laid special stress 
on the point that their acceptance of the money would give 
to the transaction the legal character of a bargain, which 
would be likely to invalidate any future claims they might 
make to their former possessions. The King of Hanover, 
however, after receiving the gratuity, declined to make any 
formal renunciation of his sovereignty ; but Queen Victoria, 
in the English negotiations on the subject, with great good 
sense, held to Bismarck's position, declaring that this was of 
little consequence, since, by accepting the money, he would 
be bound in honor not to interfere with the North German 
confederation. Duke Adolph, of Nassau, who had received 
nine million thalers in return for the confiscation of his terri- 
tory, accepted the conditions under which it was offered to 
him and gave the Prussian government no further trouble. 

The behavior of the King of Hanover, on the contrary, 
placed Bismarck in a peculiar position. As the Reichstag 
was not in session at the time the convention with Queen 
Victoria was concluded, the Minister of Finance had taken the 
required funds from a loan authorized in 1866 for army ex- 
penditures ; and it was necessary now to obtain the sanction 

1 August Belmont once stated that he did not know how he could spend more 
than a hundred thousand dollars a year, and Froude said, " There are million- 
aires in New York who have the income of an English prince, but they are by 
no means so extravagant." 

i6q 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

of this act by a vote of the Reichstag. In the face of the 
Hanoverian legion it was rather difficult to do this. There 
were complaints of ministerial arbitrariness, a breach of trust, 
and misplaced confidence, without allowing for the exceptional 
conditions under which the transaction had taken place. The 
government was in a position not unlike that of a man who 
has made purchases with borrowed money and is unable to 
repay it. Bismarck made as little as possible of the Hano- 
verian legion, and enlarged on the advantage to Germany of 
appearing before the great powers in a magnanimous light ; 
so that, with the help of the Hanoverians and Schleswig- 
Holsteiners, the bill was finally passed. 

It was not long, however, before the same subject came up 
again. The inimical proceedings of the King of Hanover had 
been placed beyond question, and Bismarck wished the treaty 
with him to be reversed, and the income which had been 
guaranteed in it divided between a secret-service fund and a 
fund for a local assembly in Hanover for the transaction of 
business peculiar to that province. These two measures were 
introduced separately, and met with vigorous opposition on 
all sides. The National Liberals supported the confiscation, 
but wished to have the property of the King of Hanover 
turned over to the Prussian state for the amelioration of 
taxes. The Conservatives, on the other hand, objected to the 
Hanoverian state assembly as a luxury that would only be 
enjoyed by that province, whereas the various provinces of 
the old kingdom of Prussia possessed no such advantage. 
Dr. Windhorst, the Hanoverian clerical, denounced the con- 
fiscation of King George's funds as a violation of the sacred 
rights of monarchy. 

The Liberals, however, found satisfaction in the advocacy 
of a state assembly, as they foresaw it would make an enter- 
ing wedge in the direction of local self-government, and they 
finally concluded that this was more important than the ques- 
tion of a secret-service fund. The Conservatives, to whom 
the favor of royalty was as a second nature, were brought to 
terms by William I., who realized as well as Bismarck the 
advantage at that moment of conciliating the Hanoverians, 

170 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

who may be said to constitute the heart of Germany. In this 
way both bills were finally passed ; but Bismarck incurred the 
displeasure of the Conservatives, who considered him, as po- 
litical parties are apt to do in such cases, as trying to curry 
favor with the Liberals, and as having intrigued against them 
with the king. His two principal speeches on the Hanover 
question were soon afterwards translated into English, and 
there is not much eloquence in them, but a cogent, logical 
statement of the case in hand. " No motive," he said in the 
last of them, " except personal ambition could have induced 
a king whose dominions separated the two portions of Prussia, 
and whose good will it was therefore for the interest of our 
government to conciliate, to join hands with the enemies of 
Prussia." 

The constitution of the North German confederation had 
been framed with rather too exalted a view of human nature. 
It was supposed that the true representatives of the German 
people would always behave and act like gentlemen, and, 
while there was no rule by which a member of the Reichs- 
tag could be suspended, as in the House of Commons, for 
unseemly conduct or improper language, it was expressly 
provided, under Article LXXXIV., that members of neither 
house should be called to account for their votes or for any 
expression of opinion. Von Sybel says, " The idea prevailed 
that within the circle of the nation's representatives the public 
humiliation consequent upon the call to order following 
upon a breach of decorum would be an all- sufficient means 
to insure justice and propriety of behavior." x Truly, it is 
important in politics to consider the ideal, for without that 
there can be no sure progress ; but it is equally important to 
remember that human nature changes but little from one 
generation to another, and is at best a variable and uncertain 
commodity. 

An illustration of this had already arisen in the preceding 
session. A deputy named Twesten in the present parliament 
had criticised with unmeasured severity the Prussian police 

1 Von Sybel, vi. 344. 
171 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

and courts of justice ; and another deputy named Frentzel, one 
of the remaining Progressists, had brought serious charges 
against the chief of the Konigsberg police. In both in- 
stances these gentlemen had indulged in plenty of loud-voiced 
rhetoric without producing any sufficient testimony to sub- 
stantiate their statements, and Count Lippe, the minister of 
justice, brought a legal action against them for libel on the 
government. The two deputies were tried before the Superior 
Court, and were acquitted on the ground that Article 
LXXXIV. permitted full expression of opinion in the assem- 
bly ; but on appeal to the Supreme Court this judgment was 
reversed, and a decision rendered of the highest importance 
in its definition of the right and limitation in freedom of speech. 
It was held by the Supreme Bench that an opinion could only 
be construed in the sense of a process of reasoning, and that 
mere vague assertions, unsupported by documentary evidence, 
could not properly form an opinion, and might be held as 
reprehensible in a parliament as in a court-room. This marks 
the exact difference between freedom of opinion and license 
of speech, a point which people often find it difficult to deter- 
mine. 

The immediate consequence was, however, that the Cham- 
ber of Deputies passed a resolution declaring that the pro- 
ceedings of the Supreme Court were unconstitutional, and 
protested against their validity. Count Lippe on his part en- 
tered a protest against this action as an infringement on the 
supreme tribunal of the land, and a conflict between the 
Landtag and the Supreme Court ensued, which continued 
till near the close of the session. The court's decision had 
excited great popular indignation, and was made use of as 
an electioneering argument. In November, 1867, Lasker in- 
troduced a bill requiring that the legal construction of Article 
LXXXIV. should be accepted as unrestricted freedom of 
speech, which was passed by a narrow majority in the Land- 
tag, but defeated in the upper chamber. Bismarck, how- 
ever, considered it best in this instance to take the popular 
side. The sentence of Twesten and Frentzel, which had 
been two years' imprisonment, was reduced to a small fine, 

172 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

and the point at issue permitted to remain in abeyance. The 
Landtag showed a patriotic spirit in passing appropriations 
for the army, and for those novel expenditures which are re- 
quired for the establishment of a new governmental system. 

THE BREWING OF THE STORM 

Old Marshal Niel was intrusted by Napoleon with the re- 
organization of the French army, which he effected in rather 
too antiquated a manner. The infantry were armed with the 
chassepot rifle, which proved to be a better weapon than the 
needle-gun, but their tactics were not adapted to the use of it. 
Marshal Niel adhered to the old Napoleonic methods, which 
the French naturally supposed could not be improved on. 
He did not consider sufficiently the influence which modern 
inventions, especially the improvement in fire-arms, might 
have on them. He did not recognize that heavy-armed 
cavalry, such as was so effective under the command of 
Murat, could no longer make a sustained charge against the 
firing of modern projectiles ; and he either retained or intro- 
duced a complicated series of evolutions, quite at variance 
with the principle asserted by Frederick the Great, that 
nothing which is not simple is of any use in war. He estab- 
lished large central depots of military stores, which were found 
inconvenient when the war finally came, and caused delay by 
creating a traffic blockade on the railways. It was at this 
time that the world began to hear something of a deadly 
machine invented by the French emperor himself, which was 
expected to surpass all others in its destructive effect on ranks 
of infantry. 

Metternich's policy was dogmatic, Bismarck's rational, and 
Louis Napoleon's empirical. Dogmatic politics, starting on 
a basis of things as they are, always succeed most easily for 
a time, but finally, as they are not suited to the progressive 
wants of mankind, end in revolution. A rational policy is 
the only sound one, — a policy based on a knowledge of 
human nature and progressive development,— but involves 
the necessity of a perpetual conflict between the different 
classes of society, — the governing and the governed, — such 

i73 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

as we meet with in the history of Rome before the time of 
Marius, and in England since the time of James II. This is 
the proper and healthy condition for a nation to continue in ; 
and though it sometimes approaches to a social revolution, it 
is really the best preventive against revolutions. The struggle 
between the centrifugal and the centripetal forces of society 
keeps the body politic in a healthy condition, and affords 
room for those popular impulses to expand in, which finally 
take the form of national progress. An empirical policy, 
which is neither consistent with any set of political dogmas 
nor allows sufficient scope for popular movements, necessarily 
results in a series of makeshifts. It is like leaping one ditch 
after another, and, though it may succeed with skilful man- 
agement for a time, it is sure to end at last in complete and 
utter ruin. 

The failure of the second French empire was inherent in 
the condition of the French people. For the last hundred 
years France has been the head centre of the liberal move- 
ment in Europe; but France is still a Catholic country. 
There is a political contradiction in this, which has resulted in 
intermittent revolutions. Catholicism belonged to the earlier 
mediaeval period, when ignorance was the rule and education 
the rare exception, and it still continues well suited to the in- 
tellectual capacity of ignorant persons. The invention of 
printing necessarily brought with it a more enlightened and 
spiritual faith. There is an element of progress in the Church 
of Rome, but it is too slow and too much embarrassed by 
old traditions to keep pace with the march of events. An 
educated man in a Catholic country, therefore, finds himself 
in a position of outward antagonism to his inner life, and if 
he breaks through this he finds himself in that element of 
disbelief which we call scepticism. Either condition is weak- 
ening intellectually, and places him at a disadvantage with the 
man who has a real faith which he can express freely in out- 
ward action. This is the reason why French literature in the 
nineteenth century compares so unfavorably with English and 
German literature. The average Frenchman of to-day is 
either a philosophical materialist or a lukewarm Romanist, 

i74 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

just as either his mental tone or external conditions happen 
to decide for him. 

It is true that the French take their religion very lightly, 
but, while this affords them an opportunity for intellectual 
progress, it has a decidedly weakening effect on character. 
The Gallic race is light-hearted and cheerful. In many phases 
of life the French appear to great advantage beside their 
more stolid neighbors in England and Germany ; but light- 
headedness is not inconsistent with profound religious feeling. 
Of all the sects of Protestants, the Huguenots were the most 
impassioned, and the strong religious convictions of their 
opponents are indelibly expressed in the sermons of Bossuet 
and the poetry of Racine. It was this moral and intellectual 
intensity which brought about the grand epoch in French 
literature, and produced those noble old Frenchmen of whom 
Lafayette was one of the last examples. What a change to 
the time when the funeral of Victor Hugo, the Dickens of 
French novelists, was made a public orgy in the streets of 
Paris ! 

This contradiction is illustrated to perfection in Louis 
Napoleon's Italian policy. Beaconsfield affirmed in his last 
novel that during Garibaldi's invasion of the papal states 
Napoleon's inclination was really on the side of the insur- 
gents ; and it is known that he was for some time wavering 
in his decision. Yet he suppressed the Roman revolution 
of 1848 in order to obtain the support of the French Ultra- 
montanes, though in doing so he offended his former confed- 
erates and risked assassination by the Orsini bomb. Then in 
1859 he undertook the campaign in Lombardy in the interest 
of French liberalism. In 1868 again he defended the pope 
against Garibaldi, and compelled the Italians, in order to 
realize their aspiration for national unity, to seek the alliance 
of a Protestant power. On the other hand, in order to gratify 
the frivolity of his subjects, which arises from their lack of 
religious seriousness, he was obliged to make a continual 
effort in the way of scenic diversion. He was continually 
afraid of being outvoted in the Chamber of Deputies, of rev- 
olution, and assassination. During the last seven years of 

i75 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

his reign Louis Napoleon was in the position of a man who is 
riding two horses, which may separate at any time and let him 
fall between them. Benedetti spoke seriously enough to Bis- 
marck when he said, on the 5th of August, 1866, "There is 
too much danger that if Napoleon does not obtain proper 
compensation it will cost him his throne." 

While strengthening the internal condition of his kingdom, 
and preparing himself for a contingency towards which events 
were rapidly drifting him, Napoleon looked abroad for the 
possibility for an alliance which might serve him when the 
final struggle came. The British government, weakened by 
internal dissensions and always loath to take an interest where 
the ultimate advantage might accrue in a large measure to 
another country, he knew well enough would give him no 
assistance. He had a permanent defensive and offensive alli- 
ance with Victor Emmanuel, but the sentiment of the Italian 
people was turning against him, and of all governments in 
Europe at this time the Italian was the one most dependent 
on popular support. He had mortally offended Francis Jo- 
seph, but still he hoped that self-interest and hatred of Bis- 
marck might counterbalance the grudge of Solfeiino at the 
Austrian court. He therefore attempted to build up an 
Austro- Italian alliance out of such poor material as was still 
left to him, — a doubtful undertaking, and a crazy structure to 
depend on if he succeeded in erecting it. 

Von Beust is here of great value to us, for, though he some- 
times hedges like Bismarck in his assertions, and tries to give 
a favorable Austrian color to them, the sound character of the 
man is beyond question. Already during the Luxemburg 
difficulty the Due de Gramont had proposed an alliance to 
him in case of war with Prussia, with the offer of Silesia or 
an equivalent in South Germany. He says : 

" I replied by pointing out that the emperor, having millions of 
German subjects, could not make an alliance for the purpose of 
diminishing German territory. I cannot recollect whether I re- 
peated in this despatch the idea which I have repeatedly expressed 
to the Due de Gramont, and to which he alludes in his answer of 
January, 1873, but I remember the idea itself very distinctly. It 

176 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

could not be our task to attack Germany any more than it is our 
duty to protect her. The field of action to which our interests 
pointed, and where all the races in the empire could fight without 
aversion, was the East. ' ' ' 

This reply must have been as unpleasant to the Due de 
Gramont as some of Bismarck's replies were to the French 
emperor. Von Beust had a number of reasons for this decli- 
nation, of which the first and foremost was the character of 
Napoleon himself. " We had to consider a double danger," 
he says, " when considering such a proposition, — the possi- 
bility of Napoleon coming to an agreement with Prussia at 
our cost, and his leaving us to enjoy the evil effects of his 
alliance." Then, Von Beust did not like the idea of having his 
internal reforms suspended, and perhaps thwarted altogether, 
by the exigencies and perhaps catastrophes of a colossal 
war. In the third place, it was doubtful if the Hungarians, 
who were now quasi independent, would support a coalition 
against Bismarck, whom they naturally looked upon as their 
best friend. Moreover, the agitation in the Danubian princi- 
palities, which had commenced with the assassination of the 
Prince of Roumania, appeared to be on the increase, and was 
a source of grave anxiety to the Vienna cabinet. 

In August Napoleon and Gramont made a visit to Francis 
Joseph at Salzburg to condole with him on the murder of his 
brother Maximilian by those Mexican devils, and it is note- 
worthy that the imperial party was severely hissed at the rail- 
way station of Augsburg, in Bavaria, on their way thither. This 
ought to have been a note of warning to Napoleon as signifi- 
cant of the disposition of the people of South Germany. To 
a more alert mind than his it would have been sufficient to 
change the whole current of his policy, but he knew that the 
Bavarian nobility were on his side, and neglected to consider 
the effect of Bismarck's popular elections. Augsburg is the 
financial centre of Southern Germany, and it was Bismarck's 
Zollverein from which the hisses originated. 

Maximilian was in a measure Louis Napoleon's victim, 

1 Von Beust's Memoirs, ii. 172. 
12 177 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

though he finally lost his life through an excess of chival- 
rous devotion to his Mexican adherents. The meeting, there- 
fore, could not have been a very cordial one. Francis Joseph 
had reason to be pleased with the removal of his brother to a 
distant scene of action, but he showed true fraternal feeling 
and deep concern at the approach of his unhappy fate. It is 
not likely, therefore, that there was more than a formal dis- 
cussion of politics at Salzburg, though Prussian government 
organs undoubtedly made the most of the meeting there. 
Von Beust says : 

" We arrived at the conclusion that it was our joint task to ob- 
serve minutely the stipulations of the peace of Prague, but to avoid 
on both sides any interference in German affairs. It was especially 
agreed that France should refrain from any measures or manifesta- 
tion of a threatening nature, while Austria should limit herself to 
preserving the sympathies of South Germany by developing a 
liberal and truly constitutional system." l 

This amounted to nothing more, apparently, than leaving 
things as they were. In the following October, when Francis 
Joseph visited the Paris Exposition, Von Beust had an inter- 
view with the Prussian envoy, and they agreed in thinking 
that the best means of avoiding a collision with France 
" would be to consolidate South Germany so as to present a 
united front to the foreigner." Between the two evils of-as- 
sisting Napoleon or remaining outside the German confeder- 
ation the Austrian emperor evidently preferred the latter. 

In the summer of 1868 Napoleon renewed his proposals for 
a Franco-Austro-Italian alliance. The discussion of the sub- 
ject was protracted for more than a year, and the most that 
the Austrian government was willing to admit was that in 
case of complications with Russia, and Prussia's giving Russia 
countenance and support, Austria would be willing and ready 
to take part with France in a war against Germany ; but such 
an unequal conflict as that might prove had no charm for 
Napoleon III. 

1 Von Beust's Memoirs, ii. 36. 
178 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

Old political stagers predicted that the campaign of 1866 
would have its reflection in a number of small insurrections in 
various parts of Europe, and so it proved. The Panslavic 
agitation continued to seethe and ferment, but did not come 
to the surface of events till ten years later. The Cretan insur- 
rection began in the winter of 1867, and Garibaldi's invasion 
of the papal territory took place the following summer. 

The first of these was so favorable to the interests of Prus- 
sia that we might almost suspect that Bismarck had instigated 
it, though he could only have done so through the mediation 
of the Russian court. It would be interesting to know what 
he thought about the Cretans and Turkish affairs in general, 
but he gave no more sign than the Speaker of the House of 
Commons does in regard to the subject of debate. However, 
he readily agreed with the British ministry in favoring a 
friendly attitude towards the Cretans at Constantinople ; but 
Napoleon followed the example of Austria in taking an oppo- 
site course, which practically left the Sultan to act as he 
pleased. 

The first six months of 1867 in Italy proved an anxious 
period for both Bismarck and Napoleon. The sudden acqui- 
sition of Venetia, against all expectation, had filled the Italians 
with an enthusiastic longing for their ancient capital, but 
Prussia could do nothing for them in that direction. The 
nation was not in a condition to cope with France, and its 
acquisition depended on either the good-will of Napoleon or 
such an internal condition of French affairs as to render his 
interference impossible. This latter alternative does not 
appear to have occurred to Victor Emmanuel's counsellors, 
and there were those among them who were willing to join in 
an attack upon Prussia if Napoleon would only permit them 
to march into Rome. 1 It is doubtful if the king would ever 
have consented to this, and the pressure of events soon turned 
the political current in the opposite direction. Ratazzi, who 
had succeeded La Marmora, informed Napoleon that the sit- 
uation was critical, and that he feared the patriotic ardor of 

1 Von Sybel, vol. vi. ch. iv. 
179 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

the Italians would soon find an outlet in one way or another. 
Napoleon felt himself m the same position, and attempted to 
effect a compromise with Pius IX., but met with such an ob- 
stinate refusal that for a time he allowed matters to take their 
natural course. In Florence the uncertainty of opinion was 
so great that two ministries resigned in less than four months. 

The natural course of events in Italy meant — Garibaldi. 
Rome was his game, and he was ready to spring upon it as 
soon as the leash which held him was loosened. An invasion 
of the states of the Church by his " sons of freedom" followed 
as a matter of course, and it is said that Napoleon was never 
so distracted in his mind as on this occasion. He gave orders 
and countermanded them a number of times, but finally de- 
cided to support the pope. The battle of Mentana followed, 
and Garibaldi's forces were dispersed by the effective use of 
the chassepot, but the same fusillade killed Napoleon's influ- 
ence in Italy. The French alliance continued as an empty 
form, but it was worse than nothing, for it served to encourage 
an expectation which could never be realized. The chassepot, 
however, had done its whole duty, and the superiority of the 
Prussians at Sadowa was now fully explained. 

The continued interference of France in the affairs of so 
many other nations had now aroused a general feeling of exas- 
peration at European courts, and Napoleon's attempt to shift 
the responsibility of the pope's temporal authority from 'his 
own shoulders by a conference of the powers met with small 
favor, and finally died a lingering death amid great volumes 
of diplomatic correspondence. The sympathy in England, 
both Tory and Liberal, was with the Italian government. 
Von Beust, having a controversy with the pope himself over 
the concordat, had no desire to increase the pope's influence 
by strengthening his position, and Bismarck was non-com- 
mittal. In the summer of 1868, as Marshal Niel repre- 
sented to Napoleon that it was folly to make war on Prus- 
sia without a substantial ally, the emperor bestirred him- 
self again to bring about the triple alliance with Austria and 
Italy, but Von Beust had his hands full without attempting to 
pull Napoleon's chestnuts out of the fire, and Victor Em- 

1S0 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

manuel, though expressing the most cordial sentiments to- 
wards his imperial friend and benefactor, would only join the 
proposed alliance on terms which were a practical nullification 
of it. These were that the French garrison should be with- 
drawn from Rome, and the possession of the Italian Tyrol 
guaranteed in case of a successful termination of the war. 
Napoleon must have perceived from this only too clearly 
what he had to expect from Victor Emmanuel. 

In this perplexity, and, as it were, grasping at straws, he 
turned to Isabella, the disreputable Queen of Spain. The influ- 
ence of the pope in European politics would never have been 
one-half of what it actually has been if it were not for the influ- 
ence of the priests on queens and empresses. Isabella, who 
governed by means of one of the most tyrannical of prime 
ministers, was no doubt informed by him that it would be im- 
possible to drag her impoverished country into a war with 
Germany, but that there would be no difficulty in providing 
for the protection of Pius IX. with forty thousand Spanish 
bayonets. This would have relieved Napoleon from further 
embarrassment in that direction, and enabled him to add the 
troops in Rome to his effective force upon the Rhine; but the 
covenant had been no sooner agreed upon, in September, 
1868, when suddenly the Spanish revolution took place; the 
queen and her minister, Gonzalez Bravo, were defeated at the 
battle of Alcolea, and Isabella obliged to fly for succor to the 
man who had expected assistance from her. Such a buga- 
boo had Bismarck become to the French people that he was 
accused by the Parisian journals of having instigated and 
abetted this Spanish revolution ; though he was opposed to 
revolutions on principle, and the compact between Napoleon 
and Isabella was not discovered till many years afterwards. 1 

It is noteworthy that, although Napoleon III. professed to be 
the champion of popular rights and the principle of nationality, 
all the popular movements of this period, excepting the cam- 
paign of 1859, were unfavorable to him, and equally to the 
advantage of Bismarck, who never pretended anything of the 



Von Sybel, vi. 411 ; also Heeling's Memoirs, iii. 360. 
181 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

sort. The conclusion is unavoidable that Bismarck was act- 
ing in harmony with the laws of nature, or human nature, 
and that Louis Napoleon was contending against them. The 
condition of France in 1868 is a fair example of the result of 
a government based, like that of Napoleon I., on prestige and 
popularity. When Marshal Niel, a genuine old soldier, at- 
tempted to reorganize the French army, he found such oppo- 
sition to his plans, both in the Chamber of Deputies and 
among his colleagues, that it became simply an impossible 
task. The French people believed that they had only to rise 
up in their might, as they did in 1793, and demolish the Prus- 
sians. Thiers, Favre, and other opponents of the government, 
who had attacked Napoleon in the Chambers for permitting 
Bismarck to build up a strong German power, were now as 
vehemently opposed to granting appropriations for an increase 
of the army, while the newspapers of both parties maintained 
a continuous clamor against the odious Prussians. It is sup- 
posed also that Marshal Niel's colleagues in the ministry se- 
cretly undermined his efforts to create a strong military 
establishment for fear of the ascendency which this might 
give him. The consequence was that the appropriations were 
largely reduced, and a force of three hundred thousand men 
was the most the marshal could report to Napoleon at the 
close of the year. 

Sparta, Rome, and Prussia are the three military nations 
of history, — that is, as compared with others. Napoleon 
I. made France a nation of soldiers during his time, but after 
Waterloo this came to an end. Frederick the Great so or- 
ganized the Prussians during his reign that with seven millions 
of population he was able to maintain himself and preserve 
the peace in Europe for thirty years. 1 Scharnhorst originated 
the present Prussian military system, which has been devel- 
oped not only into the most effective but the most equitable 
that has ever been devised. It was a decided improvement 
on the French system of the First Empire, and it was evi- 



1 He wrote to the King of France, " Not a shot is fired on the continent 
without my permission." 

182 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

dently what upset Napoleon's calculations in 1813. Every 
able-bodied youth at the age of eighteen is obliged to report 
himself to the authorities for service. The sons of counts and 
barons are obliged to do this, the same as common peasants. 
Wealthy young men, however, are permitted the advantage of 
serving for only two years if they will contribute to their own 
maintenance during the time. As all others serve for four 
years, this is not abstractly just, but probably, on the whole, 
better for the state. At the expiration of four years they go 
into the Landvvehr, or reserves, and are required to drill 
six weeks each year for six years longer. The officers are 
to a large extent taken from the titled classes, and are re- 
quired to be highly educated men, so that a refined esprit du 
corps is preserved in the profession. In the autumn the sol- 
diers are relieved from discipline, and take part in gathering 
the crops. 

Although a large army is always something of a burden 
to a nation, the German system certainly has a number of 
advantages. It trains up young men in the most healthy and 
orderly of all modes of life just at the time when they are 
liable to contract idle and dissipated habits, so that it may even 
be affirmed that the time devoted to their country in this way 
is no loss, but doubled or even trebled in the average du- 
ration of German life. It also effects an unconstrained inter- 
course between the different classes of society, by which the 
higher are induced to respect the more humble, and the less 
educated to acquire something of the culture of those who 
have been more fortunate ; and, as Von Moltke discovered, it 
teaches them all to speak good Hanoverian German, so that 
dialects and provincialisms are now dying out. 

If we now contrast this with the Napoleonic system, it is 
easy to foresee — if we did not already know it — the issue of 
the impending struggle between France and Prussia. The 
French army was recruited by the old method of conscription, 
and the unfortunate persons enrolled in this manner were 
obliged to serve from ten to fifteen years. Those who had 
the means to purchase a substitute were certain to do so, and 
thus the real burden fell almost entirely upon the laboring 

183 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

classes. The system was just and fair only in the sense that 
a lottery is just and fair. There are no braver soldiers than 
the French ; but a man's devotion to his country will always 
be more or less influenced by the way in which he is treated 
by his country, — if we except such rare instances as Aristides 
and Mazzini. The more prosperous classes were supposed 
to be organized into a national militia ; but, though the service 
was made obligatory, various ways were discovered of es- 
caping from it, and Marshal Niel found his most difficult 
obstacle in attempting to give a sufficient consistency to the 
National Guard, so that it might serve to garrison the for- 
tresses. The young aristocrats of Paris stubbornly objected 
to anything like discipline, and ridiculed the Prussians as 
Bismarck's drudges, low-bred fellows who ate with their 
knives. There was actually more equality in monarchical 
Germany than in democratic Paris. 1 The average intelli- 
gence of the French army officers was also of a lower grade 
than the German. There was not, perhaps, so much favoritism 
in the appointments as there was formerly in the English 
army, but there had been numerous promotions for bravery 
on the field of battle which went much beyond the actual 
deserts of the individual. French generals were captured in 
the campaign of 1870 so ignorant that they could not write 
their names. 

THE ROUMANIAN QUESTION. 

How easily a person in Bismarck's position accomplishes 
what he undertakes, if he only comprehends the situation, is 
shown by the denouement of the Roumanian complication in 
1868. After the Roumanian revolution of 1866, Napoleon, 
of course, wished to increase his prestige by originating the 
appointment of a prince to fill the vacant throne, and, perhaps 
to bring Prussia into closer relations with his policy, he pitched 
upon Prince Charles Anthony, of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, 
a twelfth-century relative of the Prussian king. He was, 
however, much more nearly connected with Napoleon him- 

1 Paris has been republican certainly since 1830. The support of the Second 
Empire came chiefly from the country districts. 

184 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

self, since his mother was a princess of the Murat family. 
He was at the time an officer in the Prussian army, and as 
such a subject of William L, who disapproved of the appoint- 
ment as likely to result in political complications, but recog- 
nized the young man's right to accept the position if he 
thought best. Bismarck held the same opinion at first, but, 
on finding that Austria and England were opposed to it, he 
changed his mind and advised the prince to accept. 

Louis Napoleon's man of business in this affair was a Rou- 
manian named Joan Bratianu, who accordingly obtained a 
plebiscite of the Roumanian people (after the French fashion) 
in favor of Prince Charles ; and the prince, after being smug- 
gled through Austria in disguise, was seated with eclat on 
his precarious throne. Being a Prussian officer through and 
through, he naturally wished to introduce the Prussian mili- 
tary system in his principality, and one of the first acts of his 
government was to negotiate with William I. for forty thou- 
sand needle-guns. These, however, could not be had at once, 
owing to the danger of an attack by France ; and meanwhile 
Bratianu, who was prime minister and a brilliant but visionary 
man, had evolved a scheme of his own for enlarging the boun- 
daries of Roumania in imitation of Garibaldi's conquest of 
Naples. Incendiary movements, of which Prince Charles must 
have been entirely innocent, were set on foot on the borders 
of Bulgaria and Transylvania. It is possible that these may 
have been instigated at the Russian court, but that Bismarck 
could have had nothing to do with them is evident from the 
events which followed. About the same time a consignment 
of needle-guns, which had been forwarded through Russia in 
order not to attract the attention of Von Beust, were discov- 
ered by Austrian spies. Von Beust immediately notified Na- 
poleon, who informed the Gladstone ministry, and a great 
howl was raised over this fresh instance of Bismarck's insidi- 
ous machinations. 

The howling of the French press did not trouble Bismarck, 
for he knew that the louder they howled the stronger and 
more deep-rooted would become the sentiment for national 
unity among the German people; but when the Hungarian 

185 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

press began to complain of the faithlessness of their Prussian 
allies, and to talk about the integrity of the empire of the 
Danube, he recognized that the right time for intervention 
had come. He directed the Prussian minister at Bucharest, 
on the 22d of November, 1868, to demand of Prince Charles 
the immediate dismissal of the Bratianu ministry, and when 
this was complied with the whole disturbance came suddenly 
to an end. Whatever may be said or thought about the agi- 
tation on the Bulgarian border, it is incredible that Bismarck 
should have intended to irritate the Hungarians, or the Tsar 
to offend Francis Joseph, by the disorders in Transylvania. 
Bismarck recognized the true origin of the difficulty and re- 
moved it with a stroke of his pen. 

The Cretan revolution had now been dragging along for a 
year with hopeless prospects, and there was danger that Greece 
would become involved in the struggle to its own ruin. Von 
Beust would have liked much to have had it suppressed, but 
his hands were tied for the time being, and he could only in- 
fluence the French cabinet in the same direction. Gladstone 
had favored the Cretans, and Bismarck was not unfriendly to 
them; but the latter now saw that of two great calamities one 
was sure to happen, — either Greece itself would be crushed 
by the Turkish army, which was assembled on the borders 
of Thessaly, or that there would be an Oriental convulsion 
like that of 1854. He accordingly laid the case before Alex- 
ander, and persuaded him to see it in its true light. He then 
proposed to Napoleon and the Sultan, a European conference 
for a pacific solution of the problem. This all parties con- 
cerned readily agreed to, and with it closed the year 1868. 



CHAPTER IX 

THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR 

French authorities are altogether silent on the subject, but 
it is well known in Germany and Spain that the proposition 
to place Prince Leopold of Hohenzollem on the Spanish 
throne originated in the summer of 1869. It was Salazar, a 
Spanish minister of the provisional government, who first 
made the proposal, and Dr. Busch gives a circumstantial ac- 
count of an interview on the subject between Benedetti and 
Bismarck, wherein the former pointed out the critical situa- 
tion of affairs which might result from it ; in reply to which 
Bismarck made a counter-proposition, which must have 
pleased Benedetti still less. He suggested that Prince Fred- 
erick Charles, nephew to William I., and one of the ablest 
generals in Europe, would make a more suitable candidate, if 
only his religion did not interfere to prevent it. Unemployed 
princes have been commonly ready and willing enough to 
change their religion for the sake of a throne ; but Benedetti 
did not suggest this, and there was otherwise a grim humor 
in Bismarck's proposition which he may have laughed at after- 
wards himself. If there was a man in Europe who could dis- 
cipline the Spaniards and train them up in the way they should 
go, it was the red Frederick ; and if the Cortes had offered 
him the Spanish throne, it is safe to presume he would either 
have done this or died in the attempt. 

It is rather suspicious that about this same time Marshal 
Niel submitted to Napoleon III. the plan of a campaign for 
the invasion of Germany. According to the statement that 
has been made of this plan the French army was to follow 
the line of the Main, and having once defeated the forces op- 
posed to it the left wing was to unite with a division from 
Holland, which was expected to join in this raid for conquest ; 
the centre was to instigate a revolution in Hanover and Hesse, 

187 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

and the right wing was to detach Wurtemberg and Bavaria 
from the Prussian alliance. This was a bold design, but one 
which could have succeeded only through exceptional good 
fortune. The probability is that, even if successful in their 
first attack, the French invading divisions would have been 
overpowered by the Prussian reserves, for it was part of Von 
Moltke's strategy to retain his best troops for such an emer- 
gency. Whether it was intended to act upon this plan at once 
we do not know, for Marshal Niel died on August 13, and his 
successor, General Leboeuf, made wholly different arrange- 
ments. 

Prince Leopold, like Prince Charles Anthony, was more 
closely connected with the Bonaparte family than with the 
royal family of Prussia, but he was also an officer in the 
Prussian army, and considered William I. as his liege lord 
and the head of the house. In the autumn of 1869 he was 
first interrogated by Salazar in regard to accepting the Span- 
ish throne, and, after a consultation with King William, de- 
clined the offer. William I. was always strongly opposed to 
it or to any measure which would have a tendency to promote 
a war with France. Underneath the documents in the national 
archives, and such confidential letters as have been preserved, 
there is always an undercurrent in national diplomacy which 
never comes to the surface. It is possible that Napoleon III. 
suggested the candidacy of Prince Leopold, in order to set 
him up as a man of straw, to serve as a pretext in the way he 
finally did ; or it is possible that the nomination was instigated 
by Bismarck in order to establish a strong position in the rear 
of France, which might at least serve to divert the enemy's 
attention. Much more likely is it that Serrano, Salazar, and 
the other Spanish leaders, having become thoroughly sick of 
the Bourbon and Hapsburg families, had concluded to apply 
for a scion of royalty from a house that had long since proved 
its virtue, intelligence, and capacity for government. The at- 
tempt to establish another Bonaparte dynasty in Spain would 
have been injudicious for a number of reasons, especially since 
the intriguing resident of the Tuileries would then have a 
continual excuse for interfering in the affairs of the Spanish 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

government. With respect to Germany no such complica- 
tions would be likely to result. There were neither conflicting 
interests nor allied interests between the two countries, and 
Leopold on the throne of Philip II. would have been as far 
removed from Prussian influence as it was possible to be on 
the continent of Europe. 

Another incident in this rather uneventful year was the 
reaction against Prussia in Bavaria and Wurtemberg. The 
greatest of statesmen cannot alter the character of human 
nature, and the haughty bearing of Prussian officers in those 
countries produced an effect like that of the first Napoleon's 
subordinates in the Confederation of the Rhine. There was 
great rejoicing in Munich when a Prussian captain, for once, 
became intoxicated and disgraced himself generally. The 
Jesuits took advantage of this to increase the agitation as 
much as possible, and Bavarian newspapers were loud-voiced 
in their protestations against Prussian tyranny and their desire 
for French intervention. In Wurtemberg the ebb-tide was so 
strong that not one National Liberal was elected to the Ger- 
man Customs Union. 

This only served, however, to mislead Louis Napoleon, 
who made the common mistake of supposing that a majority 
of votes, and the opinions of editors, represent the real politi- 
cal force of a country. There is quite likely to be in such 
cases among the more influential men a reserved opinion 
which holds a steady and determined course, while the popu- 
lar excitement foams itself away without producing any defi- 
nite result. Von der Pfordten and Varnbuler knew all the 
time on which side their true interests lay, and realized as 
well the strong clutch which Bismarck had upon their gov- 
ernments. While the chambers at Stuttgardt resounded with 
the eloquence of anti-Nationalists, Von Suckow, the Wurtem- 
berg chief of staff, was quietly arranging in Berlin the course 
which he and his forces should pursue to make a junction 
with Von Moltke in case of a French invasion. In Baden 
the enthusiasm rose to such a pitch that it caused Bismarck 
no slight anxiety, lest the excitable Germans of the Palatinate, 
who are really Burgundians, should bring on a collision with 

i8q 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

France through an excess of patriotism. For the second 
time he was obliged to decline the request made by the Baden 
minister for permission to join the North German confeder- 
ation, and the vote of the chambers for an exceptional appro- 
priation of two million florins to introduce the Prussian mili- 
tary system was treated by Parisian journals as if it had 
been an open declaration of war. In the North German 
Reichstag Lasker introduced a bill for the purpose of bringing 
all the jurisdiction of German citizens within the province of 
legislative authority, and, surprising as it may seem, this 
extravagant proposition, which would have placed even the 
judges of the courts at the mercy of political parties, passed 
the lower house, but was rejected by the Bundesrath. A bill 
to establish a central board of jurisdiction for mercantile 
affairs passed both houses, but, in opposition to Bismarck's 
wishes, who preferred to have it located in Berlin, the Reichs- 
tag decided to establish it at Leipsic. Thus it appears that 
the minister-president could not always have his own way, 
even when his influence was at its highest ascendency. 

That Bismarck still earnestly wished to remain at peace 
with France is evident from a peculiar little piece of diplomacy 
which seems like rather small business for so great a man, but 
which, nevertheless, must be admitted to have been intended 
for the public good. He dictated a letter to Dr. Busch with 
directions that it should be published in a paper at Cologne, as 
pretending to emanate from a Parisian liberal. Similar letters 
were published in the New York Tribune about the same time, 
so that we may judge that it did not misrepresent the liberal 
feeling and opinion in 'France. A French professor, visiting 
in America in the summer of 1868, said, "They are all for 
fight in Paris, and Napoleon encourages it, because he hopes 
in that way to get rid of the National Assembly." In this 
letter Bismarck said : 

"The urgent desire of every sincere supporter of constitutional- 
ism in France may be thus summed up : Let us have no new 
diversion abroad just now, no new phenomenon cropping up in the 
foreign political horizon, which may be turned to account not as a 

190 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

real motive, but as a pretext for howling down the youthful exist- 
ence of constitutionalism in France, or for turning public attention 
to foreign complications. The emperor, as we believe, is in 
earnest with his experiment, but the people in his immediate 
entourage and the tools he uses — who are all greedily yearning for 
some event that may give them a chance of diverting the emperor 
from a groove they hold in abomination — are very numerous, and, 
in virtue of the roots they have struck into his eighteen years past, 
much more powerful than people fancy abroad. Whosoever has 
constitutional development at heart can now only wish most ear- 
nestly that no change may take place in the foreign relations of 
France which may in any way lead to the reaction wished for by 
the opponents of any and every constitution in France." 

After the surrender at Sedan, Napoleon always asserted 
that he had been forced into the war; and though Bismarck 
remarked that the emperor was not so innocent as he pre- 
tended, there can be little doubt that during this later stage 
of the French mania he would have been glad to resist the 
current of public opinion and court intrigue, if he had been 
able to do so. Looked at from this side, one can feel a good 
deal of commiseration for him ; but it was the inevitable result 
of a habit which had become chronic with him to meddle in 
the affairs of other countries. He had sown the wind, and 
now the tornado was coming. Who could tell what course it 
would take ? and Louis Napoleon realized only too acutely 
how powerless he was to control the forces which he had 
conjured up. 

The state of public feeling in 1870 may be best estimated 
by the irritation that was caused in Paris by the appropriation 
of five million thalers by the German Reichstag towards 
boring the St. Gothard tunnel, which would give Germany 
direct communication with Italy, independent of France or 
Austria. Bismarck was quick to perceive the advantage of 
this for the future interests of his country, and that it would 
be equally certain to withdraw large traffic from the Mont 
Cenis tunnel of Napoleon ; but not less than six or seven 
years would be required for its completion, and who could 
tell what political changes might take place within that time? 

191 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

Nevertheless, it was looked upon as another of Bismarck's 
insidious designs, to which there seemed to be no limit. 

When the British Parliament was opened in the spring of 
1870, Gladstone, in the name of the queen, congratulated the 
nation that the prospects of peace were never more favorable 
for Europe than at that moment. Napoleon sent a similar 
message to the Chamber of Deputies at Paris. What else 
could they say? In France and Germany there was such 
deep-seated unrest that even the sound of a church-bell 
seemed to every man like a call to arms. If the beating of 
a drum was heard in the Boulevard des Italiens, every man 
dropped his work and ran to the sidewalk. The political at- 
mosphere was sultry ; yet the sun might continue to rise and 
set in peace, as it had done for so long. 

What pretext Napoleon would have found for commencing 
hostilities but for the Spanish candidature cannot even be 
imagined. It would have been more honest for him to have 
sent a declaration to William I., — " Luxemburg or war;" but 
he wished to have an apparent justification, no matter how 
slight it might be, to place before the world. There have 
been numerous accounts of this important transaction, but 
they all come to much the same result. It is certain that the 
Spanish throne was offered to Prince Leopold twice at least 
before he accepted it, and that King William earnestly en- 
deavored to persuade him to relinquish the idea ; but, as in 
the case of the Prince of Roumania, he felt that he had no 
right to go beyond this. In General Hazen's invaluable 
book, 1 " The School and the Army in Germany and France," 
there is a verbal statement by Bismarck himself, which in this 
connection is of great interest, since it brings the man so 
vividly before us. Generals Sheridan, Burnside, and Hazen 
were commissioned by President Grant to make a report on 
the Franco-German war; and Sheridan, with the true instinct 
of military genius, went straight to the Prussian head-quarters. 

It is now nearly thirty years since his statement was made 



1 This is not intended, however, as an endorsement of General Hazen's 
attacks on General Townsend and the United States Engineer Corps. 

192 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

to these generals, and, allowing for a slight variation through 
General Hazen's memory, no evidence has come to light 
which vitiates any portion of it. Bismarck says nothing in it 
of the supposed insult to King William by Benedetti, but 
keeps to the main point, which is, after all, that the French 
government insisted upon making the candidacy of Prince 
Leopold a casus belli after that candidacy had been revoked 
and could only be considered a past event. Bismarck saw 
that what Napoleon wanted was war, and, if so, Napoleon 
should have it. His firmness, calmness, moderation, and 
clear-sightedness at this time show forth in bold relief against 
the frothy ebullition of Napoleon's court. The Empress Eu- 
genie is reported to have exclaimed, " This is my war. With 
God's help we shall subdue the Protestant Prussians." 
/The precise order of events, as narrated by Miiller, was 
nearly as follows : On July 4 the French government sent a 
telegram of inquiry to the foreign office at Berlin, to know 
what position Prussia would take in regard to the candidacy 
of Leopold, and a reply was returned that King William had 
no interest whatever in Spanish affairs. At the same time the 
Due de Gramont requested Baron von Werther, who had suc- 
ceeded Von Goltz at Paris, to inform William I. that Napoleon 
expected him to prevent Leopold from accepting the Spanish 
throne. In the Chamber of Deputies, Gramont announced 
that France would not permit a neighboring nation to upset 
the European balance of power by uniting two thrones in one 
royal family. On July 9 Benedetti had an audience with 
King William at Ems, in which he assumed that Prussia was 
responsible for the nomination of Prince Leopold, and the 
king denied any such responsibility or control over the action 
of the prince. He added, — what must occur to every sen- 
sible person, — that it was to the government at Madrid, and 
not at Berlin, to which Napoleon ought to apply on this sub- 
ject. 1 It does not appear that this had been thought of at Paris 
at all. On July 12 the withdrawal of Prince Leopold was 
announced to the European courts by a despatch from his 

1 Dr. Busch, ii. 53. 
13 l 93 



^ 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

father's castle at Sigmaringen, and this certainly ought to 
have removed all pretext for a quarrel between France and 
Prussia. This it was generally supposed to have done ; and 
Bismarck noticed that Von Moltke's face, which had com- 
menced to brighten with a sort of internal light at the pros- 
pect of active service, now became old and wrinkled again. 

Louis Napoleon was distracted between doubts and fears, 
and worried continually, but the war party had the upper hand, 
and he was carried along like a chip on the tide. The very next 
day Gramont informed Von Werther that, in order to resume 
cordial relations with Prussia, it was essential that William I. 
should make a distinct avowal to Napoleon, to the effect that 
when he empowered Leopold to accept the Spanish throne he 
had no intention of doing injury to the interests of France, or 
to offer any offence to the French nation, — that is, in sub- 
stance, that William I. should make a public apology for the 
act of a third person which he had never encouraged. Baron 
Werther, instead of reporting this message to the king, pru- 
dently notified Bismarck in regard to it, and he, with his 
usual tact, telegraphed the baron to take a short leave of 
absence. Having been foiled in this direction, the Due de 
Gramont, who appears to have managed the whole affair, 
sent word to Benedetti at Berlin to demand King William's 
definite approval of Prince Leopold's declination, and to give 
an assurance that no member of the Hohenzollern family 
should again become a candidate for the Spanish throne. 
Benedetti accordingly took the next train to Ems, and went 
through with this programme in a conspicuous and embar- 
rassing manner. The king, of course, refused to give any 
pledge for his future action in any matter whatever, and upon 
Benedetti's requesting a subsequent interview, William I. 
refused to see him. 1 

1 This is the despatch of the Due de Gramont to Benedetti in regard to the 
interview at Ems, according to the statement of Jules Favre, July 17, 1870: 
" Make a last attempt with the king; tell him that we confine ourselves to asking 
him to forbid the Prince of Hohenzollern reconsidering this question in the 
future. The king must say, ' I do forbid it.' And he must authorize you to 
write to me, or charge his ministers or ambassadors to let me know what he 

194 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

This was an insult, and evidently intended for one. To 
have given such a pledge would have made William I. the 
vassal of Napoleon, and would have degraded him in the 
opinion of all Germany. He did not, however, immediately 
request Benedetti's recall, though the French allege that he 
insulted Benedetti by not recognizing him at the railway sta- 
tion on leaving Ems. He at once telegraphed to Bismarck, 
who was with Von Moltke in Berlin. 

The king sent a brief account of the interview with Bene- 
detti, and authorized Bismarck to publish a similar statement 
if the cabinet thought best. Von Moltke and Von Roon, so 
Dr. Busch states, did not consider the situation a critical one, 
but Bismarck thought otherwise, for he realized that this 
publication would make Napoleon III. appear ridiculous be- 
fore the civilized world. Bismarck's version of it runs as 
follows : 

" Ems, July 13, 1870. — When the intelligence of the hereditary- 
Prince of Hohenzollern's renunciation was communicated by the 
Spanish to the French government, the French ambassador de- 
manded of his Majesty the King at Ems that the latter should au- 
thorize him to telegraph to Paris that his Majesty would pledge 
himself for all time to come never again to give his consent in case 
the candidature of Prince Hohenzollern should be renewed. Upon 
this his Majesty refused to receive the French ambassador again, 
and sent his aide-de-camp in attendance to tell him that his Majesty 
had nothing further to communicate to the ambassador.'.' 

It has been repeatedly stated that Bismarck gave an inten- 
tional force and cogency to his version of the Ems telegram 
not to be found in the original, and prejudiced writers have 
made superhuman efforts to hold Bismarck responsible on 

says. That will suffice. And, in fact, if the king has no reserve, this will be 
for him only a secondary question ; but for us it is a very important one ; the 
king's word alone can constitute a sufficient guarantee for the future. 

" 1 have ground for believing that the other cabinets think us just and mod- 
erate. 

" The Emperor Alexander supports zis warmly." — "Government of the Na- 
tional Defence," p. 253. 

195 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

this slender basis for the war of 1870. The telegram from 
Ems, however, has lately been made public, 1 and a compari- 
son with Bismarck's statement proves that, although the latter 
was somewhat condensed, he has not swerved a hair's breadth 
from the sense of the despatch received through Councillor 
Abeken. William I. evidently desired to consult Bismarck 
before publishing an account of the interview with Benedetti, 
but the idea of giving it publicity must have been his own. 
If he had hesitated before, he now saw clearly that the time 
for action had arrived. At that moment he and the Prussian 
people were one. 

This publication had the effect which Bismarck expected, 
and which also was what the French government most de- 
sired. All Paris was in an uproar, and the newspapers printed 
" On to Berlin" in the largest capitals. The final declaration 
of war was not made, however, till the 19th of July, and the 
intermediate time was spent by Bismarck in futile negotiations 
with the English ministry for arbitration, and in a confidential 
arrangement with Alexander II., who providentially happened 
to be at Ems in company with King William. The behavior 
of the British cabinet was simply mercenary, and Bismarck 
always expressed himself in regard to it in a very decided 
manner. There can be no doubt that Gladstone himself 
would have liked to preserve peace, and it would have been 
much to the honor of England had he done so ; but he could 
not withstand the pressure of the British commercial interest, 
which forms the strongest element in the English Liberal 
party. Dr. Kapp said, " We appealed to England to prevent 
war, but they preferred to let it go on, in order to make money 
out of it." The British envoy at Berlin was directed to advise 
the Prussian government to the effect that King - William 
should make a suitable apology to the French Emperor, — 
little less in itself than an additional insult. This was about 
what Bismarck anticipated, and he did not concern himself 
further on the subject. 

After all, what cause of complaint had France against the 
Prussian government? The North German Confederation 

1 Bismarck's Memoirs, ii. 97. 
196 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

contained a population of about thirty millions, and South 
Germany some fifteen millions more. The population of 
France was nearly forty millions, including Algeria. What 
was there, then, for the French to be alarmed at? If the 
French government had a right to form an alliance with Italy, 
why should not William I. possess the same right to ally him- 
self with the South German states? In what manner was the 
German confederation dangerous to French interests or 
French independence ? The Moniteur of July 8 said, in an 
attempted explanation of the French position : 

" Our policy towards Spain must be a moderate one, but we are 
upon quite another footing with Prussia. This power, self-deluded 
by its first successes, seems to think it can acquire preponderance 
and even rule throughout Europe. The time has come to put an 
end to such pretensions. The question must be enlarged ; Prince 
Leopold's renunciation is no longer sufficient. The least we can 
demand, the least that will now satisfy us, will be the formal recog- 
nition and enforcement in word and spirit of the Prague treaty." 

Truly this is not a strong statement. It might be asked in 
this connection how the policy of the Prussian government 
had differed during the past twenty years from that of the 
French government. Both had made war upon Austria, and 
both had formed alliances with Italy. If Prussia had annexed 
Schleswig-Holstein, France had annexed Savoy. If the 
Prince of Roumania and the proposed candidate for the Span- 
ish throne were distantly related to the King of Prussia, they 
were more closely connected with the house of Bonaparte. 
If Bismarck had interfered with the internal affairs of German 
states, was not Napoleon perpetually doing the same ? One 
might suppose that two equally balanced powers, side by side 
on the map of Europe, would be more likely to keep the 
peace through mutual respect and dread of one another than 
if one was decidedly more powerful than the other. It is a 
rare instance when either individuals or nations apply the 
same rules to themselves which they do to other people, and 
the French had long since ceased to be capable of this. The 
oft-repeated principle of Thiers, that if France wished to be 

i97 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

strong she must keep her neighbors weak, was captivating to 
the Parisians. 

It is often difficult to distinguish between national vanity 
and that consciousness of a nation's solidarity which forms 
the basis of patriotism, for the two merge into each other; 
but when a people continually speaks of itself as the " first 
nation of the universe," as the French have done since the 
time of Louis XIV., we may safely affirm that they have 
more vanity than self-respect. General Hazen reports that 
reading-books were discovered in the French school-roomsln 
which France was plainly declared to be the first of all nations, 
and represented as the birthplace of all great men, as well as 
the source of all discoveries and inventions. French children 
were educated in these notions, so that they became to them 
like a religion. Thiers's history of the first Napoleon is full 
of this patriotic glorification, and even Guizot, in his " History 
of Civilization," does not hesitate to place France above all 
other countries as the type of what a civilized nation should 
be. During the campaign of 1870, Bismarck suggested that 
the different personages, who were responsible for the war and 
so much bloodshed, should all be brought into court and 
placed in the prisoner's dock together, — first, the old Napo- 
leon ; then M. Thiers, who wrote his history ; the Empress 
Eugenie, the Due de Gramont, Pius IX., and others. Behind 
them all, however, might be placed the French habit of self- 
glorification, which both of the Napoleons had played upon, 
and which Napoleon III. especially had cultivated as the most 
efficient means of preserving his popularity. His official 
newspapers in Paris were not only claqueurs for himself, but fof 
the French people also. There is plenty of national vanity in 
Germany, England, and America ; but we do not find states- 
men like Bismarck and Gladstone, or historians like Macaulay 
and Von Sybel, giving utterance to such fulsome adulation as 
that referred to from Thiers and Guizot. 

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1870 

In the light of subsequent events, Napoleon III. appears 
like a self-deluded man rushing upon destruction; but in July, 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

1870, he counted upon eventualities which might have misled 
many another. In the first place, he felt a sort of maternal 
confidence in his own invention, — the mitrailleuse, — which 
was expected to concentrate a more severe fire on some par- 
ticular point of the enemy's line than any other form of mili- 
tary weapon in existence. With this and the traditional dash 
of the French soldier he expected to gain a success at the 
outset, and establish his lines on Prussian territory. He was 
confident that in that case Austria, Bavaria, and Denmark 
would fall to and attack his enemy in the rear, while Victor 
Emmanuel, wishing to be on the winning side, would also lend 
a helping hand to the vivisection of Prussia. The Bavarian 
newspapers gave him good reason for this confidence. The 
Valeriana 1 asserted that the Bavarian chambers would not 
vote a single gulden for the mobilization of the army to assist 
Bismarck in furthering his unrighteous schemes. There was 
the same popular opposition among the democrats of Wur- 
temberg and the imperialists of Vienna ; but Napoleon had 
not counted on Alexander II. and Von Beust and Von der 
Pfordten 1 and Von Moltke. He judged by general principles, 
and was as ignorant of the precise situation in foreign cap- 
itals as, according to Bismarck, he was of geography. To 
the request of the younger Metternich, who was Austrian 
envoy at Paris, as to what answer he should make to Napo- 
leon's entreaty for an Austrian army of observation in Bohe- 
mia, Von Beust replied with such icy coldness as to preclude 
all possibility of aid from that quarter. Almost simultane- 
ously with the Ems telegram, Von Beust wrote to Metternich : 

" I consider it paramountly important that the Emperor Napoleon 
and his ministers should not entertain the erroneous impression that 
they can, at their own good pleasure, drag us with them beyond 
the limits of our engagements, to the disregard of our own vital 
interests. They make much too bold in talking confidently about 
a corps of observation, to be stationed by us in Bohemia. The 
duke has no right whatsoever to count upon any such measure on 

* Von Bray had succeeded Von der Pfordten, but his policy towards Prussia 
still continued in Bavaria. 

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LIFE OF BISMARCK 

our part. All that we have undertaken is not to ally ourselves to 
any other power without giving France due notice. ... It is alleged 
that Prussia will provoke war unless she will withdraw the Hohen- 
zollern candidature. On this point I will speak quite frankly. If 
war be inevitable, it is, above all, owing to the attitude assumed by 
France from the very inception of the difficulty. Her first an- 
nouncements do not in the least partake of a diplomatic character, 
but practically constitute a declaration of war against Prussia, 
couched in terms that have aroused amazement throughout Europe, 
and justified the conviction that she has made up her mind before- 
hand to war at any price ..." 

Napoleon III. was like a stock-gambler who is always ready 
to make friends with his last enemy if he can gain something 
by it; but Francis Joseph was made in a different mould, — an 
implacable Hapsburger. He admired and hated Bismarck, 
but he detested Napoleon. He perhaps recollected the policy 
of Metternich in 1813, to allow France and the allies to get 
well into the struggle before he interfered. Napoleon III. re- 
membered that Austria was in the rear of Prussia ; but he 
forgot that Hungary was in the rear of Austria. Von Beust 
asserts in his Memoirs that Russia exerted no pressure on 
Austria at this juncture, and there really does not seem to 
have been much need of it. Von Bray and his colleagues 
carried his bill for a war credit through the Bavarian chambers, 
in spite of the Ultramontanes and the Vaterland paper. The 
greatest triumph of Bismarck's policy appeared in Saxony, 
where the crown prince, who had fought so gallantly against 
the Prussians at Sadowa, led a whole German army corps 
to the campaign against France. Private soldiers may some- 
times be made to fight against their inclination, but the com- 
manding general must have his precincts swept clean of sus- 
picion. At the same time it was reported to the associated 
press that Victor Emmanuel had telegraphed to the French 
government that any attempt to assist France in the present 
emergency could only result in his losing his crown. Napo- 
leon must have left the Tuileries with a heavy heart. 

Von Moltke's face grew young again at the prospect of 
having a crack at the " red legs," as the French soldiers were 

200 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

commonly designated. He was better informed concerning 
the condition of the French army than Napoleon was, and 
felt confident of success. The Crown Prince of Prussia says, 
in his diary, under date of July 15 : 

"Bismarck informed me that he, with Roon and Moltke, would 
go with me to Brandenburg to meet the king. On the way he ex- 
pressed with great clearness and proper seriousness, free from his 
favorite little jests, his view of the peculiarities of our situation with 
France, so that it became clear to me that he and Moltke do not 
desire concessions for the sake of peace, which is already impos- 
sible, considering the strength and position of the French army. 
The king was surprised at our arrival, and during the rest of the 
journey, after he had heard Bismarck's statement, he had nothing 
substantial to oppose to the urgency of ordering immediate mobili- 
zation." 

There can be no question that the crown prince took an 
active interest in the great events of 1870, and did his full share 
in what was accomplished at that time. The Reichstag emu- 
lated the French assembly in the unanimity with which it 
voted a war credit of a hundred and twenty million thalers. 
So do whole nations join in the chase when the dogs of war 
are let loose. 

Professor Muller and General Hazen have both given an 
erroneous impression of the forces engaged on either side in 
1870, by the manner in which they have stated them. The 
latter expresses his surprise that Napoleon, with armies 
amounting to three hundred thousand men, should have de- 
liberately waged war against a force of twice that magnitude ; 
while Muller speaks of the number of Germans finally engaged 
in the conflict as over eleven hundred thousand. Leaving 
out of account that Napoleon expected that the South Ger- 
man troops would fight with him, instead of against him, the 
German army at the commencement of hostilities numbered 
about five hundred thousand men ; and as Bazaine's army 
at Metz numbered one hundred and seventy thousand, and 
one hundred and twenty-five thousand French soldiers sur- 
rendered at Sedan, it is evident that there must have been 
nearly one hundred thousand more stationed at Paris, Stras- 

201 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

burg, and other fortresses, besides the Garde Mobile. Dur- 
ing the siege of Paris enormous armies were recruited on the 
Loire and Rhone, and as at this period of the conflict the 
Germans were everywhere outnumbered, it seems probable 
that France finally placed in the field as large, though by no 
means so well disciplined, a force as her rival. 

The first conflict took place at Saarbriicken, on the 2d of 
August, and is memorable for the melodramatic despatch 
which Napoleon sent to Eugenie concerning their intrepid 
boy, whose " coolness under fire made veterans weep." The 
town was held by a single Prussian regiment, which was 
driven out by General Frossard's army corps after a hot skir- 
mish. The German victories of Spicheren and Worth, how- 
ever, followed on the 4th and 5th instant. Spicheren was a 
remarkable battle, fought by the colonels of German regi- 
ments without any general commander. At Worth the Crown 
Prince of Prussia gave MacMahon a crushing defeat, as he well 
might with an army of a hundred thousand against fifty thou- 
sand men. At Vionville * Prince Frederick Charles fought a 
desperate battle against a French army twice as large as 
his own. At nightfall he remained master of the field, but 
gained no other advantage. The battle was remarkable for 
two cavalry charges, one of which was fully equal to the 
charge of the six hundred at Balaklava. Bismarck's two 
sons took part in the first charge, and the eldest, Herbert, es- 
caped in a miraculous manner. One bullet struck his watch, 
another went through his coat, and a third wounded him in 
the thigh. His brother William came out of this fiery gulf 
unharmed, and brought with him a wounded comrade, whom 
he threw upon a horse at the risk of being captured himself. 
The second charge on the left wing was even more terrible. 
Out of eight squadrons of cavalry only three returned to the 
German lines. The rest were left upon the field, — a portion 
also captured, — but they succeeded in protecting the German 
flank until reinforcements could arrive. 

Von Moltke now concentrated all the force he could bring 

1 Also called " Mars la Tour." 
202 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

together against Metz, and Bazaine took up a strong position 
similar to Wellington's ground at Waterloo, but covering a 
much wider extent, with his right wing resting on Metz and his 
left extending to the village of St. Hubert on the northwest. 
His effective force numbered about one hundred and forty thou- 
sand men, and that of Von Moltke one hundred and seventy- 
five thousand. The struggle which followed can only be com- 
pared to the battles of Borodino and Leipsic, though the 
losses on either side were not so great. William I. and Bis- 
marck arrived on the ground at noon, and witnessed the 
engagement. The French Zouaves, who had served in Alge- 
ria and stormed the hill at Solferino, declared that they had 
never seen such fighting as there was at Gravelotte. 

The German head-quarters were stationed at Gravelotte, 
from which the battle has derived its name. The strength of 
the French position, partially fortified, is supposed to have 
counterbalanced the advantage of numbers on the German 
side. Canrobert commanded on the right, Bazaine in the 
centre, and Frossard on the left. 

Von Moltke's plan was first to attack the enemy's right 
wing, and then, finally, to turn the left wing by a flanking 
movement, conducted by the Crown Prince of Saxony, with 
a simultaneous attack on Frossard's front. The movement 
against Canrobert failed, and the flanking movement occupied 
so much time that the Berlin guards, who attempted the front 
attack too soon, were fearfully cut up and obliged to retire. 
The Prussian cavalry that accompanied them succeeded in 
breaking the French squares, but suffered as severely as the 
French squadrons at Worth. It was considered essential to 
sacrifice Prussian troops if possible, where sacrifices had to be 
made, in order to prevent the allied German states from feel- 
ing that their soldiers were made use of for Prussia's interest. 

Encouraged by his success in repulsing the enemy, Bazaine 
decided to take the offensive, and late in the afternoon began 
a well-planned and determined attack on the German centre. 
The French fought more bravely than in any previous engage- 
ment, and for some time the issue of the battle remained in 
doubt, but they were finally repulsed by drawing together a 

203 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

large number of field-pieces at the critical point. Von Moltke 
followed this up by an assault on the extreme right and left 
of the French positions, and, though the attack on Canrobert 
did not meet with much success, the Crown Prince of Saxony 
finally captured the most important of Frossard's positions, 
and by nightfall Bazaine found himself with only one outlet 
of escape, and that in the direction of Metz. During the 
night the French abandoned their remaining positions, and 
the following day retired within the fortress. The German 
loss at Gravelotte was something over eighteen thousand men, 
of whom nearly five thousand were killed outright, — an excep- 
tionally large proportion. The French loss was not much 
over twelve thousand, so that it is evident that they did not 
fight so bravely here as at Leipsic and Waterloo. Bazaine, 
although defeated, is admitted to have shown good military 
skill. 

During Bazaine's attack on the Prussian lines both William 
I. and Bismarck were again in danger, for the former was too 
much absorbed in watching the course of the battle to con- 
sider his personal safety. On the following day Count Her- 
bert was carried on a mattress to his father's quarters, where 
they made a bed for him on the floor. His wound was pain- 
ful, but not dangerous. After he had been sent home to 
recuperate, his father said, " I trust now that I shall be able 
to save that fellow." He was evidently proud of both his 
sons, and related to several persons how William had helped 
a wounded comrade on to a horse and led him from the field. 
Before the close of the war both the young Bismarcks were 
promoted to lieutenancies. 

Two nephews of Von Moltke were also serving at this time 
in the ranks. There is no other instance in modern history 
where the near relatives of such important personages have 
fought as common soldiers. It is this impartiality which in- 
spires the Prussian people with such confidence in their gov- 
ernment. 

In the grave rejoicing over this victory at the Prussian 
head-quarters Bismarck's diplomatic habit never deserted him. 
He directed Dr. Busch to send a despatch to Berlin as follows : 

204 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

"In the battle before Metz, August 18, the Saxons distinguished 
themselves by their usual bravery, and contributed most essentially 
to the attainment of the object of the German commander. To 
bring the Saxon army corps into the field very long marches from 
the right to the extreme left wing had been made the day before, 
and even on the 18th itself. In spite of these fatigues, they at- 
tacked with extraordinary energy, drove the enemy back, and com- 
pletely fulfilled the duty they were charged with, thus preventing 
the enemy from escaping towards Thionville. Their losses in these 
actions amounted to twenty-two hundred men." 

Bismarck was evidently desirous to conciliate the Saxons 
and inspire them with a more national feeling, but the Prus- 
sians bore the brunt of the struggle, and the Dresdeners still 
continued to abuse him for the next ten years. 

SEDAN 

At the outset of the war Napoleon had extorted a promise 
from Victor Emmanuel that he would respect the territory 
of Pius IX. so long as hostilities might continue. After the 
battle of Worth, Prince Napoleon was despatched to Italy to 
obtain assistance on any terms that should be demanded, even 
if it was the possession of Rome itself. The Italian cabinet, 
however, could see plainly from this that Napoleon was in a 
very tight place, and that Rome was practically theirs as soon 
as they chose to take it. Prince Napoleon was therefore put 
off with the plea of a pretended consultation with Von Beust. 
This required several days, and the consequence was that 
Prince Napoleon was obliged to remain in Italy all winter. 
If Von Beust had little inclination for a French alliance in 
July, he. had still less in August, with the prospect of another 
invasion of Bohemia; and the French opposition papers 
treated Prince Napoleon's embassy as if he had deserted his 
country in her hour of need, though it was not difficult to 
imagine the occasion for it. 

Bismarck, meanwhile, was en rapport with the governments 
of Great Britain and other powers. He -knew of Prince 
Napoleon's mission and how to counteract it with an equally 
good offer. After the battle at Gravelotte he sounded the 

205 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

great powers in regard to the annexation of Alsace and Lor- 
raine. He did not expect favorable replies from them at this 
time, but he wished to inform them what they might look for 
in case the German successes continued. August 28 he dic- 
tated an official letter on the subject to the government organ 
• in Berlin, indicating the policy which William I. and his min- 
isters intended to pursue, and closing with this statement in 
regard to the restoration of those German provinces which 
had been treacherously seized on in the seventeenth century : 

" He who sincerely desires peace on the continent of Europe, 
he who wishes that nations should lay down their arras, and that 
the plough should prevail over the sword, must wish above all that 
the neighbors of France on the east may secure this position, for 
France is the only disturber of peace, and will remain so as long as 
she has the power." 

It is doubtful if any one in Germany — and certainly no one 
in Berlin — imagined that the Alsatians would make any 
decided objection to this transfer of their nationality. Their 
names are German, and most of them could speak German. 
Though they had long been accustomed to French domina- 
tion, and were French themselves by association, they had at 
first been greatly incensed at this. To some one T who sug- 
gested that a slice of France might be added to Rhenish 
Prussia, Bismarck replied, "We do not want too many 
Frenchmen in Germany." 

Dr. Moritz Busch has given a faithful account of Bis- 
marck's sayings and proceedings during the campaign of 
1870, and much of it is instructive and valuable to us. W T e 
miss, however, the penetrating force and broad generalization 
of statement which make the remarks of the first Napoleon 
so magnetic and impressive. Bismarck is admitted to have 
been the wiser man of the two, but he was not in a position to 
speak out his mind so freely. There were some truths which 
even Napoleon at the height of his power could not venture 



1 Name not given, but he must have been an important personage, perhaps 
self-important. 

206 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

to speak ; but Bismarck was obliged to be doubly cautious, 
for he had not only the ear of the public on one side, ready 
to catch up and report whatever he might say, but on the 
other side the royal family had also to be considered. It was 
a shrewd statement Von Beust made, that it was generally 
better for an ambassador to see too little than to see too 
much. 1 It would not do even for Bismarck to appear to be 
too knowing, and as a natural consequence he made a prac- 
tice of disguising his genius in the dress of trivial conversa- 
tion. He told anecdotes of Humboldt, Metternich, and other 
past actors on the German stage, amusing enough, but not of 
exceptional value. General Sheridan, to whom, as an Ameri- 
can, he might perhaps have spoken more freely, found him a 
great talker, but not memorable for bright and characteristic 
sayings. Bismarck talked about small matters to change the 
current of his mind and to avoid speaking of more important 
ones. He acquired this habit at Frankfort in the days of the 
musty old Diet, and found it useful ever afterwards. 

We do not hear of profound reflections on European 
politics, but we know from Dr. Busch that Bismarck occa- 
sionally conversed with him in a higher strain than was his 
usual wont, and it is just these colloquies, which we should 
most like to know, that his secretary prudently declines to 
favor us with. He talked philosophy on his way to the 
battle of Sedan, 2 as such a man might to prevail over the 
demon which accompanies extravagant success ; and there 
are other incidents as terse and significant in their way as 
those recorded of old Dr. Johnson. One such happened just 
before the battle of Beaumont, while the troops were hurrying 
forward to take up their allotted positions in the field. Bis- 
marck was giving some directions to Privy Counsellor Abeken, 
who sent the famous telegram from Ems, and in the midst of 
his statement Prince Charles of Hohenzollern rode by with 

1 In reference to Prince Richard Metternich, who was wholly surprised at the 
breaking out of the Franco-German war. 

2 Bismarck carried with him to the French campaign a book called " Daily 
Refreshments for Believing Christians," and he had a clerk in his employ named 
Engel (angel). 

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LIFE OF BISMARCK 

his negro lackey in oriental costume. Abeken followed this 
phenomenon with his eyes, and failed to hear what Bismarck 
was saying. The count lost patience and exclaimed, " Listen 
to what I have to tell you, Mr. Privy Counsellor, and for 
God's sake let princes be princes. We are talking business 
here." Then, after he had finished with Abeken, he remarked, 
" Our old friend is quite carried away if he sees anything be- 
longing to the court ; but, after all, I could not do without 
him." To Bismarck princes evidently were princes, and they 
were nothing more. The undisguised use which Bismarck 
made of newspapers, at this and other times, to circulate 
opinions and statements favorable to his policy was one of 
his peculiarities ; so much the honester and better that it was 
undisguised. 

Von Moltke left Prince Frederick Charles to besiege Metz, 
and, having united with the crown prince, set forward on the 
road to Paris. His army had been largely reinforced from 
Germany, and amounted to more than two hundred thousand 
men in all. The whole northeast of France was filled with 
German soldiers. At Verdun, half-way between Metz and 
Chalons, Von Moltke first heard that the French army was at 
the north of him, and he considered this move to his ad- 
vantage, as he could now descend perpendicularly on Mac- 
Mahon's communications. There were a number of small 
engagements along the line of the Meuse, in all of which the 
French were compelled to retreat. On August 30 a French 
army corps was surprised at breakfast near Beaumont by the 
German heavy artillery, and, having been severely bombarded, 
were attacked by German infantry and driven off in great con- 
fusion. MacMahon, having thus been already foiled in his 
plan, withdrew his outposts and concentrated his forces around 
the fortress of Sedan. The star of the Bonapartes was evi- 
dently setting. 

This was the worst plan that MacMahon and Napoleon 
could have pursued. If they had made a precipitate retreat 
towards Paris a large portion of their army might have been 
saved. The siege of Paris would have followed as a matter 

20S 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

of course, but its chances of success would have been con- 
siderably lessened, and Louis Napoleon would have remained 
on his throne, at least until peace was declared. Sedan is a 
Vauban fortress, built on rising ground in a valley, and nearly 
surrounded by lofty hills. Before the invention of rifle pro- 
jectiles it was calculated to sustain a siege of a year's dura- 
tion, but with the improved ordnance of the nineteenth cen- 
tury an enemy can command it from the heights on every side. 
Metz was impregnable, but Sedan proved a strategic trap. 

The town lies in the centre of a natural amphitheatre, 
through which winds the sluggish Meuse to its meeting with 
the Sambre, on which Bliicher was defeated in 1815. About 
the same distance to the southwest is the city of Laon, where 
Bliicher defeated the first Napoleon. On the 1st of Septem- 
ber MacMahon formed his line of battle in the concave order 
on a range of low hills behind the fortress and town, his left 
wing drawn around to the river, and his right wing stretching 
off towards the west. He had blown up the bridge crossing 
the river at Sedan, but the Germans, having control of Stenay, 
marched down both sides of it, and planted batteries on the 
heights to the east and south. William I. and Bismarck, with 
a large retinue of princes and officers, took possession of a 
stubble-field on a hill about one mile from the town, — a spot 
still exhibited to tourists. The king went round to the dif- 
ferent groups, saying, " Gentlemen, spread yourselves, and do 
not attract the enemy's fire by standing too close together." 
Von Moltke and the German staff, with whom was General 
Sheridan, occupied a lower position on a declivity nearer the 
scene of action. The army of the crown prince was on the 
opposite side of the Meuse. As the battle progressed the 
German line extended itself continually to the left, and to 
withdraw attention from this movement Von Moltke directed 
a vigorous attack on the left wing of the enemy. It was 
unfortunate for the French that Marshal MacMahon was 
wounded early in the engagement ; and his successor, General 
Wimpfen, does not appear to have understood the character 
of this enclosing movement. From the first the French suf- 
fered more than the Germans, being exposed to an almost 
14 209 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

concentric artillery fire, and it was not until General Wimpfen 
had repulsed the enemy on his left wing that he seems to 
have realized the situation his army was in. He then brought 
forward his least injured regiments on the right for a des- 
perate attempt to break through the cordon of the crown 
prince. Here he arranged an attack of infantry supported by 
cavalry at about half- past two p.m. Bismarck, from his stand- 
point on the eastern side of the Meuse, could see the blue 
and red lines of the French advancing and falling back again 
under the destructive fire of the Prussians. Then came the 
cavalry charges, — a magnificent spectacle. Twice they came 
on, but never reached the Prussian lines. " The beggars are 
too weak," cried Sheridan, who had begun to sympathize 
with the hard position of the French army. The king could 
see through his field-glass that the ground was covered with 
the bodies of horses and men. 

After this Von Moltke ordered a gradual advance along the 
whole line, and in the course of an hour the French troops 
had everywhere fallen back to the immediate vicinity of the 
town and fortress. This placed them more at the mercy of 
the German shells than before, so that MacMahon's army was 
fast becoming a demoralized mob. Then Napoleon, wishing 
to prevent further bloodshed, ordered a white flag to be raised 
over the fort, and the firing ceased. " This must be a proud 
day for you, Mr. Chancellor," remarked one of the foreign 
attaches to Count Bismarck. " I have nothing to do with 
this," quickly replied the latter ; " it is the king and Von 
Moltke who are to be congratulated here. That the South 
Germans fight with us, not against us, may be something to 
my credit, but I have nothing to do with military affairs." 
When some one inquired if the French emperor was not with 
the army which was about to surrender, Bismarck said, " I 
doubt it. Napoleon is not very wise, but he knows too much 
to be in Sedan." It was not long before an officer arrived to 
inform the king that Napoleon was in the fortress. 

General Wimpfen now appeared with Von Moltke to ar- 
range terms of capitulation. Napoleon wished permission for 
his troops to march over the Belgian frontier and be disarmed 

2IO 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

there, but this could not be granted. William I. said, "This 
is indeed a great success," and gave his two hands to Von 
Moltke and the crown prince, adding, " I thank you both for 
what you have contributed towards this victory." He then 
thanked Bismarck also, and drew him aside for a lengthy 
conversation, which produced a slight expression of displeas- 
ure on the face of the crown prince, more noticeable from 
the gladness of those around him. 1 The capture of a live 
emperor, however, was not an every-day occurrence, and re- 
quired serious diplomatic consideration. How he should be 
received, how he should be disposed of, and how his capture 
would affect the relations of Prussia with other governments, 
were points on which only Bismarck could be consulted. He 
advised the king to avoid an interview with Napoleon, and 
that he had better return to Stenay, where he could find more 
comfortable quarters. Afterwards Bismarck said, that if the 
emperor were to break his parole and escape over the Belgian 
frontier it might be quite as well for all parties concerned. 
From being the first monarch in Europe, Louis Napoleon had 
suddenly become a white elephant, whom nobody wanted. 

Bismarck was awakened at an early hour on September 2 
with the information that Napoleon desired a personal inter- 
view with him at Donchery. Mounting his horse, he rode 
down the hill alone to meet Napoleon, who was in a carriage 
with three French generals. Bismarck says, " I had a revolver 
in my belt, and his eye rested on it for a moment." What 
was Napoleon III. thinking of in that instant ? Was it the 
possibility of suicide? Bismarck took off his hat, though 
contrary to rule on such occasions, and they went together 
into a weaver's cottage, a yellow house with white shutters, 
Venetian blinds on the upper story, and a slated roof. Napo- 
leon was friendly enough, as Bismarck said afterwards; com- 
plained that he had been forced into the war ; wished for an 
interview with King William ; wished for more favorable 
terms, which he would negotiate on a political basis. Bis- 

1 In one way or another Bismarck was evidently a thorn in the side of the 
crown prince. No wonder he speaks so frequently of the old monarch's health 
in the letters to Frau von Bismarck. 

211 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

marck informed him that the terms of the surrender had been 
negotiated by Von Moltke, and were not within his province ; 
that the king was at an inconvenient distance, and that as he, 
Napoleon, was now a prisoner of war, political negotiations 
could only be carried on with the de facto government of 
France. He assured Napoleon of considerate treatment, and 
offered him his own lodging for the night 1 

Napoleon's friendliness may have been owing in a measure 
to the insults he had received from his own soldiers. He felt 
now that his life, at least, was safe, and perhaps the wheel of 
fortune might again turn in his favor. The French prisoners 
also took their captivity in a light-hearted manner, and the 
wounded Frenchmen made friends with their companions in 
the German hospitals. 2 

Bismarck, having disposed of the emperor and sent his sec- 
retary to distribute five hundred cigars among wounded sol- 
diers, went in search of his younger son, and suddenly came 
upon " Count Bill/' who was a large, athletic fellow, carrying 
a French pig in his arms, evidently for the benefit of the mess- 
room table. On seeing his father he dropped the pig and 
fell into his arms. Bismarck thought the French officers 
must have been astonished to behold a German general em- 
bracing a private soldier. His son explained that he had 
found driving a pig very troublesome, and finally concluded 
that it would be much easier to carry it. 

Von Moltke is the only high German official who is re- 
ported to have shown a decided elation at the victory of 
Sedan. He may have felt that his life's work was nearly fin- 
ished, for serious resistance was no longer to be expected. 
That he had overcome the enemy, with the advantage of 
numbers, discipline, and courage on his side, was not sur- 



1 This promise was faithfully kept. Napoleon was sent to Wilhelmshohe 
through Belgium the next day in a close carriage to avoid the humiliation of his 
being exposed to the gaze of German soldiers. During his confinement in 
Prussia he was handsomely treated, — very differently from the treatment of Napo- 
leon I., — and, according to the American opinion, much better than he deserved. 
W. Miiller has made a mistake here ; Busch was on the ground. 

2 Dr. Busch, i. 103. 

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LIFE OF BISMARCK 

prising, but that all the movements of that vast army should 
have been directed with such precision, and been so invariably- 
successful, was a record for the future historian which the 
greatest commanders might have envied him. The first Na- 
poleon himself might have been astonished at the capture of 
an army of one hundred and twenty thousand men. He went 
on his Russian campaign with nearly half a million soldiers, 
and the only advantage he gained over the enemy was the 
indecisive victory of Borodino. Von Moltke was always the 
model of what a soldier should be, — as Emerson says, 

"Grave, chaste, contented though retired, 
And of all other men desired." 

When some one asked a Prussian officer, many years after 
these events, why Von Moltke had not been made a prince, 
as Bismarck was, he replied, " Von Moltke does not care for 
it himself, and we all feel that it would add nothing to his 
reputation." He has been compared to Wellington, who was 
also a man rather difficult to find fault with ; but he made war 
on a grander scale than Wellington, and was more decidedly 
a man of genius, though perhaps not as forcible a character. 
That they were both of a reserved temperament does not imply 
that they were cold-hearted or indifferent to the welfare of 
their fellow-men. Von Moltke was probably the most popu- 
lar German of his time. 1 It was not without reason that he 
was called " the thinker of battles." 



1 The writer saw Von Moltke on the floor of the Prussian Landtag in 1873. 
He was of rather slender build, broad-shouldered but thin, with aquiline feat- 
ures and a much-wrinkled face; eyes like a falcon's. His eyes were supposed 
to resemble Frederick the Great's ; Csesar also had falcon eyes. He wore 
silver epaulets and a broad red stripe on his pants. When he saluted an ac- 
quaintance he bowed low and came up again very erect. 



213 



CHAPTER X 

THE SIEGE OF PARIS 

William I. and Bismarck looked at each other after Napo- 
leon III. had been transported to Germany. What next? 
They had not long to wait for news and political changes. 
The Second Empire had only existed by the support of the 
army, and now that that was gone, it collapsed like a railway 
speculation. In the Chamber of Deputies there was the 
greatest confusion ; the rabble of Paris broke into the legis- 
lative halls and intimidated the ministry, who requested the 
establishment of a committee of defence, while the radical 
leaders demanded the deposition of the Bonaparte dynasty. 
Finally Gambetta, Favre, and a majority of the assembly left 
the hall, and, escorted by an immense crowd, held a meeting 
at the Hotel de Ville, where a republic was proclaimed and a 
provisional government constituted, with a committee of pub- 
lic safety and General Trochu for president, an officer whose 
chief distinction at this time was that he had not been in favor 
with Napoleon. Thiers prudently declined to serve on this 
committee, among whose members there were several avowed 
Socialists. Before these proceedings were concluded the 
empress had already left the Tuileries and was on her way to 
England. The committee immediately made arrangements 
for levying fresh armies, — one in Brittany, another on the 
Loire, and a third in Provence. Jules Favre, the French 
compeer of Wendell Phillips, with two others, were appointed 
on an embassy to confer with Bismarck in regard to an armis- 
tice and an honorable peace, if that could be obtained. 

Bismarck held the opinion that Victor Emmanuel was 
ready to sell his soul for Rome, and it is certain that an Ital- 
ian envoy, Count Vimercati, was in consultation with Napo- 
leon at Metz previous to the battle of Saarbriicken. Victor 
Emmanuel finally kept his word to both parties in this 

214 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

conflict ; and, though after the defeat at Worth he resisted a 
strong pressure from the Italian Liberals to take possession of 
the Eternal City, after Sedan he considered his engagement 
no longer binding, and accordingly marched in with a suffi- 
cient force to overawe Pius IX. Great was the rejoicing of 
the Roman citizens at the downfall of the priests' temporal 
power, and a plebiscite, taken immediately afterwards through 
the States of the Church, resulted in an almost unanimous 
approval of consolidation with the Italian government. Few 
more important events than this have taken place during the 
nineteenth century, and here again we recognize the harmony 
of Bismarck's policy with the essential needs of his time. 

Nevertheless, at the moment Bismarck treated the matter 
with cool indifference. " We might have done something for 
the pope," he said, " if he had been willing to do more for us. 
Nothing for nothing is the only rule that one can act on in 
such cases." He may have thought at the moment that the 
Italians were getting more than they deserved, and this feel- 
ing must have been increased when Garibaldi, carried off his 
feet with the name of a republic, landed at Marseilles with a 
shipload of Carbonari to assist the French in driving the 
Germans out of their country. A change in the form of gov- 
ernment did not make the war less unjustifiable, and Gari- 
baldi, without being aware of it, was now enlisting in the 
pope's service and doing the pope's work. 1 It was true he 
may have suspected that on the conclusion of peace the King 
of Prussia would replace Louis Napoleon on his throne, but 
Bismarck's attitude towards the government in Paris must 
have soon dispelled this illusion. 

In fact, Bismarck always favored republicanism in France 
from the first. If, as has been stated, he did so from an expec- 
tation that the extravagances of the new government would 
bring republicanism into disrepute, the result has not an- 
swered this calculation ; 2 but it is certain that he once said 



1 The German hegemony in Europe is still the only support of Italian unity. 

2 One reason may have been to« justify King William's proclamation before 
the battle of WSrth, that he came to make war against the French government, 
and not the French people. 

2I 5 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

to Dr. Busch, " I am by temperament a republican, but my 
belief in God makes me a monarchist," a statement which it is 
difficult to understand, except by supposing that he considered 
it prudent to qualify the assertion in some way. He may have 
heartily wished at times for a German republic of which he 
could be president, impossible as he knew this to be. At all 
events, when the German ambassador at Paris advocated the 
support of a coiip d'etat for the restoration of the Bonapartes, 
Bismarck set himself firmly against it, although such a change 
would have been for the interest of Germany as well as the 
monarchical principle; for nothing could be more improb- 
able than that either Napoleon III. or his son would under- 
take another campaign on the Rhine. At the present time 
Germany has more to fear from republican France than it 
might from a Bourbon or Bonaparte dynasty. Here Bismarck 
appears again in alliance with the tendencies of his age. 

The German army now began to extend its lines towards 
Paris, and Bismarck issued a circular to the powers, stating 
the terms on which the king and his ministers were willing 
to conclude peace, — nothing less than the retrocession of 
Alsace and Lorraine, or, as the Germans call these provinces, 
Elsass and Lothringen. 

The great powers could make little objection to this, as 
they would certainly have done the same under like con- 
ditions. Considering the success of the German armies, it 
was looked upon as a modest demand. In like circumstances 
the first Napoleon would have annexed the half of France. 
It is known that Bismarck favored this demand, but he was 
willing to leave out Metz and its surrounding territory for the 
sake of an earlier agreement, but Von Moltke and the Prussian 
staff would not hear of this. They considered the fortress 
of Metz essential to a scientific frontier for Germany. If 
Bismarck had opposed these terms the result would have 
been the same. The current of feeling, not only in the army 
but throughout Prussia, would have been too strong for any 
one man to resist it. 

The provisional government at Paris replied with a mani- 
festo, in which the expression, " not one inch of territory, not 

216 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

one stone of our fortresses," has become proverbial. The 
idea of dismembering France, even to this extent, had never 
been dreamed of before, and excited the greatest indignation. 
It was another illustration of how impossible it was for the 
French to place themselves in the position of other people. 
If the Prussians had been defeated in an equally decisive 
manner they would have been obliged to surrender the left 
bank of the Rhine as a matter of course. Even if the pro- 
visional government had thought best to accede to this sacri- 
fice to prevent further bloodshed, it is not likely that public 
opinion would have supported it; but there was good reason 
why Favre, Gambetta, and their associates should desire to 
continue the war. 

Bismarck had reached Ferrieres and was quartered on the 
country residence of the Rothschilds about the middle of 
September, when Sir Edward Malet, the British envoy at 
Paris, came to him as an intermediary, and wished to know 
if the Prussian government would treat with the Paris com- 
mittee as the de facto government of France ; and Bismarck's 
reply was, that he was ready to consider terms of peace with 
any government that would obtain the substantial support 
of the French people. This was sufficient guarantee of the 
republic before the world, and showed that Bismarck had 
no intention of interfering with the domestic affairs of 
France. 

Jules Favre came to Ferrieres on the 19th and 20th of 
September in order to negotiate an armistice, — presumably to 
hold elections for the establishment of a new government, but 
also, doubtless, to gain time for military preparations. Bis- 
marck tried to explain to him that as an armistice would be 
an advantage to the French, the Germans should also receive 
corresponding advantages, and suggested the surrender of 
Strasburg and Toul in return for it ; but Favre either could 
not or would not recognize this fact, and expatiated on the 
sufferings of his country and the advantage to Germany of a 
speedy conclusion of the war. He insisted, however, that it 
was impossible to make territorial concessions to Prussia. Bis- 
marck spoke of Strasburg as the western gate of Germany, 

217 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

" the key to their house," and that its possession was essential 
for the future security of the German nation. 

Favre [in his own account]. Then it is Alsace and Lorraine. 

Bismarck. I have not spoken of Lorraine ; but as for Alsace, I 
am very decided. We regard it as indispensable for our defence. 

Favre. Such a sacrifice would inspire France with sentiments of 
vengeance and hatred, leading by a fatal necessity to another war. 
Alsace intends to remain French. She might be ruled, but cannot 
be assimilated. The province will always be an embarrassment 
and perhaps a source of weakness to Germany. 

Bismarck. I do not deny that ; but in any case, even if we treat 
your nation in a generous manner, she will always be plotting 
against Germany. Your people will never become reconciled to 
Sedan any more than they are to Waterloo. 

Favre attempted to show Bismarck that he ought to recog- 
nize that the progress of industry, the creation of railroads, 
the interchange and complication of commercial interests, 
would tend in future to render war more and more improb- 
able. The present war was a severe lesson to France, and all 
the more so because the French people had been dragged into 
it against their will. Bismarck, however, denied this, affirm- 
ing that the French had desired the war and supported the 
emperor in proclaiming it. Favre's reiteration that the war 
was the exclusive work of Napoleon III. was promptly denied 
by Bismarck, and certainly was not a fair statement. Neither 
was Bismarck mindful of the Duke of Brunswick in 1792, 
when he declared that Germany never made war upon France. 
Favre believed that there was but one means of pacifying the 
French people and of uniting the two nations, by relinquishing 
the old policy of conquest and military glory, and by adopting 
that of liberty and the fraternity of nations. In conclusion, 
Bismarck said : 

" I acknowledge that you have always supported the policy you 
defend to-day ; and if I were sure that it were that of France, 
I would engage the king to withdraw without touching your terri- 
tory or demanding an obole. And I know so well his generous 
sentiments that I would guarantee you his acceptance. But you 

218 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

represent the imperceptible minority. You have sprung from a 
popular disturbance, which may overthrow you to-morrow. We 
have therefore no guarantee. We should have no more in any 
government which may succeed you. The evil is in the fickleness 
and irreflective character of your nation ; the remedy is in the 
material pledge which we have the right to take." 

At a second interview, which took place in the Salle de 
Chasseurs at Haute Maison, Favre pressed the subject of 
an armistice, but without making any impression on the 
minister-president. When in the course of his argument he 
referred to the Prussian victories, and the effect that they had 
produced in the eyes of the world, — a military glory which 
might satisfy the most ambitious, — Bismarck interrupted him 
with, — 

" Do not mention that ; that is a glory without value to us. It 
is our interest alone that we consult, and the need of guaranteeing 
it is so evident that we should be wrong to abandon ourselves to a 
chimerical hope." 

Favre believed that a profound change had taken place in 
the French nation and in the opinions of the civilized world, 
— a strong opinion against going to war : 

''The majority of the nation will be necessarily drawn by that 
irresistible current which conducts her towards a new policy and to 
higher destinies. She will understand that the support of all na- 
tions — especially Germany — is indispensable to her ; and she will 
seek it, not by sterile conquests, but by the benefits of work and 
interchange ; and it may be affirmed that if this movement be 
favored by wise statesmen, war will soon become impossible." 

To this Bismarck replied, — 

"The question is to find these wise statesmen, and I am con- 
vinced that they do not exist in France. You express noble ideas, 
and if you were master I should be of your opinion, and would treat 
with you at once ; but you are in opposition to the real sentiments 
of your country, which retains its warlike disposition ; and, to speak 

219 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

only of the present, you, as a government, are born of sedition, 
and you may be overthrown to-morrow by the populace of Paris." * 

So the conference ended. The interviews have slight his- 
torical importance, but Favre's account of them has a rare 
value for its clear setting forth of Bismarck's plain, straight- 
forward method of dealing. How conspicuous does the 
virtue of these two men appear in it ! How much honester 
were these two diplomats negotiating for whole provinces 
than the average business man who has wool to buy or iron 
to sell ! The problem they were dealing with was one of the 
gravest, and the arguments on either side evince great good 
sense and historical foresight. Only time can determine 
which of the two was most nearly right. 

Bismarck showed Favre a curious missive which had been 
sent to Napoleon III. by his empress as a sort of passport for 
a Bonapartist envoy. It was a photograph of an English 
sea-port, and underneath was written, " This is a view of 
Hastings, which I have selected as a residence for my good 
Louis;" signed "Eugenie." Bismarck did not think well of 
the emissary, but gave him permission to visit the emperor. 
Bismarck, in his report to the king of the interview, said : 

"I was unable to convince him that conditions which France 
had obtained from Italy and demanded of Germany, without having 
been at war with either country, — conditions which France would 
undoubtedly have imposed upon us had we been vanquished, and 
which had been the natural outcome of every modern war, — could 
involve no dishonor to a country conquered after having gallantly 
defended itself; or that the honor of France differed in any essen- 
tial respect from that of other countries." 

So they parted, to meet again under less favorable auspices 
for France. 

Favre and the provisional government had excellent rea- 
sons for not desiring too speedy a termination of the war. 
Marshal Bazaine was a thorough Bonapartist, and had with 
him in Metz the only French army that was now of any value. 

1 Favre's " Government of the National Defence," chap. iv. 
220 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

If peace had been concluded at this moment, it is morally 
certain that he would have marched upon Paris and replaced 
Napoleon in the Tuileries. To give stability to the new gov- 
ernment it was, therefore, necessary that the Committee of 
Safety should maintain an army of its own and continue the 
war until either Bazaine surrendered or they became strong 
enough to withstand the Bonapartist faction. 

Neither did Favre and his colleagues count without some 
chance of success. To besiege a city of two million inhabi- 
tants, fortified in the most skilful manner and capable of rais- 
ing an army of one hundred and fifty thousand men within 
its walls, was a problem altogether new in military science. 
Three hundred thousand men would be required to invest it, 
and half as many to prevent Bazaine from breaking forth from 
Metz. Then they depended on a general arming of the pop- 
ulation, such as had been so successful in the first French 
revolution. What they neglected to consider was that the 
soldiers who drove the Duke of Brunswick back to Ger- 
many in 1792 were fighting for a great cause; they were 
filled with the spirit of the time, and the whole French nation 
was at a white heat. It was now the Germans who had a 
cause to fight for, and this was as essential to their success as 
Von Moltke's tactics. The rank and file of Louis Napoleon's 
army were not the persons who made the conflict, and felt 
little interest in it. Never since the Seven Years' War had 
French armies fought so tamely. The Parisian journalists 
and gay saunterers of the boulevards who had helped to pre- 
cipitate the conflict were the ones who had least at stake in it. 
The small peasant proprietors in France knew little of what 
Bismarck was doing, and cared less. They hated war, and 
only wished to enjoy the fruits of the earth without inter- 
ference. Nevertheless, the Committee of Safety was so nearly 
right that Bismarck confessed to Von Beust three years later 
that if Bazaine had held out a week longer German affairs 
would have been in a critical condition. By the 1st of De- 
cember Germany was almost denuded of able-bodied men, 
and trade, except for military supplies, was nearly at a stand- 
still. Such mammoth wars cannot be of long duration. 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

As Favre's mission had come to no result, Thiers was sent 
on a circular tour to foreign courts for the purpose of organ- 
izing a coalition against Germany. Thiers was the best per- 
son that could have been appointed for this purpose, for, 
in spite of his national egotism, be was the ablest French 
politician of his time, — a skilful and conciliatory negotiator. 
However, he met with no success. He found in England, it 
is true, a favorable public sentiment, — songs about that wicked 
Bismarck were sung in coffee-houses and cheap theatres, — 
but as the British government had no army to speak of, there 
was not much it could do to assist its Crimean ally. The Tsar 
Alexander asked the coldly pertinent question, " What can 
you do for us in return ?" Neither he nor Victor Emmanuel 
could be persuaded that the retrocession of Elsass and Loth- 
ringen could in any way disturb the European balance of 
power; while Von Beust was still less inclined to place an 
army of observation in Bohemia than he had been two months 
earlier. Meanwhile Von Moltke had drawn his lines about the 
capital, and Paris was besieged. On October 6 Bismarck and 
William I. arrived at Versailles ; the king was quartered in the 
palace of Louis XIV., and Bismarck at the house of Veuve 
Jesse. An English M. P., who was residing in Paris and per- 
mitted himself to be shut in there, has given an edifying 
account of the proceedings he witnessed. The confusion 
would seem to have been almost indescribable, and he com- 
pares General Trochu to a military professor who understands 
theory, but is not a fighter. Large crowds of French men 
and women rushed into the city at the last moment, where 
they could be of no use except to eat up the supplies and 
hasten the famine. It seems as if the Committee of Safety 
might have been wise enough to send away those families 
who could afford to live in London or elsewhere before the 
city was encircled by the German forces. 

Bismarck, anticipating that the Paris government would 
make what capital they could out of the failure of Favre's 
negotiation to prejudice the German interests, addressed a 
circular to the powers, in which he summed up the situation 
in these terms : 

222 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

" By refusing to avail itself of the opportunity offered to it to 
elect a National Assembly (even within the portions of French ter- 
ritory occupied by us) the French government proves its determi- 
nation to prolong the difficulties, hindering it from effecting an 
international conclusion of peace, and to close its ears to the voice 
of the French people." 

One effect of this was to excite the Legitimists and Bona- 
partists with renewed hope that their claims might yet find 
consideration at the German head-quarters. The crown 
prince in his diary thus sums up the position of affairs on 
October 9 : 

" Bismarck tells me that Chambord and Ollivier have written to 
his Majesty. The former wishes that he should comply with the 
demands of his people, but make no concessions of land ; Ollivier 
stands for war, but warns against debt ; and both presume to 
give advice to the conqueror ! St. Cloud in flames. Burnside 
comes again from Paris, commissioned by the government, which 
offers proposals without any judgment, hearkens to no sugges- 
tions, and carries on the war without plan, holding counsel only 
with itself. Bazaine wishes his chief of staff to arrange trea- 
ties of a military-political kind. Bismarck will listen to him, but 
neither Roon nor Moltke, who, disagreeing with each other, yet 
object to the reception of communications. Friedrich Charles is 
opposed to this because he fears the capitulation may be concluded 
at Versailles. The king will direct the negotiations from Wurtem- 
berg so as not to appear in Bavaria's tow. Bismarck keeps watch 
of the imperial question, advising me that in 1866 he may have 
failed to realize the strength of the popular impulse in Germany for 
the imperial title. He is now chiefly apprehensive of too great a 
display in the way of court splendor, in regard to which I reassured 
him." 

It is clear from this summary that there was not always 
harmony and agreement in the German camp. We see the 
crown prince already looking forward to the imperial title and 
substantially justifying Von Sybel's statement in regard to the 
kings and dukes in Germany in 1866; while Bismarck applies 
a timely warning to the weak side of the victor of Worth. If 
there were five distinct political parties in France, there were 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

also five different commanders-in-chief to the German forces. 
Somewhat later we hear of a decided coolness between Von 
Moltke and the crown prince in regard to military operations 
before Paris. Fortunately, everything came to be decided at 
last by the old monarch, and he finally followed Bismarck's 
advice. 

General Burnside had offered to serve as mediator in the 
interest of the French republic, and Bismarck, who liked 
Americans on account of their frankness and business-like 
methods, readily agreed to this. He was accordingly escorted 
to Paris under a white flag, and remained there two days, but 
returned without accomplishing anything. Burnside described 
the condition of affairs there in terms similar to the besieged 
M. P., and he did not hesitate to express the opinion that it was 
of no use attempting to reason with such people. The real 
difficulty was that he had undertaken the office of peace-maker 
too early in the season ; but it is evident that he considered 
that the German claims were not unreasonable. Gambetta 
had gone off in a balloon to organize the army of the Loire, 
from which grand results were expected. A note was re- 
ceived from . Earl Granville — a faint echo of Thiers's visit to 
London — entreating King William to bring the horrors of 
war to a close as speedily as possible, and was bluntly an- 
swered by Bismarck to the effect that there was no place for 
sentiment in politics. 

If Jules Favre had consented to Bismarck's proposal in re- 
gard to an armistice, the French cause would have lost nothing 
by it, for Toul surrendered three days later, and Strasburg fol- 
lowed suit at the end of a week, after a bombardment of three 
days. How Bazaine was informed of MacMahon's advance on 
the line of the Meuse remains a mystery ; but he made a vigor- 
ous attempt to escape from Metz at that time, which was frus- 
trated by the activity of Frederick Charles, though with heavy 
losses on both sides. Bismarck complained at dinner that the 
Red Prince was not sufficiently considerate of the lives of his 
soldiers. It is doubtful if Bazaine made any effort to escape 
after the dethronement of Napoleon ; and the reference in the 
crown prince's diary to an audience with Bazaine's chief of 

224 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

staff clearly refers to some political negotiation, which was, 
however, strangled in its birth. An army of one hundred and 
eighty thousand men could not hold out forever in a besieged 
fortress, and Von Moltke calculated exactly the length of time 
they would be able to do this. On the 27th of October, 
Bazaine, Canrobert, and Lebceuf surrendered with six hun- 
dred cannon, besides the guns on the fortress ; the heaviest 
capitulation recorded in history. That Bazaine behaved with 
comparative indifference towards the French cause after the 
battle of Sedan cannot be denied; but whether the result 
would have been different if he had made successive attempts 
to escape from the German blockade is doubtful. In all 
probability, by acting as he did he saved the lives of thou- 
sands of brave men. After peace was concluded, however, 
he was made a scapegoat of and condemned to death for 
treasonable practices towards a republic which at that time 
certainly had no real existence. His sentence was commuted 
by President MacMahon to exile for a term of years. 



WILLIAM AS EMPEROR 

That Bismarck should take advantage of these signal suc- 
cesses to strengthen the position of William I. in Germany 
was to have been expected. He felt now that he held the 
South German states in the hollow of his hand, and could ac- 
complish whatever the king and his ministers considered 
best ; but there is nothing more remarkable in the life of this 
world-statesman than his readiness to seize an opportunity 
when it suddenly presented itself to him, and the cautious, 
gradual manner which he adopted at other times to gain his 
ends. His prediction, made years since, that the North Ger- 
man confederation once formed, the South German states 
would gravitate to it as inevitably as iron to the magnet, was 
now to be fulfilled ; but he did not wish to artificially hasten 
an event which he foresaw would take place in the due course 
of nature. In spite of the popular enthusiasm which is aroused 
by a victory like Sedan, he knew that the least attempt to 
exert a pressure on Wurtemberg or Bavaria would not only 
J 5 225 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

excite anti-Prussian agitation there, but would create a perma- 
nent ill feeling in those states, and an evil reproach towards the 
king and himself in other countries. The crown prince was 
equally desirous of attaining this end ; and we may suppose 
that his interest in German national unity was a fairly unselfish 
one ; but he did not, like Bismarck, see over the whole ground, 
and he feared that the grand opportunity might pass by with- 
out achieving the due result. From the last of October until 
December, 1870, we find continual references to this subject in 
the crown prince's diary, which proves that the matter was 
under discussion at the German head-quarters for several 
weeks before definite action was taken. 

The discussion would seem to have been concerning the 
organization of an upper house of parliament, and that the 
crown prince, from his English education and proclivities, 
favored something like the House of Lords, without realizing 
the political weakness and comparative uselessness of that 
venerable body. It may have been that the King of Saxony 
and others wished for such a collective union of princes, so as 
to maintain their dignity nearer to an equality with William I. 
Bismarck, however, did not want personages of that sort 
staying in Berlin ; besides which, the presidency of such an 
assembly would have been a severe burden to the aged king. 
Neither did he believe in the imitation of foreign political 
machinery. Every country, in his opinion, should have its 
own style of government. 

On the 1st of November the crown prince speaks of a con- 
ference between the ministers of the smaller German states 
for the purpose of winning over Bavaria to the scheme of a 
German empire, with responsible delegates for the states, or 
else a House of Lords ; but he says, " It has come to no re- 
sult, because Bray, the Bavarian envoy, asserts that all these 
questions will have to be discussed with Count Delbrtick at 
Munich." Bavaria was evidently the chief and only remain- 
ing obstacle to the completion of this plan. 

What the king's views were on this subject we have no 
means of ascertaining further than this : The crown prince 
says, October 27 : 

226 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

"The king told Regenbach yesterday that he looks upon the 
North German situation as requiring a change and revision, and 
has declared himself generally favorable in regard to the question 
of the empire. As Bismarck cannot leave here, people are of the 
opinion that the German Reichstag had better be called here. 
Then the power of impressions would work ; and if, besides, the 
congress of princes would join in with the same session, as is now 
much desired by me, then the German cause would be helped at a 
blow." 

Again the crown prince writes, November 16: 

"Talked with Bismarck about the German question. He wants 
to come to a decision, but expounds the difficulties with a shrug of 
his shoulders, — What can be done with the South Germans ? Do I 
wish that they should be threatened ? I answered, ' Yes, indeed, 
there is no danger at all if we are fair and imperious ; you will see 
that I am right in maintaining that you are not as yet, by any 
means, sufficiently aware of your power.' Bismarck seriously dep- 
recates any threatening, 1 and thinks if we went to extreme measures 
we might drive Bavaria into the arms of Austria. ' We shall have to 
leave the imperial question, to work itself out of its own free will.' 
I replied that I was well acquainted with that method of procedure, 
but that, representing the future as I do, I could not regard the 
matter with indifference ; that it would not be necessary to use 
brute force to prevent Bavaria and Wiirtemberg from uniting them- 
selves to Austria." 

There is no reason why we should blame the crown prince 
for his attitude on the South German question, except so 
far as it appears inconsistent with respect to his professions 
of liberalism and government according to law and order 
during the Schleswig-Holstein muddle. No great nation has 
ever been organized without the use of force in some direc- 
tion. We may have supposed that the United States was an 
exception to this, until we were undeceived in 1861. There 
was no serious disagreement between Bismarck and the crown 
prince, as the partisans of both have sometimes tried to prove ; 

1 One of Bismarck's sayings was, " If you want to make a bargain, never 
threaten." 

227 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

it was only a question of the right time and method ; and 
here Bismarck appears in decided advantage to his would-be 
rival. If there was opposition anywhere to the founding of 
a new German empire, it came from the Prussian Particular- 
ists, who foresaw that the admission of the South German 
states would diminish their influence, and perhaps from the 
old king, who dreaded the infusion of Bavarian Catholics and 
Wurtemberg democrats. 

The real difficulty in dealing with Bavaria in this emer- 
gency originated not in Munich, but in Rome. Since the 
occupation of the latter city by Victor Emmanuel, Pius IX. 
and Antonelli had been in a state of exasperation beyond the 
faculty of speech either to express or describe; and since 
they could discover no way to escape from their own difficul- 
ties, they were determined to make as much trouble for Bis- 
marck and the King of Prussia as they possibly could. There 
is no engine for such work like the priesthood, and perhaps it 
was fortunate that the young King of Bavaria had no queen 
for the Jesuits to play upon ; but they exerted themselves to 
arouse the Bavarians to the danger which threatened the true 
faith from the prospect of having their country under the con- 
trol of a Protestant emperor, and they started a lively anti- 
German agitation in Elsass and Lothringen. This went so 
far that the Bavarian ministry feared a popular uprising in 
Munich, which, with their whole army employed in France, 
would have been a dangerous problem to deal with. Prussian 
interference would have been only too likely to kindle this 
into a flame, and it was from his better information of existing 
conditions that Bismarck could answer the crown prince with 
so much confidence. 

Two months later, after the empire had been established 
and William had been crowned emperor in Versailles, it was 
generally reported in English newspapers, and echoed in many 
American ones, that the Crown Prince of Prussia was opposed 
to the new political order in Germany, and would have much 
preferred to have, his father remain simply King of Prussia 
at the head of the North German confederation. This is 
an excellent example of the growth of the modern mytlms. 

228 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

Although English gentlemen have always confessed that the 
national organization of Germany was an advantage to Great 
Britain and conducive to the general peace of Europe, a large 
allowance of national vanity was aroused by the surprising 
victories of Gravelotte and Sedan and the formidable growth 
of this neighboring power. As the crown prince was Vic- 
toria's son-in-law, it was considered essential for the credit of 
the English royal family that he should be represented as 
having no direct agency in such high-handed proceedings. 
All newspaper editors are by no means to be considered un- 
truthful; but when one of the brotherhood imagines such a 
canard as this, others naturally copy it, and the correspond- 
ents of leading newspapers were not slow to transport such 
valuable information to America. Now they are trying to 
prove that it was the crown prince rather than Bismarck 
who laid the corner-stone of the new German empire, since 
Germany is the main support of England's Eastern policy. 

THE TSAR CLAIMS HIS REWARD 

On or about October 30, Prince GortchakofT cast a diplo- 
matic bomb-shell among European potentates by issuing a 
circular to the effect that, since the Franco-German war had 
materially changed the political status of Europe, Russia did 
not consider the clause in the treaty of Paris which restricted 
her from a free navigation of the Black Sea was longer obli- 
gatory on her government. The true reason was that the 
French government was no longer able to enforce the treaty 
of Paris, and the British government, left to itself, would not 
be likely to attempt it. This had evidently been agreed upon 
at Ems, for Bismarck is admitted to have said, on hearing it, 
" The fools have begun a month too early ;" and the crown 
prince reports that his father was greatly disturbed by it. In 
fact, GortchakofT had chosen the most critical moment in the 
affairs of the Germans to assert the Russian claim, and it was 
as much a surprise to Bismarck as it was to the British 
Cabinet or to the unutterable Turk. It was, in fact, the mo- 
ment when the Prussian government would be most depend- 
ent on Russia's friendliness ; and if Gladstone had been a 

229 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

match In diplomacy for Bismarck, and had acted in a bold 
and decisive manner, thirty days later the German forces 
might possibly have been encamped again before the Rhine- 
land. Gladstone, however, was pacific, indisposed to foreign 
intervention, and indecisive. He commissioned Lord Odo 
Russell, a sort of English Polonius, to wait on Bismarck and 
protest against the action of Russia. Von Beust thought that 
Lord Russell was the most unsuitable envoy he could have 
selected, and that if an inflexible, determined Englishman had 
been sent in his place something would have been accom- 
plished. Sir Odo Russell is said to have been an admirer of 
Bismarck, and by this time there was no diplomat in Europe 
who did not dread an audience with the Prussian colossus. 
The interview was pleasant enough, with an effusion of amia- 
bility on both sides, but resulted in nothing. 

Bismarck knew how to suit himself to his man. Treaties 
were, after all, only good so long as they could be enforced. 
The Black Sea clause was a mean and petty restriction on 
Russia and of no real advantage to any other power. It was 
unreasonable that a nation should not have the right to pro- 
tect the shipping on its own coast. Such a restriction must 
come to an end sooner or later, and it had already endured 
for fifteen years. He could not believe that England would 
go to war on a question which concerned her material inter- 
ests so little. Besides, the British government was not pre- 
pared for war. As for any future aggrandizement of Russia, 
that would concern Germany quite as much as it would Eng- 
land. He advised a European conference in order to give the 
Black Sea clause a dignified burial. There was not much 
that Lord Russell could say against this, and the suggestion 
of an Anglo-German alliance against Russia had a hopeful 
sound. 1 

Alexander and Gortchakoff may have feared that the Ger- 
man successes would make Bismarck too independent, but 
they clearly made a mistake by interfering with him when his 



1 The crown prince writes, December 6, "Odo Russell says that Bismarck is 
favorable to an alliance with England." 

2^0 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

hands were full. This showed Bismarck what he might ex- 
pect from them in the future, and it would have been more 
for their interest in the long run if they had trusted him as 
Francis Joseph and Andrassy afterwards trusted him. There 
is no evidence that Bismarck ever betrayed the confidence of 
man or woman, though during the siege of Paris the French 
newspapers published the most infamous libels against him. 
" It is fortunate," he remarked, " that they do not know about 
the little house in my garden." He talked at dinner of the 
war between Poland and Prussia in the time of the Great 
Elector, which might have resulted in the conquest of Poland 
but for the interference of Holland. " Poland," he said, 
" might have played the same part in Prussian affairs which 
Hungary had in Austrian;" and this would certainly have 
been far better for the Poles than their present situation. He 
remarked to the crown prince, " I wish your Royal Highness 
would study the Polish language," to which the latter replied 
that he had already had enough of such studies. 

The capitulation of Metz was a severe blow to the Paris Com- 
mittee of Safety, and immediately afterwards Thiers, having 
returned from his foreign expedition, requested a consultation 
with Bismarck in regard to an armistice. He was accordingly 
conducted to the domicile of Madame Jesse, and Bismarck 
immediately asked him if he was provided with full and 
necessary powers for the negotiation. When Thiers expressed 
surprise at such a question, Bismarck informed him that 
news had already been received of a revolution within the 
city since he had left it. Thiers was evidently startled, and 
Bismarck judged from this how unstable the state of affairs 
was in Paris. 

In a general circular of November 8 Bismarck said : r 

" I proposed to him to fix the relative positions of both armies, 
as they stood on the day of signing the armistice, by the line of 
demarcation ; to suspend hostilities for a month, and during that 
time to accomplish the elections and the constitution of a National 

1 Our Chancellor, p. 72. 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

Assembly. . . . With respect to the elections in Elsass I was able 
to assure him that we would not insist upon any stipulation calling 
in question the restoration of the German departments to France 
before the conclusion of peace, nor would we haul any inhabitant 
of those departments, over the coals for having represented his com- 
patriots in a French National Assembly. I was amazed when he 
rejected these proposals, and declared that he could only agree to 
an armistice if it should include a thorough provisioning of Paris. 
I replied that this would involve a military concession, so far ex- 
ceeding the status quo and every reasonable expectation, that I 
must ask him what equivalent, if any, he was in a position to offer 
for it." 

The situation of France was a peculiar one. The country 
was without a legitimate government, and could only obtain 
one through an armistice; and yet an armistice would afford 
the French such advantages as no enemy in the field could 
possibly agree to. Thiers was entirely right in saying that 
a German possession of the forts would be a capitulation 
within an armistice. If the whole negotiation was a stratagem 
of the French in order to gain time, who can blame them ? 
The endurance of the Parisians was heroic, and they were not 
yet prepared to yield to the conqueror. The army of the 
Loire was still in position, and much was expected of a second 
army which General Bourbaki was organizing on the frontier 
of Switzerland, and with which he intended to invade Ger- 
many. 

About the middle of November Bismarck and the crown 
prince came pretty close to a quarrel. The latter says : 

" P)ismarck thought the expression of my opinions must have 
an injurious effect on the imperial question. In his judgment the 
crown prince ought not to utter such opinions. I take a most de- 
cided stand against having my mouth sealed in this manner, espe- 
cially with regard to questions like this of the future. I looked 
upon it as a duty to leave no one in doubt in regard to my opinion ; 
furthermore, nobody except his Majesty himself can give me any 
directions in regard to what I may talk about or not. Perhaps 
they take the ground that I am not yet old enough to have my 
own opinion. Bismarck declared that if I gave him orders, he 

232 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

would treat me accordingly. Against this I protested, because 
I had no orders to give him. Whereupon he said, as far as he 
was concerned, he would gladly make room for any other per- 
son whom I considered better fitted to carry on the matter than 
himself, but until then he must hold fast to those principles which 
accorded with the result of his experience and of his best under- 
standing. Then we came to questions of particulars. I remarked 
that perhaps I had become a little excited, but one could not expect 
me to be indifferent at a turning-point in the history of the world." 

Here we have a view behind the scenes, — an insight into 
those family jars of the Hohenzollerns of which much has 
been said and so little is known. There was evidently a con- 
stant internal struggle going on ; or, if not constant, at least 
intermittent, like that of Richelieu with Louis XIII. This 
vigorous conflict of opinion only indicates a vigorous intel- 
lectual life. Bismarck and the crown prince had the same 
end in view, but wished to reach it by different ways, and each 
thought that his road was the only safe one. Such contro- 
versies are common enough in all human affairs, from the 
direction of a household to the management of an empire. 

The policy of Bavaria toward other German states had al- 
ways been mean and provincial. A Bavarian who married a 
wife from any other German state could not bring her to his 
home without paying a heavy duty on his feminine importa- 
tion. The King of Wiirtemberg had complained to Bismarck 
two years previously that the railway fare between Munich 
and Stuttgart was so arranged as to impose a tax on those of 
his subjects who wished to visit the Bavarian capital. If 
Bavaria entered the new German empire these petty sources 
of local emolument would have to be dispensed with ; and 
the Bavarians strongly objected to being taxed for a German 
navy, since as an inland community they would derive only 
an indirect advantage from it. November 29 Dr. Busch says, 
" In the afternoon I sent off another article on the conven- 
tion with Bavaria; a grudging dissatisfaction seems to be the 
prevailing mood there." There was also opposition on the 
Prussian side, which irritated Bismarck, although he declared 
he was not surprised at it. " They are out of humor," he 

233 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

said, " because certain officials, who will have to conduct 
themselves in all respects according to our laws, will wear 
the Bavarian uniform. . . . They would have us wait a long 
while. If we put off we allow time for our enemies to come 
in and sow tares among our wheat. They want more uni- 
formity, — if they would only think of five years back and 
what they would have been satisfied with then." Something, 
it is true, had been conceded to Bavaria, chiefly in matters of 
form and uniform, in order to bring the state fairly within the 
Qerman fold ; but was not this better than the use of force or 
intimidation ? 

A brief review of the Bavarian negotiations will explain 
the difficulty of Bismarck's position in regard to them, as well 
as the cause of the crown prince's irritation. The last of 
September Bismarck commissioned the Prussian minister 
Delbriick to proceed to Munich and hold a trial conference 
with King Louis's ministry on the imperial question. Much 
to Delbruck's astonishment, the Bavarians designated eighty 
particulars in which they wished the constitution of the North 
German confederation changed before Bavaria could enter it. 
They wished an independent administration of the army, their 
own legislation in regard to the judiciary, complete indepen- 
dence of their railway system, an absolute veto on constitu- 
tional changes, and exemption from taxes for the support of 
a navy. Such conditions had never been heard of before, 
and seemed to preclude the necessity of further negotia- 
tion. 

However, Bismarck was not discouraged ; he saw that he 
had begun at the wrong end, and took another direction. A 
month later he invited the ministers of Baden, Wurtemberg, 
and Darmstadt to a conference at Versailles, and when the 
Bavarian ministers were informed of this they expressed a 
desire to be present also. At the conference, however, they 
found themselves in a minority, for the other states cared 
little for most of the Bavarian exceptions. It was plain to 
them that if all other states had the right to a constitu- 
tional veto there would never be any constitutional changes. 
Von Bray, who had succeeded Von der Pfordten as premier 

234 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

to King Louis, finally yielded this point, but the conference 
came to an end without definite result. 

Three weeks later there was a conference at Versailles with 
the Darmstadt, Baden, and Wiirtemberg ministers, to which 
apparently Von Bray was not invited. This time the obsti- 
nacy of the Wiirtemberg assembly prevented a conclusion, 
but terms were agreed upon to the satisfaction of the Wiir- 
temberg ministers, who dissolved the assembly and ordered a 
fresh election. On November 15 Baden and Darmstadt sig- 
nified their assent to enter the national federation on the same 
terms as the Saxon duchies. Finally the Bavarians, finding 
the current too strong for them, came to an agreement with 
Bismarck the last of November, after several days of very hard 
talking. Bavaria retained her diplomatic service, the manage- 
ment of her military establishment, postal, telegraph, and rail- 
road lines ; besides which a most important compromise was 
that the united votes of Bavaria, Saxony, and Wiirtemberg 
in the Reichstag should constitute a veto on any proposed 
change of the national constitution. There were other minor 
exceptions, but the eighty objective points were reduced to 
less than a dozen. Wiirtemberg was admitted with similar 
privileges in regard to the post, railroads, and telegraph lines, 
and a new assembly, in which the demagogues were left out, 
ratified the Versailles convention at once. Could there have 
been a finer illustration of Richelieu's grand maxim, " First, 
all methods to conciliate " ? 

This brought the crown prince's troubles to a close for the 
present. After an interview with his royal father and Bis- 
marck, on December 3 he wrote : 

" As he left the room Bismarck and I shook hands. This day- 
finds the emperor and the empire irrevocably fixed. Now are the 
sixty-five years of long interregnum and dreadful emperorless 
time past. This grand title is a surety in itself, for which we might 
thank the Grand Duke of Baden, 1 who has spared no trouble. 
Riiggenbach is sent by Bismarck to Berlin." 

1 The grand duke may not have realized that this would result in Bismarck's 
driving the gambling-hells out of Baden. 

235 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

It was sixty-five years since the first Napoleon had com- 
pelled the Emperor Francis to change his title from Germany 
to Austria, but the office had been practically in abeyance 
since the peace of Westphalia in 1648. The first German 
empire, which began after the death of Charlemagne, was 
ruled by the finest race of monarchs of whom history can 
boast, ending with Frederick II., to whom both pope and 
Saracen were obliged to bend the knee. The present German 
empire is constituted in a wholly different manner from its 
predecessor, and is substantially a new form of government, 
similar to that of constitutional Austria, which antedated it 
but four years. Nothing now remained to complete its es- 
tablishment but the coronation of William I. 

When King Leopold of Belgium wrote a letter of congratu- 
lation to the crown prince on the fortunate conclusion of the 
imperial question, the latter magnanimously showed it to 
Bismarck, who expressed himself in a highly appreciative 
manner over its contents, and requested him in his answer to 
refer to the advantage which a strong Germany would be to 
Belgium, and the protection which a strong Germany would 
afford the Belgians against France. " Founding the empire," 
however, began in 1866, or, one might say, on April I, 18 15. 

General Bourbaki, having assembled an army of more than 
a hundred and twenty thousand men about Lyons, including 
the remnant of De Paladine's force, early in January decided 
to take the offensive, and marched northward, driving General 
Werder before him towards Belfort. His plan seemed to be 
to relieve the siege of Belfort, and then cut the Prussian 
communications with Germany ; perhaps, also, to invade the 
Rhineland. General Werder took up a strong position at the 
south of Belfort and applied to Von Moltke for reinforce- 
ments. General Manteuffel was despatched to his assistance 
with two army corps, in whose ranks was Count William von 
Bismarck, now promoted to a lieutenancy for bravery on the 
field of battle. He had fought at Sedan and done his duty 
in the siege of Paris, and was now entering on his last cam- 
paign. 

Before Manteuffel could arrive, Bourbaki attacked Werder, 

236 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

January 15, and was repulsed. General Werder's army con- 
sisted of only about forty thousand men, but he held his 
ground against Bourbaki three days in succession. The 
losses of the French were not heavy, and General Bourbaki, 
a noble type of the old French soldier, was so much dis- 
couraged at the conduct of his troops that he attempted 
suicide. 

On November 30 General Trochu had arranged for a grand 
sortie on the side of Paris towards Fontainebieau. General 
Ducrot attacked the German lines with not less than fifty 
thousand men, but after an engagement of several hours was 
obliged to retreat with heavy loss. After this there was more 
than a month of inactivity, when a series of desperate sorties 
were attempted during the middle of January, but all without 
effect. These were timed in concert with Bourbaki's advance 
on Belfort, and after his defeat there the Parisians settled 
down to face starvation and the inevitable. When, on the 
2 1st, a second socialist uprising had to be suppressed, the 
Committee of Safety realized that their time had come. On 
January 8 Von Moltke had commenced his bombardment of 
the city, — mainly for moral effect, — but so solidly built were 
the blocks on Napoleon's boulevards that in the better portion 
of Paris it was even less effectual than he anticipated, and the 
fires which it caused in the Latin Quarter were easily extin- 
guished. The Tuileries and Louvre were not damaged, and 
would seem to have been purposely avoided. 1 

THE CORONATION AT VERSAILLES 

The new German empire was announced to the various 
governments of Europe, January 1, 1871, without waiting for 
the sanction of the Bavarian legislature, since that of the 
king and his ministers had already been obtained. In medi- 
aeval Germany the emperor had always been chosen by elec- 
toral princes of the larger states, with a tendency to hereditary 

1 The building to which the Venus of Melos had been removed for safety 
was afterwards set on fire during the Commune, and the statue was preserved as 
if by a miracle. 

237 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

succession so long as the imperial family produced first-rate 
men. After the time of Charles V. the title had become 
hereditary in the house of Hapsburg, but it also became little 
more than a title. Bismarck had taken advantage of this fact 
to make the position hereditary in the Prussian family, which 
certainly was no more than prudent, and in order to clinch 
the business at both ends he wished to have the confirmation 
come from the representatives of the people as well as from 
the princes. A vote to this effect, therefore, was obtained 
from the North German Reichstag, not without a good deal 
of declamatory opposition from the Prussian Particularists, 
the Saxons, and the Ultramontanes. 

The chief objection to the new title seemed to be that it 
would afford William I. an increase of authority, which might 
prove dangerous to the personal liberty of German citizens, 
although there is practically no real difference between the 
authority of a king and of an emperor. The difference always 
consists in the manner in which their authority is limited. 
Louis XIV. was a more absolute ruler than Napoleon I, 
Emperor, Imperator ; Kaiser, Ccesar ; and Prince, Princeps 
Seiiatns, were all derived from the titles of Augustus, but no 
German emperor from Henry the Fowler onward possessed 
the unlicensed power of the Caesars. In the character of 
their authority they resembled more closely the Henrys and 
Edwards. King is of German derivation, and its origin is 
lost in the prehistoric twilight of the German forests. Eng- 
lish monarchy is the best representative of it, but Napo- 
leon cheapened the title by conferring it on the electoral 
princes of Saxony and Bavaria. It was now essential that 
the King of Prussia, as the chief executive of United Ger- 
many, should be endowed with an exceptional distinction, 
and what could be more appropriate than the name of Kaiser? 
His authority as emperor, however, never equalled .that which 
he had exercised (or Bismarck for him) during the previous 
five years ; nor did it much exceed the authority of President 
Lincoln during the Civil War. 1 

1 It was characteristic of King William's plain good sense lhat he at first ob- 
jected to the imperial title, which he spoke of as a fancy-dress affair, and it was 

238 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

The time for the coronation was fixed for the 18th of Jan- 
uary, an anniversary of the day when the first King of Prus- 
sia was crowned in 1701. It was his contribution in soldiers 
and money to the war against Louis XIV. by which he ob- 
tained that elevation • and Prince Eugene, foreseeing its ulti- 
mate effect on Austrian affairs, declared that the man who 
suggested it ought to have been hanged. Now the successor 
of Frederick was to receive a still further elevation through 
a war with France, in the very hall of Louis XIV., — the 
Hall of Mirrors, intended purposely to give an infinite reflec- 
tion to the magnificence of the grand monarch. Louis XIV. 
never dreamed what a use his showy palace would come to. 
Certainly it never saw a more distinguished gathering than 
the present, considering the princes, generals, and foreign 
ambassadors who were assembled there ; not supernumeraries 
in uniform, but men of genuine ability, who had earned their 
right to surround Emperor William by dignified public ser- 
vice. There were, besides, two men of genius there, — Bis- 
marck and Moltke, — conspicuous above all others, whose 
names will be spoken so long as German or English lasts. 

The crown prince's account of the ceremony has rather a 
critical tone. The Prussian court chaplain, in his opening 
prayer, referred to the German spoliation by Louis XIV., the 
theft of Strasburg and the sacking of Worms, and the final 
retribution which had attended these unhallowed deeds. The 
crown prince did not find this in good taste, nor was he 
better pleased with Bismarck's reading the proclamation to 
the German people in his " monotonous, business-like man- 
ner." William I. read a congratulatory address to the sov- 
ereigns and representatives ; and then the coronation took 
place, and the Duke of Baden called out, "Long live his 
Imperial Majesty, the Emperor William !" 



only through the united efforts of Bismarck, the Crown Prince of Prussia, and 
the King of Bavaria that he was finally persuaded to agree to it. Even after this 
he had a stubborn controversy with Bismarck as to whether his title should be 
Emperor of Germany or, as the latter preferred, Emperor of the Germans. Bis- 
marck supported his argument by producing a thaler of Frederick the Great on 
which was the legend Rex Borussorwu. 

239 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

The two Fredericks were created field marshals of the 
empire, a title of more value since it occurs but rarely in 
Prussian history as compared with the French custom. Na- 
poleon I. made it much too common, conferring it on officers 
of inferior merit like Grouchy and Suchet. Bismarck about 
this time received the honorary distinction of lieutenant- 
general. 

The London conference on the Black Sea clause had 
opened the day previous. Bismarck seems to have given the 
subject little attention ; but we find an entry in Dr. Busch's 
diary, a short time before, to the effect that the Prussian 
delegate was to support the claims of Russia with all his 
might. As Bismarck's influence was now at its height, and 
as Francis Joseph and Victor Emmanuel were very much 
afraid of what he might do next, the British government 
found itself in a minority of one, and allowed the question to 
subside as quietly as possible. 

CONCLUSION OF PEACE 

The bombardment of Paris lasted two weeks before the 
white flag appeared announcing the capitulation. Trains of 
supplies had been prepared in Germany for the benefit of its 
starving citizens before the catastrophe came, and Bismarck 
feared that the knowledge of this might encourage the Pari- 
sians to prolong their ordeal, but it was the revolt of the Com- 
munists which finally broke the camel's back. On January 
23 J Favre appeared at Versailles with request for an armistice, 
which, however, was as unreasonable as the previous one. 
He wished for permission to have the regular troops march 
out with honors of war and retire to the Loire, where Gam- 
betta was again organizing fresh levies. This, of course, 
could not be granted, and a long, fruitless discussion ensued, 
lasting the best portion of five days. Bismarck said of him 
afterwards, " Favre is a good talker, and his sentences are 
well balanced, but he is not the man to effect a favorable bar- 
gain, not even to sell a horse." In order to find out more 

1 The crown prince says on the 24th. 
240 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

exactly as to the condition of affairs in Paris, he said to 
Favre, " We know the situation in Paris better than you do, 
who have only been there a few days ; there are still pro- 
visions in the city for three weeks more." By the surprise 
on Favre's face Bismarck perceived that this was not the 
case. 

The bombardment continued all the time while Favre and 
Bismarck were arguing at Versailles. Finally, on the 28th, 
it was agreed that there should be an armistice for three 
weeks, during which time elections should be held for dele- 
gates to a national convention, with authority to make a per- 
manent peace and decide all questions appertaining thereto. 
The army in Paris was to be surrendered to Emperor William, 
with the exception of one division, who were to retain their 
arms for the preservation of order, and the German forces 
were to occupy the forts. Besides this, the city of Paris was 
compelled to pay a war contribution of two hundred million 
francs. The surrender and the occupation of the forts took 
place the following day, while provision trains rushed into 
Paris from all directions. The crown prince states that Favre 
ate like a wolf. 

Gambetta's behavior in this crisis was indicative of the 
peculiar mental condition of the average French mind, as it 
had been fostered by the political writing of Thiers and the 
imperial adulation of Louis Napoleon. Although he had 
seen the armies which he had conjured up, as Bismarck said, 
with a stamp of his foot, dissipated like smoke, and every 
fortress, as well as the capital, was now in the possession of 
the enemy, he still refused to believe that the war was over 
and that further resistance was useless. The French army 
and government had ceased to exist, and yet he still had faith 
that in some miraculous manner his country might yet be 
delivered from the Germans. He opposed the armistice with 
all the force of his untiring energy, and when he failed to 
produce an effect in this direction he endeavored to turn the 
elections to account by supporting such candidates as might 
persuade the convention to continue the war at all hazards. 
Nothing could be more unpatriotic than such a course, and 
16 241 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

yet Gambetta always believed that he was the one person in 
France who lived lor his country and for her alone. The last 
of January he published a manifesto on his own responsi- 
bility, declaring that no persons who had held office or had in 
any way been connected with the government of Napoleon III. 
would be eligible to vote at the coming elections. Bismarck 
protested against this, or any other measures which would 
interfere with the free expression of public opinion ; and. as 
the national committee also objected to it, Gatnbetta resigned. 
It has been supposed that his course at this time was dictated 
by personal ambition. — a desire to preserve his popularity at 
the expense of his colleagues, who would have to bear the 
odium of the capitulation. — and this is the natural way to 
look at it ; but it is quite as likely to have arisen from the same 
infatuation which had led his countrymen into this unequal 
conflict. Thiers. Favre, Gambetta, and Rochefort formed a 
descending series in French republicanism, if the last can 
properly be called a republican. 

The elections were held on February 8, and four days later 
the national convention met at Bordeaux and declared almost 
unanimously for peace and republicanism, — as two years pre- 
viously the French people had declared for the continuation 
of the empire. On the 17th Thiers was elected temporary 
president of the republic, and on the 21st, with Favre and 
Picquard, he proceeded to Versailles to conclude terms of 
peace with Bismarck. 

It must have been with gloomy forebodings that these three 
gentlemen made their way to the mansion of Veuve Jesse, 
but Bismarck's demand exceeded even their worst anticipa- 
tions. Strasburg, Metz, and Belfort must be given up with 
adjacent territory, and in addition France must pay a war 
indemnity of six thousand million francs. Such a demand 
had to be fought out so long as words and arguments would 
last, and Thiers and Favre were just the men to do this. On 
the other hand, Bismarck had France completely in his power, 
and, so to speak, held the long end of the lever. The limita- 
tion to this was that he was really as desirous of concluding- 
peace as his opponents, and he also knew that there is an 

242 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

clement of desperation in the French character which always 
has to be considered in critical emergencies. It must have 
been a severe ordeal for all concerned. It is nervous business 
bargaining for a house, and when it comes to a question of 
thousands of millions of dollars the strain is, to say the least, 
herculean. 

The discussion was conducted in French, and the fine lan- 
guage was all on the side of Thiers & Co., but the facts were 
mainly with Bismarck. When they urged that the war was 
not of their making, he replied, " Yes ; but you continued it, 
and could have obtained better terms after Sedan." When 
Thiers called it a veritable spoliation, he was reminded of the 
terms which Napoleon exacted of Prussia in 1806 and re- 
mained inexorable, although the weeping queen, mother of 
William I., fell on her knees before him. 1 It was true that 
Napoleon had never exacted such a colossal sum of money, 
but he had systematically fleeced Prussia for six years, so that 
her wealthiest merchants were reduced to poverty. Bismarck 
had not based his calculations on guess-work, but had a pre- 
pared table of statistics on hand in order to prove that the 
revenues of France were quite equal to the provision of such 
a sum. Finally he declared, in reply to Thiers's eloquent pro- 
test that France might be ruined but would never consent 
to a dishonorable peace, " If you persist in prolonging the 
war four or five years, the German government will annex 
France." 

A more potent argument, perhaps, was the threat to rein- 
state Napoleon with the two hundred thousand French sol- 
diers who were then imprisoned in Germany. We may 
wonder that Bismarck consented to continue this discussion. 
Lord Nelson's method on such occasions was to place his 
watch on the table, and give the opposite party an hour for 
silent reflection on the subject ; but Bismarck was not so 
domineering as that. Exacting he certainly was, but he liked 
to base all his actions on logical grounds, and to satisfy his 

* Thiers could not be ignorant of this, for he had written a graphic account 
of it. She was avenged by her own son. 

243 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

opponents that whatever he did he considered right. Finally 
he brought the conference to a conclusion in a highly adroit 
manner. The French commissioners had protested vigor- 
ously against a triumphal entry into Paris, and so, when Bis- 
marck perceived that they had reached the last ditch of 
despair, he offered them the choice between a triumphal entry 
and taking off a milliard of francs with Belfort from the con- 
ditions of peace. The offer was snapped at eagerly, for the 
triumphal entry really amounted to nothing, and, after an 
eloquent epilogue on the buried glory of France, the bargain 
was clinched at five milliard francs, with Alsace and Lor- 
raine. 

Von Beust allows Thiers the credit of having saved Belfort 
and reducing the war indemnity, and something may be 
accredited to the tenacity with which he conducted the nego- 
tiation, but it is more probable that Bismarck put these items 
on before he took them off, as men usually ask more for an 
object of barter than they are willing and ready to accept. 
One does not altogether like Bismarck's small tricks and 
stratagems, but the charitable way to consider them is- as a 
part of his profession as a diplomat rather than as belonging 
to the man. They do not differ essentially from the decep- 
tions which doctors practise for the benefit of their patients. 
Referring to this interview, Favre afterwards said of him, 
" Bismarck is a political man of business, and on such a scale 
as it is difficult to imagine." 

The peace preliminaries were signed at Versailles on Feb- 
ruary 26, and the French commissioners at once returned to 
Bordeaux, where the national convention ratified it by a rela- 
tive vote of five to one. As Bismarck knew that the payment 
of such an immense sum would only be secured under compul- 
sion, he made the new government agree to an occupation of 
French territory by German forces until it was liquidated, — 
an evacuation of territory to take place according to the par- 
tial payments which should be made. This was another 
expensive burden on the French people, but there was no 
help for it. On March 1 a select army corps was reviewed by 
Emperor William and afterwards marched through Paris, 

244 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

with the emperor, Bismarck, Moltke, the crown prince, and 
other high officers. It was like a city of the dead ; the blinds 
and shutters were everywhere closed, and not a Frenchman 
was to be seen in the streets, except here and there a stray 
vender of supplies. It gave the private soldiers, however, an 
opportunity to view this wonderful city, which in its way is 
without a rival, and to many of them it would be the only 
chance they would ever have. During the following week as 
many battalions as possible were entertained by their officers 
in a similar manner. The emperor signed the treaty of peace 
at Versailles the following day, and on the 17th was again 
in Berlin. 

The French will never forgive Bismarck for the severe 
terms of this treaty, and he has been liberally blamed for it 
in England and America. If our civil war cost the United 
States government three million dollars a day, it is not 
probable that the French campaign cost the German govern- 
ments at a higher rate. If greater forces were employed in 
it, the cost of labor and materials must have been relatively 
smaller. Half of the five milliard francs, therefore, must 
have been intended to cover the loss in killed and wounded, 
and should properly have gone to them or their families. It 
is to be feared that this was not the case to the extent to 
which it might have been. What is abstractly right in par- 
ticular instances often has to give way to what is judicious. 
It was Favre's finest argument at the conference, as previously 
at Haute Maison, that to conclude an enduring peace it was 
necessary to agree upon terms which the vanquished party 
should consider reasonable. 

Bismarck did not believe in this. You may, perhaps, ex- 
pect magnanimity from an individual if you know your man, 
but from a large number of men it is useless to think of it. 
In the second Silesian war, when Frederick the Great was 
attacked by Austria and Saxony and defeated his enemies in 
four decisive engagements, he replied to their commissioners, 
"I want nothing of you but peace," trusting in this way to 
escape future coalitions against him. Yet he was obliged not 
long afterwards to contend against the whole continent of 

245 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

Europe, — the hardest piece of work that man ever succeeded 
in. On the other hand, the first Napoleon's practice of weak- 
ening his enemies by taking territory from them is supposed 
to have been the proximate cause of his downfall. It is often 
difficult to choose between the danger of doing too much and 
that of letting slip a favorable opportunity. The practice of 
abstracting territory as one of the penalties of warfare is not 
confined to Europe : there are precedents for it in both North 
and South America. It is well known that Bismarck's own 
judgment favored the establishment of a frontier in a nearly 
straight line from Luxemburg to Switzerland, but Von 
Moltke insisted on Metz (which can only be compared to 
Gibraltar and Ehrenbreitstein) as equal in value to three 
army corps. Bismarck had a very strong pressure behind 
him, — an exultant army and an ambitious court. It was in 
his nature to conceive and carry out grand designs, yet if he 
could have been satisfied himself and satisfied others with the 
cession of Elsass and an indemnity of three milliard francs, it 
might have been less expensive for Prussia in the long run. 
The possession of Elsass and Lothringen has cost the German 
government not less than fifty million thalers in the military 
establishment which it entails. 

The French at least should feel indebted to Bismarck for 
relieving them of Louis Napoleon. To whom else can we 
attribute the demoralized condition of the French army which 
was so conspicuous at Vionville and Sedan, — the army which 
in 1855 had so heroically stormed Sebastopol, and behind this 
there must have been the same tendency in the French people, 
from whom the army was taken ? Whatever may be the 
virtues of the Bonapartes, their line of policy is not the one 
by which the French nation can rise to a higher civilization 
than that of the First Empire. The French people are now 
at liberty for the first time in history to work out their destiny 
according to their own judgment, and the person whom they 
have to thank for this above all others is Otto von Bismarck. 
A meddlesome Metternich or Beaconsfield would have re- 
stored the Bonapartes or Bourbons, and compelled France to 
accept another term of monarchy. 

246 



CHAPTER XI 

THE IRON CHANCELLOR 

Prussia is really the most peaceable of the great powers of 
Europe. This becomes evident when we compare the dif- 
ferent campaigns undertaken by the Prussian government 
during the past century with those of other countries. Count- 
ing from 1798, the French have had full twenty years of 
warfare, and Great Britain about the same, if we consider such 
small affairs as the Ashantee war and the Egyptian campaign 
in the way of fractions. Russia has had fourteen years of 
war ; Austria, twelve ; the United States of America, nine, in- 
cluding the numerous Indian wars; and Prussia, seven years 
of warfare. Italy and Spain have been treated too much like 
footballs between other nations to enter into this computation. 
Many of these wars have been inevitable, and could not have 
been avoided, so far as we can judge from a candid estimate 
of the facts concerning them ; but Great Britain could cer- 
tainly have escaped from the War of 181 2, and France from 
the War of 1870. It is difficult to determine whether the 
English or French are the more pugnacious people, but they 
certainly lead all others in that respect. 

Grim old Manteuffel was left in command of the army of 
occupation, to make sure of the French indemnity, with about 
one hundred and fifty thousand men, and the rest of the 
German forces returned to their own firesides as quietly and 
methodically as they had come. To the French they were 
like an army of locusts ; but the manner in which they went 
back to their daily avocations, as if nothing great or remark- 
able had happened in the mean time, is very pleasing, not to 
say poetic. Senator Wilson, of Massachusetts, was present 
when some twenty thousand men were mustered out of ser- 
vice at Munich, and was delighted with the sober, orderly 
manner in which they dispersed ; not crowding the sidewalks 

247 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

or filling up the streets with idle groups, though the beer- 
gardens were unusually well attended, and every musician 
that could be found was in request for them. 

The war was over, but whether peace was at hand Bis- 
marck did not feel sure. It seemed as if the era of prosperity 
had arrived for Prussia ; but there is a Spanish proverb, 
" Beware of smooth water," which men of the wiser sort 
always bear in mind. He knew the inflammable condition in 
which he had left the French people, with an improvised and 
untried government and inexperienced rulers, who pretended 
always to act in conformity with the popular will. It was one 
of his few maxims that the unexpected may happen in France 
at any time; and, sure enough, it did in less than two weeks, 
to the astonishment of mankind. Overcome" with the exer- 
tions of the last six months, Bismarck had only reached his 
country residence when the first news from the Paris Com- 
mune followed close upon him. 

All the world was startled, and especially America. Pow- 
erful revolutionary elements and extensive secret organiza- 
tions were known to exist in Europe from Poland to Portugal ; 
but it was generally supposed that their object was the sub- 
jugation of tyrants, that they were chiefly enemies of the 
monarchical order, and if they once attained republican gov- 
ernments they would be contented. In the Paris revolution 
of March 17, 1871^ there was plain evidence that the object 
of these associations was not republicanism, but the abolition 
of the Roman law, the system of jurisprudence which has 
held society together since the dark ages. It was an attack 
on the very existence of government, on the possession of 
property and all individual rights, on education and superior 
culture. To name it in a single phrase, it was barbarism let 
loose. This was the character by which it declared itself, 
and the moment it selected was the one above all others in- 
imical to republicanism and liberal institutions. It was at 
once predicted in political circles that the result of the Com- 
mune would be the restoration of the Bourbons, and it came 
very near to this shortly afterwards. It is not to be doubted 
that the Commune greatly strengthened the cause of mon- 

248 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

archy in Europe, and that the antagonism to communism is 
now the strongest support of kings and emperors. 

The proceedings of the Paris revolutionists were worthy 
of such a cause. Thiers had contended in the peace stipu- 
lations at Versailles that a division of the National Guard 
should retain their arms, and the far-sighted Moltke protested 
against this. The result was now perceived in the fusion of 
the National Guard with the communists. Two generals of 
the regular army whom they captured were condemned and 
shot, after the fashion of 1793. The Socialists plundered the 
churches, forced loans from the banks, insurance companies, 
and millionaires, burned down the Tuileries, and imprisoned 
the priests, against whom they seemed to have a particular 
spite. The final murder of Archbishop Darboy and his com- 
panions requires no comment. It was from this class of 
irreconcilables to civilization that Charles Cohen emanated, 
the would-be assassin of Bismarck in the spring of 1866, and 
numerous other assassins and inhuman monsters have ema- 
nated from it since. The Internationals were not all Com- 
munists, however, but contained many stanch Republicans 
and high-minded men. There were wheels within wheels in 
the society, and its membership included a wide range of 
political theory and belief. 

The Paris revolution must have been in preparation for a 
number of years. According to Disraeli, the secret societies 
promised to Napoleon III. the continuance of his reign and 
the succession of his son if he would only leave Rome to 
Garibaldi, but he did not do this. An International named 
Linton, an English engraver, came to America in 1868, to 
obtain recruits for a conspiracy against the French emperor. 
He persuaded Wendell Phillips to become an associate mem- 
ber of the fraternity, and even Charles Sumner had some 
connection with the Internationals at an earlier time. It was 
the Mazzini wing of the society which Sumner affiliated with, 
but after the Commune in 1871 he disclaimed all further con- 
nection with them. 

The government at Versailles appealed to Bismarck for 
assistance, and, though he preserved his attitude of non-inter- 

249 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

ference, he hastened the liberation of a large body of French 
soldiers captured at Sedan, considering it only right that their 
country should have the benefit of their services. These, 
being troops of the regular line and chiefly Bonapartists, could 
be depended on not to fraternize with the insurgents ; and 
Marshal MacMahon, having repulsed two attacks of the Com- 
munists before the arrival of this re-enforcement, stormed the 
forts about Paris and finally entered the city on May 21. 
The Communists were driven from one barricade to another, 
and a large body of them, who had taken refuge in the church 
of the Madeleine, were all bayoneted by the infuriated soldiers 
of Napoleon. Fifty thousand more were taken prisoners, and 
the streets of Paris ran with blood. 

Bismarck, although there was nothing he hated like social- 
ism, saw that in this outbreak there was more justification 
than even a republican might suppose. In a semi-official state- 
ment, published the last of April, he said : 

"It is communism of the grossest description which has tempted 
from fifteen to twenty thousand released criminals and other scum 
and dregs of modern society to lend their aid to these champions 
of cataclysm. In this revolution, however, bad as it is, may be 
detected a movement founded upon reason and supported by or- 
derly and intelligent social elements, — viz., the effort to obtain a 
sensible municipal organization, and to emancipate the commons 
from vexatious and unnecessary state tutelage, an effort finding its 
explanation in French history, and its exact converse in Hauss- 
mann's tyrannical proceedings, so injurious to the Paris munici- 
pality. Were the Parisians endowed with a municipal constitution 
like that possessed by the Prussian cities ever since the days of 
Hardenberg, many practical thinkers in Paris who now hold aloof 
from the Versailles government would be satisfied, and no longer 
support the revolution by passive resistance." 

Haussmann the Alsatian was Louis Napoleon's prefect of 

the Seine, and it is to be feared that in his remodelling of the 

Paris boulevards he often proceeded in a tyrannical and unfair 

manner with respect to the property of persons who stood in 

the way of his improvements. 

250 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 



THE FIRST GERMAN REICHSTAG 

It was a momentous occasion, the first opening of parlia- 
ment for united Germany on March 21, 1871. The address 
from the throne was brief, dignified, and modest. The em- 
peror said : 

"On seeing you for the first time after the glorious but hard 
struggle which Germany has successfully accomplished for her in- 
dependence, the German Diet assembled round me, my first impulse 
is to offer my humble thanks unto God for all important successes 
with which His grace has crowned the faithful unanimity of the 
German allies, the heroic courage and the excellent discipline of 
our troops, and the self-denying devotion of the German nation. 

" We have accomplished that which since the time of our fathers 
has been the universal aim for Germany, — the union and its organic 
formation, the safeguarding of our frontiers, the independence of 
the development of our national laws. 

" Although hidden, the consciousness of its unity was ever alive 
in the German nation ; it burst its shell in the moment of enthu- 
siasm in which the entire nation arose to the defence of their threat- 
ened Fatherland, and cut its name in indelible characters on the 
battle-fields of France as a nation resolved to be and remain one 
people. 

" The spirit that lives in the German people, and that penetrates 
its culture and civilization, as well as the constitution of the empire 
and the structure of its army, preserve Germany in the midst of 
successes from any temptation to misuse the power gained by her 
unity. The respect which Germany claims for her own indepen- 
dence she is fully prepared to accord to the independence of all 
other states and nations, the weak as well as the strong. The new 
Germany that has come forth from the fiery ordeal of the present 
war will be a reliable surety for the peace of Europe, being sufficiently 
powerful and self-conscious to reserve for herself the ordering of her 
own affairs as an exclusive but at the same lime fully sufficient and 
satisfactory heritage. 1 '' ' . . . 

The announcement that Bismarck was created a prince 2 and 

1 Bismarck's Speeches, v. 7. 

2 Readers of Bismarck's Memoirs will remember that he wished to decline 
this title, and went to the Schloss in Berlin for that purpose, but at the top of the 

251 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

chancellor of the new empire was received with more enthu- 
siasm than the title of count and field-marshal general which 
was bestowed on Von Moltke, for it was felt that the latter had 
not been rewarded equal to his deserts. No shade of envy or 
disappointment, however, could be detected on the face of the 
old veteran, who was as cool-headed in the hour of success as 
on the field of battle. He had done his work, and he must 
have been conscious that he had earned an enviable place in 
the world's history, and not in that of Germany alone. From 
this time forth he avoided ovations and all other demonstra- 
tions in his honor, — an unostentatious hero. As for the sin- 
cerity of the emperor's pacific intentions, twenty-eight years 
of continued peace and prosperity in Europe ought to have 
sufficiently proved it. Sensational news and magazine writers 
maintained a perpetual clamor in regard to the danger of the 
German military power and the malign intentions of Bismarck, 
until he and Marshal Moltke both became too old to take the 
field, — and it is wonderful how much of this was believed ; 
but the world finally concluded that William I. and his min- 
isters knew their own interests too well to run the risk, by 
grasping too much, of losing any portion of what they had 
already gained. 

The government had a large majority in this Reichstag and 
could have accomplished almost anything that Bismarck 
considered expedient, but the chancellor now showed his 
strength in his moderation. He had no intention of tinkering 
the political machine until he discovered how well it would 
run, and where the weak spots in it actually were. A fund 
of two hundred and forty million thalers, or nearly one-fifth 
of the war indemnity, was set apart for the benefit of wounded 
and disabled soldiers, as well as for the widows of those 
who had fallen in the campaign ; four million thalers were 
distributed among the more deserving veterans, and four 
millions were divided among the most distinguished generals. 
Prince Frederick Charles, Manteuffel, and Von Roon received 



royal staircase he was met by the whole imperial family ; William I. embraced 
him, and he felt that it would be positively ungracious to oppose his wishes. 

252 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

three hundred thousand thalers apiece, and it may be fairly 
said that they deserved it. Bismarck himself was rewarded 
by his sovereign with estates in Holstein valued at nearly a 
million thalers. 

This Reichstag seemed almost like a symposium of sages, 
but its perfect harmony was somewhat ruffled by an aston- 
ishing resolution, offered by the Catholic members, that it was 
the duty of Emperor William to interfere in behalf of the 
pope and drive Victor Emmanuel out of Rome. This motion 
was brought up on March 30, and was closely followed by a 
demand of the Polish members of Posen for Polish indepen- 
dence. Bismarck perceived that the two movements were 
closely connected, and conjectured rightly that they both 
originated from the Vatican. It was the first premonitary 
cloud, small as a man's hand, of the approaching storm. 
Bismarck replied to the Polish resolution : 

" You, gentlemen, are really no people : you represent no people ; 
you have no people backing you, — you are backed by nothing but 
your fictions and illusions, one of which is that you were elected 
by the Polish people into the Reichstag in order to represent the 
interests of the Catholic Church, and if you do this whenever the 
interests of the Catholic Church are at stake you meet the expec- 
tations of your electors. But a mandate to represent the Polish 
people or the Polish nationality has been given you by no man, and 
least of all by the people of Posen and Western Prussia. I do not 
share your fiction that the Polish rule was good and not bad. I 
wish to be impartial and just, but I can assure you it was truly bad, 
and therefore it will never return." 

What the Poles demanded was nothing less than separation 
from the German empire, and Bismarck, in his position, could 
not have spoken otherwise than as he did. Not only was the 
thing absurd in itself, for the Prussian Poles are too small a 
community to form an independent political organization, but 
the inevitable consequence would be that Posen would be- 
come the centre of a revolutionary movement which would 
extend to Russian Poland and produce a coalition of Russia 
with France. But for the instigation of the priests it is not 

253 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

very probable that the Poles would have thought of this chi- 
merical project, but Bismarck hit the nail exactly when he 
referred to the Polish members as representing the interests 
of the Catholic Church. It is true that the old Polish gov- 
ernment was one of the worst, — fully as vicious as the French 
government of the eighteenth century, — but there is no rea- 
son why a reunited Poland should not obtain a government 
as just and liberal as that of France at the present time. A 
reunited Poland, however, would mean the disruption of the 
Russian Empire, for which at present there is no vestige of 
hope. 

In reply to the request of Dr. Windhorst and other Cleri- 
cals for material aid and comfort to the pope, it was con- 
sidered sufficient to substitute a resolution to the effect that 
the present German Empire was not identical with that of 
Frederick Barbarossa, and that the day of interference in 
internal affairs of other countries had passed by, " never to 
return, it was to be hoped, under any form or pretext." The 
vote by which this resolution was carried — 243 to 63 — not 
only indicated the strength of the Clerical party in the Reichs- 
tag, but the comparative numbers of Protestants and Catho- 
lics in the empire. Dr. Windhorst then moved the insertion 
in the imperial constitution of the three liberal principles 
of the Prussian constitution, — complete independence of the 
church, freedom of the press, and the right to hold public 
meetings ; but, as this was evidently intended to place the 
Catholic Church beyond the sphere of government super- 
vision, it was also defeated. Bismarck evidently intended to 
have a Protestant empire. 

Unlimited success always has its effect. Emperor William 
and his chancellor did not lose their balance politically, as 
many predicted they would, but the victories of Sedan and 
Gravelotte produced an aggressive Teutonism which lasted 
five or six years, and resulted in some peculiar manifestations. 
The Berlin hatters consulted together to introduce a German 
national hat. intended to supersede the French chapcau, which 
has become the dress-hat of all civilized countries, but 
their attempt ended in a miserable failure. It was also cur- 

254 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

rently reported that Bismarck attempted to make German the 
language of diplomatic correspondence, and with as little 
success. A communication in German to the British ministry 
was returned to him. France, although conquered, still re- 
mained France, and Paris still continued the centre of good 
taste and fashion, because the world felt confidence in French 
judgment so far as dress and behavior are concerned. To 
the feminine world, at least, Paris had become an oracle — a re- 
ligion of the toilet — which it would require centuries to over- 
throw. The French language also had superseded Latin as 
the universal tongue, not from the supremacy of Louis XIV., 
but because it was the most convenient language for commu- 
nication between the different European nations. Everybody 
knew more or less French, because France was in a central 
position between Spain, England, Germany, and Italy. French 
became the language of diplomacy by the principle of nat- 
ural selection, and it was as impossible to change this as to 
move Mont Blanc. Berlin, however, had become the politi- 
cal centre of Europe, and it remained to be seen what would 
be the consequences thereof. 

THE FRANKFORT CONVENTION 

Alsace and Lorraine were not annexed to Prussia directly, 
but placed under military government for the time being 
as imperial fiefs. It might have been supposed that Alsace 
would have been united with Baden, but the people of the 
Palatinate were as much opposed to this as the Alsatians 
were to being separated from France. It would have joined 
two states together of nearly equal size, but of different re- 
ligion and antagonistic in all political respects. Representa- 
tive government under such conditions would be practically 
impossible; and if Lorraine had been added the people of 
Baden would have found themselves continually outvoted in 
their state assembly by their two unfriendly neighbors. The 
formation of the annexed provinces into fiefs was looked on 
as a concession by Prussia to the German Union. Bismarck 
did not consider it prudent that they should possess local 
autonomy, but they were, of course, represented in the Reichs- 

255 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

tag, and their delegates lost no time in protesting against 

their separation from France. This action was anticipated, 
and tailed to excite a ruffle on the surface of Legislative af- 
fairs. But they soon began to agitate in a more serious 
a tner. 

France could hardly be said to have had a regular govern- 
ment until Thiers was chosen president of the republic on the 
last day of August, iS;i. and it is not to be wondered at that 
the Versailles organization managed affairs in a rather irregu- 
lar and uncertain manner. It is not surprising that the need- 
ful supplies for supporting the German army of occupation 
were not forthcoming- in suitable quantity ; but the French 
commissioners, who were occupied at Brussels with the tier- 
man representatives in reducing the preliminaries of Versailles 
to a sound legal condition, showed a disposition to evasion 
and postponement which did not augur well for a speedy con- 
clusion, and the people of the annexed provinces had. begun 
to complain of an unfair discrimination against them in their 
dealings on the other side of the border. This was all nat- 
ural enough, but required serious attention, and Bismarck 
accordingly seized the opportune moment before the Com- 
mune was crushed to summon Favre, the French foreign 
minister, to an interview at Frankfort, and there, in the ancient 
sot: of the Frankish nation and the former capital of medi- 
aeval Germany, the final settlement between the two countries 
was effected. 

A few days later Bismarck made a report of this meeting 
to the Reichstag, in which, after specifying the details of the 
conference, he said : 

"When I went to Frankfort I did not hope to settle matters 
finally, but to obtain an abridgment of the terms fixed for pay- 
ment of the war indemnity and an improvement in the nature of 
the guarantees for that payment. But, in the prospect of a defini- 
tive settlement which became manifest at Frankfort, \ recognized an 
enormous advantage to both countries concerned therein, being 
convinced that such an arrangement will not only materially lighten 
the military burdens Germany has hitherto had to bear, but will 

25 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

contribute in no inconsiderable measure to the consolidation of 
affairs in France- . . . This settlement will probably not please 
everybody, but I think it realizes all that we could demand from 
France in reason, and conformably to the traditions connected with 
transactions of this class. We have secured our frontiers by terri- 
torial annexation ; we have, so far as is humanly possible, insured 
payment of our war indemnity. I feel confident that the present 
French government intends to carry out the treaty honestly." ' 

His tribute to the character of the French government was 
well deserved. The affairs of France were never so wisely 
administered as by Favrc and Thiers, and their overthrow was 
little to the credit of that restless and changeable people. 

The Reichstag had adjourned on the 14th of June, and on 
the 15th there was a triumphal procession in Berlin such as 
reminds us of the days of Pompey and Caesar, though there 
were no captives present to humiliate the vanquished foe. It 
was a triumph of rejoicing unmixed with vengeance. 

A chosen corps of forty- five thousand men, selected from 
the different armies of Germany, were mustered in the Tern- 
pelhof field, where the emperor appeared at eleven a.m., 
accompanied by his ministers, generals, and princes of the 
royal family, to take command of the procession. He was 
followed by a brilliant cavalcade, in which the different royal 
and princely houses of Germany were represented, and after 
this came the carriages of the Empress Augusta, the crown 
princess, and other queens and princesses. The emperor led 
the procession at the head of the guard to the Brandenburg 
gate, where he encountered sixty beautiful young ladies, 
dressed in blue and white, representing the large and small 
political divisions of Germany, who presented him with a 
laurel wreath of gold in the name of the United Fatherland. 

Thence the procession was conducted by the emperor 
through the Unter den Linden, which was spanned by five 
triumphal arches, adorned with trophies of the war, while the 
sidewalks were lined with captured pieces of ordnance. The 
emperor rode a dark brown horse of great beauty, and sat as 

1 Bismarck's Speeches, v. 193. 
17 257 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

erect and looked as vigorous as any man in the procession ; 
but Bismarck, in his white cuirassier's uniform, was the ob- 
jective point of every eye, and no man knew better how to 
carry himself in a dignified manner. The stately courtesy of 
the empress, who bowed repeatedly to the enthusiastic crowd, 
was contrasted with the more gracious manner of the crown 
princess, who had been brought up in a less military and 
more democratic country. In front of the French hotel the 
procession halted and a deputation of officers brought for- 
ward the eagles and standards taken from the French and 
presented them to the emperor with appropriate ceremonies. 
When they reached the end of the avenue the emperor and 
his suite took up a position by the statue of Blucher, while 
the procession marched past for the space of two hours. He 
then crossed the Schloss-briicke leading to the palace and 
unveiled the statue of his father, Frederick William II., in 
whose reign Prussia had been conquered by the French and 
afterwards recovered her independence. The ceremony in- 
cluded music by the royal band, an address by the emperor, 
and speeches by Bismarck, Von Moltke, and others, — alto- 
gether a tasteful and impressive ceremony. 

The unprecedented success of the French campaign and 
the sudden rise of Prussia to the first position in European 
affairs was viewed with no slight jealousy by England and 
Russia, but created great rejoicing in Italy and Hungary. 
There was no longer danger of French regiments being seen 
at Rome; no more fear that Hungarian independence would 
become the dream of a day, as in 1848. Francis Joseph, who 
was really the football of the age he lived in, found himself 
as dependent on the Hungarians as he formerly supposed 
Germany dependent on him, and he was willing to accept this 
fact for the sake of peace and harmony after so many troubles 
and disasters. Bismarck, writing from Hungary in 1852, 
mentioned meeting the Austrian emperor, and of being 
pleased with him. It has been said that he also liked Bis- 
marck, and it is certain that from this time forward he fol- 
lowed Bismarck's advice with an implicit confidence that 
proved much to his advantage. 

25s 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

The Tsar of Russia passed through Berlin in the summer 
of 1 87 1 on his way to Ems, and held a satisfactory consulta- 
tion with William I. Francis Joseph must also be conferred 
with to secure the peace of Europe on an enduring basis, but 
for him to come to Berlin might have had the appearance of 
too exacting a requirement ; so William I. graciously offered 
to meet his imperial brother at Salzburg in Upper Austria. 
Bismarck and Von Beust accompanied their respective sov- 
ereigns, and held, no doubt, a highly edifying conference ; 
but little of their conversation has ever been revealed to the 
public. The Paris Commune, however, was a phenomenon 
which must have occupied their attention, and Bismarck is 
supposed to have made the most of this argument to bring 
the three imperial powers into a closer and more sympathetic 
relation. The evident danger to all governments from those 
secret societies, whose object strikes at the root of civilization 
itself, was the most serious problem of the future. All mon- 
archical governments especially should cultivate peaceful re- 
lations to avoid public censure and disarm the imputations of 
these invisible enemies to law and order. There was, in fact, 
at this time the shadow of a second Holy Alliance passing 
over Europe ; but it proved to be nothing more than a shadow, 
and Bismarck was too far-sighted to attempt the revival of 
a political organization with which the name of Metternich 
would always be connected. One consequence of the Salz- 
burg meeting was the retirement of Von Beust in the follow- 
ing autumn, and the appointment of Count Potocki as Aus- 
trian premier in his place. His previous antagonism to 
Bismarck rendered it impossible for Von Beust, in spite of his 
invaluable services to the state, to take the lead in a policy of 
reconciliation towards Prussia. He may have requested this 
himself, and Francis Joseph sent him to the court of St. 
James, where he found ready listeners to his animadversions 
against the German chancellor. That his removal was sug- 
gested by Bismarck is not at all probable. Such a decided 
change of policy required a change of ministers to make it 
effectual, and Potocki was soon succeeded by Count Andrassy, 
the first Hungarian premier to rule the Empire of the Danube, 

259 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

who was the right man to carry out the Salzburg programme. 
He was in all respects Von Beust's equal, even if Louis Napo- 
leon had not spoken of him as a " caged eagle," and he ap- 
pears to have been the one statesman of his time whom Bis- 
marck thoroughly respected. 

FRENCH AFFAIRS 

Thiers was finally elected President of the French Republic 
on the last day of August, and his first serious effort was an 
attempt to arrange with Bismarck for the evacuation of 
French territory by anticipating the payment of the war in- 
demnity. Bismarck was ready to meet him half-way on such 
a question, and expressed a desire to do anything he could to 
facilitate the establishment of order and tranquillity under the 
new government. Germany could not accept French securities 
in return for the indemnity to any large amount, because in 
that case it would depend on the good-will of the French 
people whether the securities were finally redeemed; but if 
the bankers would exchange French rentes for other securities 
there would certainly be no objection. The Rothschilds and 
other bankers assured Thiers that this could be done, and the 
French government accordingly advertised for a loan of two 
and a half milliards (five hundred million dollars), and over 
seven milliards were subscribed, or more than enough to ex- 
tinguish the whole indemnity. This was not accomplished, 
however, until 1873 ; but by this policy Thiers relieved France 
of the burden of supporting fifty thousand German troops. 
There were other reasons why the Germans should evacuate 
France as soon as possible. 

There is no better evidence that the campaign of 1870 was 
a popular war on the French side than the spiteful feeling that 
has endured so long towards their gallant opponents. There 
was no such bitterness in Germany towards Napoleon I., and 
it is difficult to find an unfavorable criticism of him among 
German writers. The French went to war for glory, and got 
the worst of it, and might have learned wisdom from the 
lesson. Instead of doing so, however, they immediately com- 
menced preparations for a war of revenge. This belligerent 

260 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

spirit manifested itself in the autumn of 1 871 by the murder 
of a German soldier at Melun and another at Paris. The 
cases were so clear that Bismarck trusted the trial of the as- 
sassins to French jurisdiction, which resulted in their acquittal 
amid a chorus of approbation from the more ordinary class 
of French newspapers. Under some conditions such a fla- 
gitious proceeding might have resulted in a renewal of hos- 
tilities ; but Bismarck contented himself with notifying Presi- 
dent Thiers that in the future, if the perpetration of such 
crimes was not duly punished, French hostages would be 
exacted and further reprisals inflicted. If the classes to which 
judges and barristers belonged were not above such bitter- 
ness of feeling, the German government would be obliged to 
take rigorous measures for the protection of their citizens in 
the occupied departments. 1 Thiers accordingly issued a proc- 
lamation to the French people on December 7, in which he 
said, " To those who may believe that killing a foreigner is 
not murder, I may observe that they are abominably in error." 
The Empress. Augusta ingenuously wrote to Guizot to advise 
her how the French animosity towards the Germans might be 
ameliorated. No doubt it might have been ameliorated by 
a heavy reduction of the war indemnity and the retroces- 
sion of Metz ; but this plan does not seem to have occurred 
to the newly created empress. The letter occasioned a good 
deal of comment; so that Count Henry von Arnim, the Ger- 
man envoy at Paris, sent a despatch to Bismarck concerning 
it, and also in regard to the troubles of German residents in 
Paris, who were suffering a kind of small persecution on ac- 
count of their nationality. 

Bismarck replied that, with all respect to the empress, he did 
not consider any attempt to appease the wrath of the French 
people would be likely to succeed, and, as for the German 
residents on French soil, they were at liberty to return to 
their own country, and must take their chances if they re- 
mained. 



1 Our Chancellor, ii. 80. I cannot learn that these villains were finally pun- 
ished at ill. 

261 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

This certainly was not a narrow or supersensitive view of 
the situation, and later reports indicated that the complain- 
ants were chiefly German Jews, who had gone to Paris on 
speculation and to escape military service ; so that they were 
suffering not for their patriotism, but from their pronunciation. 

THE KULTURKAMPF BEGINS 

The spiritual strength of Protestantism consists in its lib- 
erty of conscience, which allows every man to think for him- 
self, and, though this has its small evils, it is far better than 
the religious despotism of the Church of Rome ; but in this 
also lies the political weakness of Protestantism. It is strange 
how little sympathy was felt by English and American Prot- 
estants for the German struggle against papal infallibility 
between 1871 and 1882. It was a long-continued, harassing 
conflict, and caused Bismarck more trouble than Francis Jo- 
seph or Louis Napoleon had. It has been called in Germany 
the Kulturkampf, or religious battle. 

The dogma of infallibility was intended to place the au- 
thority of the pope above all civil authority, and was directly 
aimed against the Italian government. That it would pro- 
duce a conflict with the civil authorities must have been fore- 
seen, but what advantage the Church of Rome was to grain 
by this the most impartial judges could not determine. The 
obstinacy of priests is proverbial, and little as their spiritual 
weapons avail them against the scepticism of the nineteenth 
century, their defensive armor is as invulnerable now as it was 
in the twelfth century. Like the Greek Capaneus, they can be 
buried for a time, but cannot be destroyed. 

In Italy the dogma proved of very slight effect. The people 
were so heartily on the side of national unity that it could 
hardly find an entering wedge anywhere. Of all civilized 
cities there were none in which the pope was less respected 
than his own capital. The king of Italy had already been 
excommunicated with but trifling inconvenience to himself or 
the government, and the pope might continue this down to 
his most petty officials without its attracting serious attention. 
The distinction between civil and religious marriages con- 

262 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

tinued, without producing any worse consequences than a few 
youthful and perhaps unprincipled divorces. 

In Switzerland, however, the dogma created a fierce tumult 
between the Protestant and Catholic cantons, and in South 
America a number of violent revolutions were occasioned by 
it with various results. In Ecuador the Clerical party was 
triumphant, while in Brazil the reaction against the Church 
was so energetic and the clergy so tenacious of its rights that 
the Supreme Court finally imprisoned the archbishop — buried 
like Capaneus — for four years. In the old, unconstitutional 
Prussia of Frederick and his descendants the pope could not 
have accomplished much, but in constitutional Germany the 
Catholics, by uniting with the Poles, Saxons, and other mal- 
contents, could cause the government a good deal of annoy- 
ance, and this Pius IX. was determined they should do. 
There was practically little to be gained by it, but revenge 
is sweet, even to a pontiff. It was to be a campaign of ob- 
stacles. 

There is only one step from papal infallibility to the wor- 
ship of man as a god, — from the High Pontiff to the Grand 
Lama. Bismarck informed the crown prince, during all the 
pressing business of the French campaign, that he intended 
to make a stand against infallibility. 1 What he would have 
done if the conflict had not been forced on him is not very 
evident, but he perhaps foresaw that it would be forced on 
him. " Sovereignty," he said, "is a unit, and there could not 
be two sovereignties in Germany." It was not long before 
this question was brought to a crucial test. The first three 
months of peace had not closed when the Catholic Bishop 
Krementz of Ermland excommunicated one of the subordi- 
nates of his diocese for refusing to subscribe to the new 
dogma. This in a Catholic community was a serious matter 
to the subordinate priest, and an infringement of the principle 
of religious liberty which had continued in Prussia for nearly 
a hundred and fifty years. Emperor William was very much 
disgusted at it, and still more indignant when the Archbishop 

1 The crown prince's diary, November, 1870. 
263 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

of Cologne suspended a number of professors at Bonn for the 
same reason. This was not only persecution, but in direct 
contravention to Prussian law, and the more inexcusable since 
it was only through the liberality of the Prussian government 
that the university at Bonn was permitted to exist. Not only 
the German government but public opinion, even among a 
large portion of Catholics, was mightily stirred up at such a 
tyrannical procedure. 

While the Ecumenical Council was in session the Prussian 
envoy at the Vatican had warned Bismarck of the course 
events were taking, and suggested the appointment of a lay 
representative to confer with Pius IX. and endeavor to re- 
strain him before the Rubicon was passed ; but Bismarck 
knew Pius IX. too well to make the attempt. " We should 
only obtain a rebuff," he said, " and weaken our cause before 
we were fairly in the field." Now he acted with his custom- 
ary promptness, and on July 8 issued a decree abolishing the 
Catholic department of public worship in the ministry. This 
was a summary proceeding and was freely criticised ; but this 
branch of the government jurisdiction was filled mainly with 
Ultramontanes, and Bismarck foresaw that it would continue 
to be an obstacle between the public and any laws which the 
Reichstag might enact on this question. It also served as a 
case of lex talionis ; for if the professors at Bonn were to be 
deposed the Catholics serving under the government would 
also lose their places. The almost infinite wealth of the 
Roman Church, however, prevented this from having much 
effect. 

As the priests in Bavaria and other Catholic communities 
preached sermons exciting their parishioners against the gov- 
ernment and urging them to vote for Clerical candidates, the 
Reichstag passed a law in December that this should be con- 
sidered insurrectionary talk, and its authors be held respon- 
sible according to the penal code. The Bavarian government 
supported this bill, and, in fact, the condition of affairs in 
Bavaria was a smaller duplication of that in Prussia. The 
Bishop of Strasburg was one of the first to suffer under this 
law. His attacks on the government were so violent and 

264 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

uncompromising that he was banished from the empire. The 
conflict, however, was like fighting a swarm of mosquitoes, 
for where one irreconcilable papist was disposed of two or 
three others appeared in his place. The mock-heroic is such 
an easy part to play that there will always be found plenty to 
attempt it when the opportunity presents itself. The self- 
imposed imprisonment of Pius IX. served as an example for 
his dark-robed followers to imitate. 

Bismarck's next card was a trurnj^_and_a_Jaigli~©ne. Ever 
since the foundation of the Prussian monarchy, and of many 
other German states, all schools, public and private, had been 
under the jurisdiction of the church. The universities were 
independent, but in primary and secondary instruction the 
courses of study and the text-books in use were under the 
supervision of the clergy. This, of course, gave them great 
influence over the minds of the young, and a change in this 
direction would affect the future of all Germany. By a sweep- 
ing measure in January, 1872, this jurisdiction was transferred 
from the church to the state, — making the board of school in- 
spectors a government appointment in both Protestant and 
Catholic communities. At the same time the religious in- 
structors connected with the schools were not to be interfered 
with, so long as they avoided the obnoxious dogma and made 
no attempt to prejudice their youthful hearers against the 
German government. When the bill for this purpose was in- 
troduced in the German Reichstag it produced the most pro- 
found sensation that had been known since the capitulation 
of Paris. Dr. Windhorst instantly recognized its importance, 
and exerted himself in opposition to it with an energy and 
determination equal to Bismarck's own, and in power of in- 
vective he went far beyond him. Never had Windhorst 
displayed such resources ; never had the keen blade of his 
scimitar flashed so brilliantly. The act was revolutionary, — 
it would penetrate to every German home ; would overturn all 
traditions of German education ; would strike at the root of 
moral instruction. What would Germany be like in the next 
century with such violent changes and innovations ? 

There were others who considered the measure revolu- 

265 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

tionary, but a revolution too long delayed and now most 
needful and salutary. Bismarck was on hand to defend his 
bill, which he did in his usual clear-cut, business-like manner. 
The fine speeches were all on the side of clerical indepen- 
dence and the rights of minorities, but the votes were on the 
side of Bismarck. 

Having proved to Pius IX. and Antonelli what he had 
power to accomplish, Bismarck now adopted a more pacific 
policy, and evinced his desire to ameliorate the situation by 
the appointment of Cardinal Hohenlohe as special ambassador 
to the Vatican, where Germany had only been represented 
before by a simple legate or charge d'affaires. The Hohen- 
lohe family of Germany is, like the Orloff family in Russia, 
bred to the diplomatic service for generations. Until the 
present epoch they have never risen to high distinction, but 
they have grown time-honored, both in the service of Prussia 
and of Bavaria. If there was a person in Germany who 
could have been selected with any expectation of success as 
a mediator between Emperor William and Pius IX., it was 
Cardinal Hohenlohe. His loyalty to the state was unques- 
tionable, and as the first Catholic appointment of the kind 
from a Protestant government he ought to have been accep- 
table to the pope. Pius IX., however, was soured beyond 
the help of antiseptics, and he was determined to continue the 
selfish warfare, although there was nothing he could gain by 
it except the mean satisfaction of causing petty annoyances. 

On April 25, 1872, Von Derinthal, the German charge 
d'affaires at Rome, reported the appointment of Cardinal 
Hohenlohe to Antonelli, and announced the expectation of 
his early arrival. As no reply was received to this commu- 
nication, Von Derinthal was directed to make inquiries of the 
Jesuit cardinal as to the cause of his silence. Antonelli re- 
plied that, though the pope was not insensible to the good 
intentions of the emperor, he was nevertheless, under existing 
circumstances, obliged to decline the acceptance of so impor- 
tant a mission. Great indignation was expressed at this in 
Berlin and other German capitals, and a motion was imme- 
diately made in the Reichstag to strike out from the schedule 

266 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

the appropriation for the charge d'affaires at the Vatican. On 
May 14 Bismarck made a speech in the Reichstag in opposi- 
tion to this motion, which has become historical. He said, 
inter alia : 

"I hardly believe that with the existing ruling sentiments of the 
Catholic Church an envoy of the German empire could, by most 
skilful diplomacy or by persuasion, exert any influence ; that he 
would be capable of modifying the attitude taken by his Holiness 
the Pope towards us in temporal matters. According to recently 
expressed and publicly promulgated dogmas of the Catholic Church, 
I do not think it possible for a temporal power to attain to a con- 
cordat 'without this temporal power being effaced to a degree and in 
a way which the German Empire, at least, cannot accept. Fear 
not ; to Canossa we shall not go, neither bodily nor mentally. 

" I had hoped that by the choice of an envoy who had full con- 
fidence from both sides on account of his love of truth and his 
trustworthiness, and on account of his conciliatory disposition, — I 
had hoped that the choice of such an envoy as his Majesty the Em- 
peror had made, in the person of a noted prince of the church, 
would be welcome in Rome, that it would be conceived as a pledge 
of our peaceful, friendly sentiments, that it might be used as a 
means of coming to an understanding. . . . My regret at this re- 
fusal is exceedingly great; but I am not justified in giving this 
regret the form of an irritation, for the government owes our Catholic 
fellow-citizens an untiring search for those paths in which the 
boundary-line between clerical and temporal power, so absolutely 
necessary to us in the interest of peace, might be found in a manner 
least inclined to cause ill-feeling. Therefore, I shall not be dis- 
couraged by this occurrence, but continue in trying to persuade his 
Majesty the Emperor to find a representative of the empire for Rome 
who enjoys the confidence of both powers, if not in an equal 
measure, at least to a degree sufficient for his calling. That this 
task has been rendered exceedingly difficult by recent events can 
hardly be denied." 

Even the Clericals could not withhold their admiration for 
Bismarck's calm, dispassionate wisdom, and the more enthu- 
siastic Liberals were obliged to admit the superiority of his 
judgment. He again repeated his determination never to 

267 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

admit any claim of the Church of Rome that a law passed 
by the Reichstag should not be binding on every German 
citizen. The motion for striking out was then rejected by 
a heavy majority. The expression, " We are not going to 
Canossa," became as proverbial as the earlier expression, " By 
no means sufficient" ; and though much of the anti-papal 
legislation was afterwards retracted, it cannot fairly be said 
that Bismarck ever went to Canossa any more than Canossa 
came to him. 1 

Afterwards the Jesuits still remained to be dealt with. 
Antonelli was the chief adviser of Pius IX., and diplomatic 
opinion made him responsible for a large share of the pope's 
deviltry; but there were other substantial reasons. Within 
the last fifteen years the number of convents in Germany had 
increased from sixty-nine to eight hundred and twenty-six, 
and the number of persons immured in them from nine hun- 
dred and seventy-six to something like ten thousand. This 
withdrawal of so many efficient helpers from the community, 
and a large proportion of young women among them, was 
looked upon as a national evil, and generally attributed to the 
influence of the Jesuits. Huge petitions from all parts of Ger- 
many were presented to the Reichstag, praying for the expa- 
triation of the order of Jesus ; and it is noteworthy that on 
these, besides other distinguished names, was that of Prince 
Hohenlohe of Bavaria, the brother of Cardinal Hohenlohe 
who had lately been refused as ambassador to the Vatican. 

The question was debated on May 15, and a resolution 
drawn up jointly by a body of conservative and liberal mem- 
bers was adopted petitioning the chancellor for the expulsion 
of the Jesuits. The petition desired Prince Bismarck, firstly, 
to take measures that peace and concord among the various 
churches of the empire should be preserved ; and, secondly, 
that a bill be introduced for the purpose of regulating all re- 
ligious orders, congregations, and the like, to decide whether 
they should be admitted, and on what terms, special consid- 

1 Canossa, a town in Lombardy, where the Emperor Henry IV. abased himself 
before Gregory VII., — the greater Gregory, and most powerful of all the popes. 

268 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

eration being taken in this matter to the behavior of the order 
of the Jesuits. In accordance with this resolution the Federal 
Council, on June n, adopted a bill authorizing the police 
authorities to forbid members of the society of Jesuits from 
residing in any part of the German empire, even if they pos- 
sessed rights as native Germans. At the first reading of the 
bill the federal commissioner, Friedberg , declared that the 
law was only provisional, and necessitated by the dangerous 
opposition of the order of Jesus to the state. At a meeting 
of the leaders of the various parties in the Reichstag, with 
the exception of the Clericals, a substitute for the govern- 
ment bill was agreed upon, to the effect that members of the 
order of Jesuits, if foreigners, should be expelled from the 
empire; but if native Germans they might remain on certain 
conditions, and by changing their residence to places desig- 
nated by the government. This substitute was finally adopted 
by a hundred and thirty-one against ninety-three votes. 

A few days later, when a German Catholic delegation at 
Rome waited on Pius IX. to assure him of their unfailing alle- 
giance, the pope complained of the persecution of the Catholic 
Church in Germany in bitter and aggressive language, finally 
concluding with the words which were generally reported, " Be 
trustful and united, for some stone will surely fall to shatter 
the heel of this Colossus." J This was imprudent, to say the 
best of it, for it easily might be interpreted as an invitation to 
rid the world of his opponent by unlawful means, and so it 
seems to have been interpreted. It also showed plainly that 
the Catholic party were getting the worst of this war of legal 
measures which they had inaugurated. The Bishop of Erm- 
land was one of the first to feel the weight of the anti-Catholic 
laws. He persisted in excommunicating all those who did 
not subscribe to the doctrine of infallibility, and in conse- 
quence his salary was stopped by the government. He en- 
tered a suit for arrears, but lost his case and was obliged to 
depend for his living on the slender munificence of the 
Vatican. 



1 Miiller's Political History, p. 500. 
269 



CHAPTER XII 

1873 TO 1876 INTRIGUES OF VON ARNIM 

Thiers remained president of the French Republic from 
August, 1871, until May 24, 1873, and he did much to raise 
his country from the gulf of despair into which it had been 
plunged by the suicidal folly of Gramont and Napoleon III. 
His appointments were judicious and gave satisfaction; he 
elevated the character of the foreign service ; he was a skilful 
financier, and helped to lighten the severe burden of the war 
indemnity. In a little more than two years the last regiment 
of the army of occupation was recalled from French terri- 
tory, a great relief to both parties concerned. Thiers advo- 
cated the adoption of a protective tariff, which stimulated 
industry, effaced the ravages of war, and gave a kind of pros- 
perity and prestige to the new republic. Unhappily, he felt 
too confident of his position, and had no suspicion how short- 
lived his ascendancy would prove to be. Von Beust came 
to see him from London for a consultation on the peace of 
Europe, and remarked to him on the strength of the oppo- 
sition in the French Chamber of Deputies. " Yes," replied 
Thiers, " they sometimes make disturbances, but I have only 
to do so," holding up his finger. It occurred to Von Beust 
that Thiers might have made the same remark to a less 
friendly and prudent person than himself. 

This self-complacency may have helped to bring about his 
downfall, but there was also a deeper reason. France had 
not yet become republican at heart. As the brilliant mono- 
graphist, Arsene Houssaye, wrote at the time, the French Re- 
public derived its support from a combination of Legitimists, 
Orleanists, and Bonapartists. The monarchical reaction had 
set in again, and the elections for 1873 were strongly in 
Napoleon's favor. Strange as it may seem, Thiers was re- 
peatedly outvoted in the Chamber of Deputies, and finally 

270 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

sent in his resignation, in a confident belief that it would not 
be accepted. On the contrary, it was accepted, and Marshal 
MacMahon, still faithful in spirit to the old emperor, was 
chosen in his place. It is thought that if Thiers had dis- 
solved the Chambers and appealed to the public for support, 
a new election might have sustained him in his place ; and 
MacMahon afterwards made precisely the same mistake in his 
struggle against Gambetta. 

Napoleon III. did not remain idle at Chiselhurst, nor had 
he given up hope of returning to his uncle's throne. His 
situation was convenient for loyal Bonapartists, who came and 
went continually from France. Finally, in the autumn of 
1872, a definite plan was arranged for a second coup d'etat, no 
doubt with the connivance of President MacMahon. In order 
to accomplish this it would be necessary for the emperor to 
appear on horseback, and unfortunately his physical condition 
was such that a dangerous surgical operation was necessary 
before he could attempt it. The operation was undertaken on 
January 9, and Napoleon expired under the influence of the 
chloroform. 1 

This left the Bonapartists without a leader until the prince 
imperial should be more advanced towards manhood, and it 
strengthened the two Bourbon factions in a corresponding de- 
gree. The Count of Chambord was the Legitimists' heir to the 
throne, and the Count of Paris was the nearest living relative 
of Louis Philippe. Neither of them was a man of exceptional 
ability nor especially popular; but the tide was running in 
their favor, and if one or the other could be persuaded to 
resign his claim it was likely that France would again become 
a monarchy. The idea of this was acceptable to Emperor 
William and the other hereditary monarchs of Europe, in- 
cluding Queen Victoria ; but Bismarck did not favor it, and it 
is supposed that he had frequent discussions on the subject 
with his sovereign, who finally yielded his opinion to Bis- 



1 Von Be'ust even fixes the date, March 20, on which Napoleon III. intended 
to imitate his uncle's return from Elba. He says, " Great hopes were then 
entertained of a Napoleonic restoration, as I saw during my occasional visits to 
Chiselhurst." Memoirs, ii. 195. 

271 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

niarck's superior wisdom. The German ambassador at Paris, 
however, Count Henry von Arnim, was an enthusiastic mon- 
archist, and, having been sounded by the Boriapartists shortly 
before Napoleon's death, notified Bismarck of the fact, adding 
a decisive opinion of his own approval of the movement. 1 
This in itself was exceeding the customary bounds of an en- 
voy's authority, for it was not Von Arnim's place to judge of 
what measures the home government should adopt. Bis- 
marck, however,- replied to him in a temperate manner, and 
endeavored to persuade him that the interests of Germany 
were not likely to be improved by any change from the 
prudent and pacific policy of Thiers. His argument did not 
seem to produce any effect on Von Arnim, who continued to 
discuss the matter and reiterate his first position. At the 
same time Bismarck became satisfied that Von Arnim was 
carrying on a correspondence on this subject with some one 
at the Prussian court independently of the foreign office. 

Bismarck found more difficulty in obtaining suitable am- 
bassadors for the foreign service than Von Moltke did in his 
selection of subordinate generals for the ami}-. Dr. Busch's 
report of his chief's commentaries on some of them is more 
amusing than complimentary. Baron Goltz, who figured at 
Paris during the campaign of i860, was always flirting, so 
Bismarck said, first, with the Queen of Portugal, and after- 
ward with Eugenie herself; and, though this was creditable 
to his powers of attraction, it was not exactly what Bismarck 
wanted of him. Von Arnim, while legate at the Vatican, 
had troubled his superior with such freedom of advice as was 
hardly in place from a subordinate officer. His despatches 
from Paris were composed in a similar tone of self-confidence, 
which may have caused Bismarck to suspect that in opposing 
Von Arnim he had also to deal with a power behind him. 
Who it was that encouraged the count in this business to 
show such a bold front has never yet come to light, but 



1 Even recently it was stated in an American magazine that from the beginning 
of Von Arnim's career he •• developed strong radical opinions, and was bitterly 
opposed to the growing influence and conservative policy of bismarck." 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

suspicion naturally points towards the crown prince. It is 
possible, however, that Von Arnim was aware of a difference 
in opinion between the emperor and Bismarck in regard to 
republicanism in France, and hoped, by taking the emperor's 
side, to widen the breach, bring himself prominently into 
favor, and supplant Bismarck when his master had become 
dissatisfied with him. Among the long list of opponents 
whom Bismarck may be said to have tumbled from their 
horses in this grand political tournament, there was no other 
so vainly ambitious, so unscrupulous of his means, and who 
so well deserved his fate as Henry von Arnim. 1 

This, however, is anticipating events. From the time of 
MacMahon's accession to the presidency, Von Arnim paid no 
more attention to Bismarck's directions than a spoiled child 
does to those of his parents. It was not long, therefore, 
before Bismarck informed him that it was his business to take 
orders, and not criticise the home government. This resulted 
in a letter from Von Arnim to the emperor, complaining that 
Bismarck placed him, metaphorically, in a strait-jacket, and 
did not allow him such freedom of judgment or action as an 
envoy or plenipotentiary was always supposed to possess. 
That this letter did not result in his immediate recall is ample 
evidence that Von Arnim was not acting alone, but was the 
confederate, if not the instrument, of more powerful parties at 
court. The difficulty of Bismarck's position in this emer- 
gency cannot be overestimated. If there had been a flaw 
anywhere in the magnanimous nature of the old emperor for 
jealousy to enter in, Bismarck would have gone under like 
Von Stein before him, and as Chatham did after the Seven 
Years' War. He was compelled to endure, in the most criti- 
cal and important position of the foreign service, a subordinate 
who deliberately opposed his policy and who evidently in- 
tended to become his rival. The Bismarck who had revo- 
lutionized Austria and crushed Louis Napoleon was to be 
balked by this " young gilded serpent," as Richelieu called 

1 There is an excellent account of this intrigue in Holtzendorff ' s Rechtsgut- 
achten. 

18 273 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

the giddy favorite of Louis XIII. To the emperor, who sent 
for him, Bismarck opened his mind concerning Von Arnim 
with customary frankness. He may have found William I. 
more than half inclined to side with Von Arnim's opinion. 
At all events, it was agreed that Von Arnim should not be 
removed for the present, but that Bismarck should await the 
development of events. 

The transition from the prudent and peaceable adminis- 
tration of Thiers to the energetic but less experienced Mac- 
Mahon was not favorable to the interests of Germany, and it 
was doubly irritating to Bismarck that his representative in 
Paris not only would not be persuaded of this, but had actu- 
ally assisted in bringing it to pass. The tendency to sudden 
changes in French politics was of itself a source of insecurity 
to Germany and a danger to the peace of Europe ; and with 
a disorderly Chamber of Deputies, a fanatical clergy behind 
that, and a Bonapartist general at top, the prospect of a con- 
tinued peace did not look favorable. As the monarchical 
movement strengthened during the summer, Von Arnim be- 
came bolder and more combative. He believed the tide was 
running in his favor, and there can be little doubt that he 
received equal encouragement from Berlin. The evacuation 
treaty, which had been commenced by Thiers and left unfin- 
ished at his resignation, was so delayed and neglected by Von 
Arnim that Bismarck was obliged to attend to the case him- 
self with the help of the French ambassador at Berlin ; and 
now it appeared that the whole of Thiers's communication on 
the subject had not been reported by Von Arnim to Bismarck 
the preceding winter, as it should have been. Any other 
foreign envoy would have been immediately superseded. 

The emperor sent for Von Arnim to return to Berlin and 
explain himself, and, according to the latter's account of the 
interview, William I. was not, on the whole, displeased with 
his statement, while he admitted that Bismarck had serious 
faults which made him difficult to deal with. The truth of 
this statement is questionable, but it is certain that the em- 
peror was conciliatory, and advised Von Arnim to call on 
Bismarck in a friendly spirit. Whatever spirit he may have 

274 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

been in at the time was quickly knocked out of him by the 
savage attack that Bismarck made. The wrath of many 
months, bottled up like champagne, burst forth in a torrent of 
vindictive eloquence which swept everything before it. 1 After 
the first surprise, Von Arnim, who was a man of real ability, 
defended himself stoutly, — stemmed the torrent, as it were, — 
and finally persuaded Bismarck that they should lay their 
case together before the emperor. We can almost admire 
Von Arnim for the determined manner with which he sus- 
tained his position, unstable as it was, against the strongest 
will and before the most powerful monarch in Europe. Bis- 
marck impeached Von Arnim's veracity, and the latter re- 
turned the compliment in round terms. If the emperor's 
confidence in Bismarck remained unshaken, he nevertheless 
concluded to give Von Arnim the benefit of a case not proven. 
Perhaps he also wished to have it said that he did not al- 
ways follow Bismarck's judgment. The Iron Chancellor was 
obliged to accept a reconciliation, and Von Arnim returned to 
Paris with the admonition to be more prudent in the future. 
What a position for the autocrat of Europe to be placed in ! 
Truly, Bismarck was a much-enduring man. 

Von Arnim now hurried onward to his fate like a ship that 
is driven on the rocks by a storm. The monarchical move- 
ment in France ripened by the magnanimous withdrawal of 
the Count of Paris in favor of the Legitimist candidate, to 
whom the National Assembly finally offered the crown, only 
to discover that they had set up a fool for all men to gaze at. 2 
The Count of Chambord would accept the proffered honor only 
on condition that the French would serve under the white flag 
of his ancestors, and that he was not to be circumscribed by 
constitutional forms. It was this foolish letter of Chambord's 
which upset Von Arnim's plans, and perhaps saved Bismarck 
for Germany. It left the monarchical movement stranded on 
a bar, and produced a revulsion of feeling among the French 
people, who now realized from what an empty figure-head they 

1 Arnim's " Pro Nihilo." 

2 This is what Minister Bancroft called him at the time. 

275 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

had escaped. Louis XV. did not deal a more severe blow 
at royalty. The Prussian court saw clearly now that Bis- 
marck was justified in the course he had pursued towards 
the French republic ; but Von Arnim did not see it, and con- 
tinued as stiff-necked as ever. All this time the Kultur- 
kampf was raging, and a number of French ecclesiastics on 
the borders of Elsass and Lothringen were preaching incen- 
diary harangues against the Protestant Germans and their 
heathen emperor. It was the business of the German ambas- 
sador to notify the chancellor of this, but he failed to do so, 
and the information came to Bismarck from other sources. 
When Von Arnim was directed to confer with President Mac- 
Mahon on the subject he is reported to have replied that he 
did not consider it of sufficient importance. How far it is 
best to interfere in such matters is always a question of judg- 
ment, but Bismarck believed that incendiary harangues and 
sensational newspaper articles caused a great deal of mischief. 
In this case it was part of the same struggle that he was fight- 
ing in German}'-, and the relation of the two countries was too 
critical at this time to leave much of a margin for theoretical 
politics. 

Bismarck accordingly applied to the French envoy at Berlin, 
M. de Gontaud-Biron, who appears to have been a sensible 
person and well adapted to his difficult position, to convey a 
remonstrance to President MacMahon in regard to the inimi- 
cal behavior of the French ecclesiastics, but MacMahon, 
requiring the support of the Ultramontanes, and being aware 
that the German ambassador was opposed to Bismarck's 
action, declined to interfere. This, however, was the first step 
towards Von Arnim's downfall, for the German emperor's 
sympathies were heartily enlisted in the conflict with Pius 
IX., and he had no intention of yielding an inch on that ques- 
tion. Bismarck accordingly returned to the attack, and, find- 
ing that he had French law on his side, pressed the case so 
energetically that in January, 1874, he issued a circular note 
to the great powers, dwelling on the serious danger that evi- 
dently existed of a renewal of the conflict between France 
and German)', and intimating broadly that in such case the 

276 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

authorities at Berlin would not wait until the enemy was 
better prepared for it than at present. Diplomats had learned 
by this time to know that Bismarck meant what he said and 
never threatened in vain. To his enemies he had come to 
appear like a veritable bogie, or limb of Lucifer. President 
MacMahon recognized the crisis and bowed his head to it. 
The incendiary bishops were threatened with suspension in 
case they continued their warlike counsels, and the Ultra- 
montane movement was thus held in check for the time being. 

The exasperation of the French people, however, soon ex- 
pressed itself in a new direction. Previous to 1871 it had been 
customary to commission envoys from the French court to 
all the more important German states, and these positions 
served as comfortable sinecures to the impecunious depend- 
ents of Napoleon, but after the establishment of German unity 
these missions naturally came to an end for the smaller states 
with the exception of Bavaria. It was now proposed (winter 
of 1874) in the French Chamber of Deputies that diplomatic 
relations should be renewed with Saxony and the South Ger- 
man states. This would have served as a fine entering wedge 
for French intrigue, and was, in fact, a blow aimed directly at 
German national unity. It was Von Arnim's business to have 
protested against it at once ; but, instead of doing so, he wrote 
to Bismarck for instructions as to how he should proceed. 
Such a case indicates little more than a sulky disposition, but, 
as it happened, it capped the climax. The truth was that, now 
the monarchical problem was out of sight, Von Arnim had 
lost much of his former importance. The emperor now 
agreed with Bismarck, and on March 12 Von Arnim was 
superseded by Prince Hohenlohe and directed to report at 
Constantinople. 1 

" Whom the gods would destroy they first make mad." 
Henry Von Arnim's subsequent behavior can only be ac- 
counted for by a blind rage which overpowered all judgment. 

1 Bismarck had provided Von Arnim with seven thousand thalers from the 
"reptile fund - ' to subsidize French newspapers in the German interest, but he 
was satisfied that Von Arnim had used this money to subsidize German news- 
papers against himself. 

277 



LIFE OF BISMAKCk 

He carried off from the embassy ;ii Paris a large number of 
state documents, which might either have compromised his 
previous transactions there, or such as he thought might aid 
him in righting out his quarrel with the chancellor. He also 
supplied a news correspondent of the Vienna Press, an old 
Catholic Metternich organ, with material for an attack on 
Bismarck's Roman Church policy, in which it was compared 
to a disadvantage with the advice proposed by Von Arnim 
while Prussian legate at Rome. This was published in time 
to prevent Von Arnim's departure i«>i the 'Turkish capital, 
and created a lively sensation throughout Germany and Aus- 
tria. Bismarck at once divined its authorship, and though 
Von Arnim denied any connection with it he was at once 

retired from the diplomatic service. It was an act of treach- 
erous insubordination which even the kindly old emperor 
could not overlook. 

Worse consequences were soon to follow. Hohenlohe, who 
has since become chancellor himself, was more of a Prussian 
than a prince ; he had no intention of doing his work as ambas- 
sador by halves, and he soon reported from Paris in regard to 
the missing documents. This was a case- of theft, quite as much 

as if Von Arnim had stolen government bonds ; but he '.Iocs 
not seem to have realized the fact. Perhaps he supposed that 
his social position ami powerful friends at court would shield 
him from the customary penalties oi' Prussian law. When 
tin- missing documents were demanded he returned a portion, 

but evidently not the whole number. Bismarck had a search- 
warrant issued; Von Arnim's house at Stettin was ransacked, 

and, as other government papers were found in his effects, he 
was arrested and brought to jail in Berlin. 

At this a general outcry was raised throughout France and 
England. Before the proper explan.it ion could be offered it 
was looked upon as Bismarck's high-handed tyranny, and 
Disraeli congratulated a small audience, the following evening 
in London, that they did not live in a country where domi- 
ciliary visits were possible. 11 is speech was, of course, re- 
ported to the press, ami Bismarck telegraphed to London the 
next day to know if the English premier's remarks were 

27S 



LIFE OF BISMAKCK 

intended to have a personal application, to which Disraeli 
replied meekly enough that he had no thought of Mich a 
thing, to the great amusement of the opposition. The Anglo 
American public was .till more astonished to learn that Von 
Arnim's offence was for intriguing in favor of monarchy. 1 

His imprisonment only lasted a few days, for the condition 
of his health was so delicate thai if. was feared the confine- 
ment would prove- fatal to hini. I lis trial, which took place 

in December, was looked forward to with great expectation 
by Bismarck's enemies, for it was supposed that all the du- 
bious tricks and underhand methods by which the chancellor 
gained his ends would now be revealed. They were, how 
ever, doomed to grievous disappointment. Von Arnim did 
bring some unpleasant charges against him, but they were 
unsubstantiated, and even if true would not seriously com- 
promise him. On the other hand, the letter to the Vienna 

Press was traced directly to Von Arnim's apartments in Paris. 
His unpatriotic policy and selfish ambition were paraded 
before the court in perhaps too sensational colors; while Bis- 
marck's character went up ten d<;'ie<-s in the public estima- 
tion ; for it clearly appeared that he had endured much and 
patiently, and was really a disinterested statesman whose 

country's welfare was the- magnetic needle which guided his 

com,' through storm and darkness. William Miiller says, 

"I he most weighty despatches weve read and published, and 
the- world had another opportunity to admire the consistency 
and far sightedness of the- chancellor's national policy." One 
fact was elicited, however, which must have caused him some 
uneasiness, and that was the plans he had already laid in 
regard to the election of a successoi to Pius IX. The trial 

Concluded on the 19th of December, and Von Arnim was 
sentenced 1o three months' imprisonment, which seems rather 

a light penalty when it. is considered thai two centuries earlier 
he would certainly have been decapitated. 

Bismarck considered the punishment too light, and appealed 
from the decision, of the Superior Court to the High Chamber 

• I his at least was the cornrm ne< merit of it. 
279 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

of Justice. Von Arnim also appealed, but prudently took 
himself out of the way before the decision of the second tri- 
bunal, on October 20, 1875, which increased his sentence from 
three to nine months ; after which a charge of high treason 
was brought against him, and, as he refused to appear before 
the court, he was sentenced to five years' imprisonment. He 
lived for some time in Switzerland, where he published tracts 
and books in self-defence, and afterwards went to Vienna. 
He died at Nice, strangely enough on April 19, iSS 1, a man 
of ruined reputation and an illustration of Wolsey's warning 
to Cromwell, " Let all the ends thou aimst at be thy coun- 
try's, thy God's, and truth's." Of all the incidents of Bis- 
marck's life his conflict with Von Arnim has the most strongly 
dramatic character, and if we could only know what went on 
behind the scenes, — Bismarck's struggle with the emperor, 
and the influence that was brought to bear on the other side, 
— it would be far more interesting than it is now, seen from 
the external side. Some Schiller of the future, perhaps, will 
place it on the German stage. It was the last, if not the first, 
" intrigue" against Bismarck during the reign of William I., 
and it is not surprising that no others followed it. 

THE MAY LAWS 
Meanwhile the Kulturkampf was dragging on its weari- 
some existence, with a good deal of animosity and hard feeling 
on both sides, but with little real injury to any one concerned 
in it. Political intrigue is the natural element of the Vatican, 
and a priest enjoys his obstinacy as an athlete does his exer- 
cise. Neither is it likely that Bismarck and Dr. Falk suffered 
more severely ; and the conflict aroused an interest in religious 
subjects in Germany such as had not been felt since the Thirty 
Years' War. The breach between the Emperor William and 
Pius IX. widened continually. In December of 1872 the 
pope referred to Bismarck and the emperor, before a meeting 
of cardinals, in such opprobrious language that the German 
legate at the Vatican, who duly reported the circumstance, 
was at once recalled. Such action between two civil govern- 
ments would have been tantamount to a declaration of war, 

2S0 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

but Bismarck was the only person in real danger, and whether 
he realized this or not, he kept straight on his course, like the 
knight in Durer's picture, though death and the devil stalked 
behind him. 

Early in the new year Dr. Falk had introduced a bill in the 
Reichstag containing a number of laws for the better regulation 
of Catholic institutions in Germany. They occasioned a long 
and spirited discussion, and were finally enacted in the month 
of May, from which they derived their well-known title. As 
the original document is lengthy and legal in form, we will 
content ourselves here with an abstract statement of them. 

The first of the May Laws placed a limitation on the penalties 
imposed by Catholic ecclesiastics on the members of their diocese 
or parish. It permitted them to regulate the conditions of mem- 
bership in the church, and also to dismiss members who had in- 
fringed on the laws of religious government; but it withheld all 
right of jurisdiction over the property, free lorn, or reputation of a 
German citizen, or of taking any action whatever affecting his civil 
rights. This was especially designed to prevent intimidation or 
undue influence in regard to voting at elections. 

The second measure was intended to control the training and 
education of the clergy, and provided that neither priest nor bishop 
should be installed unless he were a graduate of a German gymna- 
sium, and had studied three years at a German university. After 
this he might study at the College of the Propaganda in Rome if he 
chose ; but he must first become a German by education and by 
habit of thought. The second law also provided a board of inspec- 
tors for all religious seminaries and monastic institutions, and placed 
them under the direct guardianship of the civil government. It re- 
quired the Catholic bishops to give previous notification to the gov- 
ernment of the appointment of priests to particular parishes, or of 
their transference from one parish to another, and it forbade ap- 
pointments or changes without the approval of the state inspectors. 

The third law was intended for the protection of Catholic dis- 
senters, so that the same freedom of opinion might be encouraged 
within the fold of the Church of Rome as now exists in all Protes- 
tant communities. A dissenter was only required to express his 
difference of belief before a local court of law to obtain protection 
in his new position. 

281 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

The fourth measure was intended to provide against all secret 
and arbitrary forms of punishment, especially corporeal chastise- 
ment, and placed all monastic institutions under the supervision of 
inspectors for this purpose. 

Surely there was nothing very terrible in this. It seems 
like a fair and judicious measure, not of a coercive charac- 
ter, but intended to guarantee the same freedom of thought, 
right of individual opinion, and unrestricted action in the 
clerical profession which prevails in other professions. A 
similar code had long existed in Wurtemberg and some other 
German states. Compared with the religious code of Sweden, 
or that of England in the eighteenth century, it was liberality 
itself. According to the traditional custom of the Church 
of Rome, Catholic boys, especially of indigent parents, are 
marked for the priesthood while still at the gymnasia, and 
hurried or coaxed into the College of the Propaganda at 
Rome before they are old enough to realize the difference it 
is going to make to them. Their studies are, of course, all 
directed to a single end ; they have no debating societies, hear 
no arguments on opposite sides of a question, know nothing 
of the free discussion which takes place in Protestant univer- 
sities, and thus their whole intellectual life becomes a piece 
of cast-iron dogmatism. No progress is possible in a religion 
constituted in this manner, and if it once began the whole 
fabric would fall to pieces. Catholic priests are often sympa- 
thetic, warm-hearted, and practically helpful men, but the 
higher mental qualities are stultified in them. Bismarck and 
Dr. Falk struck at the root of the matter, and if their plan 
could be carried out in all Catholic communities the su- 
premacy of the pope over the minds of his followers would 
soon come to an end. They wished to have all citizens of the 
empire become Germans before they became anything else. 
No wonder the May Laws raised a storm in which, as ^Eschy- 
lus says, " The heavens were embroiled with the deep." 

These laws were debated in the Reichstag until the 27th of 

February, when the final vote was taken on them. Just before 

this was done Bismarck addressed the assembly in favor of 

the bill. 

282 






LIFE OF BISMARCK 

The returns of the last elections had not been so favorable 
to the government as previously, and though the Clericals were 
still in a weak minority, they, as well as the Social Democrats, 
had gained a number of seats. As this fact was made the 
most of in debate by Dr. Windhorst and Lasker, Bismarck 
recalled to their minds that he had predicted as much, the 
year before, and considered it likely that they might gain still 
more ground. The reason for it was to be looked for in the 
distrust and difference of opinion between the Conservatives 
and the National Liberals. " There can be no decisive politi- 
cal action without confidence, and confidence is a delicate 
plant; if it is once destroyed it will not soon sprout again. 
The supporters of the government, though united in their 
opposition to the usurpation of the pope, are divided among 
themselves, and hence become a prey to decomposition." He 
then said : 

"The gentleman who spoke last has further followed the same 
tactics taken up by the opponents of this bill in the other house, 
that is, to give these bills a confessional — I would say, a clerical 
character. The question which we are treating becomes, in my 
opinion, falsified, and the light in which we look at the same is 
false, if we treat the same from the confessional or clerical point of 
view. It is essentially political ; it is not, as our Catholic fellow- 
citizens are made to believe, the contest of a Protestant dynasty 
against the Catholic Church, — it is not a contest between faith and 
infidelity. It is the ancient contest of power, which is as old as the 
human race ; the contest of power between kingship and priesthood ; 
a contest of power that is much more ancient than the appearance 
of our Saviour in this world ; the contest of power in which Aga- 
memnon engaged at Aulis against his seers, which there cost him 
his daughter and prevented the Greek ships from sailing ; the con- 
test of power that impregnated the German history of the Mid- 
dle Ages up to the decomposition of the German Empire, known 
as the conflict of the popes with the emperors, which found its 
climax in that the last representative of the illustrious Swabian im- 
perial lineage died on the scaffold under the axe of a French con- 
queror, and that this same French conqueror was in league with 
the pope then reigning. We have been very close to an analogous 
solution of this same situation, only applied to the customs of our 

283 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

own time. If the French war of conquest, the outbreak of which 
coincided with the publication of the Vatican decrees, had been 
crowned by success, I do not know what one might have been able 
to report of the gesta Dei per Francos even within domains of the 
church. 

" Also in the conflicts of the popish power it has not always been 
the case that just Catholic powers were the exclusive allies of the 
pope ; neither have the priests always stood by his side. Cardinals 
have been the state-ministers of great powers at a time when these 
powers followed a strongly anti-papistical policy, even to pro- 
nounced violence. 

" The question is, here, the defending of the state. The ques- 
tion is, the limitation of priestly by monarchical government, and 
this limitation must be such that the state can assert itself at the 
same time. For 'in the kingdom of this earth' it is the state which 
rules and which has the precedence." 2 

Bismarck's interpretation of Iphigenia at Aulis is not to be 
found in Greek mythologies, but it is plausible and probable. 
There was no doubt a conflict between the temporal and the 
priestly power at that time, caused, perhaps, by some slight 
or displeasure which the augurs had incurred from Agamem- 
non. Unfortunate is the nation in which priestcraft or any 
traditional religious formalism gains the ascendancy; all the 
higher forms of intellectual life are crushed out of the people, 
and progress in civilization is no longer possible. India is 
an example of such a country, and formerly, also, Egypt. 
Two thousand years before Christ only the Jews could com- 
pare with the Hindoos in their lofty religious thought and 
grand conception of a supreme being ; but the whole political 
power of India was permitted to merge in the priesthood, 
an inflexible system of caste was established, life became a 
traditional, unprogressive routine, and the Brahmans, with 
their fine intellectual heads and close kinship to European 
nations, are no wiser to-day than in the time of Moses. So 
it would have been in modern Europe but for the reformation 
of Luther and Calvin, and so it was largely in Spain, Italy, 

1 Bismarck's Speeches, Reclam ed., v. 251. 
284 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

and Portugal from that time until the revolution of 1789. It 
was an after-skirmish of this old battle that Bismarck was 
fighting. 

The chief measures of the May Laws were passed at this 
date by a strong majority, but were amended at various times 
afterwards, and the question of civil and religious marriages 
was brought up the following month. It was considered 
necessary to introduce this separately, because Bismarck had 
formerly placed himself on record against it in the debates on 
the North German constitution of 1868. It is even stated 
that he now placed himself in opposition to it, and was over- 
ruled by Dr. Falk and his associates in the ministry. How- 
ever that may have been, either he was prostrated by the severe 
strain of business or, as his opponents declared, was schul- 
krank, because he did not wish to have his sudden change of 
base continually hurled at him in argument. The latter is 
likely enough, although there is sufficient difference between 
the action of such a law in Protestant and Catholic commu- 
nities — since it is impossible to place the highest Protestant 
prelate in the position of the pope — to justify such an altera- 
tion of opinion. The people who prefer a contradiction in 
form to an agreement in fact are always sufficiently numerous 
to have made it unpleasant for Bismarck to face this discus- 
sion, and the government would also have suffered a certain 
loss of prestige in the eyes of the vulgar, so that it was quite 
as well that he should not be present during the debate. The 
Italian application of the law has already been referred to. It 
was found necessary there in order to prevent acts of illegally 
appointed priests from having a public validity, and there was 
no reason why the same application should not be made in 
Germany. 

The bill was passed without Bismarck's assistance, and with 
the other measures previously agreed upon was approved by 
the emperor on the 1st of May. It was first necessary, how- 
ever, to change the Prussian constitution in regard to civil 
marriages ; and here the chief difficulty was encountered in 
the Prussian House of Peers, always more conservative than 
the Landtag or the Reichstag, whose members were only too 

285 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

ready to make changes that would suit the requirements of 
the moment, without much consideration for the future. The 
vote was taken on April 24, and Bismarck in his explanatory 
speech aptly compared his change of policy to the action of a 

man who has been compelled by circumstances to lav aside a 

peaceful demeanor .\nd adopt a belligerent one. 

The Church of Rome has always been the enemy of 
national consolidation, and its intrigues for this purpose were 
older than the order of the Jesuits. Francis Newman takes 
notice that it was not long after the formation of European 
countries into solid nationalities with effective central govern- 
ments that Protestantism appeared. The priests Mid the 
socialists were now Bismarck's two enemies, and the manner 
in which he finally played off one against the other was an 
ingenious piece of statecraft which cannot be too much ad- 
mit ed. The constitutional amendment on civil marriages was 
passed, but not without a general expression o( regret that 
such a measure should have become necessary. 



Till- ASSASSIN Kb I I MAN 

The stone which Pius IX. had predicted M\d desired to fall 
on the heel of Bismarck took the form of a pistol-bullet, at 
Kissingen, in July of this year. The self-appointed avenger 
of Catholic wrongs was a cooper of Magdeburg named Ed- 
ward Kullman, a man possessed of an idea until it had become 
a personal devil. He was only twenty-one years old. a youth 
of good conduct and reputation, but at that impressionable 
age much given to the society of priests and religious exer- 
cises. The prince was riding in a half open carriage on 
Jul\- 15 through the crowded streets of the watering-place, 
when a man in priestly habiliments placed himself as if by 
accident in front o( the horses, so that the driver reined them 
in. Simultaneously Kullman advanced, and bred a shot at 
Bismarck's head. At the same instant Bismarck was raising 
his hand to make a salute, and the bullet just nicked his 
waist without doing further injury, Kullman probably aimed 
at his head from the popular impression that Bismarck always 

2S6 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

wore a shirt of mail under his military coat,' and this rep- 
utation no doubt preserved .Bismarck's life; for, though he 
may have taken such a precaution at one time, it is not likely 
that he always continued it. 

Kullman was instantly seized, but in the public anxiety for 
the chancellor, his confederate, whether a priest or not, ap- 
pears to have escaped." After Bismarck had returned to his 
hold he sent for Kullman and cross-examined him. The 
latter made no secret of the object of his crime, and an inves- 
tigation at Magdeburg soon implicated a priest named Stohr- 
mann, who suddenly died before the plot could be traced any 
further. In the sixteenth century this would have been ac- 
counted for by a mandate from the Vatican, but in our own 
time it is more likely to have been a case of suicide. Al- 
though this chapter of the Kulturkampf is the darkest epi- 
sode in the biography of Pius IX., there is no sufficient reason 
for believing that he would deliberately plan an assassination. 
Kullman was tried at Wurzburg and condemned to fourteen 
years' imprisonment, — a sentence which seems hardly severe 
enough. As a matter of security he ought to have been im- 
prisoned during the rest of Bismarck's life. In Prussia death 
is the penalty for an attempt to assassinate members of the 
royal family, and so it should be everywhere for the highest 
officers of state, such as presidents, cabinet ministers, and 
field-marshals. It is no ordinary crime, but high treason of 
the blackest description. 

A cold shudder ran through Germany at Kullman's at- 
tempt, and there was scarcely a Protestant church where 
prayers and thanks for the chancellor's safety were not offered 
the following Sabbath. The act was, of course, injurious to 
the- pope's cause, and even converted a large number of Ultra- 
montanes into honest, patriotic Germans. The Clerical party 
endeavored to counteract this feeling by stigmatizing Kull- 
man as a half deranged crank, who was not altogether respon- 



1 There was also a belief that he wore a coat of plaited linen of many thick- 
nesses which no bullet could penetrate. 

2 At least I have not been able to find an account of his arrest or trial. 



V 28 7 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

sible for his act ; but the Magdeburgers, who have good reason 
for their strong Protestantism, testified contrary to this, and 
his connection with a large Catholic society and the influence 
of the priest Stohrmann^were soon proved beyond question. 
The weapon that he used was traced to the man from whom 
he bought it, and was found to have been purchased during 
the Clerical agitation of the previous year. The sudden death 
of Stohrmann added to the public sensation, and attached to 
the event the character of a dark and hidden mystery. 

Bismarck cannot be blamed after this for withdrawing the 
German legate from the Vatican, and ordering a strict enforce- 
ment of the laws against revolutionary sermons and libellous 
publications. Incendiary language and personal calumny are 
the powder and ball of the assassin's revolver. Among others 
who were indicted under his special orders was a Silesian 
priest named Majunke, formerly editor of the Volkszeitel, a 
furious Catholic publication, who was also a member of the 
Reichstag. Surprising as it may seem, Majunke succeeded 
in escaping arrest, and, trusting to the protection of those 
" sacred precincts," appeared in his seat when the Reichstag 
was convened in the following December. It was now that 
the Social Democrats, and especially Lasker, who was really 
a German Rochefort, showed their true colors by supporting 
the Clericals in their hour of disgrace. A committee ap- 
pointed to consider Majunke's case reported that the indict- 
ment against him was well grounded, and that the judgment 
of the court of a year's imprisonment ought to be enforced ; 
but Lasker succeeded in carrying a motion by a small ma- 
jority which substantially declared that members of the Reichs- 
tag were superior to the civil laws, and could only be judged 
and punished by their own associates. This was practically 
the same as the pope's doctrine of infallibility, and it is an 
indication of a tendency of our time which goes to maintain 
that legislative bodies exist by divine right, and that their 
decisions are equally inviolable. 

How disheartening this must have been to Bismarck ! He 
was in constant danger of assassination, and yet this body of 
men, who were supposed to represent the sentiment and feel- 

2SS 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

ing of united Germany, — the Germany which he had created, 
— refused him the only relief from this grievous oppression 
which he knew how to obtain. A man who had been con- 
demned under laws created by the Reichstag could, never- 
theless, escape punishment, and continue to beard him in the 
legislative halls so long as his superstitious constituents chose 
to send him there. Never before had his language to the 
popular assembly been so scathing, so scornful. It was like 
Scipio's reply to the senate when he was accused of pecula- 
tion. His words were like burning coals, and those who saw 
the expression of his face never forgot it. 

He left the chamber abruptly and waited on the emperor 
with the information that he had been outvoted and was 
willing to resign. William L, however, refused to consider 
this as a possibility, and, though almost as indignant as Bis- 
marck, advised him to take no further notice of the difficulty. 
Bismarck's absence from the chamber at the next meeting 
attracted attention, and a rumor of his retirement was circu- 
lated, causing no slight uneasiness, among both the Conser- 
vatives and the National Liberals. It was now the latter who 
came forward in his support with a resolution of special con- 
fidence in the " wisdom, uprightness, and patriotism of the 
chancellor," which Deputy Benningsen supported with such 
a vigorous speech that even Dr. Windhorst was effectually 
silenced by it. Legislative bodies are even more unwilling 
than individuals to confess that they have made a mistake, 
but the resolution was passed by a union of all parties except- 
ing the Clericals, Poles, and Socialists. 

The German Catholic bishops held a convention at Fulda 
and agreed upon a series of resolutions, which were forwarded 
to the ministry, protesting against the May Laws as unjust, 
inhuman, sacrilegious, and contrary to canon law. Dr. Falk 
replied to this with a request that they should submit regular 
reports of the condition of their parishes and all their pro- 
ceedings to his bureau. The bishops were enjoined against 
the installation of priests without previous notification to the 
government. There were some who might have obeyed this 
order but for fear of being dispossessed themselves by the 
19 289 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

Vatican council. The unfortunate bishops were really under 
a cross-fire. They declared that they were not able to 
comply with Dr. Falk's demands, and would be obliged to 
resist them to the extremity of persecution. Dr. Falk's per- 
secution, however, went no further than to declare the acts of 
such installed priests illegal, and to suspend the payment of 
salaries due them from the government. Hundreds of par- 
ishes soon became vacant of their officiating clergy, but the 
parishioners did not appear to suffer much from this, and the 
government reaped the benefit of the suspended salaries. 
When Joseph II. abolished capital punishment in Austria the 
number of murders increased so alarmingly that he found 
himself obliged to restore the death-penalty ; but we do not 
hear of an increase of crime or vice in the Catholic portions 
of Prussia during what has been termed Bismarck's Diocle- 
tian period. What might have resulted if this order of affairs 
had continued for a whole generation, it would hardly be safe 
to predict. 

The severest case under the operation of the May Laws 
was that of Archbishop Ledochowski of Posen, who was at 
once a prelate and a Polish count. In order to make amends 
for the deficit in the exchequer in his diocese, he made an 
importunate and successful endeavor to raise contributions in 
all the parishes under his dominion. As this was an onerous 
burden on the Poles, for the funds were mostly derived from 
the superstitious peasants, Dr. Falk requested him to discon- 
tinue it, and, as he still persisted, Dr. Falk suspended him. 
As Ledochowski lived in a community that was determined 
to protect him, he defied the German government, and actu- 
ally succeeded in protracting his case by a series of ingenious 
legal make-shifts for nearly seven months before he was finally 
brought into court under a criminal indictment and sentenced 
to four years' imprisonment. Among the accusations against 
him he was charged with having attempted to exclude the 
study of the German language from the schools in his dio- 
cese, and the police discovered that he was in active corre- 
spondence with certain Russian Poles who were under sus- 
picion of hatching a new revolution. Pius IX. sent him a 

290 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

cardinal's hat for consolation in his confinement and to show 
his contempt for German jurisprudence. The Archbishop of 
Cologne and the bishops of Treves and Paderborn were all 
imprisoned for short terms for contumacious behavior, — no 
severe trial for a common priest, but hard lines for a luxurious 
bishop. A bishop who had been excommunicated by the 
pope for refusing to support the infallibility dogma was re- 
stored to his diocese by Dr. Falk. 

The anti-infallibility Catholics under the lead of Dr. D61- 
linger formed themselves into a separate party called the Old 
Catholics, with the professed intention of reforming their 
church and restoring it to the purity and simplicity of the 
early Christians. Although not a large fraction of their own 
sect, they gave the German government a strong moral sup- 
port, and the adherents of the pope quite as much trouble, at 
the elections. 

What was Pius IX. going to do about this? In the pre- 
ceding August (1873) he had written a most imprudent letter 
to Emperor William, in which he took for granted that there 
was a difference of opinion between him and his ministers on 
the Catholic question, and trusted that he would be suffi- 
ciently resolute to adhere to his convictions, and to dispense 
with the services of those who wished to lead him into con- 
troversial pitfalls and unfriendly relations with the See of 
Rome. What advantage the pope and Antonelli expected to 
gain from this manoeuvre, especially after their declination to 
receive Cardinal Hohenlohe at the Vatican, it is difficult to 
comprehend, and its ultimate effect was merely to cause Pius 
IX. to appear ridiculous. The emperor replied in September 
that he and his ministry were altogether in harmony in regard 
to the policy that was being pursued on the dogma of infalli- 
bility, and designated the Roman Catholic clergy as the origi- 
nators of the quarrel, since they had distinctly refused to 
render obedience to the laws and constitution of the German 
empire ; nor could he consider the pope in any respect as a 
mediator between him and the Christian religion. The corre- 
spondence was made public, greatly to the pope's annoyance ; 
and the absurdity of presuming that the stout old emperor 

291 



LIFE ov BISMARCK 

had been acting ; undei the pressure of unfair influence was 
manifest to evei ybody, 

After Kullm. m's attempt to assassinate Bismarck the Vati- 
can council prudently went under cover, and the < hief interest 
of the time centred in the prosecution of the Archbishop of 
Posen, when it was discovered Pius IX. had named Ledo- 
chowski to be primate of Poland, - a revolutionary movement, 
m view oi' the fact that no such state as Poland existed. The 
revolutionary intentions of the Vatican were so carelessly 
concealed thai a document in evidence of them from the 
pope's nuncio al Munich came into Bismarck's possession, 
and was exposed by him in the Reichstag during the debate 
on Paul Majunke, 

The agitation in Belgium reached such a pitch that Bis- 
marck found himself obliged to interfere, and notified the 
Belgian government that a stop must be placed to such in- 
flammatory proceedings, which might even endangei the 
peace oi Europe, At fust the Kin;- of Belgium, relying on 
the protection of Great Britain, was inclined to disregard this 
admonition; but a notification from Disraeli, who was even 
more opposed to Catholicism than Gladstone, caused an alter- 
ation in his cabinet councils, and the requisite orders were 
issued; and though not enforced with proper strictness, they 
served indifferently to reform the evil. 

After the commencement of the new year the pope took 
courage again, and on February 5, 1875, published an encyclic 
letter to his bishops, declaring the May Laws invalid with re- 
gard to his adherents ; forbade all faithful followers, both clergy 
and laity, from rendering them obedience; and ordered a hull 
of excommunication against Dr. Dollinger, Bishop Reinkens, 
and the whole sect of the Old Catholic clergy. In the twelfth 
century this edict might have produced a terrible effect, but 
it could do little harm in the nineteenth, especially under 
a Protestant government. However, it was considered in- 
judicious that so much seed of incipient rebellion should be 
sown broadcast without receiving some check and supervision 
from the government; and as the Ultramontane organ Ger- 
mania published at this time an atrocious editorial, in which 

29a 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

assassins were made to appeal conspicuously to th< advantage 
of wli.ii were called the oppressors oi the faithful, Bismarck 
and l>). Falk contrived togethei three new enactments, as a 
supplement to the ih.vj Laws, oi a still more sweeping char- 

'I he first oi these was an i xt< nsioti oi the law againsl gov 
ernment salaries being paid to priests who had been install* d 
contrary to the civil regulations, [t provided forastoppage 
oi salary to all ecclesiastics ivho were unwilling to subscribe 
implicit obedience to the May Laws and take an oath to sup- 
poi t the govei nmcnl , 

The second law was intended for the expurgation of mon 
asteries and cloisters; and it provided that all such establish- 
ments should be clos< '1 and their inmates expelled unless they 
were willing to take the oath of allegiance to the German 
government. The Sisters oi Mercy, however, were exempted 
from this regulation, as serviceable and harmless member:; of 
society. 

The third law was intended to reconstruct such Catholic 
parishes as had become disintegrated, and to afford them an 
opportunity oi managing their own affairs, — very much after 
the American fashion ; though it was provided that this should 
take place under the supervision oi government inspector.. 
Bills were also pa ised securing to the Old Catholics continued 
use and occupation of their churches and church property. 

Supplementary laws were found nec< isai y to pi evenl pi lests 
\>j\\<> had been turned out of their parishes by the government 
from returning and p< rforming the functions of their office in 
an illegal manner, and also for the administration of property 
belonging to the Church in dioceses left vacant \>y the ex- 
patriation oi bishops. In the former case moderate terms oi 
imprisonment were adjudicated, and in the latter commis- 
sioners were appointed to care for the property and account 
for its income in a scrupulous manner until bi ihops should be 
appointed who could receive the sanction of the ministry. 
Various additions were made to the May Laws from time to 
time, bni these ar< th< substance oi them. The fierceness of 
the debate in th< RLeichstag on this occa ion may readily be 

293 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

imagined. Mud-throwing was common, and everything that 
could be raked up against Bismarck, just and unjust, true and 
improbable, from his college days to the malicious inventions 
of the Paris journalists, was made full use of. The socialistic 
Lasker made himself particularly conspicuous in this dirty 
work. At the same time Bismarck received abundant as- 
surances of encouragement and support from all parts of 
Germany, including Bavaria and Rhenish Prussia. A warfare 
of pamphlets was carried on continually, and cartoons published 
representing infallibility as an ugly serpent, into which a St. 
George in the likeness of Bismarck was thrusting his spear. 
That there were honest convictions on the other side, much 
endurance, and a praiseworthy dignity to be recognized in 
the behavior of the priests, is not to be denied. It was at 
least a bloodless warfare, and even the sufferings of Arch- 
bishop Ledochowski and others, who were imprisoned for the 
glory of Pius IX., cannot properly be estimated at a high 
rate. 

These enactments were passed and approved by the em- 
peror in the spring of 1875, and made a grand clearing out 
of Catholicism from the greater portion of Germany. Bis- 
marck, like the morning sun, had swept the dark shadows 
across the horizon. Whether he had slain the python of infal- 
libility still remained to be proved, for such monsters have a 
rare faculty of coming to life after remaining for long periods in 
a torpid condition, and it is even said of common snakes that 
their tails never die till after sunset. He knew that his own 
life was constantly in danger, but he went straight on, like an 
ocean steamer through storm and fog. To a certain extent 
the whole community was in a state of siege, and this he 
knew could not endure forever. The event from which he 
chiefly apprehended relief was the death of Pius IX., which 
now could not be delayed many years. Without the least 
pretence of concealment he agitated the question of the next 
pontifical election, and advised the Christian courts of Europe 
to take such measures in regard to it that a repetition of the 
present evil might not occur. 

The King of Bavaria and his ministry supported Bismarck 

294 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

in the Kulturkampf to a degree which plainly shows that the 
question was not one of Protestantism versus Catholicism so 
much as it was of church against state. The elections in 
1874 for the Bavarian legislature resulted in a loss to the 
Ultramontanes, though they still preserved a slight majority 
in the House. They nevertheless adopted an address to the 
throne, in which they requested the dismissal of the patri- 
otic ministry and the formation of a cabinet to support the 
policy of Pius IX. ; but the king was not to be moved, and 
gave the committee from the House to understand that their 
majority was too small to dictate the policy of Bavaria. At 
the same time he signified to the ministry that he was entirely 
satisfied with their position with regard to the Kulturkampf, 
and assured them of his entire confidence in their manage- 
ment of affairs. This was in November, and one month 
earlier Emperor William had made a visit to Victor Em- 
manuel in Rome itself, where he was received with an enthu- 
siasm which in the pope's opinion was near akin to madness. 

THE SPANISH REPUBLIC 

After the withdrawal of the Hohenzollern candidacy the 
crown of Spain was offered by the Cortes to Amadeo, the 
second son of Victor Emmanuel, and this plan of uniting the 
interests of Spain and Italy by a royal family bond would 
seem to have been a judicious one. Amadeo, however, found 
the Spanish throne a most uncomfortable position. The whole 
country was divided into factions, whose leaders were contin- 
ually conspiring together to make difficulties for him, and 
the behavior of the Spanish nobility, always noted for their 
arrogance, called soberbia, was unfriendly and disagreeable. 
After enduring these tribulations for nearly two years, Ama- 
deo concluded that a princely life in Italy was preferable to a 
royal life in Spain, and tendered his resignation. This left 
the monarchical party in the vocative. They had tried every 
experiment that had offered itself. Castelar, the finest orator 
in Europe, 1 now led the Republicans to victory, which was 

1 According to Sumner's estimate. 
295 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

not difficult in the demoralized state of the opposition. The 
political condition of Spain, however, or the temperament of 
the people, is not suited to republicanism, and Castelar had no 
sooner become president than he found it necessary to usurp 
the authority of a dictator. How reluctant he was to do this 
those who knew him can testify. He was a high-minded 
patriot, and by no means a sentimentalist ; but in the confused 
turmoil of Spanish affairs the wisest judgment might have 
been at fault. He looked to republicanism as one chance 
among others; but republicanism strengthened the hands of 
the Carlists, who were the Ultramontanes of Spain. The 
guerilla warfare which the Carlists had been carrying on in 
the northern provinces now assumed a formidable aspect, and 
on December 9 they gained a decisive victory over General 
Loma and captured a large number of prisoners. 

Among the captives there was a German officer named 
Schmidt, who was serving as war correspondent for the Ger- 
man press. In violation of all rules of warfare and humanity 
this man was shot by the Carlist general, with many others, 
to the great indignation of the German people, who were in 
no mood, after their late victories, to feel resigned to such an 
outrage. As the Carlists were rebels and beyond the direct 
reach of diplomacy, Bismarck found other ways by which he 
could make his power felt. Castelar was succeeded by Mar- 
shal Serrano as president of the immature republic, which was 
not yet recognized by foreign courts. To give stability to 
the government at Madrid and weaken the position of the 
Carlists, Bismarck proposed to the powers that the Spanish, 
republic should be accepted as a de facto government. All 
agreed to this, with the exception of France and Russia. The 
Tsar was sufficiently disgusted with the French republic, and 
MacMahon's relation with the Ultramontanes was such that 
he was equally afraid of displeasing them and of irritating 
Bismarck ; so that the curious spectacle presented itself of a 
monarchy endorsing a republic, and of a republic supporting 
monarchical claims. Not only did the French administration 
give moral encouragement to the Carlists, but large quantities 
of arms and other war material were being furnished to Don 

296 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

Carlos by his French sympathizers. As soon, however, as 
Serrano's government had been recognized by Great Britain, 
Germany, and Italy, this traffic became contrary to inter- 
national law, and Bismarck notified the French president that 
it must come to an end. MacMahon, who was always a 
well-meaning man, and as desirous as Thiers of the public 
good, had no objection to this so long as he could give a 
satisfactory excuse for it. At the same time two German 
ships of war were despatched to the Bay of Biscay, in order 
to cut off the supplies of the Carlists in that direction, and it 
was not long before France also recognized the government 
at Madrid. 

Unfortunately the republic could not support itself in Spain 
even with foreign assistance. Almost on the last day of 
December General Campos proclaimed Alfonso, the son of 
Queen Isabella, at the time a pupil of seventeen years in a 
French school, to be king of Spain. His example was imme- 
diately followed by the other generals serving under Serrano, 
who accordingly resigned the presidency with a good grace. 
Two weeks later the unfortunate boy was crowned in Madrid 
as Alfonso XII. Don Carlos, after struggling obstinately 
against fate during the spring. and summer of 1875, finally 
crossed the French frontier with a remnant of two thousand 
men. Although the murder of Captain Schmidt was never 
avenged, Don Carlos's chances were materially injured by it, 
and something at least had been gained towards enforcing 
respect for German citizenship in foreign countries. Ger- 
many, for" the last hundred years or more, had really been the 
first nation in Europe, — the nation which produced the great- 
est men and the finest art, — and yet it had been habitual for 
English, French, and even Italians to speak of Germans in a 
tone of condescension, if not of contempt. 

THE RIOT AT SALONICA 

Bismarck's next interference in behalf of the rights of Ger- 
man citizens placed him side by side with President Mac- 
Mahon. On May 6, 1876, the French and German consuls 
at Salonica were murdered by a fanatical mob of Mohamme- 

. 297 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

dans for interfering to prevent a young Christian woman from 
embracing the faith of Islam. It is always difficult to reach 
the true condition of such affairs, so conflicting are the ac- 
counts in regard to them, and whether undue pressure was 
exerted on the mind of this young girl it is now impossible to 
determine. The Turks live in a state of sluggish animosity 
towards their Christian neighbors, which is generally harm- 
less enough, but which may at the slightest irritation madden 
them to the most desperate deeds. They have learned to 
tolerate the Christian faith as a political necessity, but they 
resent the least interference with their own creed with a fury 
that passes all bounds. If the missionaries make converts of 
Mohammedans by the Christian method, the Turks retaliate 
by making converts according to their own method, — that is, 
at the sword's point. The Turkish mind is so constituted 
that this seems to them perfectly fair and reasonable. It may 
have been injudicious for the French and German consuls to 
interfere with the ceremonies in the mosque, but their murder 
was no less an outrage of international right. 

Bismarck and MacMahon acted in concert. A Franco- 
German fleet was despatched to Salonica, and the Sultan 
received a peremptory demand for satisfaction. The cus- 
tomary method of treating such claims of justice at the 
Ottoman court has been to make unlimited professions with 
small performance of the same. Real or imaginary obstacles 
are brought into play, all of which the foreign ambassador 
has to discover some method of removing, until the time has 
passed by when anything like justice can be obtained, and 
only some pitiful compromise is possible. By what persua- 
sion Bismarck succeeded in having his demands enforced in a 
prompt and effective manner has never transpired, but it is 
certain that Abdul Aziz acted in this' instance with excep- 
tional alacrity. A Turco-European commission was ap- 
pointed and proceeded at once to Salonica, where a number 
of the leading rioters were seized, convicted, and hanged, 
while many others were condemned to milder punishments, 
which the German ambassador was directed to see were prop- 
erly enforced. Even indemnities in money for the families 

298, 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

of the murdered consuls were obtained, though with some- 
what more difficulty. 

A WAR SCARE 

During the spring and summer of 1875 suspicious rumors 
were in the air of another war between France and Germany, 
and the frog-and-insect chorus on the political Brocken set up 
a constantly repeated refrain of " that demoniacal Bismarck," 
who was again going to water the valleys of Europe with 
blood. The origin of this appears to have come from the 
constantly increasing military preparations of the French gov- 
ernment. The Prussian military system had been introduced 
into France, and this enabled the nation to maintain a force 
twice as great as that with which Napoleon III. went to war 
in 1870. Such an army, well drilled, and with competent 
general officers, would not have been an unfair match for the 
German military machine, and the fact naturally attracted 
attention in Berlin, and the question was asked in the impe- 
perial cabinet, "Whither is this armament tending?" The 
influence of Gambetta was constantly increasing in France, — 
a rash, impetuous man, full of what is called the spirit of the 
age, and who had proved in 1870 to be not less remarkable 
for his organizing ability than for his unwillingness to recog- 
nize accomplished facts. 1 There could be no more appro- 
priate or more dangerous leader for a popular war of revenge 
against Germany. French newspapers, periodicals, and books 
were never more belligerent than at this time, and the same 
spirit expressed itself in the fine arts, so that during the next 
ten years a large number of French paintings were produced 
representing battle-scenes in which the Germans were always 
defeated, — and these, too, the work of excellent artists. Mean- 
while President MacMahon, who had no intention himself of 
going to war a second time for French glory, was organizing 
a fine army for Gambetta's purpose, — if only it should fall 
into his hands. MacMahon recognized the superiority of 

1 Manteuffel expressed his opinion in 1872 that Thiers would be succeeded 
by Gambetta, Gambetta by the Commune, and the Commune by a military 
despotism. 

299 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

Von Moltke, and had no desire to try conclusions with him 
again. 

At the same time an intrigue was on foot to unite the 
Ultramontanes of France, Austria, and Italy in an alliance 
against Germany. The plan was impracticable in itself, un- 
less a revolution could be effected in Austria first of all. If 
that could be accomplished it was expected that MacMahon 
and Francis Joseph would shake hands, and that Victor 
Emmanuel, finding himself between two fires, and that the 
chances were turning against Bismarck, would feel obliged to 
fall into line. The current in Austria, however, was now run- 
ning in the opposite direction. Public opinion in Vienna, 
which had always counted for something, and now counted 
for much more, was fairly expressed by the citizen who knelt 
on the sidewalk to embrace Von Beust's knees for having 
delivered Austria from the concordat ; yet liberalism had gone 
a pretty fair length in Austria since the battle of Sadowa, and 
there were many to predict that a conservative reaction was 
at hand, as it always comes in time. That it did not come 
sooner in Austria was mainly owing to the wisdom and con- 
ciliatory policy of Bismarck in 1871. The Hungarians are 
Protestant to the backbone, and now, with the Prussian mili- 
tary system to support their rights, they had no intention of 
bowing before Catholic mandates from Vienna. The triumph 
of Pius IX. in Austria must have resulted in civil war. 

This movement could not escape the notice of the lynx- 
eyed chancellor and he took his measures accordingly, but 
of the consultations that were held over it only a kw signifi- 
cant words from Bismarck have survived. The Berlin Post, a 
semi-official organ, was first to sound the note of alarm, in an 
editorial which was ascribed to the government, though this 
was afterwards denied. It was mainly an echo of Bismarck's 
threat to the French government the year before. It called 
attention to the belligerent tone of French publications and 
the unprecedented increase of the French army. " If there is 
going to be a war of revenge," said the Post, "the sooner it 
comes the better for Germany." 

This statement created quite a sensation in the political 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

centres of Europe, which was not much allayed by Bismarck's 
explanation in the Reichstag a few days later. The present 
attitude of the French, he admitted, was a threatening one, 
and would have to be seriously considered. He did not regret 
the editorial in the Post, and wished other nations to take 
notice of the situation. How long were these attacks on 
Germany to continue ? The French also would do well to 
consider what might be the effect of a second defeat by the 
German forces. President MacMahon, who really wished for 
peace as much as Emperor William did, and was more afraid of 
his own people than he was of the Germans, appealed to Lon- 
don and St. Petersburg for intervention in behalf of France, and 
the Parisian journals suddenly changed their tone to a cry for 
help against the insatiable monster Bismarck. Even Gam- 
betta went under cover, and the Chamber of Deputies became 
as quiet as an audience at a theatre. There was more occa- 
sion for this than perhaps many of them imagined. 

In the spring of 1893, after Bismarck had left public life, 
he made a brief statement which shows that at this time there 
was a strong war party at Berlin, including Von Moltke, Man- 
teuffel, Prince Frederick Charles, and perhaps other high 
officials, which Bismarck was obliged to resist and repress at 
the same time that he made use of the war scare to intimi- 
date the French. It must be admitted that this was a diffi- 
cult position even for a great statesman to be placed in, and 
the result of it was that he received the credit of belliger- 
ent intentions which properly belonged to others. " I was 
obliged," he said in 1893, "to protest to the emperor against 
the interference of the German staff in the affairs of the for- 
eign office." Von Moltke always talked in favor of war, — as 
Bismarck said, it was his business, — and it is presumable that 
he thought if there was to be a war of revenge it had better 
come while he was still equal to the command of the German 
army, and it could be fought by veterans, instead of under new 
generals and with untried soldiers. It is not to be won- 
dered at that he should have felt so, but the far-reaching con- 
sequences of such a collision were better understood by Bis- 
marck than by himself. In fact, Bismarck had now arranged 

301 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

the map of Europe exactly as he wished to have it, and not 
on any account would he hazard the chance of having it 
readjusted again. 

It was this consideration also that caused anxiety at St. 
Petersburg and London. The efficiency of the German mili- 
tary machine was perhaps overestimated at this time. It was 
considered almost irresistible, and the prospect of a second 
conquest of France, with consequent loss of more French 
territory, was not one which either Alexander or Victoria 
liked to contemplate. If Germany became too strong to be 
interfered with, the annexation of Holland was not improb- 
able, and such a combination of land and naval power would 
threaten the independence of Great Britain itself. The Tsar 
likewise was beginning to think that the agreement with his 
Prussian uncle at Ems in 1870 was resulting too favorably for 
German interests. MacMahon's special envoys to Disraeli 
and Gortchakoff were well received, and the two premiers 
promised to give the French government active support so 
long as it persevered in a pacific policy. The French presi- 
dent was only too ready to do this, while Bismarck, for rea- 
sons already stated, was obliged to preserve an aggressive 
attitude ; and so it happened that Disraeli and Alexander 
obtained the credit of preserving the peace of Europe and 
protecting France from the ambitious designs of the German 
chancellor ; ' although it is more than probable that the source 
of this political tension originated in the Vatican and was 
directed against Prussia. 

1 Bismarck said in the Reichstag in 1888: "My Russian colleague, Prince 
Gortchakoff, first evinced in 1875 an inclination more friendly to France than 
towards us, and employed artificial means to gain popularity there, — trying to 
make the world believe that we had some vague notion of attacking France, 
and that it was his especial merit to have preserved France from this danger." — 
Speemann's "Bismarck's Speeches," xvi. 160. 



CHAPTER XIII 

THE RUSSO-TURKISH WAR AND THE CONGRESS OF BERLIN 

The most serious trouble with Turkish finances is that 
there is no limitation to the drafts for the sultan's personal 
expenses. Abdul Aziz was always extravagant, and had no 
consideration for bad harvests. In 1874 there was a very 
short crop in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and at the same time 
the sultan gave orders to the tax collectors that they must 
fill up his empty treasury at the risk of their lives. The 
consequences of this might have been foreseen by any one 
except a sultan. The collectors' demands were excessive, 
and finding a deficit in Bosnia and Herzegovina they carried 
off everything that they could find. Many families fled with 
what they could take with them in their wagons to the neigh- 
boring Austrian provinces. Those who resisted were beaten 
or imprisoned. A deputation of the wealthier citizens waited 
on the Turkish pasha, or governor of the provinces, who gave 
the customary pledges of reform, which he had no intention of 
fulfilling. A report, circulated, perhaps, by Russian agents, 
that the Austrian government had proposed to purchase 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, set the provinces ablaze. It is often 
said that a man will give all he has for his life ; and this, per- 
haps, is true with regard to individuals, but not where masses 
of men and their families are concerned. Assured of the as- 
sistance of the Montenegrins, who in their Balkan Switzerland 
have defied the Turks for centuries, the people of these narrow 
provinces entered on a desperate conflict with the whole 
Turkish empire. They succeeded in raising an army of from 
twelve to fifteen thousand men, and drove back the first 
Turkish contingent that was sent to subdue them. When, 
however, Raouf Pasha advanced against them with a greatly 
superior force, they retired to the mountainous districts and 

3°3 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

maintained a guerilla warfare during the winter and spring of 

1875- 

Here was a serious problem for England, Austria, and 

Russia, but especially for Austria. Whatever good-will An- 
drassy might feel towards the persecuted subjects of Abdul 
Aziz, he was obliged to recognize the fact that the interests 
of the Austrian empire were nearly identical with those of 
the Turkish government. Austria might have long since 
swept Turkey into the Bosphorus, but for the impossibility of 
organizing a government at Constantinople that would prove 
an effective barrier either to the return of the sultan or to 
Russian ambition. The old Greek empire fell to pieces from 
the lack of true national feeling ; and to attempt to revive it 
would be like the Jews' returning to Jerusalem. The Slavonic 
races have not yet shown the least capacity for self-govern- 
ment, and are, besides, antipathetic towards the Hungarians, 
who, having obtained local autonomy, objected in a deter- 
mined manner to their further introduction in the empire. 
Even Von Beust, the most liberal of Austrian premiers, has 
stated that in his opinion if Abdul Aziz had crushed out the 
insurrection in Herzegovina at once, it would have been better 
for all parties concerned. 

In Russia the sympathy for their suffering coreligionists was 
lively and ardent. The government newspapers of St. Peters- 
burg treated the question in a diplomatic manner, but evidently 
in a firm belief that the time had come to put an end to the 
atrocities in the Balkan states, while less official publications 
fairly clamored for the intercession of the Tsar. Fervent 
prayers were delivered in the churches that the God of 
battles might give aid and victory to the insurgents, and sub- 
scriptions were raised from Finland to the Crimea in aid of 
their destitute families. 1 In Great Britain there was an appre- 
hension fully equal to that in Austria. Nobody wanted an- 
other Crimean War, and it was doubtful if the queen and 
Disraeli would be supported by the general public in bringing 

1 Chiefly, however, from the poorer classes, so that the aggregate was not so 
very much. 

3°4 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

about another Inkerman or Balaklava. In this, at least, 
Disraeli was confident : that the British fleet could prevent the 
Russians from taking possession of Constantinople. Beyond 
that there was diplomacy, in which he believed himself to be 
more of an expert than afterwards appeared. At the same 
time his old rival Gladstone was waiting in readiness to take 
advantage of any mistakes he might make. His position was 
not a comfortable one, and the path before him was beset 
with difficulties. 

European politics now revolved about Germany. The 
prestige of the Prussian military machine did not surpass 
Bismarck's reputation for sound judgment and political fore- 
sight. Nothing of importance was likely to be undertaken 
without his first being consulted. It was not presumed that 
he could mould Gortchakoff and Andrassy to his will, but if 
he said to them, " Only thus far it is prudent to go," it was 
not considered likely that they would exceed his limit. The 
London Times no doubt asserted too much when it declared 
that Bismarck by one word could prevent the Russian army 
from crossing the Danube, but there was no question that he 
could recall it from the Balkan provinces whenever he thought 
best to do so. He watched passing events with the eye of an 
expert who knows from old practice when the time has come 
to take a hand in them. It is doubtful if he shared Von 
Beust's opinion, but, as he often confessed, his chief interest 
in foreign affairs was, what advantage or disadvantage might 
result to Germany. He did not wish to have the Tsar take 
possession of Constantinople, but neither did he propose to 
interfere with the Russian government in behalf of Great 
Britain. As already suggested, there may have been a previ- 
ous understanding in regard to this very occasion. At all 
events, he is known to have expressed himself in a friendly 
way towards Russia at the time, and to have considered the 
cause of the Slavonic states a just one. If he foresaw or cal- 
culated the ultimate effect of the insurrection in the Balkans, 
he must have been far-sighted indeed. 

It was Andrassy's place to take the initiative, as representing 
the power which was most directly compromised by the Balkan 
20 305 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

disturbances, and the one which could least be suspected of 
self-interest. For Bismarck to have done this would have 
had the appearance of unreasonable interference, and Gort- 
chakoff might be supposed to act from interested motives. 
The guerilla warfare had continued through the spring and 
summer without decisive results ; and when, late in August, 
the ambassadors of the three powers went to Abdul Aziz with 
a joint note of intervention, the sultan promised everything 
and performed nothing. The schedule he agreed to, if car- 
ried out, might have resulted in an idyllic mixture of despot- 
ism and democracy ; but he issued one firman after another, 
and neither Turk nor Christian paid any heed to them. Ac- 
cordingly, on the last of January, 1876, Andrassy sent a defi- 
nite demand to the sultan, specifying five essential points of 
reform, — complete religious freedom, the introduction of a 
European tax system, the application of the revenue of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina for a term of years to restoring prosperity 
in the provinces, the establishment of a commission to super- 
vise the condition of the country farmers, and of a mixed 
commission to supervise the execution of reforms. This was 
accepted by the Turkish government, and a proclamation 
issued promising the rebels a safe return to their homes if 
they would lay down their arms ; but the insurgents refused 
to do this unless the great powers would guarantee their per- 
sonal safety and also the administration of the reforms. Pro- 
crastination and the memory of broken pledges were the two 
best allies of the sultan ; but he was soon found to have an- 
other ally, and one that caused all parties concerned a great 
deal of trouble. 

The behavior of the English Tory government at this 
crisis was not only injudicious, but a disgrace to the name of 
civilization. Repeated editorials in the London Times argued 
that the only security for British interests was a prompt sup- 
pression of the revolt in such a manner that it would not be 
likely to occur again ; or, in the language of Machiavelli, to 
deal the insurgents such heavy blows that they could not 
well be repaid. It would seem as if the Turks required little 
encouragement in this direction ; but it was well known in 

•;o6 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

Berlin that Disraeli encouraged the sultan in his treacherous 
course, and even persuaded Andrassy in the spring of 1876 
to set a patrol on his frontiers to prevent the defeated insur- 
gents from crossing, and to close Austrian charitable estab- 
lishments against the refugees ; so that he succeeded for a 
time in disturbing the cordial relations between the three em- 
perors. Disraeli, with characteristic cynicism, admitted that 
the Bosnians and Herzegovinians were greatly to be pitied, 
but said that the peace of Europe could only be preserved 
by crushing them to the earth. He did not believe that the 
Turkish nature was accessible to reform, and the mildest de- 
gree of independence for the Balkan states would only prove 
a stepping-stone to Russian aggression. This policy proved 
a failure from the start, and resulted in the death of Abdul 
Aziz as well as the overthrow of the Tory party. 

It was the counterpart of Louis Napoleon's policy in 1870, 
a desperate venture which could only succeed by quickness 
and good fortune. Unhappily for Disraeli and Lord Derby, 
the rebellion was not to be crushed in a week or a month. 
Mukhtar Pasha marched into Herzegovina with a consider- 
able army in March, 1876, and offered the rebels two weeks 
in which to make their submission. His promises were gen- 
erous, but nobody trusted them ; and before the fortnight had 
expired a subsidiary revolution broke out in Turkish Croatia, 
and a force of fourteen thousand men sent to suppress it was 
defeated. As the armistice came to an end without result, 
Mukhtar Pasha marched through the Dugar Pass, where he 
was beset on all sides, and compelled to retreat again with 
heavy losses. No doubt there were Montenegrins present in 
these engagements, but the prince of Montenegro had thus 
far preserved an attitude of fair neutrality, although thousands 
of Bosnians and Herzegovinians had taken refuge in his 
country and were being supported by the inhabitants. Mukh- 
tar Pasha, in order to excuse his defeat, represented that he 
was attacked by a large force of Montenegrins, and the con- 
sequence was that the sultan prepared an invasion of that 
country also. The Turks established a fortified camp on the 
borders of Servia, and in less than four months after Disraeli's 

3°7 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

cynical statement in the House of Commons the insurrection 
had spread over a territory seven hundred miles in extent. 
The most terrible consequences followed in Bulgaria, where 
the Turkish government had since 1855 practised a regular 
system of extirpation of the native population and the colo- 
nization of the country with bands of Tartars, who lived by a 
discreet system of plundering. A revolt broke out there on 
May Day ; and as the available forces of the sultan were em- 
ployed in other directions, the Turkish governor ordered a 
general arming of the Mohammedan population, who, being 
under no military control, fell upon the Christians, robbing 
and murdering indiscriminately, without regard to age or sex. 
The atrocities committed at Batak, described by a correspon- 
dent of the London Daily Nezvs, sent a thrill of horror through 
Great Britain, and came close to upsetting the Tory ministry. 
The number of sufferers in the Bulgarian massacre has been 
estimated as high as a hundred thousand, and, though that 
may be an exaggeration, it was without question one of the 
most awful atrocities in history. We hear so much of " our 
enlightened era" that it is difficult to realize that such horrors 
continue to take place and are permitted in Christian Europe. 
In the time of Frederick Barbarossa an army of knights 
would soon have been gathered on the Danube that would 
have retaliated for every Christian life which had been 
taken. • 

The Bulgarian massacre was the finishing stroke to Abdul 
Aziz. The ablest of his advisers perceived that he had made 
a mistake, and the withdrawal of Disraeli's support, which 
was necessitated by public opinion in England, proved fatal 
to him. It was also believed that in spite of the financial 
dearth — many of the highest officers being in long arrears 
for their salaries — the sultan had immense sums of money 
stored away in his palace. There was a sudden revolution 
among the viziers, and Abdul Aziz was deposed. Several 
millions in gold coin were recovered to the treasury, and a 
few days later he mysteriously died in the kiosk of Top-Capu, 
where he had been confined. It was given out that he had 
committed suicide, but it is quite credible that he was dis- 

308 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

posed of after the oriental fashion. In his death he was com- 
parable to Nero ; nor was his life much better. 

When the standard of rebellion was raised in Bulgaria 
Bismarck saw that the time had come for a definite policy. 
He proposed a conference at Berlin to Gortchakoff and An- 
drassy, and the proposition was accepted. By uniting with 
Great Britain and Austria at this time, Bismarck might have 
postponed the independence of the Balkan states for fifty 
years or more. Whatever his motives may have been, he 
certainly acted in the cause of humanity, and played the part 
of a true statesman. Andrassy meanwhile had discovered of 
what light stuff Disraeli was made, and returned to Bis- 
marck's lead with increased confidence. Only two days before 
the massacre at Batak the three ministers held a meeting and 
drew up a statement based on Andrassy's previous note. This 
was agreed upon and approved by the three emperors. A 
truce of two months was to be proclaimed in order to confer 
with the insurgents on disputed points, the execution of the 
reforms was to be superintended by the consuls of the great 
powers, and an international fleet was to take possession of 
the Bosphorus as moral support to the consuls. If this failed 
to produce the desired result, armed intervention should 
ensue. The plan was approved by the French and Italian 
governments, but rejected by Disraeli, though he was already 
aware of the Bulgarian outrages, and in his nonchalant man- 
ner had denied all knowledge of them when questioned in the 
House of Commons. The Tory newspapers congratulated 
their readers that Bismarck was not, after all, the autocrat of 
Europe. Andrassy, however, informed the Austro-Hunga- 
rian Parliament on May 18 that the conference had resulted 
in a complete unanimity of the three emperors in regard to 
the Turkish question, and in a resolve on their part to renew 
their present agreement from time to time. 1 Disraeli's com- 
munication of this circular to the Turkish government, with 
the expression of an unfavorable opinion on it, was a piece of 
trickery not unlike Louis Napoleon's. 2 His Eastern policy 

1 Our Chancellor, ii. 122. 2 Miiller's Political History, p. 512. 

3°9 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

might be compared to a man who was trying to prop up a 
falling house with a barber's pole. 

When this became known in St. Petersburg the peace-lov- 
ing Tsar was furious. Bismarck, in his place, might have said, 
as he did of the Augustenburger, " Thank goodness for it ;" 
but Alexander was not so far-sighted. " To have everything 
spoiled by that fortune-hunting Jew !" For every one could see 
that by treating the circular of the great powers with such 
levity Disraeli encouraged the Turks to make the utmost 
resistance, and it is only fair to hold him responsible in some 
measure for the events which followed. On June 27 Prince 
Milan of Servia declared war on the sultan, and on July 2 
Prince Nikita of Montenegro followed his example. Their 
combined forces amounted to over one hundred thousand 
men, but the Servian army was mainly composed of volun- 
teers not sufficiently well trained for operations in the open 
field. The most active sympathy was manifested in Russia 
for the cause of the two princes. It is not permitted to 
hold public meetings in the dominions of the Tsar, but 
the war was supported in the churches as a holy cause ; 
collections were taken up, hospital stores were provided 
by cities and towns, and even ladies of quality volunteered 
their services with army surgeons to do duty in the hos- 
pitals. 

While the Montenegrins were successful and held their 
ground in a number of small encounters, the Servian general 
trusted too much to the enthusiasm of his soldiers. The 
Turkish army outnumbered the united forces of the insur- 
gents, and was continually increased by the addition of 
troops drawn from Asia and Egypt, and with recruits who 
were attracted by the report of fabulous treasures discovered 
in the palace of Abdul Aziz. On July 14 the Servians were 
repulsed and obliged to retreat, and on August 5 they were 
defeated in a pitched battle at Knyazebec, but continued to 
contest the invasion of their country step by step in an obsti- 
nate and courageous manner. Failing to receive the expected 
succor from Russia, and finding himself hard pressed, by the 
middle of September Prince Milan begged of the Turkish 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

commander an armistice, which was readily granted him. As 
soon as negotiations for peace commenced, however, disagree- 
ments arose again between the Turkish government and the 
Russian ambassador, who insisted on compensation to those 
sufferers in the Bulgarian massacres who still lived to receive 
it, and punishment for those who were chiefly accountable for 
them. As usual, the sultan attempted to shirk the responsi- 
bility of direct interference by the execution of a few bashi- 
bazouks. Disraeli was also obliged to support the Russian 
demands in this instance as a sop to English public opinion, 
and the British envoy warned Sultan Murad that in the event 
of a war with Russia he would be obliged to contend alone ; 
but the new sultan possessed neither force nor intellect, and 
could do nothing to stem the current of events. 

The Tsar Alexander appears more prominently than Gort- 
chakoff in dealing with the Balkan question, and always 
appears to advantage. Early in November he was interviewed 
by Lord Augustus Loftus, and expressed himself on the sub- 
ject with a plainness and sincerity to which subsequent events 
have testified. The Porte, he declared, by a series of ma- 
noeuvres had frustrated all Europe's efforts to terminate the 
war and secure general peace, and that if the other powers 
chose to put up with such behavior, he could not reconcile 
it with Russian honor, dignity, and interests to do so any 
longer. It is plain that he pledged his word to Lord Loftus 
that he had no design upon Constantinople, and that if he 
found it necessary to occupy Bulgaria he would only do so 
until suitable guarantees of local autonomy had been given. 
He declared that he had made the same proposal to all the 
powers ; that he had suggested the occupation of Bosnia by 
Austria, and that Great Britain should make a naval demon- 
stration before Constantinople. Alexander then specified his 
demands of the sultan to be an armistice for Servia and Mon- 
tenegro, a conference to decide what reforms were practi- 
cable and requisite for the Christian provinces, and adequate 
guarantees from the sultan that the reforms should be carried 
out in earnest. That the Tsar and Bismarck were acting in 
concert in this crisis is evident from a statement made by the 

3" 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

latter at a dinner-party in Berlin, only three weeks later, in 
which he said : 

"Germany's duty, before all, is to maintain peace within her 
own borders. If war should take place between Russia and Turkey 
they will both become tired of it in course of time, and then the 
mediation of Germany will be more likely to prove effectual. It 
would be inexpedient to give Russia advice just at present. Such 
a step would put the Russian nation out of temper, which would be 
more prejudicial to us than a passing difference with any govern- 
ment. It is unlikely that England wiil go to war with Russia." 

Alexander's proposition was fair enough to have satisfied 
any one except the sceptical Disraeli. He may have been 
right in not trusting the Russians any more than he could 
help, but it was fortunate for Austria that he was not in An- 
drassy's position. The irritation caused by these events in 
England was taken note of by the German people in their quiet 
way, and contrasted with the public feeling there in 1S70. 
Oueen Victoria was very much distressed, and exerted her- 
self in a laudable manner in the interest of peace, though, with 
such a will-o'-the wisp as Disraeli to guide her, her efforts 
were no more than a vain beating of the air. She sent her 
secretary, Colonel Wellesley, to the Tsar on a secret mission 
which has never been properly explained. She also wrote a 
number of letters to Bismarck imploring him to make use of 
his great authority for the benefit of England. British influ- 
ence was also brought to bear on the crown prince, and Bis- 
marck had the same struggle to contend with in the palace 
which had happened so often before, 1 — this time not a difficult 
one, however, for the personal regard of William for Alex- 
ander had increased rather than diminished since the Franco- 
German war. The Turk had one other ally in Europe and 
only one, — Pius IX. The Voice of Truth, a semi-official pub- 
lication of the Vatican, printed an editorial to prove that the 
Mohammedan rule was to be preferred before the ascendancy 
of the Greek cross. The head of the Catholic Church would 

1 Our Chancellor, ii. 127. 
312 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

seem to have been stony-hearted so far as the suffering of 
human beings was concerned. 

On December 5 the Socialist leader, Eugene Richter, inter- 
rogated Bismarck in regard to the presumed support that 
Russia was receiving from the German government, and re- 
ceived the following reply : 

" If, at an ill timed moment, you put a spoke in the wheel of 
a power which happens to be in difficulties, it is quite possible that 
you may upset the coach, but the driver will have noticed who it 
was that inserted the spoke. The previous speaker, like many other 
people, labors under the error that Russia is just now soliciting great 
favors and services at our hands. This is by no means the case. 
He has hinted that Russia is bent upon conquest and territorial 
annexations. We have the Emperor Alexander's solemn assurance 
that he will refrain from the one and the other. Russia asks us for 
nothing that we can bargain about ; she only seeks our co-operation 
in a peaceable conference, with an object which is ours as well as 
hers, — namely, the safeguarding of the Porte's Christian subjects 
against the treatment which is incompatible with existing European 
legal conditions, and upon the abolition of which Europe is entirely 
at one, although she has not yet hit upon the right way of giving 
effect to her unanimity. It would appear that, should the con- 
ference prove fruitless, Russia will very shortly proceed on her own 
account to obtain by force that which the Porte refuses to concede 
peaceably. Even in that case Russia asks nothing from us but neu- 
trality, which it is in our interest to observe. ' ' 

The conferences between the Turkish government and the 
envoys of the great powers continued at Constantinople from 
the middle of December until the middle of January, 1877, 
without coming to any favorable issue, and perhaps it was not 
intended that they should. It does not appear that the Turks 
were encouraged at this time by English support, but the war 
party had gained the ascendancy and the old Moslem element 
had become thoroughly stirred up. On January 20 the Tsar 
issued a circular note to the effect that the continual refusal 
of the Turkish government to consider the claims and wishes 
of Europe could no longer be disregarded. The Christian 
nations of Europe were dishonored by it, and the only remedy 

3*3 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

now possible consisted in an appeal to arms. At this Victoria 
is credited with having written a spirited letter to Emperor 
William, in which she designated him and his chancellor 
as chiefly responsible for the approaching war. 

We wonder if Emperor William replied that he had also 
appealed to her government to prevent a war which was a 
much more serious matter to Germany than the Balkan ques- 
tion was to England, and had received in reply the advice to 
humiliate himself to Louis Napoleon. Let us suppose that 
William I. and Bismarck had permitted Victoria and the 
crown prince to determine their policy in this crisis ; what 
would have happened ? Two consequences were possible, — 
either the Russo-Turkish war would have been prevented, 
and the population of the Balkan states have been relegated 
to a worse than African slavery, or Russia would have formed 
an immediate alliance with France, and carried out her pro- 
gramme as before, on condition of a combined attack against 
Germany in the near future. In either case Germany would 
have become the chief sufferer, and would have fallen from 
the first position in Europe to the tributary one of 1854. 
Emperor William would have been obliged either to make 
war, in case of the Tsar's refusal to accept an authoritative 
mediation, or to expose his own weakness before the whole 
of Europe. The result proved that there was no such great 
danger to British interests as Disraeli imagined, and that Bis- 
marck understood perfectly the elements he was dealing with, 
and how to bring the Turkish problem to a fortunate issue. 
It was not until April 24 that the Russian forces passed the 
Danube and invaded Bulgaria. The slow progress which was 
made after this, however, did not compare favorably with Von 
Moltke's rapid and decisive advance in 1870. The army of 
the Danube was commanded by princes of the royal blood ; 
but they were not princes like the two Fredericks, and after 
they had met with a bloody repulse south of the Balkans, the 
Tsar began fairly to realize this. General Todleben, the 
venerable defender of Sebastopol, was given the chief com- 
mand early in December, and took advantage of an imprudent 
advance of the Turkish right wing to isolate it in the Bal- 

314 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

kans, where its commander, Osman Pasha, was soon com- 
pelled to surrender with forty thousand men. On January 
20 he captured Adrianople and opened the road to the Otto- 
man capital, and the following day the London Daily News 
published a statement to the effect that Turkey as a military 
power no longer existed. 

This sudden collapse of the Ottoman empire produced 
great consternation at Westminster. A large fleet of iron- 
clads was already posted at the Dardanelles ; British regi- 
ments were ordered from India to the Levant, and Disraeli 
despatched an ultimatum to Gortchakoff threatening war in 
case the Russian forces occupied Constantinople. There is 
no evidence that Alexander intended to do this in contra- 
vention to the pledge given to Lord Loftus at Livonia. The 
Russian army paused at Adrianople; Andrassy conferred 
with Bismarck, and proposed a European congress to meet 
at Berlin. Bismarck now appeared as the mediator between 
these great antagonists. It was he who persuaded Gortchakoff 
and Disraeli to submit their opposing claims to European 
arbitration. The Turk was powerless, and could be disposed 
of as the great powers considered best. 

To bring Disraeli and Gortchakoff together was not a 
simple task, for they represented the most aggressive element 
in their respective nationalities. The Turkish government 
had concluded a provisional treaty with Russia on March 3 
at San Stephano, and this gave the Russians such advantages 
as both Disraeli and Andrassy declared were incompatible 
with the peace of Europe. The war indemnity of fourteen 
hundred thousand roubles was not so important, since it was 
quite unlikely to be paid; but the extension of Bulgaria from 
Roumania to the boundaries of ancient Thessaly, to be occu- 
pied by an army of fifty thousand men, would place Con- 
stantinople in continual danger from any sudden uprisal of 
the Greeks and Macedonians. Disraeli was decidedly of this 
opinion, and the Hungarian traveller Vambery wrote lettters 
and articles on the subject for English periodicals. Indig- 
nation meetings were held at Buda-Pesth, and there was a 
corresponding agitation for Russia in the Slavic provinces of 

3'5 



LIFE OF H1SMAKCK 

Austria. Andrassy steered his course between these danger 
oiis rocks like a skilful pilot, and succeeded in preserving 

Austrian neutrality without throats or bombast. It was at 

this time that Bismarck said of Andrassy in the Reichstag: 

"Our relations to Austria are characterized by frankness and 
mutual confidence, which is a remarkable fact, considering what 

took pluc m former limes, when other political parties in Austria 

were more powerful than they are now. This is not only the case 
between the two monarchs and the two governments j no, I am 

proud to say that my personal relations to Count Andrassy ait- ol 

so friendly a character as to permit him to put any question openly 

to me in die interest ol" Austria, and to feel as certain that I will 
answer il truthfully, as I do that he tells me nothing but the truth 

wiih respect to Austria's intentions." 

The Clericals, of course, sympathized with Turkey, and Dr. 
Windhorst had questioned Bismarck sharply with regard to 
his sacrifice ol' German interests by a continued informal alli- 
ance with Russia; in this instance German interests and Aus- 
trian interests were identical. To which Bismarck replied as 

above, and also assured the doctor that there was a perfect 
understanding between Count Andrassy and himself, which 

did not require Windhorst's oversight or mediation. The easy 

good humor of Bismarck's speeches at this time indicates 
that he was well satisfied with what was taking place, and 
felt himself master iA' the situation. 

The posture ol' affairs in April appeared more warlike than 

before, a\m\ Bismarck exerted himself energetically to per- 
suade Alexander to mitigate the conditions of peace, ami the 
English cabinet to be more willing to accept accomplished 

facts. In this good service he was greatly assisted by Count 

SchouvalofF, who belonged to the moderate Slavonic party 
iii Russia, and who acted as a mediator between Bismarck, 

Alexander, and Lord Salisbury, whose advent in the- English 

ministry at this juncture was fortunate for all concerned. The 
last of May Schouvaloff ami Salisbury signed an agreement 
to the effect that the clauses in the treaty of San Stephano 
which had become a bone of contention should be left to the 

316 



LIFE OF BISMAHCK 

Berlin congress, for which Bismarck immediately issued invi- 
tations to all the powers. 

As usual, Bismarck was requested to explain his policy in 
the Reichstag, which he did in the following felicitous 
manner : 

" I do nol picture to myself a peace mediator playing the part of 
an arbitrator, and repeating, ' It must he thus, or thus,' when tin- 
whole power of Germany stands behind to enforce my statemenl ; 
but a more modesl one, something like that of an honest broker 
who really wants to transai I business. We are in the position to 
save any power entertaining secret wishes from the embarrassment of 
encountering refusal, or even a disagreeable rejoinder, from its op- 
ponent in the congress. Jf we are equally friendly with both par- 
ties, we can first sound one and tell the other, 'Don't do this or 
that, but try to manage it thus!' I have had many years' experi- 
ence iu these mailers, and have often observed that in discussions 
between two people the thread is frequently dropped, and each 
party feels bashfully disinclined to pick it up. If a third party be 
present he can do so without hesitation, and even bring the other 
two togethei again if they have parted ill-humoredly. That is the 
part I want to play." 

The modest, intelligent simplicity of such a statement dis- 
arms criticism, for it seems too much even to praise it; and 
Bismarck was known henceforth as the "honest broker" 
anion;.' the diplomats of Europe. If he began his course as a 
statesman with a sword in his hand, he now carried an olive- 
branch and wielded it no less effectively. 

The congress met on June 13 in Bismarck's own dwelling, 
the Radziwill Palace, in Berlin, and continued its sessions 
exactly one month. Bismarck presided and played the part 
of honest broker in and out of its sessions. Gortchakoff may 
not have expected such an obstinate resistance as he encoun- 
tered to the Russian demands. The natural tendency of all 
men to unite against an individual who proves himself too 
Strong for them also applies to nations, and it is only neces- 
sary to look at the map of Europe to recognize its applica- 
tion in the present instance. There was an excellent oppor- 

3'7 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

tunity for French intrigue at the Congress of Berlin, which 
Waddington, the French envoy, was perhaps too high- 
minded to take advantage of. If he did not oppose the 
claims of Russia, he certainly neglected to support them in 
an outspoken manner. The tendency to an alliance between 
Austria, Germany, and Great Britain was evident from the 
first ; but in spite of that Disraeli was found the most difficult 
plenipotentiary to deal with. 1 In his case the proverbial diffi- 
culty was exemplified of making a bargain with a Jew, and it 
was essential, besides, that he should return to England with 
flying colors for the sake of the Tory party, which had been 
weakening ever since the massacre at Batak ; but the current 
of affairs was now in his favor. Bessarabia was restored to 
Russia, and the other Christian states became autonomous, 
with the exception of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which were 
placed in the care of the Austrian government for a term of 
years, — an indefinite term, apparently. Servia and Bul- 
garia were both enlarged in the interest of Christianity, and 
Batoum was made a free port. The only direct advantage 
which Russia had obtained from the war, at a sacrifice of 
seventy thousand men, was Kars and adjacent territory, Bess- 
arabia, and an uncertain indemnity, which could not be com- 
pared with the compensation that Prussia derived from the 
campaign of 1870. Gortchakoff was very much disgusted at 
this ; but the Tsar kept the promise he had made to Lord 
Loftus, and did not go beyond the scheme he laid down at 
Livonia. 

At the close of the conference Punch published a humorous 
cartoon of Bismarck and Disraeli, viewing each other across 
a table, and underneath this Bizzy was represented saying, 
" Do you know, I doubt if our friend the Turk will more than 
half like this arrangement ;" to which Dizzy replies, " Ah, yes, 
that is possible, but we must educate him up to it" — referring 
to the sentimental talk in the House of Commons in regard 
to educating the Turks to a sense of moral responsibility. It 



1 Bismarck even states that he went to Disraeli's bedside at midnight in order 
to obtain his assent to agreements concluded between the other envoys. 

318 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

would be quite as practicable to train up cougars for sheep- 
dogs. 

This, after all, was the truth of the matter. The English 
cabinet had been insisting for two years past that the dis- 
memberment of Turkey would be a political monstrosity, the 
thought of which was not to be tolerated, and Disraeli had 
declared at a London dinner that " in such a righteous cause 
the cost of one, two, or three campaigns, in men and money," 
was not to be considered. 1 Yet this was what the Berlin 
Congress had accomplished, and what Disraeli subscribed his 
name to. He returned to England with a flourish of trum- 
pets, and Victoria made him Lord Beaconsfield for work that 
had really been performed by Bismarck and Andrassy ; after 
which he plunged into the most chimerical political adven- 
tures, and led his party to defeat at the next general election. 
The purchase of the Suez Canal was sensible and practical, 
but Beaconsfield's scheme of a railroad through Mesopo- 
tamia, and his treaty with the Ameer of Herat almost bor- 
dered on political lunacy. Bismarck shook his head at the 
Afghanistan adventure, and remarked that treaties with half- 
civilized nations were worse than useless, — one must either 
conquer them or let them alone. 

Gortchakoff returned to St. Petersburg with a feeling of 
dissatisfaction that never left him. He had perhaps pictured 
to himself reviving the former ascendancy of Russia during 
the Holy Alliance, and did not realize the difference between 
the times of Alexander I. and of Alexander II. Bismarck may 
have preserved Russia from a war with England and Austria, 
but Gortchakoff did not realize this. The cordial feeling 
which continued between the two emperors did not extend to 
their ministers. Bismarck expressed himself afterwards as 
holding Gortchakoff in slight esteem, either as a man or a 
statesman. The Journal de St.- Peter sbourg, the Golos, and 
other Russian newspapers soon began to attack the policy of 



1 Wilhelm Miiller says that Disraeli's policy was " oriental" in more senses 
than one. History, p. 510. It was in fact oriental in its geography, its ferocity, 
and its extravagance. 

3*9 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

the German empire, ami hinted broadly at the possibility of 
a French alliance. Austria and Count Andrassy came in for 
their share of this splenetic humor. The Tsar had supported 
Germany during the war in 1870, and the opposition to Gort- 
chakoff at the Berlin congress was treated, of course, as base 
ingratitude. It is true enough that Russia was not permitted 
the full swing in 1878 that Germany may be said to have en- 
joyed in 187 1, and the accruing advantages of the war with 
Turkey were not equal to those which Prussia obtained in the 
war with France; but the question may be asked whether 
Bismarck could have effected nunc- favorable results for Russia 
if he had attempted to <-\o so. The solution of the Turkish 
problem was, if anything, more difficult than the creation of 
German nationality, — so diverse and antagonistic were the 
elements of which it was composed, — and if it was not settled 
by the Berlin congress in a wholly ideal manner, it was cer- 
tainly settled in a more satisfactory manner than any one 
could have expected two years before, and the peace and con- 
tentment of the Christian provinces since that time is good 
testimony in its favor. As Gladstone replied to his old antag- 
onist, "A cordon of independent states is a much stronger 
barrier to Russian aggression than the hollow shell of the old 
Turkish Empire." l"ov Bulgaria and Servia to come under 
the yoke of the Russian despotism would be only a less mis- 
fortune than their reconquest by the Turks, and their inhabi- 
tants were well aware of this. Humanity, as Bismarck stated 
in the Reichstag, had been well served, and Turkey was the 
only power that could reasonably complain. 

Looked at from all sides the settlement of the Turkish 
problem was one of the most ingenious pieces of statecraft. 
The Russian press was particularly exasperated at the trans- 
fer o( Bosnia and Herzegovina to Austria, 1 for by this means 
Bismarck achieved a three-fold advantage. The presence of 
an Austrian army corps in this entering-wedge of the Bal- 



1 According to Bismarck, tins was the result of a previous agreement between 
Alexander and Francis Joseph before the commencement of hostilities. Me- 
moirs, ii. 2]$. 

320 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

kans would serve to discourage local insurrections and rash 
political movements; a short route was secured from Hun- 
gary to Constantinople by which an Austrian force could 
reach the Bosphorus before the Russians might be able to 
pass the Balkans ; and the loss of Austrian territory by the war 
of 1866 was in a great measure repaired. 1 At the same time 
the possession of Bessarabia and the independence of Bul- 
garia had given Russia an advantage at the mouth of the 
Danube which could not but have a permanent effect on the 
policy of Austria, and this effect proved in the sequel to be 
greatly to the advantage of Germany. Bismarck's master- 
stroke, however, was his suggestion to M. Waddington that 
the French government should take possession of Tunis as 
their share in the general distribution of prizes. This was 
done shortly afterwards, but it produced an amount of irrita- 
tion in Italy which French politicians had not counted upon. 
The Parisian journalists discovered too late that Bismarck's 
object was to produce an antagonism in Rome against France, 
and that the possession of Tunis was paid for in an Austro- 
German-Italian alliance. Bismarck had remodelled Europe 
after his own fashion, and had buttressed Germany about like 
a strong castle. Austria, however, gained the most decided 
advantage, for, next to Turkey, it was the power most se- 
riously imperilled by the Russian victories ; and it was some- 
thing more than an amiable formality which led Count An- 
drassy to propose a vote of thanks to Bismarck, previous to 
the adjournment of the congress, for the wisdom and untiring 
energy with which he had directed its proceedings and influ- 
enced its members in the work of pacification ; to which Bis- 
marck replied in a gracious and complimentary spirit. 

1 Andrassy had a hard struggle to reduce these provinces to an orderly condi- 
tion after two years of continuous revolution, hut the equitable manner in which 
he treated all parties, Christians and infidel alike, has been greatly com- 
mended. 



21 321 



CHAPTER XIV 

SOCIALISM AND THE TARIFF 

During the last month of 1877 it was well known that 
Pius IX. could not live much longer. He had been one of 
the youngest popes ever elected to the papal see, and he had 
occupied the chair of St. Peter, which he acquired in a literal 
sense, longer than any other, but his reign had happened in 
unfavorable times, to which his naturally amiable and kindly 
disposition was not suited. That he was still possessed of a 
forgiving spirit towards his enemies appeared at the sudden 
death of Victor Emmanuel on January 9, 1878. "Victor," 
he said, " was not bad at heart, but he was surrounded by evil 
counsellors. But he will have a good bath, — yes, yes, he 
will have a good bath, and then he will come out all right." 
A vivid description of the good bath referred to will be found 
in Dante's " Purgatorio," z and in Victor Emmanuel's case it 
would come to several centuries of purification by fire. In 
less than a month Pius followed after the King of Italy, and 
Cardinal Pecci was chosen pope by a vote of forty-five to 
eighteen, adopting the title of Leo XIII. 

This election was a quiet revolution in the Catholic Church, 
for Pecci had always acted in a half-concealed antagonism to 
Pius IX. He had been Bishop of Perugia, and a favorite 
with the predecessor of Pius, and it was expected that he 
would adopt a more conciliatory policy than had prevailed of 
late in the Vatican councils. Whether Bismarck had exer- 
cised any influence in his election, or whose Bismarck's can- 
didate may have been, has not been revealed, but Francis 
Joseph, the King of Belgium, and even the French govern- 
ment took a lively interest in the selection of a pope, and 
probably all had something to say on the subject. Those 



1 Purgatorio, canto xxvi. 
322 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

who expected to see Leo XIII. reconciled immediately to the 
German emperor and the May Laws repealed by the Reichs- 
tag without delay were soon undeceived. Great bodies move 
slowly, and though the new pope made friendly advances to 
William and Alexander, they were such as signified little 
beyond a desire to live as peaceably as the present situation 
of affairs would permit. 

Leo issued an encyclic letter on April 21 in which he re- 
newed and confirmed all protests of his predecessor against 
the deprivation of his temporal dominion and against every 
infringement of the rights properly belonging to the Church 
of Rome. This was a dignified assertion of a position the 
church had assumed, and which the pontiff could not wholly 
escape from. He wrote to the Emperor of Germany at the 
same time, expressing the utmost good-will, and suggesting 
for the promotion of peace and harmony an alteration, though 
not the repeal, of the May Laws. William I. never answered 
this letter, for the buckshot of Nobeling had laid him at the 
door of death ; but Leo, upon hearing of this catastrophe, 
joined the other potentates of Europe in a despatch express- 
ing the keenest solicitude and sympathy for his condition. 
The crown prince was now acting as regent, and between him 
and Bismarck there was for once no difference of opinion. He 
answered the pope's letter of condolence, and at the same time 
replied to his previous communication in regard to the May 
Laws. His statement was clear, simple, and emphatic. With 
all good-will to the Church of Rome and its highest repre- 
sentative, the regent could see no alternative other than the 
supremacy of the empire and the strict enforcement of its 
laws. However, a change of policy soon became evident. 
The form remained the same, but the animating spirit was 
different. There was no longer a German envoy at the Vati- 
can, but diplomatic relations still continued between the pope 
and the Bavarian government. When Bismarck went to Kis- 
singen in July it was noticed that he had a number of inter- 
views with the papal nuncio from Munich. No external re- 
sults followed upon these consultations, but to the shrewder 
sort it was apparent that both parties were heartily tired of 

323 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

the contest, and would be glad of an opportunity to escape 
from the continuation of it. Although the May Laws re- 
mained nominally in force, there was continually less occasion 
for the application of them, and it is supposed that in many 
instances the opposition to them passed unheeded where this 
did not attract public attention. Subsequent ev.ents would 
seem to indicate that there was some kind of an under- 
standing between Bismarck and the pope's nuncio at Kis- 
singen. 

It was now that the slumbering volcano of socialism, or, as 
it is called in Germany, social democracy, suddenly became 
active beneath the German soil, manifesting itself in a most 
surprising manner. On the nth of May, 1878, while the 
emperor was driving in an open carriage in the Unter den 
Linden, a tinker from Leipsic named Hodel fired two shots at 
him from the sidewalk, neither of which took effect. Hodel 
was immediately arrested, and ultimately executed. 

Hodel was not a typical Socialist, but rather a vagabond, 
like Guiteau, who, having been exposed for fraudulent prac- 
tices, wished to distinguish himself by some desperate act 
which he supposed would win the applause of suffering hu- 
manity. He had, however, belonged to two Socialist organi- 
zations, and professed that his object was to rid the earth of a 
tyrant. Why he should have considered William I. in the 
light of a tyrant, while Germany was enjoying a period of 
peace and prosperity, and its government had no aggressive 
policy except towards the Roman Catholics, it is difficult to 
comprehend ; but at this same time there were Germans in 
America who talked against Emperor William with a blind 
bitterness like negrophobia. A German newspaper published 
in New York never ceased its vituperation of him, and did 
not hesitate to declare that the Reign of Terror was prefer- 
able to a peaceable condition of society under the existing 
laws. Carl Schurz, the representative German of America, 
was described as a traitor to two hemispheres. Only two 
months later a riot of foreign workmen broke out on the 
Pennsylvania Railroad, which could only be suppressed by a 

324 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

regiment of United States regulars. It was a wide-spread 
conspiracy, not directed against monarchical government or 
any particular kind of government, but against the right of 
individuals to hold and inherit property. 

Bismarck had not expected that Germany would escape 
from this French mania, but he was surprised at the sudden 
form in which it appeared. He had looked for a general 
uprising of the laboring classes in Berlin and other portions 
of Germany, and this would probably have happened if they 
had been organized into militia by themselves, as they had 
been at Paris. If William was less than an emperor to his 
chancellor, he was more than a friend, and Hodel's criminal 
attempt was like a blow which stung Bismarck to action. 
Something must be done; but what? How was this invisible 
hydra to be reached and dealt with? His health was never 
so miserable as at this period of his life ; for he was now sixty- 
three, and feeling the influence of old age upon him. Von 
Beust had proposed to him at Salzburg to organize an anti- 
international society, independent of governments, which 
would serve to inculcate such doctrines as might counteract 
the influence of those chimerical and impracticable theories 
from which the Socialists distilled their peculiar mental poison. 
Some attempt had been made at this in Berlin, and what had 
been the consequence ? Irony of ironies : Hodel was an asso- 
ciate of this very society at the time he made his attempt ! 

" Bismarck," says Von Beust, " agreed that the govern- 
ments on their side would have to introduce more stringent 
laws against such revolutionary societies, against commu- 
nistic undertakings with a criminal intent, such as arson, and 
against speeches in defence or glorification of communism. 
Prince Bismarck recommended that a committee should be 
formed to investigate this question, and to this I agreed, under 
the proviso that one of the subjects referred to it for consid- 
eration should be the condition of the working classes, with a 
view to its being ameliorated in a constitutional manner." * 
This memorandum formed the basis of Bismarck's subsequent 

1 Memoirs, ii. 273. 
3 2 5 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

policy towards the Socialists : first, government repression, 
especially for incendiary speeches and publications, and, sec- 
ondly, an attempt to ameliorate the condition of the laboring 
classes. He had never been a believer in absolute freedom 
of speech, and thought the Prussians had too much liberty in 
that respect. He now saw plainly that assassins like Cohen and 
Hodel were little more responsible for their own acts than the 
weapons they used. Socialist publications and photographs 
of Socialist agitators were found upon Hodel's person. It 
was the rhetoricians who stirred up unbalanced and misan- 
thropic individuals to these desperate attempts. 1 For the 
government to permit such revolutionary talk and licentious 
language was a libel on all freedom. There must be a limit 
in such matters as in all other mundane affairs ; and the first 
point to be considered was the emperor's safety. Bismarck 
drafted the sketch of a law, making it a penal offence to use 
inflammatory language in regard to the emperor in any public 
manner; and also a law to restrict the right of holding public 
meetings to such as were convened by the better class of citi- 
zens. Not feeling equal to an exertion which included so 
much personal feeling, Bismarck sent the sketch of his laws 
to the Bundesrath, where all constitutional changes had to be 
entered, and delegated Von Moltke, whose personal feeling in 
the case was equally strong, to undertake its passage in the 
Reichstag ; but there, to his surprise and to that of many 
others, all parties, except the Conservatives, united against 
the law. The National Liberals deserted Bismarck in a body, 
an act of treachery, as he considered it, which warned him in 
regard to the future. Von Moltke's simple, unpretending 
argument, delivered with all the earnestness of a soldier on 
the battle-field, failed to produce any effect on the serried 
ranks of the opposition. Absolute freedom of speech and 
the right of all classes to hold public meetings had been won 
in the street-fights of 1848, and was not to be relinquished. 



1 So Guiteau admitted on his trial, — that during the month while he was lying 
in wait for President Garfield he fed upon the editorials of certain newspapers 
which were violently opposed to the policy of the administration. 

326 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

The assertion of the Clericals, that the tendency to anarchy 
was the natural outgrowth of the suspension of religious exer- 
cises in so many German parishes, was silenced by the retort 
that even if such an argument could apply to Hodel, whose 
parents were Protestants, it certainly could not apply to Kull- 
man ; but the chamber was fairly drowned with the floods of 
Lasker's eloquence in regard to " the rights of man" and " the 
meaning of the nineteenth century." 

Lasker was very close to a Socialist himself, and the Con- 
servatives thought that he would not have regretted it if 
Hodel's shots had taken effect. The bill was defeated by an 
exceptionally large majority. One would think that the 
Reichstag might have taken some action for the better se- 
curity of their chief magistrate. If Bismarck's measures 
were considered too stringent, it would seem as if the 
National Liberals might have introduced a substitute of some 
kind. 

This result so disheartened Bismarck that he contemplated 
resigning, and declared openly that he would no longer serve 
so ungrateful a public. It of course encouraged the Socialists, 
and may have contributed to the subsequent attempt at assas- 
sination on the 2d of June. Dr. Charles Nobeling, a philolo- 
gist and a disagreeable egotist, believed that he could improve 
on Hodel's method, which it was easy to see had small chance 
of success unless the assassin were a practised marksman. 
Nobeling was a fine shot with a fowling-piece, and could hit 
swallows on the wing. He was well educated, but had lived 
rather a vagrant life, and was known in all his haunts for the 
aggressiveness of his socialism. He had lately visited among 
the Internationals at London, and it was believed that they 
had encouraged him to make this desperate attempt. The 
emperor took no special pains to protect himself after Hodel's 
miscarriage, and could be seen driving on the Unter den 
Linden at regular hours. Nobeling obtained a room on the 
first story of a dwelling-house, and, waiting until William I. 
drove by, fired two charges of buckshot at him in rapid 
succession. In the excitement of the moment, however, he 
neglected to allow for the declination, and this saved the em- 

3 2 7 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

peror's life. The buckshot riddled the helmet, — Mtiller says 
it looked like a sieve, — and inflicted a good many scalp 
wounds, but did not penetrate the skull. William was driven 
back to his palace almost insensible, but was able to say, as 
they laid him on his bed, " I cannot understand why people 
are always shooting at me." 1 The crowd on the Unter den 
Linden, where army officers are always promenading, rushed 
into the house where Nobeling was concealed, and, seizing 
upon a man whom they supposed to be the offender, came 
near tearing him to pieces before his innocence could be 
proved. Others who saw the window from which the shot 
was fired broke into Nobeling's room and attempted to arrest 
him ; but the criminal made a desperate struggle, and after 
inflicting severe injuries on those nearest him, gave himself 
a wound with a dagger which eventually ended his life. 

The news went all over Berlin in a twinkling, and the 
greatest excitement prevailed. An immense crowd collected 
about the royal palace, and stood there silently and respect- 
fully waiting for information of the emperor's condition. 
When at length the surgeons reported that his wounds, 
though serious, were not necessarily fatal, there was a gen- 
eral feeling of relief. Every one spoke of the strength of the 
emperor's constitution, the regularity of his exercise, and his 
hardy, vigorous, and virtuous life. These were certainly in 
his favor ; but the doctors found the next day that the feeling 
of discouragement that had taken possession of him was more 
dangerous than the gunshot wounds. He had done every- 
thing he had known how to do for his people, and this was 
his return for it. The two attempts to assassinate Bismarck 
had a definite object, but what advantage could any one expect 
from removing him from the world ? 

Bismarck was still at Varzin and the crown prince in 
London, where the hisses of the Internationals served as a 
premonition of Nobeling's crime. Both came at once, and 
their strengthening presence revived William's courage, so 
that in a few days the Prussian people were rejoiced to learn 

1 Political History of Recent Times, p. 638. 
328 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

that he was convalescent. The greatest indignation was ex- 
pressed all over Germany at the outrage, and Bismarck, like 
a man heated through with indignation, dissolved the Reichs- 
tag and ordered a new election. Even such an event could 
not obliterate old party lines, but there was a large increase 
in the number of Conservatives ; and the Social Democrats, 
who hastened to disclaim all connection with Nobeling, were 
reduced to nine members, six of whom were from Frenchi- 
fied Saxony. The Conservatives were still in a minority, but 
the National Liberals had changed their minds, and many of 
them had been replaced by men of a more loyal spirit. They 
would not agree to all that Bismarck desired, but they were 
willing to adopt a compromise measure, which it was hoped 
would provide for the better security of the emperor and his 
chancellor. The chief articles in the anti-socialist law were, 
firstly, empowering the government to dissolve all societies 
which were considered dangerous, confiscate all revolutionary 
publications, and enable the police to interfere with the pro- 
ceedings of public meetings whenever these showed a danger- 
ous tendency ; secondly, to expel from their residences or 
banish all persons whose proceedings were of an obnoxious 
character; and thirdly, to make all opprobrious language in 
regard to the emperor, or even severe criticism, a criminal 
offence. The Reichstag met on the 9th of September, so that 
the deputies had sufficient time to act on these measures with 
calm nerves and cool heads. They were severe and despotic 
remedies, but it was a case for severity. Socialism was a 
political monstrosity, which in Bismarck's opinion would have 
to be treated as Hercules dealt with the hydra. Yet it was 
not without a ratio essendi in the inequality of fortune, the 
hardships of poverty, and the terrible power which wealth 
gives its possessor. These would have to be considered, as 
well as the danger which menaced civilization from its im- 
practicable theories. On September 17 Bismarck reviewed 
the subject in a temperate and masterly manner, admitting, in 
the course of his address, that there had been a time when he 
felt a certain sympathy with socialism, but he could not feel 
that any longer. He said, in explanation of this : 

3 2 9 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

" The change took place in me long ago, at that moment when 
either Representative Bebel or Liebknecht — certainly one of the two 
— represented in a pathetic appeal the French Commune as a model 
of political institutions, and openly professed himself a disciple of 
the creed of these murderers and incendiaries. From that time on- 
ward I have felt the heavy weight which the conviction of the pres- 
ence of this danger carries with it. I had meanwhile been absent, 
owing to sickness or war ; but that appeal to the Commune was a ray 
of light that was thrown on the matter, and from that moment onward 
I have known the social-democratic element to be an enemy against 
whom the state and society had to stand on guard in self-defence. 
The attempts which I have made in this line at different stages of 
the legislature are known, and the members of the Reichstag will 
not fail to remember them. You know, also, that I have not suc- 
ceeded in carrying out the same ; on the contrary, a great many 
reproaches have been directed against me on that account; but 
from that moment I have never been remiss in my opposition to 
social democracy. Nor do I believe my endeavors to have been in 
vain, although they may sometimes appear so. We Germans have 
no need of resorting to such extreme measures as were used in 
France in 187 1, though France has ceased to be the chief seat 
of Socialism, and now takes a stand which our government, no 
less than society, need not be altogether dissatisfied with. What 
has wrought the change in France, convincing people they have 
been wholly in the wrong? By no other method than this, — by 
resorting to forcible means, such as I would not recommend you 
to imitate . . . Surely, gentlemen, if we are compelled to live 
under the tyranny of a set of murderers, life ceases to be worth 
living, and I trust that the Reichstag — that we — will stand by the 
government, by the emperor, who asks for protection for his own 
person, for his Prussian subjects, and his German countrymen. It 
is quite possible that for this occasion, perhaps, some of us may 
become the victims of murderous assaults ; but let any one to 
whom this happens bear in mind that he dies on the field of honor 
for the good — for the great good — of the Fatherland." 

The anti-socialist measures, somewhat modified by the 
amendments of the Liberals, were enacted for a term of four 
years and a half, but they were enacted again in 1883, and 
afterwards in 1887; so that public opinion in Germany evi- 
dently considered them necessary and justifiable. The doc- 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

trinaires cried out against them as " empirical makeshifts." 
" Persecution is the seed of the church," they said, and pre- 
dicted that now Bismarck would be strangled in his own 
coil ; but they were not aware that Protestantism had for- 
merly been eradicated from Belgium and Bohemia by unfavor- 
able legislation. It is not easy to decide, even now, exactly the 
effect of the anti- socialist laws. They did not eradicate So- 
cialism, for it continued to increase for the following twelve 
years, and since then it would seem to have decreased. It 
appears, however, to have placed the Socialists on their good 
behavior, and given the movement a slightly different direc- 
tion. There were no more attempts at the life of the emperor 
or of other high officials, which is probably what Bismarck 
cared for most. Prosecutions under the laws were not nu- 
merous, and caused little sensation. They did not arouse the 
excitement and animosity of the Kulturkampf laws. A num- 
ber of the most inveterate of the offenders anticipated their 
sentences by emigrating to America, where they filled the air 
with outcries against the tyranny of Emperor William, and 
finally wound up their career — at least, some of them — on an 
Illinois scaffold ten years later. Lasker came across the 
ocean about the same time, and added the force of his argu- 
ment to the odium of these reprobates. If the German gov- 
ernment was in any respect more despotic at that time, or is 
so now, than it was in 1 871, it is the Socialists and not Bis- 
marck who are accountable for this. Bismarck called the 
thing by its right name when he declared that it would be 
intolerable to live under the tyranny of such men as the So- 
cialists. Nobeling died in prison, but Hodel was hung ; and 
it is noteworthy that this was the first criminal execution at 
Berlin for seven years. What other metropolis can show the 
like of that? 1 

The best justification of the anti-socialist laws at this dis- 
tance is the fact that they have been three times re-enacted 
by the Reichstag, at intervals previously agreed upon, when 
there was no public excitement such as consecrated their 

1 General Grant approved of Hodel's execution. 
331 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

oripin, and at times when Bismarck's influence over the popu- 
lar chamber was less than it had been formerly. The law to 
provide for persons talking and writing against the emperor 
was intended to have the effect of what Berlin doctors call 
moralisches chloroform, — that is, the mild administration of 
chloroform so as to keep the patient quiet for a few minutes 
without quite taking away his senses. It was not intended to 
prevent candid, dispassionate criticism of the government, but 
to mitigate personal attacks and hot-tempered denunciations 
against the chief magistrate and those most nearly connected 
with him ; such as are only too common in all countries where 
freedom of speech prevails. No person has ever been prose- 
cuted under the law for talking in a reasonable and civil man- 
ner, and very few for any description of talking. Bismarck 
may have shown himself rather too sensitive in prosecuting 
Mommsen, the historian, for accusing him of having " dispos- 
sessed the Prussian crown," a rather serious charge when 
taken in its literal meaning, but the prosecution was discon- 
tinued, and was perhaps never intended for more than a 
threat. The editor who insinuated that the letters of assassi- 
nation with which Bismarck was threatened were written at his 
own dictation certainly deserved his punishment; for meanness 
and calumny could go no further, considering the attempts 
of Kullman and Nobeling. Apart from the assassination of 
emperors and presidents, indiscriminate falsification is an evil 
which future statesmen will have to deal with in a most ener- 
getic manner, if civilization is not to be utterly corrupted and 
destroyed by it. When all races of men become so morally 
perverted that they must be fed continually on partisan lies, 
like spoiled children on candy, and the truth is hateful in 
their ears ; then their course lies downward, and the muse of 
history turns away from them with averted face, for their 
history will no longer be worth recording. 

It will be remembered in this connection that when Bis- 
marck began to manage the Kniephof estate he issued an 
order that his tenants should attend to the necessary work on 
their own grounds before they did their work for him. If all 
land-owners and capitalists were to act on a similar principle 

332 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

it would perhaps be the best remedy for Socialism that could 
be devised. Bismarck was the same in 1878 that he had been 
in 1844, and he believed that no methods of repression would 
be of avail without some attempt to ameliorate the condition 
of the laboring classes. 

He had already made some tentative proposals in the direc- 
tion of an insurance fund for aged and disabled working-men 
or their families. The royal family had made large bequests for 
this purpose, but even an emperor could not fill such a gulf 
as this subject opened up. Bismarck's favorite device of 
making a monopoly of tobacco, and devoting the proceeds 
wholly for the benefit of persons who worked for five hundred 
thalers a year or less, did not succeed in passing the Reichs- 
tag. The Liberals and Progressists, who represented the 
mercantile and salaried classes, always opposed measures of 
this description, on the ground that they would interfere with 
the laws of supply and demand. Unfortunately, humanity 
sometimes has to interfere to prevent the demands of capital 
from crushing out the lives of men and women by overwork. 
Where and to what extent governments should interfere with 
the affairs of the business community is always a matter of 
judgment, and no rule can be scientifically devised for it. It 
is an intricate question, and one on which there will always 
be a difference of opinion ; but it has often been found neces- 
sary to limit the number of hours for employees in certain 
branches of industry, and this, at least, is sufficient to estab- 
lish the principle of legislative interference. 

FREE TRADE AND PROTECTION 

The French indemnity, the Kulturkampf, the Oriental ques- 
tion, and the Socialists had so occupied Bismarck since 1871 
that he found little leisure to attend to the industrial and 
commercial interests of the empire, and these had continued in 
the same routine condition as during the North German con- 
federation without much effort for change being made by any 
political party or particular faction. He had, however, mean- 
while, taken notice of some facts which seemed to him to 
have a peculiar significance, and now that he had bottled up 

333 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

the Socialists, as well as such gaseous creatures might be, 
with untiring diligence he devoted himself to the material in- 
terests of his country. On Christmas evening, 1878, it was 
reported to the Associated Press that Bismarck had enter- 
tained his friends at the Radzivvill Palace with a lengthy dis- 
sertation on political economy. He had noticed the sur- 
prising prosperity of France after the German evacuation, 
and he rightly ascribed it to President Thiers's protective 
tariff. He referred also to the United States of America, 
which was then entering on an era of astonishing material 
growth ; referred to the comparatively depressed condition of 
English trade, and concluded from these instances that the 
countries which had remained open were growing poor, and 
those which were closed up by a wall of custom-houses were 
becoming rich. He also produced a logical formula which 
he had worked out on this new subject, and showed a most 
surprising amount of knowledge of facts and details, all of 
which had been the result of a few months' study. His first 
principle of political economy was that every nation should 
do its own work, so far as possible. The report that Bis- 
marck had become a protectionist startled large classes of 
people in Germany, and the business world generally. 

What political economists commonly leave out of their cal- 
culations is the moral element. For instance, in the case of 
an irredeemable currency they estimate that a depreciation 
will take place in proportion to the excess that is issued ; but 
experience has proven that this is not the case, for the value 
of the currency will always depend chiefly on the credit of 
the government and the expectation of its final redemption. 
At the time of General Lee's surrender gold was at a premium 
in the United States of over one hundred per cent., and in two 
days it fell more than fifty per cent., although the volume of 
paper money in the country had not changed in an appre- 
ciable degree. So Ricardo's theory of rents was found not 
to work on our western prairies, for immigration skipped 
over certain districts because the resident population was not 
found congenial by the new-comers. On this account many 
of the finest lands still remain unoccupied. So it might be 

334 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

said generally of free trade that it leaves out the moral ele- 
ment. The greed of corporations is proverbial, and the law 
is obliged to step in to prevent capital from exercising too 
despotic a power. Free trade would work very well if all the 
civilized world was ruled by a single government. Then the 
wool-growers would gravitate to those countries where wool 
could be raised to the best advantage, and manufactories 
would spring up where climate and water-power were com- 
bined to the best advantage. This is the case to a certain 
extent at present, but the principle of nationality steps in to 
interfere with its evolution. Every nation is obliged to act as 
a unit, and to consider its interests irrespective of all others. 
There is a constant struggle for existence among nations, as 
there is among species of animals. Wool may be grown 
better and cheaper in South Africa than it is in Germany, but 
the money expended in raising it there is a direct benefit to 
South Africa, and if it is sold to Germany that takes so much 
from the " Fatherland" for the advantage of a foreign country. 
The statement that every nation should do its own work is a 
significant one. Every nation on the continent is obliged to 
maintain its population as near a maximum as possible for 
military purposes, and the question for its government is al- 
ways, how are its laboring classes to be kept from starving? 
If they earn good wages the community is prosperous, but 
if the reverse, trade languishes. The funds of a millionaire, 
unless invested mainly in industrial enterprises, are a burden 
to the community in which he resides. If he spends more 
than a fixed amount it is likely to be in foreign countries ; but 
if the farmers have good crops and get good prices for them 
they immediately make purchases, and all the wheels of trade 
are set in motion. The manner in which wealth is divided in 
a state or nation is more important than the sum total thereof. 
After fifty years of free trade the English farmer is poorer 
than he was before. 

The conflict between free trade and protection, or between 
a low tariff and a high one, is at the root a conflict between 
buyers and sellers. Those who have goods to sell wish to 
obtain as high a price as possible, while those who consume 

335 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

the goods and live on a fixed income, or, like professional 
men, are not producers in any way, are equally desirous for 
low prices. Now, any one can see that placing a duty on 
any imported article which is also produced in a country will 
raise the price of it by limiting the supply ; and it is equally 
natural to suppose that by removing the duty the price may 
be expected to decline again. 

As the class of consumers who are not in business for 
themselves greatly exceeds those who are, we should expect 
that in any industrial community the free-traders would have 
a large majority; but this is not the case. The large army of 
store-clerks live, it is true, on a fixed salary, but the continu- 
ation of that salary depends on the general prosperity of the 
community. If hard times arrive they become anxious lest 
their salaries may be reduced, or even of losing their posi- 
tions. Thus their employer's interests become their own, and 
unless they are in the service of importers they are pretty 
certain to vote the protective ticket. Lawyers, doctors, and 
professional non-producers are likely to be influenced in the 
same way, though not to the same extent ; for when money 
is scarce there is always less litigation, and physicians find it 
more difficult to collect their charges. Even the farmer will 
be affected in this manner, because when business is good 
people are always more willing to pay fair prices for eggs, 
butter, and summer vegetables. The general influence, there- 
fore, in an industrial community will be in favor of protection 
so long as protection stimulates industry, and this would 
probably be the case in England, also, if England were not 
governed so completely by its commercial interest. If, how- 
ever, the protection of home industries is carried to an ex- 
treme, those industries tend to become more profitable in pro- 
portion to others than they should be, and the tariff becomes 
a tax, for the benefit of those engaged in them, upon all the 
rest of the community. 

If the pudding is to be judged by the eating, free trade 
cannot be considered a success. It is rather too sweeping a 
generalization. It originated as a political war-cry to relieve 
Great Britain of the oppressive duties on breadstuffs, which 

336 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

were intended for the benefit of the landed gentry; and so 
long as a number of other nations adopted it, as England pos- 
sessed the carrying trade of the world, 1 it was greatly to the 
advantage of British interests ; but it is doubtful if it is so 
now. France and Germany have returned to a protective 
system, and show no present indication of a desire for change. 
The English provinces, Canada and Australia, demanded pro- 
tection as soon as they obtained power to legislate on their 
own affairs, and it was one of the principal demands of the 
Irish home-rule movement. This tendency of nations is a 
much stronger argument than the penny pamphlets of the 
Cobden Club. It is a mistake to suppose free trade is a 
political principle. Neither is there good reason for be- 
lieving that universal free trade would have the effect of pre- 
venting wars between the nations of the earth. Nations lose 
their temper like individuals, and when they once get to the 
fighting point considerations of material interest are thrown 
to the winds. 

Bismarck had already attempted in 1876 to make tobacco 
a government monopoly, but he could not persuade the 
Reichstag to agree with him ; and they were probably right 
enough in this, for, although such an authority would have 
been judiciously wielded during Bismarck's term of office, it 
might easily have been abused by his successors. Tobacco, 
though originally a luxury, has long since acquired the char- 
acter of a necessity to the working-man, and the comfort of 
his pipe at the close of the day is as essential to him as the 
roof over his head. Bismarck, however, believed that his 
countrymen smoked too much, and also drank too much 
lager, so that not long after this he issued an address to them 
on the subject, in the hope that it might induce them to become 
more temperate. 

He gave the German people three months to think over 
and discuss the tariff question before it was brought up in the 
Reichstag, and this afforded occupation for many a news- 

1 A legacy from the wars of Napoleon. 
22 337 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

writer and magazine contributor. The academic class attacked 
him at once, and not only denied any advantage in the proposed 
change, but questioned the sincerity of Bismarck's motives. 
His object evidently was to conciliate the Conservatives and 
the landed interest. The cry went abroad that Bismarck had 
deserted the National Liberals and was coquetting with the 
Clerical party. All the strongholds of Catholicism — Bavaria, 
Posen, and the Rhineland — were agricultural districts, which 
would be benefited by Bismarck's proposed duty on corn ; 
and it was also noticed that almost simultaneously with the 
proposal of his new tariff in the Reichstag, Dr. Falk resigned 
from the Ministry of Public Worship. This indicated a de- 
cided change in Bismarck's Catholic policy ; and he retorted 
to the National Liberals that if they were unwilling to follow 
him he must seek new allies where he could find them. 
There was no need of supposing him insincere in this ; and if 
he had wished to conciliate the Conservatives and Clericals, 
he might have found a more direct means of doing so than by 
changing the tariff. Political economy is eminently a prac- 
tical science, and men who have spent their whole lives in 
lecturing or hearing recitations are not the best qualified to 
express an opinion on it. 

Low prices are for the interest of the professional class, so 
far as they depend upon a fixed salary ; and it is easy enough 
to figure out results on paper which in their practical appli- 
cation fail to come to the same conclusion, on account of 
some factor which has been left out of consideration. 1 

There had never been actual free trade in Germany, nor 
had there been since I Si 5 any very high protection. Since 
1S48 the tendency of Prussia had been in the direction of 
lower duties, while raw materials were mostly admitted free 
of duty, and the duties on manufactured articles varied ac- 
cording to circumstances, without any definite system. No 
attempt had been made by any minister of finance to sys- 



1 One factor almost invariably omitted is the excessive productiveness of 
machinery. Manufacturers combining together can maintain a certain price in 
their own country and throw a large surplus at a lower rate on to foreign markets. 

«8 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

tematize the tariff, nor had the government made any oppo- 
sition to the will of the majority as expressed in the Landtag. 
This continued through the period of the North German 
confederation until the war with France, after which the in- 
flux of gold produced a rise of prices and prosperity for those 
who were in active business, though not advantageous for 
people living on a fixed income. This came to an end soon 
after the French payments ceased, and, as the French tariff 
had now closed one avenue to English exportation, Germany 
became the particular centre to which foreign imports gravi- 
tated, and the consequence was a general depression of Ger- 
man industry. At the same time the nation was burdened 
with a number of irregular taxes, of which the matriculary 
assessments were the most unpopular; and these had been 
adopted, according to the confession of the Minister of Finance, 
as temporary expedients. 

Bismarck believed that both of these evils could be reme- 
died at a single blow ; and it is significant that he should have 
taken the initiative in this matter, and should have carried 
through the reform almost on his own shoulders. His plan 
was to place a moderate protective duty on all materials of 
commerce, except such as could not be raised or produced in 
Germany. He did not believe in free raw material any more 
than in free broadcloth, though the duties on manufactured 
articles would have to be higher in proportion in order to 
protect the manufacturer at all. He showed good judgment 
both in advertising the question a sufficient time in advance, 
and in not bringing it before the country previous to a general 
election, so that the deputies who acted on it might come to 
the subject as unprejudiced as possible. It was not until the 
middle of April that he introduced his measure, when a storm 
of facts and figures broke upon him, enough to weary the 
stoutest brain and puzzle the clearest intellect. There is no 
other subject in which such contradictory results can be ob- 
tained from the most reliable statistics, and the opposition had 
come prepared for the purpose in a truly German and thorough- 
going manner. Changes of tariff have the effect for the im- 
mediate time of transferring money from the pockets of one 

339 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

class of persons to those of another, and there were few dep- 
uties present who did not feel this more or less ; so that it was 
not only a national question, but a strongly personal one. 
The debates were protracted and acrimonious. The proposed 
measure was treated as if it were a return to the dark ages. 
The prosperity of England was called to mind, together with 
the fact that wages were higher there than in protected 
France. The Liberals feared that it would make the govern- 
ment too independent of the popular will. However, a large 
body of the Liberals, led by Benningsen, were inclined to 
favor the measure to a certain extent, though Lasker and the 
extremists were bitterly opposed to it. 

Bismarck believed that the more thorough the discussion of 
the subject the better the public would be satisfied with the 
final decision. He interfered little in the debate, and it was 
not until May 2 that he brought forward his own argument 
in a moderate, conciliatory speech, which quite surprised those 
who had expected that he would attempt to carry through 
his bill by main force and hard talking. After referring to 
the matriculary assessments as a form of taxation not much 
better than financial anarchy, which made the government 
a kind of dunning creditor such as must necessarily cause 
great irritation, he presented the main points of his state- 
ment in the following summary : 

"There is still another objection that I must raise against our 
present legislation, and this is one of the most important, which is 
likely to occupy us more in our discussions than the purely financial 
part of the matter will do, — namely, that the present arrangement 
of our indirect taxation does not provide for our home industry that 
amount of protection which can be provided for it without in any 
way injuring our general interests. 

" I do not care to enter here into any general discussion on free 
trade. Up to this time we all have been protectionists, even the 
greatest free-traders that we have amongst us, for no one has till now 
expressed a desire to go below the tariff which is in force to-day ; 
and this tariff is essentially a moderately protective one, and the 
bill which we are submitting is also moderately protective. What 
we ask is a moderate protection of home labor. We are remote 

34o 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

from a system of prohibition such as exists in the majority of neigh- 
boring states. . . . 

" Surely we cannot expect Germany to be ever the dupe of 
honest conviction. Through the wide-open doors of our importa- 
tion we have thus far served as a reservoir for the over-production 
of all foreign countries. Articles that have come from abroad ap- 
pear to us to have a somewhat higher value than those of domestic 
origin ; and the flooding of Germany with the over-production of 
other countries must have, as it seems to me, a most depressing 
influence on our prices and on the development of our industry. 
Let us, therefore, close our doors and erect higher barriers, such as 
we here propose to you ; and let us take such necessary steps that 
the German market at least— the market where German good- 
nature is now being taken advantage of — shall be preserved for 
German industry. 

"The question of a large export trade is always somewhat pre- 
carious. No new countries can be discovered ; the globe has been 
circumnavigated, and we cannot find any more important nations 
to purchase our goods from us. A commercial treaty is a sign of 
friendship between nations ; but the question for the economist is, 
what is included in it? One might always ask in such cases, 
'Which party is going to be cheated?' As a rule, one will always 
be a victim, although the treaty may last for years before this is 
discovered. I do not refer here to our own treaties, but would 
remind you of those concluded between France and England, in 
which both parties now claim to have been deceived. What I 
wish to remind you of is the fact that our taxing machinery is not 
within the power of the government to the same extent as in neigh- 
boring countries. The levying and administrating of taxes is with 
us entirely publici juris, the right of the people, and no permis- 
sible deviation from the definition of the law can at any time take 
place with us ; while with our neighbors — France not excepted, 
although France resembles us closely enough — the power of the 
officials is such that there the administration of the law can be con- 
siderably interfered with." * 

It was said of this argument by the doctrinaires that Bis- 
marck had judged the subject too much from the stand-point 
of his foreign policy ; that he had introduced foreign politics 

1 Bismarck's Speeches, Speemann's ed., xvii. 8l. 
34i 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

into political economy ; and that this was to have been ex- 
pected from the nature of his genius and the mental methods 
he had been accustomed to. On the contrary, it was the 
breadth of his experience and his large way of looking at all 
subjects which enabled him to see the industrial conditions 
of his country in their true relations. The claim of specialists 
that they alone are capable of judging of matters within their 
own departments is one of the plagues of the century. That 
a man can only understand a subject by spending his whole 
life in the study of it is a delusion. It would be much more 
correct to say, as has been often said in regard to languages, 
that he who knows but one subject knows none. If an art 
critic is to judge of an historical painting, he must not only 
be acquainted with the technicalities of the school to which it 
belongs, but he must have a fine sense of color, an eye for 
form, a knowledge of history and philosophy, and, above all, 
an insight into human nature like that of the dramatic poet; 
and this last can only be obtained by a wide experience in 
human affairs. A statesman who has to legislate on the tariff 
must be well read in history as well as political economy. 
He must understand international politics, and in what way 
his proposed measures are likely to be affected by them, or 
vice versa. He must also understand human nature, or how 
men are likely to act under given conditions. Free-trade 
doctrinaires might continue to argue the ultimate advantages 
of every nation's doing the work which it could do best ; but 
the return of France to a protective policy had wholly sub- 
verted the basis on which such calculations were made. They 
reasoned in regard to Germany as if it were an isolated nation 
which could not be affected by the laws and tariffs of other 
countries. Bismarck reasoned as if Germany were a member 
of a large family whose individuals were bound by ties of re- 
lationship and habits of co-operation, so that the proceedings 
of any one of them would be certain to affect, to some extent, 
the conduct of the others. Abstract principles always have 
to be modified in their practical application. 

Bismarck's tariff was a very moderate one, few of the 
duties exceeding thirty per cent, ad valorem, and the average 

342 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

being little over twenty per cent. The discussion of the sub- 
ject lasted until the end of July, when the new tariff was 
passed by nearly a two-thirds majority. Bismarck's fore- 
sight in introducing this measure to the Reichstag before it 
could be acted upon by a popular vote was justified by the 
elections in 1880, in which the government met with a signal 
defeat. The various parties and their numbers represented in 
the election of that year are worth considering as an example 
of the confused condition of German politics. The Con- 
servatives carried seventy-six seats ; the Clericals, one hun- 
dred and seven ; National Liberals, forty-three ; Secessionists, 
forty-seven; Progressists, sixty-eight; Socialists, twelve; Poles, 
eighteen ; Alsatians, fifteen. From such an heterogeneous 
body of legislators almost anything might be expected. The 
Secessionists pretended to be a new party, but they were 
really Socialists in disguise, with Lasker among them, and 
the Progressists were not much better. 

Bismarck paid no attention to this unfavorable composition 
of the Reichstag. The new tariff had been enacted, and the 
majority of the opposition was not strong enough even to 
carry through a revision of it. He again recurred to his to- 
bacco monopoly, to a state insurance fund for laborers, and 
for elections every four years instead of every two years. 
These measures were introduced in a message from the em- 
peror. Bismarck was complained of for attempting to screen 
himself behind the imperial personality, and William I. replied 
to this in a second rescript, in which he asserted his own 
responsibility for the policy of the government. Public opin- 
ion, however, did not like the measures any better for this ; 
they were considered reactionary and intended to strengthen 
the imperial authority, and make it more independent of the 
popular will. Bismarck informed the deputies that if they did 
not like his programme the measures could go over to an- 
other Reichstag, and the whole session was consumed in 
fruitless discussion and parliamentary wrangling. Mean- 
while, the new tariff was accomplishing what its support- 
ers anticipated for it. New manufactories were being con- 
structed, industry stimulated, and the laboring classes obtained 

343 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

slightly better remuneration for their work. On the other 
hand, annual salaries were not raised to correspond with this 
change, so that even the large body of government officials 
were very much dissatisfied with it. The dissatisfaction in 
Great Britain was more open and pronounced. The unpleas- 
ant feeling towards Germany occasioned by the Danish war 
and the battle of Sedan had been passing away under the 
influence of the Kulturkampf and the Congress of Berlin, and 
now here was a protective tariff, and the doors of the only 
large nation in Europe which had remained open to Eng- 
lish manufacturers were closed. The ill effects of this were 
soon perceptible in Manchester and Birmingham. The tide 
turned again, and Bismarck became more of a bogie than 
ever. A newspaper warfare against him commenced which 
did not subside so long as he remained in power, and even 
such a high-toned weekly as the Spectator kept up a running 
scream against him which was re-echoed in America. 1 

THE AUSTRO-GERMAN ALLIANCE 

Bismarck again astonished the world in 1879 by a diplo- 
matic triumph of the first magnitude, and this was nothing 
less than turning the Austrian empire round upon its base. 
Political combinations had become with him a matter of tact 
rather than thought, as Napoleon confessed his movements 
were on the battle-field, and he may have felt this approach- 
ing change during the Berlin Congress. The difficulty was to 
make others feel it and see it as he did. Is it possible that he 
foresaw this culmination of his life's work in his lenient treat- 
ment of Austria after the battle of Sadowa ? 

It is not to be supposed that the Russian complaints against 
Bismarck were altogether groundless. He had kept his agree- 
ment with the Tsar so far as he could consistently with German 
interests, but not to the extent which Alexander expected. 
Even if a definite programme is sketched out beforehand, re- 
sults are sure to differ from expectations, and circumstances 
alter cases. The irritation which commenced at the Berlin 

1 Echoed by Protestant protectionist newspapers like the New York Tribune 
and the Boston Advertiser. 

344 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

Congress was considerably aggravated by subsequent events at 
Constantinople. It soon came to be reported that a large num- 
ber of Prussian officers had entered the Turkish service, that 
Prussian tactics were being adopted in the sultan's army, and 
that German councils and influence had superseded English 
councils and influence. This was natural enough, for the Sub- 
lime Porte, after his defeat in the Balkans, desired to reorganize 
his army after the best pattern of the time, and there was no 
law which could prevent German officers from resigning their 
commissions and leaving their country if they chose to do so. 
The pay of a German line officer was little more than enough 
to keep him in clothes and tobacco, whereas in the service of 
the Porte he would be able to lay up a competency. In Russia 
this would not have been permitted, for the Tsar's government 
claims an absolute control over the life and property of its 
citizens, so that it is impossible to leave the country without 
special permission to do so. Beyond this, the Turkish envoy 
to the Congress at Berlin had returned with a strong impres- 
sion of Bismarck's sagacity and political influence ; and Bis- 
marck, on his side, had expressed a very friendly feeling 
towards the Turkish government. Now that the Balkan 
question had been settled in just the right way, he was as 
anxious as the sultan himself that it should not be unsettled 
again ; and to further this purpose Bismarck was not unwilling 
to give the sultan a little moral encouragement, so that the 
evil tendency to excess which always follows upon a pros- 
perous issue should not lead the Christian states of Turkey 
into extravagant political movements. 

It was even more for the interest of Austria that peace 
should be kept between the Balkans and the Danube ; but it 
was not for the interest of Russia, — at least, not in the opinion 
of the Panslavists, who now were in the ascendancy. Pan- 
slavism is as dangerous for the Slavs outside of Russia as it is 
for Austria; but it is one of the tendencies of the time towards 
the union of all people of kindred race and tongue. Thus the 
rapprochement of Austria and Germany was a consequence of 
the Russo-Turkish war, but it might never have exceeded a 
mutual understanding between the two powers if it had not 

345 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

been for the imprudence of Alexander and Gortchakoff. In 
1888 Bismarck made an explanation in the Reichstag of the 
causes which led to the changed relations between Russia and 
Germany, in the course of which he said : 

" I had the feeling at the time of the Berlin Congress of having 
rendered such services to Russia as have seldom been rendered by 
a minister to a foreign power. Judge, therefore, of my surprise 
and disappointment at perceiving how a kind of newspaper war 
gradually began in St. Petersburg, in which German policy was 
attacked, and suspicion was cast on me personally in regard to my 
intentions. These attacks increased during the following year till 
1879 they grew into a strong demand for a pressure that we were 
to exercise on Austria, in matters which did not admit of our inter- 
fering with Austrian rights. I could not lend my hand to that, for 
if we allowed Austria to be estranged, we would necessarily become 
dependent on Russia if we did not wish to become quite isolated 
in Europe. Would such dependence have been bearable?" x 

In a letter of September 10, 1879, Bismarck explained the 
Russian complication to his faithful friend and admirer, the 
King of Bavaria, and from this we cull the following extract : 

"Russian policy has remained unquiet, unpacific ; Panslavistic 
chauvinism has gained increasing influence over the mind of the 
Tsar Alexander, and the serious (as, alas ! it seems) disgrace of 
Count Schouvaloff has accompanied the Tsar's censure of the 
count's work, — the Berlin Congress. The leading minister, in so 
far as such a minister there is at present in Russia, is the war min- 
ister Milutin. At his demand, the peace, in which Russia is threat- 
ened by no one, has yet been followed by the mighty preparations 
which, notwithstanding the financial sacrifice involved in the war, 
have raised the peace-footing of the Russian army by 560,000 men, 
and the footing of the army of the west, which is kept ready for 
active service, by about 400,000 men. These preparations can 
only be intended as a menace to Austria or Germany, and the mili- 
tary establishments in the Kingdom of Poland correspond to such 
a design. The war minister has also, in the presence of the tech- 

1 Bismarck's Speeches, Speemann's ed., xvi. 161. 
346 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

nical commissions, unreservedly declared that Russia must prepare 
for a war ' with Europe.' 

" In this situation of affairs Russia, in the course of the last few 
weeks, has presented to us demands which amount to nothing less 
than that we should make a definite choice between Russia and 
Austria, at the same time instructing the German members of the 
Eastern committees to vote with Russia on doubtful questions." * 

The Tsar's request to the Berlin Cabinet that Germany- 
should vote in international concerns according to Russia's 
dictation, coupled with the presence of 400,000 Russian 
troops on the German frontier, was sufficiently ominous ; and 
it is evident that Gortchakoff believed that he had placed Bis- 
marck between two fires, — France and Russia, — a dilemma 
from which there was no escape, except in submission to the 
St. Petersburg autocrat. 

When Gortchakoff sent threatening letters to Bismarck he 
counted on the wrong man for a game of bluff. Alexander 
had already tried that in regard to the deposition of the King 
of Hanover, and we have seen what he accomplished by it. 
The new tariff was on Bismarck's hands at this time, and was 
not disposed of until the midsummer. He might have perti- 
nently asked the Tsar, " What more do you want?" but he left 
that to Emperor William, who arranged a meeting with Alex- 
ander on the Prussian frontier early in September, and at the 
same time he went himself to Vienna to consult with An- 
drassy, a statesman whom he never counted on in vain. It is 
said that the proposition of an alliance came from Andrassy. 
Bismarck's face glowed. Gortchakoff was checkmated; for 
Austria and Germany together could withstand all the rest of 
Europe. The treaty agreed upon was very simple, and was 
immediately approved by Francis Joseph. If either empire 
should be attacked by Russia the other would assist it with 
two hundred thousand troops. In regard to Turkish affairs it 
was agreed that the political situation as determined by the 
Congress of Berlin should be strictly maintained. 

1 Memoirs, ii. 261. 
347 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

Meanwhile the German emperor had returned from an alto- 
gether friendly conference with his nephew Alexander at 
Alexandrovo, and Bismarck found him in Berlin quite satisfied 
that the tone of the Russian papers did not reflect the atti- 
tude of the government, and was not in itself a matter of 
serious importance. He objected to the Austrian alliance as 
a new and revolutionary movement in Prussian diplomacy. 
The tradition of the Hohenzollerns had been antagonistic to 
Austria, and this had always been encouraged by the Russian 
court. The emperor was now over eighty, and such a mental 
transposition as this treaty required is hard and difficult at 
such an age. Bismarck found that turning the Austrian 
empire round on its base was easy compared with turning 
the Hohenzollerns. He argued that the policy of Frederick 
the Great, while Prussia was an isolated kingdom, could no 
longer apply to an united Germany, and that the local inde- 
pendence of the Hungarians had changed quite as radically 
the policy of Austria. More than ever now would the Hun- 
garians continue to be the allies of Prussia, since they were 
almost surrounded by a cordon of Slavonic states. TheAus- 
trians were Germans, and felt the same sympathetic interest in 
the welfare of Germany which all Germans must. Finally he 
wrote to Von Moltke, who was at Freiburg in the Black 
Forest, urging him to meet the emperor on his journey to 
Baden, and lay before him a scheme of the advantages of an 
alliance with Austria from a military point of view. This 
commission Von Moltke was not slow to undertake, but Wil- 
liam I. still held out obstinately, trusting always in the good 
intentions of Alexander. The crown prince, with his English 
proclivities, was, of course, anti-Russian, and the whole min- 
istry sided with Bismarck, but it was of no avail. The em- 
peror's ideas seemed to have become crystallized. Finally 
the chancellor played his last trump-card, — resignation. 
" Your Majesty, I cannot remain in office and see an oppor- 
tunity which promises so much for the peace of Germany and 
of all Europe sacrificed in this manner." William gave way 
before this threat ; the necessary preliminaries were soon ar- 
ranged, and the treaty signed by both emperors by the middle 

348 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

of November. Gortchakoff was a neophyte compared to his 
German rival. 

The text of the treaty was not made public until five years 
later, when the aggressive attitude of Russia in the far East 
made a little moral pressure serviceable in the interest of 
political harmony ; but the fact that an Austro-German alli- 
ance existed was soon proclaimed in Bismarck's favorite jour- 
nal, the North German Gazette. Alexander at once tele- 
graphed to William his protest against it, but the protest came 
too late. Its salutary influence was quickly perceived in the 
abatement of Russian newspaper attacks on Bismarck's policy, 
and the withdrawal of Russian regiments from the German 
frontier. The Tsarovitch was recruiting at Cannes in France, 
and was requested by his father to pay conciliatory visits at 
Berlin and Vienna, — it is said, much against his own will.* 
Bismarck had upset the balance of power only to form a new 
one, which has continued to the present time, and offers an 
appearance of greater solidity than has ever been known 
before. It was not long before Italy also expressed a desire 
to enter this partnership, and the combined forces of these 
three powers, amounting to nearly a million and a half of 
men, can easily bid defiance to any combination, civilized or 
barbarous, that could be made up against them. A more 
serious check to Russian aggrandizement could not be imag- 
ined, and there was equal rejoicing in London and Constan- 
tinople at the news of it. The invasion of Tunis by the 
French also increased Bismarck's influence with the sultan, 
and he was thus enabled to become the protector of Greece 
and Montenegro, besides suggesting some simple reforms in 
the Turkish administration which have proved much to the 
advantage of the Ottoman empire. A coalition between 
Russia and France was no longer possible, and Panslavism, if 
not killed outright, had received such a stunning blow that it 
did not raise its composite head — at least, in a conspicuous 
manner — for some years to come. " Beware of the Cossack," 
said Napoleon at St. Helena. 

1 W. Miiller, p. 651. 
349 



CHAPTER XV 

KEEPER OF THE PEACE 

The Austro-German alliance was the last of Bismarck's 
great diplomatic victories, and the last he could very well 
have achieved. There was nothing more in that line for him 
to do. France and Russia were both kept in check by it; 
the Austrians and Hungarians were contented; the Servians 
and Bulgarians rejoiced in their liberation from the Turk ; 
Italy, like Germany, was engrossed in its internal develop- 
ment, repairing the waste of centuries ; and Spain was trying 
to discover the kind of liberalism that was best suited to its 
people. The Poles, of course, were dissatisfied, but, divided 
as they were among three nationalities, there would seem to 
be no hope for them even in the near future. Bismarck talked 
a great deal on this subject, and evidently thought a great 
deal, but could see no alternative except a continuation of the 
present order. During the siege of Paris he spoke of the 
wars of the Great Elector in Poland, which were brought to 
an unfavorable conclusion by the interference of Holland. 
If Poland could have been incorporated in Germany, as 
Hungary was in Austria, it would have been greatly to the 
advantage of all concerned ; but this was a dream of the 
moment which he was aware could not be realized. However, 
there had already been a movement in this direction among 
the Poles, and Bismarck's name had been imprudently con- 
nected with it. As Bismarck once said in the Reichstag in 
regard to Prussian Poland : 

" The Polish peasant, from being a despised and mercilessly 
plundered vassal of some noble, has become a free man and an 
owner of the soil he cultivates. The usurious Jews are his only- 
plunderers now. German manufactories and machines have pro- 
moted an improved method of agriculture. The prosperity of the 
province has been greatly increased by railways and government 

35° 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

roads. Polish children enjoy the advantage of schools for ele- 
mentary instruction, organized on German principles; and gym- 
nasia teach the higher branches of learning, not by the hollow, 
mechanical methods of the Jesuit Fathers, but in that solid Ger- 
man manner which enables people to think for themselves. Army 
service completes whatever is left unachieved by the popular schools. 
In the army the young Polish peasant learns to understand and 
speak German. He learns much by association in his company, 
and through intercourse with the inhabitants of his German garri- 
soned town he acquires ideas which enrich and emancipate his 
narrow and fettered intelligence. His notions of right and wrong 
become clearer; he is obliged to adopt orderly habits of living, 
which he usually retains after his term of service has expired." x 

This is perfectly true, and a fair picture of German working- 
class culture ; but to the average Polish mind only two modes 
of life would seem to be cognizable, — a luxurious leisure, or 
serfdom. In the Polish republic there were practically only 
two classes, and it was the absence of an industrial middle 
class, and its elective monarchy, which caused the nation to 
become so weak. They were not satisfied with being a com- 
ponent part of Prussia, but wished to form a separate state 
within the German empire, like Saxony or Wurtemberg, with 
local autonomy or home rule. They could not be blamed for 
this ; but the decisive objection to it was that such a state as 
this would be certain to form a nucleus for revolutionary 
agitation in Russian Poland, and might be the antecedent 
cause of a life-and-death struggle between Russia and Ger- 
many. They continued to agitate this plan, and their depu- 
ties in the Reichstag boldly admitted their expectation of 
restoring the Polish state in one way or another, until in 1886 
Bismarck conceived the idea of buying up the large Polish 
estates in Posen and colonizing them with German farmers. 

This was a severe remedy, but a magnificent idea, for it 
would replace a class of unproductive and unpatriotic citizens 
with industrious, patriotic husbandmen. The Reichstag did 
not consider it too severe a measure, and the chancellor re- 

1 Our Chancellor, ii. 150. 
351 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

ceived letters from all parts of Germany and from all classes 
of Germans commending his plan, which included a system 
of annual payments for the land on the Von Stein principle. 
One object which Bismarck had in this colonization was to 
organize a thickly settled loyal population on the eastern 
frontier of Germany as a bulwark against Russian invasion ; 
but at the same time the plan gave satisfaction to the Russian 
government as tending to obviate complications with the 
Prussian Poles. Whether it was right or not is what every 
man must decide with his own conscience. 

PERSECUTION OF THE JEWS 

An anti-Semitic agitation originated in Berlin in 1877, — 
where or how has not been made apparent, — and extended 
over a large portion of Prussia and some other German states, 
lasting a number of years and gradually dying out after the 
fashion of the Kulturkampf. Jews are much more numerous 
in Germany than in any other country of Europe, and the ex- 
planation would seem to be that they have been treated here- 
tofore in a more friendly manner there than elsewhere. It 
was not until 1849, however, that they were permitted to hold 
public offices in Prussia. Bismarck had taken part in this 
emancipation, but had opposed their appointments to the 
highest positions in the state; and he found afterwards that 
in all his legislative measures the Jews, of whom Lasker was 
the most prominent leader, were a compact body against 
him. This fact may have aroused the national Prussian 
spirit, which was so aggressive after the campaign of 1870 
for twelve years or more. Petitions were circulated to pre- 
vent the appointment of Jews for both civil and military offices. 
The University of Berlin declared against the appointment 
of Jewish professors. Hotel proprietors refused to receive 
Hebrew guests, and even saloon-keepers closed their doors 
to the unpopular race. In Pomerania there was serious riot- 
ing, and many Israelites were driven from smaller places to 
the large cities, whence the numbers of their brethren could 
afford them protection. The agitation extended itself into 
Russian Poland, whence the Jews were forcibly expelled, their 

352 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

property seized, personal injuries inflicted, and even murders 
committed, without the perpetrators being brought to justice. 
Exiled Russian Jews were not permitted to find a home in 
Prussia, and many of them were obliged to cross the ocean 
in search of a refuge. 

Such an order of affairs is by no means pleasant to reflect 
on, but of course there must have been a reason for it some- 
where, though we may not believe the reason to be adequate. 
The English historian Freeman advanced the theory at this 
time that a nation has always a right to get rid of any class 
of people who proved themselves a nuisance, whether it were 
the Jews in Russia or the Chinese in America. This seems 
rather brutal, and we hesitate to endorse it ; yet the trouble 
with the Jews is one which cannot be reached by legislation. 
The majority of them live like parasites on the community. 
It is true that they take care of their own poor, but other- 
wise are not public-spirited or helpful. They are not Chris- 
tians, and do not believe in the golden rule. Those who be- 
come Christians seem to change in this respect more or less. 
It cannot be doubted that they are sharper at bargains than 
any other races, but at the same time they do not make good 
financiers for states or empires. Nearly half of the floating 
wealth of Europe is in the hands of Hebrew bankers, who 
spend little and give away less. The Semitic persecution had 
the same characteristics as the Jews themselves. It certainly 
was not Christian, nor was it remediable in any degree by 
legislation. 

There were attacks upon Bismarck in the Radical papers, 
and his friends felt it necessary to defend him against them. 
He was interviewed by a Jew at Varzin, and gave an opinion, 
which was perhaps somewhat touched up in transition to the 
press so that it appeared like a stronger statement than he 
intended. He is reported to have said : 

" Nothing can be more incorrect than the notion that I ap- 
prove of the anti-Semitic agitation. On the contrary, I most posi- 
tively disapprove of this attack upon the Jews, whether prompted 
by dislike to their religion or antipathy to their race. It would be 
just as unfair to fall upon Germans of Polish or French extraction 
23 353 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

on the pretext that they were not real Germans. That the Jews 
preferentially devote themselves to business pursuits is a matter of 
taste ; moreover, it may be the national consequence of their former 
exclusion from other callings ; but it is certainly no justification for 
raising an outcry against their wealth, or reproaching them with 
being better off than Christians, — a proceeding which I consider 
reprehensible, because it provokes envy and hatred among the 
masses. I will never consent to any curtailment of the constitu- 
tional rights accorded to the Jews. ' ' 

This sounds like Bismarck, and, printed at just the right 
time alter the agitation had reached its height, no doubt 
helped to allay this strange public ebullition. He confessed, 
however, that he should not like to be governed by a Jew, 
and wondered that notable Germans should make matches 
for their daughters with wealthy Israelites. As for Germans 
marrying Jewesses, he did not think so badly of that, " for 
then," he said, " their money circulates and does good." 

THE DEATH OF ALEXANDER 

On March 13, 1SS1, Alexander II. was assassinated by the 
Nihilists, and a shudder went across the continent of Europe. 
He had liberated the serfs, he had emancipated the Christian 
provinces of Turkey, he had lived a just and pious life, and 
had done much to mitigate the severity of the military des- 
potism to which he was born and brought up ; it has even 
been affirmed that he had planned to bestow a constitutional 
government on Russia just before his death ; but even more 
conspicuous virtues would not have saved him from becoming 
the victim of political bigotry. 

There is practically little difference between a Nihilist, a 
Socialist, a Communist, a Fenian, and an Anarchist. They 
are differentiated only by the manners and character of the 
people from whom they originated. There is perhaps more 
hard ingrained atheism in the Nihilist than in any of the 
others. Atheism has been popular in the fashionable society 
of St. Petersburg and Moscow for the past fifty years. It 
appears on the surface like frivolous talk, but has a deep and 
dangerous undercurrent which may lead either to ruin or to 

354 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

crime. The realistic literature of the country is one illustra- 
tion of it, — an art which goes continually round in a circle 
without coming to any definite result. But Russian literature 
is only a reflection of French literature, and, though it repre- 
sents Russian life in externals, is not in itself an exponent of 
Russian character. The Russian language, as Professor W. 
D. Whitney says, is the vehicle of civilization to northern 
and central Asia. This also is the historical justification of 
the Russian government. In Europe it is a danger to higher 
forms of civilization, and perhaps a curse to the more enlight- 
ened portion of its subjects. It has proved a blessing to the 
Cossacks, the Finlanders, and the nomad tribes of northern 
Asia. Any one who has read Vambery's travels in central 
Asia must realize the advantage that has resulted from the 
Russian conquest of Tartary, — an advantage equal to the 
British conquest of India. The Russian government has 
stopped the Tartars from gouging one another's eyes out, and 
compelled them to give up their nomad way of life. 

The death of a man like Alexander II. never happens in 
vain. It aroused an active sentiment of indignation against 
the more radical and desperate class of Socialists, impressed 
the more moderate class with a sense of their responsibility to 
the moral law, and it helped to disaffect many others from 
the political doctrines which they had rashly embraced. There 
were, of course, a few who pretended to consider the event as 
the natural outcome of Russian institutions, but they might 
as well have inferred that Nobeling's attempt on the emperor 
was the result of constitutional government. Bismarck took 
advantage of its effect on the public mind to introduce his 
favorite scheme for the establishment of a government insur- 
ance fund for the benefit of working-men who might become 
disabled through accident, ill-health, or old age, — one of his 
grandest measures, and sufficient in itself to give any man 
distinction. Certainly it was a gigantic undertaking, for the 
requisite funds would have to be counted, not by millions but 
by hundreds of millions. The whole community would have 
to be taxed for its support, but he considered it only right 
that the nation should be taxed liberally for the benefit of its 

355 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

humble poor, who really form the foundation on which the 
whole fabric of society rests. 

The outline of his plan was simply this : it provided for the 
creation of a government department similar to the postal 
department, which would have agencies in all cities and towns, 
where money could be loaned and donated to those actually 
in need, under the direction of a local committee of citizens. 
Each committee was to consist often or twelve members, with 
a member of the city council for a presiding officer, and always 
including the city physician of the district in which the agency 
would be located. In this way it was believed that the whole 
public would take an interest in the working of the system, 
which from its nature would be more thorough and efficient 
than volunteer charities, without at the same time dispensing 
with the interest and help of private individuals. If the system 
was to be a machine, it was Bismarck's endeavor to make it a 
living, human machine. He said in regard to it : 

" I am by no means yet convinced that the notion of subsidizing 
eleemosynary associations by the state is an objectionable one. It 
seems to me that a possibility of improving the working-man's lot 
might be found in the establishment of productive associations 
such as exist and flourish in England. I have talked over the 
subject with the king, who has the interests of the working classes 
at heart, and his Majesty paid a sum of money out of his own 
pocket in aid of an experiment in that direction connected with a 
deputation of operatives from Silesia, who had lost their employ- 
ment through differing from their employer in politics. . . . To 
attempt anything of the sort upon a large scale might entail an 
expenditure of hundreds of millions ; but the notion does not seem 
to me intrinsically an absurd or silly one. We make experiments 
in agriculture and manufactures ; might it not be as well to do so 
with respect to human occupations and a solution of the social 
question ?' ' x 

Again he said : 

" People talk about state Socialism and think they have settled 
the matter, — as if such things were to be disposed of with a phrase ! 

1 Our Chancellor, ii. 196. 
356 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

Socialism or not, it is necessary, the outcome of an urgent require- 
ment. They say, too, the bill would entail enormous expenditure, 
an hundred million of marks, at least — perhaps twice as much. As 
for me, three hundred millions would not alarm me. We must find 
some means of relieving the unindebted poor, on the part of the 
state and not in the form of alms. Contentment amongst the 
impecunious and disinherited classes would not be dearly pur- 
chased by an enormous sum. They must be made to understand 
that the state is of some use, — that it does not only take, but gives 
to boot. And if the state, which does not look for interest or 
dividends, takes the matter in hand, the thing is easy enough." ' 

The laborers' relief bill failed to pass the Reichstag, owing 
to the combination of the very parties who, if they had been 
consistent, would have given it unqualified support,— that is, 
the Liberals, Progressists, and Social Democrats. It is a 
peculiarity of the doctrinaires to care more for their theories 
than they do for the good which those theories are expected 
to accomplish. If the world is to be saved it must be saved 
according to their method, and not according to any other ; 
otherwise they would prefer to have it blown up altogether. 2 
No doctrinaire could ever have succeeded in practical affairs 
as Bismarck did. He patiently waited his time, and this 
rejected measure has since become the corner-stone of the 
present German system of charitable organizations, which 
may challenge all other countries to show its equal. A late 
writer in the New York Outlook says : 

" Beyond all question, the care of the poor and distressed in the 
cities of Germany is superbly managed. Of course, there is in 
every city a general department of poor relief with its specialists 
and general advisers, but there is also a system of local committees 
which assist in the work. No man in Germany would think of 
declining to serve on the committee. But it is the German ideal 
at least to abolish poverty. Germans think the present policy of 

1 Bismarck's Speeches, Speemann's ed., vol. xvi. 

2 This is especially true of the Progressists and German free-traders. Las- 
salle, the most practical of German socialistic writers, is credited with having 
said : " If we were to shoot at Bismarck, common justice would compel us to 
admit that he is a man ; whereas the Progressists are old women." 

357 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

the government will ultimately lead to it. For this reason they 
have inaugurated a system of municipal insurance against sickness, 
loss of employment, and old age. The German cities also do all 
they can to encourage small wage-earners and protect those in tem- 
porary distress. To this end they have established a system of 
municipal savings banks and municipal pawn-shops. The Berlin 
savings-bank system has more than four hundred thousand such 
depositors. In Aachen (Aixda-Chapelle) it is said that almost 
every man, woman, and child has such a bank-book. These banks 
pay about three per cent, interest on their deposits, and it is paid 
with the greatest regularity, as the funds are usually invested in 
government securities of some sort. Experience has shown that 
the pawn-shops have also been of great practical benefit to the 
poor. ' ' 

This system of laborers' insurance has been imitated, or 
duplicated, by the Pennsylvania, the Burlington and Quincy^ 
and perhaps one or two other American railroads, with ex- 
cellent success. It had been suggested before, but Bismarck 
was the first to make the practical application, and should re- 
ceive credit for it. The supplement of a government pawn- 
brokerage business was an admirable device, as it cut the 
ground from under the feet of the Jews, thus helping also to 
allay the Semitic agitation. In addition to this, the tramps 
and vagrants in Germany have been collected into villages, 
and have had cottages built for them, where they work under 
military supervision. The report of the United States consul- 
general at Berlin for the year ending 1886 represented a 
greatly improved and flourishing condition of economical 
affairs in Germany, and gave a flat contradiction to the state- 
ments on the same subject in American newspapers at that 
time. Simultaneously the London Times complained that 
English commerce in Africa, Asia, and the Pacific was suf- 
fering from German enterprise and competition. Bismarck 
had made personal exertions to secure for his countrymen 
an immense army contract from the Japanese government, 
amounting to several millions. " The Germans were im- 
proving their foreign trade," said the Times, " by their 
promptness, thoroughness, and exact calculation of means to 

35* 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

ends, — those virtues by which English commerce has grown 
to greatness, but which are not so common in the realm as 
formerly. German clerks and book-keepers are securing the 
best places, because they know languages and are more cor- 
rect. German servants are superseding English servants, be- 
cause they are more respectful and trustworthy." 

Bismarck also made some interesting remarks on the prob- 
able effect of a national socialistic experiment. He once said 
to Dr. Busch : 

"It is extremely difficult to discuss the Social-Democratic Realm 
of the Future, while we are groping about in darkness, like the 
ordinary audience at a Social- Democratic meeting, who know 
nothing at all about the matter, but are assured that ' better times 
are coming,' and that 'there will be more to earn and less to 
work.' Where the 'more' money is to come from nobody knows; 
I mean, when every well-to-do person shall have been robbed of 
his property in order that it shall be divided amongst his despoil- 
ers. Then, in all probability, the laborious and thrifty will again 
wax wealthy, whilst the lazy and extravagant will fall into poverty; 
or if everybody is to be supplied with the needful by an adminis- 
tration, people will come to lead the life of prisoners, shut up in 
gaols, none of whom follow occupations of their own choice, but 
work under the compulsion of the warders. In gaol, too, there is 
at least an official in charge, who is a trustworthy and respectable 
person ; but who will play the warder in the Universal Socialistic 
House of Correction? Probably the speechifiers, who gain over 
the masses by their eloquence." 

Doubtless the present organization of society might be 
improved upon, and it looks as if Bismarck had taken the 
first step towards this. An association of picked men, like 
those who made the Brook Farm experiment at West Rox- 
bury, might hold together, under the protection of the gov- 
ernment which they pretended to despise, for a single genera- 
tion, and retain the culture which they had previously ac- 
quired ; but their descendants would inevitably become farm- 
ers, and subject to the limitations of farmer life, and so on 
forever. 

359 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 



RUSSIA AND ENGLAND 



Even in Germany little is yet known concerning the life 
and character of Alexander III., but he appears to have been 
a man of rather frail physique and moderate mental endow- 
ments, and yet at the same time possessed of excellent judg- 
ment, and, what is quite as important, a good heart ; so that, 
with these two qualifications of true manliness, he struggled 
through his difficult position until his comparatively early 
death in 1893 in a highly creditable manner. As Tsarovitch 
he was much under the influence of the Panslavists, and the 
assassination of his father aroused grave apprehensions at 
Berlin and Vienna on this account. Whether the responsi- 
bility of power produced a sudden revulsion in his opinions 
can only be surmised ; but certain it is that he had not been 
six months on the throne before he sought an interview with 
Bismarck, and from that time was always guided more or less 
by his influence. A meeting of William I. and the new 
monarch took place at Dantzic on the Baltic in the autumn 
of 1 88 1 ; and though we know nothing of the conference 
which followed, the Berlin editorials, supposed to be inspired 
by the chancellor after his return, gave most hopeful indica- 
tions of the result of this interview for the welfare of Ger- 
many and the peace of Europe. Its immediate object ap- 
peared soon afterwards in the form of an extradition treaty 
between Russia and Germany for the benefit of Nihilists and 
other kinds of dynamiters ; and as the French government 
had declined previously to surrender Hartmann, one of the 
would-be assassins of Alexander II., it was very natural after 
this that the relations between the court of William I. and 
of Alexander III. became more friendly. 

European statesmen were fairly astonished the following 
year when Prince Gortchakoff retired from office and Baron 
de Giers was appointed in his place. It was supposed that 
the long ascendancy of Gortchakoff in Russian politics would 
enable him at least to designate his successor. His term of 
office had been much beyond Bismarck's, and his extreme 
age might be taken as a sufficient reason for resigning the 

360 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

cares of state ; but De Giers was a German by descent, a man 
from near the middle of the Russian thirteen classes, who had 
raised himself by merit and ability to the front rank, and, 
though he had preserved a diplomatic neutrality during 
Gortchakoff's regime, was understood to be opposed to his 
predecessor's policy. This soon became evident in the more 
friendly correspondence between the governments of Russia, 
Austria, and Germany; and Count Kalnoky, who had suc- 
ceeded Andrassy in Austria, assured the Hungarian delega- 
tion in the following October that the Austro-German alli- 
ance had now been supplemented by such pacific assurances 
from Alexander III. that the prospect of amicable relations 
with neighboring states had never been more favorable. 

Still, Panslavism was an active and fomenting ingredient 
in the Russian body-politic, and De Giers was obliged to find 
an outlet for it in some direction ; and this soon came to pass 
in the direction of India. Beaconsfield's Afghanistan blunder 
had been followed by a grievous political mistake on the part 
of Gladstone. Why the " Grand Old Man" should have 
imagined an appalling danger to England and civilization 
from the Austro-German alliance can only be explained by a 
lamentable ignorance of continental politics. Gladstone's 
Midlothian attacks on Bismarck and the alliance were not 
more injudicious than they were unjust. Writers in Liberal 
periodicals designated the German chancellor as the demon 
of Berlin, — with corresponding American echoes, — and the 
one man in Europe who was most desirous of preserving the 
peace was represented as continually intriguing for war and 
conquest. A statement made by Bismarck, as applied to 
German annexations in Africa, that the existence of a great 
empire necessitated the idea of its extension, was distorted 
into a scheme for the conquest of Greece by Austria, and the 
absorption of Holland and Denmark by Germany. What 
Russia and France would be doing in such an eventuality did 
not occur to these ready-witted magazinists. The more im- 
probable these assertions the more readily they would seem 
to have been believed. It was in vain that Lord Salisbury 

made a dignified statement to prove that the Austro-German 

361 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

alliance was of great benefit to England, and that the ad- 
vanced age of William I. and the good will of the crown 
prince were an adequate guarantee against all suppositions 
of German conquests ; Gladstone and the philistines carried 
everything before them. The fact was that the English 
Liberal party had grown old with its distinguished leader, 
and had outlived its days of usefulness. It had no policy 
except the ambition for power; no better motive than the 
love of office ; and as a party it was ready to make use of 
any means that would attain this object. 

The net result of this was that Great Britain was left with- 
out an ally in Europe, and her enemies were not long in 
taking advantage of this. After Arabi Pasha had been sub- 
dued, the Arabs revolted in the Soudan. The Panslavist 
party, led by Ignatieff and Skobeleff, pushed forward the 
Russian boundaries to Afghanistan, and inaugurated a trouble- 
some policy of higgling about the frontier, which might have 
resulted in open war but for the firmness of Alexander and 
De Giers. It is certain that there was a strong war party at 
St. Petersburg, and that for some days the decision of the gov- 
ernment was suspended in the balance. When General Sko- 
beleff urged the Tsar to permit an advance of the Russian 
forces towards Herat, Alexander replied, " The destiny of 
Russia does not depend on any single movement or political 
decision. It moves forward continually, and is as irresistible 
as the rising of the tide." 1 The Governor- General of India 
made the Ameer of Herat a present of a park of artillery, and 
the British government chartered transatlantic steamers for 
the conveyance of troops. The political horizon looked dark 
and threatening. Late in the summer of 1885 Gladstone was 
outvoted in the House of Commons ; the Liberal ministry 
resigned, and this political witches' dance, which had been 
encouraged by his policy, suddenly came to an end. Glad- 
stone was more high-minded than Bismarck in theory, but 
not in practice. It is well known that there was no parlia- 
mentary trick he would not employ to carry his point. In 

1 At least, a statement to this effect was telegraphed. 
362 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

1 86 1 he eulogized Jefferson Davis as the founder of a new 
republic ; and many of his statements on the Irish question 
were rather dubious, to say the least. He did not lead his 
party, but was led by it. 

During this period Bismarck sat behind his chancellor's 
table in the Reichstag, steadily transacting business, replying 
to attacks on the government, and making notes with the long 
yellow pencils which have become so famous. 1 The Reichs- 
tag became more and more divided, and consequently more 
difficult to deal with. Bismarck had his successes and his 
defeats in it, but chiefly in regard to matters of inconsider- 
able importance, — economical questions and the like, such 
as do not enter into universal history. He accepted both, 
like an experienced man of business who has become accus- 
tomed to the fickleness of fortune. He was virtually emperor 
of Germany now ; for, though William I. was still vigorous in 
mind and body to a degree which astonished those about 
him, and caused the Germans to be more proud of him than 
ever, the long-confirmed habit of deferring to his chancellor's 
opinion was now fastened irrevocably upon him. The priests 
no longer caused Bismarck any trouble, and the socialists 
were little more than a whetstone for his argument. He had 
spent his whole public life in contention, and needed a strong 
opposition of some kind for the exercise of his faculties. His 
later speeches have an air of easy confidence, brightened 
with occasional touches of humor, which suggests that he 
was beginning to take more comfort in life. He would have 
been less than human not to have taken notice occasionally 
of Gladstone's mistakes and vulnerable performances, for he 
wished to be on friendly terms with the British government, 
and it was chiefly Gladstone who prevented this. Lord 
Granville was the English minister of foreign affairs, and, as 
his own party afterwards confessed, he conducted them in a 
very unskilful manner. One day in the spring of 1884, Bis- 
marck amused the Reichstag by stating that their corre- 

1 These pencils, so it is said, had to be renewed every day of the session, 
for some deputy or other was sure to purloin the one that Bismarck had used, as 
a souvenir for his wife or children. 

363 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

spondence with the English foreign office during the past 
six months exceeded in quantity that with all other European 
governments for several years. When the Reichstag passed 
a constitutional amendment for the daily compensation of 
its members, Bismarck did not even permit the bill to go to 
the House of Peers, but vetoed it at once, saying, " Such a 
measure in a country which was badly governed, like Eng- 
land, might accomplish mischief, but, thank heaven, I know 
my place better than to mix up monarchical institutions with 
republican practices." It does not seem fair or reasonable 
that a poor man of good ability should be prevented from 
serving his country as legislator on account of the lack of 
compensation ; but the gratuitous service of parliamentary 
members in Great Britain and Germany certainly prevents 
politics from becoming a trade, and is believed to preserve 
a higher moral tone in the national assembly. 

THE SEVENTIETH BIRTHDAY 

The Reichstag revenged itself for the salary veto on De- 
cember 15, 1884, by refusing to grant Bismarck twenty thou- 
sand marks a year for a third assistant in the ministry of 
foreign affairs, although he endeavored to convince the 
house that his own strength was not what it had been, and 
that the business of the office was continually increasing with 
the ever-extending foreign relations of the empire. In fact, 
quite a number of his associates had given out, from time to 
time, and been obliged to resign or be transferred to other and 
less arduous positions. 1 " It is the telegraph," said Bismarck, 
once, " that produces the strain in the management of foreign 
affairs. In old times, when everything came by mail-coaches, 
statesmen had plenty of leisure, and time enough to consider 
what they were going to do. Now everything is rush and 
hurry, and it is only a man of exceptional constitution who 
can stand it." 



1 One of Bismarck's secretaries informed an American that he never dared to 
go to evening parties or even to the theatre, for he might be summoned to the 
foreign office day or night at any hour. 

364 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

This action of the Reichstag was severely criticised at home 
and abroad, and Bismarck's friends were highly indignant at 
what they called the vindictive parsimony of the legislative 
body. It was claimed that in refusing to accept the salary bill 
the chancellor had acted from principle and not from any un- 
willingness to have the government pay its just dues. As his 
seventieth birthday was now approaching it was proposed to 
make him a subscription present, which would defray the 
expense of additional clerk hire and something more. The 
plan for a " Bismarck gift" quickly ripened, and the result 
exceeded the expectation of its originators. Before the 1st 
of April, 1885, 2,400,000 marks were collected, and with a 
portion of this the estate at Schonhausen, the greater part of 
which had been alienated from the Bismarck family in unfa- 
vorable times, was redeemed and restored. From the remain- 
der Bismarck donated a fund of 1, 200,000 marks, or about 
$300,000, for the purpose of assisting indigent young Germans 
for an education as teachers of the higher branches in the 
public schools. His birthday was celebrated at Schonhausen, 
and was also made a national celebration. Emperor William 
attended his reception with many of the royal family, and the 
most distinguished persons in the realm besides. It was com- 
pared with the visit of Henry VIII. to Cardinal Wolsey. If 
Bismarck's reputation suffered from jealous and unfriendly 
tongues in foreign countries, he had no lack of appreciation 
in his own. 

AFRICAN ANNEXATIONS 

The prosperity of Germany produced its natural effect in a 
tendency to colonization. In spite of the immense emigration 
to America, the population of the German empire was in- 
creasing more rapidly than that of any other country in 
Europe. Italy came next on the census list, and for the same 
causes, — national unity and internal reforms, — while the pop- 
ulation of France was almost stationary. Emigration to 
America could not give employment to German capital, and 
the enterprising merchants of Hamburg and Bremen were 
looking about for chances in various parts of the globe. A 
merchant named Leideritz thought he had discovered rich 

365 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

prospects in southwestern Africa, near the mouth of the 
Niger, and established factories there at considerable expense. 
The success of his experiment attracted others to the same 
neighborhood, and quite a German colony was formed in that 
vicinity. The development of this settlement into a German 
territorial acquisition resembled the British conquest of India. 
As the community grew it required military protection, and 
Bismarck recognized the necessity of this, though accounts 
agree that in the beginning he was opposed to colonization, and 
only consented to this new departure through the mercantile 
pressure that was brought to bear on him. The imperial flag 
was accordingly unfurled in the territory of Togo, and the 
process of annexation proceeded rapidly. On the principle 
that he might as well be hung for a sheep as a lamb, Bismarck 
next took possession of the large tract in southwestern Africa 
known to traders as the Cameroons, and also a large 
portion of Zanzibar, a tract extending inwards to Lake Vic- 
toria Nyanza, from which the Nile rises. The area of these 
territories is greater than the whole of Germany, but their 
actual value is less than Alsace and Lorraine. Yet the pro- 
ductive power of nature is so great on the dark continent that 
it is said a negro can support himself and his family by work- 
ing only three weeks in the year. Subsequently the north- 
eastern portion of New Guinea was seized by the German 
government, with the groups of islands to the right of it, 
which were christened the Bismarck Archipelago. To make 
these new provinces profitable, lines of steamers to east and 
west Africa and to the South Sea had to be subsidized, and 
the means for this were extorted from the Reichstag almost by 
main force. The subsidies were refused in 1884, and only 
obtained in 1885 after a desperate parliamentary struggle. 
People wondered how Bismarck's strength could hold out at 
his age after so much. It was thought that his indomitable 
will still kept him in the harness, and but for that he would 
long since have surrendered his office. That Bavaria and 
Wurtemberg, being inland states, should oppose this new de- 
velopment of the empire was to have been expected. 

The sudden entrance of Germany into the commercial arena 

366 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

raised a general outcry along the banks of the Thames, and 
the British government, which is really controlled by the 
commercial interest, made the settlement of these new states 
as difficult as possible. The new African possessions were 
all bounded on one side at least by British territory. Special 
treaties were required, and boundaries had to be definitely 
adjusted. A voluminous correspondence between the foreign 
offices at London and Berlin commenced, and continued until 
the final retirement of Gladstone in July, 1886. If Earl Gran- 
ville had a genius for anything it was for shifting his ground, 
and in this way he prevented Bismarck from coming to any 
definite conclusions with him for nearly two years, while the 
London papers sustained a vigorous chorus of '■ unprincipled 
acquisitions" and the " rights of original proprietors" ! Bis- 
marck had also to deal with the Sultan of Zanzibar, who 
suddenly discovered that he was no longer an independent 
potentate. But this obstacle was soon removed by the 
presence of a German fleet off the Zanzibar coast and a lib- 
eral " hongo" to his African majesty. 

The logic of the matter was that all the powers of Europe 
were now seizing on whatever they could obtain in Asia and 
Africa, and there was no good reason why Germany should 
not have her share. Portugal had annexed the strip of coast 
between the mouth of the Congo and British South Africa, 
and was already in troubled water with Great Britain on that 
account. France was carrying on war in Tonquin.and it was 
not long before the British government took possession of 
Burmah and annexed it to India in the same fashion that 
Bismarck had annexed Togo. There was even danger that 
France, England, and Portugal would fall out over the pos- 
session of the rich interior discovered by Stanley on the 
Congo River, but this was obviated by the self-appointed 
arbitration of King Leopold of Belgium, who had taken an 
enthusiastic interest in African explorations, and succeeded in 
organizing the Congo Free State on sound international prin- 
ciples, — a rare accomplishment for the ruler of so small a 
state, and a well-deserved monument to his memory. 

Africa was becoming a reflected copy of the map of Europe, 

367 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

and Bismarck foresaw that, unless some order and method 
was introduced in the internal relations of this new family of 
subordinate nations, there was danger that before long the 
powers of Europe would be involved in a conflict on their 
account. It was with this end in view that he invited repre- 
sentatives of all parties concerned to meet at Berlin in No- 
vember, 1884, and hold a conference to determine the proper 
grounds for annexation of uncivilized territory, and to estab- 
lish a uniform system of laws and regulations for interco- 
lonial relations. It was likely that Granville would have 
declined to submit the foreign policy of England to the pos- 
sible limitations of such a tribunal but for the intervention of 
Gladstone, who was beginning to feel the strain of compli- 
cations in so many different countries, and recognized the 
advantage of a court of appeal for the various provinces of 
Africa. As for France, Belgium, and Portugal, their foreign 
ministers were well enough pleased with any arrangement 
which would tie down the tyrant of the seas to a definite 
course of procedure, even if England dictated that course 
herself. The Berlin conference lasted nearly five months, and 
its proceedings were thoroughly sifted by the ablest jurists of 
the different countries represented. After the accession of 
Lord Salisbury in 1886 the friction between Great Britain and 
Germany was almost entirely removed, and a year later Bis- 
marck was enabled to state in the Reichstag that England 
no longer " behaved like a raging bull, or a comfortable ox 
chewing its cud," but could be depended on as a promoter 
of peace and international justice in the European system. 1 
In fact, Great Britain had in an informal manner joined the 
alliance of Germany, Austria, and Italy, and there was no 
longer the possibility of any other power making a serious 
disturbance in the European family. 

It is too soon to judge of the success of Germany's colonial 
policy. The good or bitter fruit of such large enterprises is 
only gathered after a long season. Some of the companies 
organized for Africa and the South Sea have paid good divi- 

* Report to the Associated Press. 
368 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

dends, others little or nothing, and subsidies are still required 
for some of the steamship lines. On the whole, the prospect 
thus far is considered a favorable one, and optimists predict 
better results in the future. Bismarck's attempt to obtain a 
foothold in the Caroline Islands was the only decided failure. 
The right of Germany was immediately challenged by the 
Spanish government, and Bismarck prudently referred the 
dispute to Pope Leo as arbitrator, who decided in favor of 
Spain after a thorough legal examination of the question at 
issue. The loss of a number of war-ships of different nations, 
German and others, by a terrific hurricane off Samoa while 
the suit was pending, made a gloomy and unhappy conclu- 
sion to this episode. 

END OF THE KULTURKAMPF 

How was the Kulturkampf to come to an end ? The resig- 
nation of the inexorable Dr. Falk, in the autumn of 1878, and 
the appointment of Von Putkammer, a man of mild and con- 
ciliatory methods, did not surprise those who were watching 
the course of events. After this there was neither active 
resistance on the part of the bishops nor persecution on the 
part of the government. Von Putkammer evidently intended 
to interfere as little as possible. An immense number of 
Catholic parishes were devoid of officiating priests. In some 
instances these vacancies were filled up by giving proper noti- 
fication to the authorities of the intended appointments ; in 
others the former incumbents returned quietly to their duties 
without being molested. There was evidently an understand- 
ing between Bismarck and Pope Leo, and what could their 
agreement be, other than to let the questions at issue grad- 
ually subside into the background, and to treat the dogma of 
infallibility as if it were a dead letter, — a thing of the past ? 

There was no other course for either party to follow. 
Neither could very well admit, if they felt inclined to do so, 
havine been in the wronsr. The Church of Rome never takes 
a backward step. Leo could not call another ecumenical 
council in order to reverse the decision of 1869 without se- 
riously undermining the authority of the Vatican. Bismarck 
24 369 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

could no more face the Reichstag with a confession that all 
his anti-infallibility legislation had been a mistake. The 
dogma of infallibility, however, could be thrown aside for the 
time and left to an innocuous desuetude. The object for 
which it was originated — in order to check the encroachments 
of Victor Emmanuel — had proved a failure. The authority of 
the pope in the States of the Church was gone, and there was 
very faint hope that it could ever be regained. Victor Emman- 
uel was also gone, and the personal antagonism which was 
felt towards him in the Vatican was not inherited to the same 
extent by King Humbert. Infallibility had lived its short 
career, and strutted on its political stage, causing a great sen- 
sation for the time being, but its day was done, and nobody 
cared for it any longer. If the priest who was deposed by 
the Bishop of Ermland and the Catholic professors at Bonn 
had not raised their voices against it, perhaps the Kulturkampf 
would never have taken place ; but if a powder-train is laid 
anywhere it commonly happens that the magazine is fired 
sooner or later. 

It would be neither interesting nor profitable to follow the 
gradual modification of the May Laws from 1878 to 1887, 
when they practically came to an end. Almost every session 
of the Reichstag witnessed some alteration in them, which 
Bismarck explained in an off-hand manner, as if his hearers 
understood already what he intended to say, and there was 
no need of a convincing argument. Every downward step in 
this change of policy appears to have required a change in 
the ministry of public worship, and Dr. Falk's successors 
were as numerous as unimportant in the record of events. 

Dr. Windhorst was now one of Bismarck's most faithful 
supporters (a strong force in his way), and it was not without 
some reason that the Liberals insinuated that his services 
were paid for in " money of Canossa." Bismarck had become 
long accustomed to the taunt of inconsistency, and he could 
reply with quite as much truth that the May Laws were still 
on the statute books and could be enforced whenever the 
government concidered it expedient. 

The alliance between Germany, Austria, and Italy had been 

37o 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

supplemented by a convenient commercial treaty ; the cry of 
Guelph and Ghibeliines was no longer heard in Italy, and a 
current of similar ideas circulated through the three coun- 
tries from the North Sea to the Straits of Messina. The 
word that went forth from Berlin was echoed in Vienna and 
again in Rome. Never since the Roman empire had the 
population of so vast a tract been animated by an equally 
sympathetic spirit. German seriousness and moderation 
tempered the less stable and more impulsive Italian nature. 
The Italian government, which for a time seemed to be 
drifting on a dangerous reef, weathered the promontory, and 
once more kept its even course. No wonder that Lord Salis- 
bury admitted to a London audience that one man ruled the 
whole of Europe. " However," he added, " I do not think 
he is unfriendly to England, but quite the reverse." 

The monastic orders were permitted to return to Germany, 1 
all except the Jesuits; and when, in April, 1887, the May 
Laws were finally repealed, with the exception of some simple 
regulations concerning the appointments of parochial priests, 
people asked the question whether Bismarck had actually 
gone to Canossa, after all his defiant protestations. No ; he 
had not gone to Canossa,' any more than Canossa had come 
to him. You may call it a stalemate, if you please ; but the 
object for which the May Laws were enacted had been sub- 
stantially attained, — the assertion of the supremacy of the 
civil law. Infallibility was dead as a door-nail. There is no 
surer way of killing an idea or a dogma than by overdoing 
it. Everybody was utterly sick of infallibility, and, it may be 
said, of the Kulturkampf also, and wished to hear no more of 
it. Requiescat in pace was the sentiment in Germany in re- 
gard to the whole affair, and Bismarck shared in this. The 
priests might believe in the dogma so long as they liked, 
provided only that they did not obtrude it before the public. 
It had been a tough, obstinate struggle; but the Church of 
Rome was the only sufferer. If Bismarck had not discon- 
certed Kullman's aim by raising his hand for the frequent 

1 It was called " the migration of the rooks." 
371 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

salutation, the balance would have been largely on the Cath- 
olic side ; so narrow a line is there often between success and 
failure in the most important enterprises. The good under- 
standing between Bismarck and Leo XIII. continued to the 
end, and the latter expressed himself as feeling highly com- 
plimented for having been chosen arbitrator of the dispute 
over the Caroline Islands. At the close of the same year he 
presented the German chancellor with the order of Jesus 
Christ set in diamonds, which had never before been pre- 
sented to a Protestant prince ; and he wrote him at the same 
time an autograph letter expressing a respectful recognition 
of his good services in church and state. 

FOREIGN RELATIONS 

From 1 871 for the next decade Gambetta was the most 
popular man in France. He upset the septennate of Presi- 
dent MacMahon on suspicion of Bonapartist intrigues, whether 
well grounded or not is uncertain. Von Beust considers that 
there was really no need of MacMahon's resigning, and that 
he might have remained in office until his seven years were 
finished, whether the national assembly liked it or not. 
Gambetta obtained the passage of a law to place the appoint- 
ment of general officers under the control of the national 
assembly, a measure sufficient of itself to shipwreck the 
French army in a protracted campaign. After the election 
of President Grevy ministries were formed and resigned so 
frequently that their average duration was less than six 
months. Gambetta was the leader who wrought these re- 
markable changes, which gave the French republic an ap- 
pearance of political instability. He declined to accept 
office himself, but finally was obliged to do this in order to 
escape from the inconsistency of his position. He had no 
sooner done so than the unpractical character of the man be- 
came apparent. His first manoeuvre was to seek an inter- 
view with Bismarck, and the German chancellor must have 
been greatly amused at the idea of being outwitted by this 
inexperienced disciple of Rousseau. If Gambetta was twitted 
at this meeting for his incendiary philippics against German}-, 

372 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

it is no more than he might have expected. A coalition had 
already taken root against him before he returned to Paris. 
The constitution did not satisfy him ; he wished to make 
changes in the suffrage laws, was outvoted in the Chamber 
of Deputies, and retired from office. Neither did he live long 
after this. Jules Ferry was the first premier since Thiers's 
resignation who evinced the capacity to deal with the ele- 
ments about him. It was during his administration that 
Tunis was annexed to Algeria, and this was accomplished in 
a very adroit and skilful manner. He wished to divert his 
countrymen from home politics by giving them a foreign in- 
terest, and it was with him that the annexation of Tonquin in 
Cochin China originated, — a country almost as rich as India in 
oriental products. Bismarck congratulated him on his suc- 
cess in governing the French, but spoiled the compliment by 
adding that no people obey better when they feel the strong 
hand. This may even have assisted in weakening Ferry's 
popularity, which was wholly upset by a defeat in the China 
seas, and he disappeared, like the others before him, never to 
come to the top again. These continuous changes indicated 
a decided weakness in the French constitution, for a system- 
atic foreign policy is impossible under such conditions. It 
was the logical consequence of imitating the English form of 
government, which is much better suited to a sober, phleg- 
matic people than to the excitable, capricious French. If the 
French had modelled their institutions in 1871 more after the 
pattern of the United States, with an independent president 
and cabinet, they might have achieved better results in the 
long run, and founded their republic on a more enduring 
basis. 

Old Manteuffel was made governor of Alsace and Lor- 
raine in 1873, and, though he could not prevent young Prus- 
sian officers from swaggering in the streets of Strasburg, he 
filled the position in an exemplary manner, dealing equal and 
exact justice to friend and foe. Wherever Manteuffel went 
order reigned, and confusion fled before him. The anti- 
German agitation, which had been largely stimulated by the 
priests, subsided after the election of Leo XIII., and even 

373 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

when Emperor William visited the two provinces in 1877 he 
was received in a cordial and friendly, if not the most enthu- 
siastic manner. The Alsatians have too much local pride not 
to feel a certain satisfaction in the military prestige of the 
new German empire, and this was a partial compensation for 
their involuntary separation from France. It could not be 
said that the French had yet become reconciled to the events 
ot 1S70; but as time went on they felt continually less in- 
clined to try conclusions again with the German army, and 
President Grevy is credited with the statement that the man 
who contemplated another campaign on the Rhine, so long 
as Moltke and Bismarck were alive, lacked common sense. 
The acquisition of Tunis was gratifying to the national pride, 
and, coming as a free gift from the German chancellor, it 
helped much to ameliorate the feeling towards him. 

After the Italian alliance the outlook for peace was particu- 
lar!}- good, but Bismarck was not satisfied until he had drawn 
Russia into the same net. In September, 1S84, he effected a 
meeting of the three emperors, with their respective min- 
isters, at Skierniviece in Poland, intended specially to satisfv 
the Tsar and De Giers that the Triple Alliance was not in 
any respect inimical to Russian interests. It was also given 
out that Bismarck was endeavoring to harmonize the relation 
between Russia and England in the Balkan states ; but it is 
equally certain that he did not succeed in this, as appeared 
not long afterward in the Bulgarian imbroglio. This pacific 
outlook, however, did not last above two years, when k was 
seriously disturbed by the waywardness of Prince Alexander 
of Bulgaria in the east, and in the west by one of the most 
singular phenomena of the past fifty years. 

Somewhere about iSS; the populace of Paris fell under 
the influence of an unprincipled adventurer named Boulanger. 
He was not a man of exceptional ability or good judgment; 
audacious rather than brave, and possessed of enormous self- 
confidence. He had served with credit in the campaign of 
1S70. and had been promoted rapidly to the rank of major- 
general. He was thoroughly unprincipled, and subsequent 
events proved that his pretended patriotism was nothing better 

374 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

than personal ambition. He was ready to sell his soul to any- 
political devil, or political party, for the sake of advancement; 
but he could deliver a lively off-hand speech, and had that 
ready good-natured manner which is often mistaken for gen- 
uine bonhomie. How such an empty character became the idol 
of Paris it is difficult to imagine, and certainly is not much to 
the credit of the Parisians ; but General Boulanger was so 
popular in 1886 that he was made minister of war chiefly on 
that account. He now succeeded to Gambetta's role as 
preacher of a crusade of vengeance against Prussia, and he 
did this so openly and energetically that under different con- 
ditions it might easily have caused the outbreak of war. He 
was secretly supported in this course by the royalists, who 
hoped to recover lost ground through the confusion which 
Boulanger created, and openly by the more sensational news- 
papers and a noisy group of followers in the Chamber of 
Deputies. The aspect of France was not more belligerent 
after the Austrian campaign of 1866. People of unregulated 
imagination already saw in Boulanger a conquering hero, who 
would recover the laurels and redeem the military honor of 
the French nation. Slight collisions which occurred on the 
frontier about this time excited the animosity of certain classes 
in both countries, and tended to aggravate the situation. 

Bismarck knew that diplomacy would avail little with such 
an undiplomatic cabinet as that in which Boulanger partici- 
pated, and perhaps he had learned from the Kulturkampf 
that -attempts to muzzle the press of a foreign country were 
of little avail. He felt strong in the triple alliance, but he 
thought Germany ought to be able to deal with France 
single-handed, and he knew that other governments would 
look at it in that light. Moltke informed him, however, that 
the present military establishment of France largely exceeded 
that of Germany. He could not feel confident of success 
without an increase of forty thousand men in the active ser- 
vice of the German army. Accordingly, in the autumn of 
1886, Bismarck went to the Reichstag with a measure to this 
effect. " In France," he said, " the unexpected may happen 
at any time, and we ought to be prepared for it beforehand. 

375 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

An armed peace is, after all, better than war; and if we pre- 
pare ourselves for war we shall be less likely to encounter it 
than if we do not." He asked for an increase of fifty thou- 
sand men for seven years to tide over the emergency. The 
Reichstag, however, looked on this rather as an attempt to 
obtain an additional support to the imperial authority, and 
refused to grant it ; whereupon Bismarck dissolved the par- 
liament in a rage, and appealed to the constituencies. As 
happened on previous occasions, the German people sup- 
ported their chancellor, and the new Reichstag, elected in the 
autumn of 1887, proved more favorable to his foreign policy. 
He opened the subject, when the delegates had assembled, in 
a celebrated speech, from which we cull the following extract: 

"That the present bill is not to be looked on in the light of a 
momentary arrangement — this, I think, will be clearly seen, if I 
may request you to consider with me the dangers of war to which 
we have been exposed within the last forty years, without, however, 
becoming at any time a prey to nervous apprehensions. 

"If in my enumeration I should have omitted one single year 
of all these years, in the terrible experiences of which you have all 
yourselves participated, one would not have the impression that this 
state of fear of great wars, of further complications, the results of 
which as to any possible alliances nobody can judge of in advance, 
— that this state is a permanent one with us, and that we must pre- 
pare ourselves, once and for all, to deal with it ; independently of 
the present conditions, we must be strong, that we, fully conscious 
of being a great nation, which, if required, is sufficiently powerful 
to take her destiny in her own hand, even against any and every 
coalition, with the self-confidence and the trust in God which is 
born of the consciousness of one's own strength and the justness 
of one's cause, which will ever be on the side of Germany as far 
as this is in the power of the government, — that thus, I say, we 
can look every contingency in the face, and that with tranquillity. 

"In short, in these times we will have to strengthen our forces 
to the utmost; and if it is possible for us to be stronger than any 
other country of a like number of individuals, it would be a crime 
not to make use of this possibility. If we do not need our military 
power, we need not call out the same. The principal point here 
is the money question, which does not involve a very great ex- 

376 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

penditure, if one considers that France has spent three thousand 
millions within the last twenty years for the improvement of her 
military forces, while we invested scarcely fifteen hundred millions, 
including the amount for which we now ask you. 

" When I say that we must perpetually aim to be always ready 
for any contingency, I herewith lay claim that on account of our 
geographical position we must make still greater efforts than other 
nations do for the same purpose. We lie in the centre of Europe. 
We offer three sides where we can be attacked. France can only 
be attacked on its eastern frontier, Russia only at its western. 
Besides that, we are more than any other nation exposed to the 
danger of coalitions, according to the development of the history 
of the world, according to our geographical situation, and also 
because of the looser organization of the Germans up to the present 
time as compared with other nations. God has put us in a place 
where our neighbors prevent us from degenerating through indo- 
lence and stagnation." 

Bismarck then dwelt on the fact that the war party in 
Russia had caused an estrangement to take place between 
the German and Russian empires ; and afterwards gave a 
history of the origin of the Austro-German alliance which 
is substantially what we have already stated. He then said : 

"There is no doubt that if the present bill is passed the alliance 
with Austria will gain tremendously in power, inasmuch as the 
power of that side of the alliance represented by Germany will be 
very largely augmented. As soon as we have the guns for the 
increase in numbers provided for in the bill, this very same bill 
will represent a strengthening of the sureties of peace as well as a 
strengthening of that peace alliance, as powerful as if a fourth great 
power had joined the league with an army of seven hundred 
thousand men." 

He then went on to say that he did not consider that there 
was any necessary apprehension of an immediate conflict 
with either France or Russia. All that was necessary for 
Germany was that she should be prepared to meet any emer- 
gency which might arise. The difficulty of preserving peace 
was greatly increased by the threatening articles in foreign 
newspapers. Again he said : 

377 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

"I would particularly admonish foreign countries to drop these 
threats. They lead to nothing. The threat which is offered to 
us — not from the government, but from the press — is, strictly speak- 
ing, incredible nonsense, when one imagines that a powerful and 
proud nation, such as the German empire, could be intimidated by 
a highly belligerent attitude in printer's ink or by a conglomeration 
of words. This should be dropped ; then it would be easier for us 
to take a more conciliatory stand towards our two neighbors. Every 
country will in the long run be made responsible for the windows 
which are broken by its press, the bill for which will be presented 
some time or other by the other nation being seriously offended. 
We can be easily impressed by friendliness and good-will, — per- 
haps too easily, — but certainly never by threats. We Germans 
fear God, but we fear nothing else in this world ; and it is 
the fear of God which induces us to love and cultivate peace." J 

This was the last of Bismarck's more important speeches, 
and in the opinion of many the greatest of them all. Its 
delivery consumed nearly two hours, and during that time 
Bismarck refreshed himself with more than a dozen glasses 
of water. It was a mighty effort for a man nearly seventy- 
three, and these short extracts do it little justice. It must be 
taken as a whole, and it represented in itself the chancellor's 
whole public career. It was felt to be a justification of his 
life-work, and brought to the Reichstag a realizing sense of 
the man's greatness as never before, — especially that he was 
at heart a man of peace, and had brought with him a sword 
so that he might establish peace on an enduring basis. After 
the oration was finished Count von Moltke came forward and, 
ascending the steps' to the chancellor's table, shook hands 
with him and congratulated him on his unusual success. The 
Reichstag then adjourned and escorted the chancellor to the 
Radziwill Palace in a body, while the audience who had lis- 
tened in the galleries dispersed and filled Berlin with their 
enthusiastic accounts of it. 

When the army bill came to a final decision all parties 

1 Bismarck's Speeches, Speemann ed., xvi. 135. Speech delivered Febru- 
ary 6. 

373 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

united in its support, except the Social Democrats, whose 
votes were the only ones cast in opposition to it. The Lon- 
don Times said, next morning, "The passage of Bismarck's 
bill for the increase of the German army will give an effectual 
chill to the belligerent party in France ; nor is it likely that 
we shall hear any more for the present about campaigns for 
revenge." This proved to be true, and, though twelve or 
more years have passed since the speech was delivered, there 
has been no further need of legislation on the subject, nor 
have the French people required further admonition. Bou- 
langer's downfall followed close upon it (February and March, 
1888), so that it almost might seem as if one were the conse- 
quence of the other. His turbulent agitation led to his court- 
martial for insubordination as an army officer, and he was dis- 
missed from the service. He then obtained an election to the 
Chamber of Deputies, where he distinguished himself by 
equally violent harangues and by his duel with Floquet, the 
president of the assembly. A year later he was charged 
with embezzlement while minister of war, and went into vol- 
untary exile to escape conviction. It was found, however, 
by a trial election that he had a million supporters among the 
voters of the French people. 



379 



C 1 1 a r T E u x v r. 

FUKHKRICK 111. AM' \\ \\ \ iam U. 

During the List years of Bismarck's parliamentary service 
he presented .1 picture of terrible and almost demoniac en- 
ergy, Seated behind his chancellor's table, in the white 
uniform of the Magdeburg Guards, with .1 stiff yellow collar 
and gold epaulets, his perfectly bald cranium (much larger 
than the average man's) rose above his shaggy white brows, 
which half concealed the nebulous eyes, whose falcon like 
gleams flashed through the chamber at every fresh statement 
or telling argument of his opponents. His stubby nose, ob- 
stinate .is Martin Luther's, heavy white mustache, and firmly 
set chin completed .1 portrait unlike any othei in the present 
century, 

More impatient than ever, more determined ol his points, 
and mete indifferent to appearances, his oratory was such as 
might have made a child laugh, or excited a feeling of con- 
tempt ui a young lady ol fashion, hut there was neither 
laughter nor contempt tor it in the Reichstag, Cowering 
awkwardly above his table, swaying slightly to the rhythm of 
his sentences, nervously clutching his coat buttons, the papers 

on his desk, or any other object that might he within his 

reach, he poured forth sentence after sentence of the most 
telling argument, not like a man who is reading from a book, 
hut rather as if he were writing out his statement, hesitating 
and revising it as he went along, Sentence crowded on sen- 
tence as it" one weie pushing another out of his mind, Mean- 
while, he would continually refresh himself with what appeared 
to he water, hut which was well known to contain a homoeo- 
pathic quantity of alcoholic stimulant. 

When the debate in the Reichstag became tedious Bis- 
marck sometimes retired to .w\ anteroom on the same floor, 
where he could continue his work to better advantage. On 

380 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

one occasion when he did so the Radicals and Socialists made 
a desperate attack on some measure he had in hand, and chal- 
lenged him to come out and reply to it on the floor, and not 
insult the Reichstag by his absence while it. was in session, 
The chancellor stepped to the doorofhis room, and informed 
them that he could hear all that was necessary and essential 
of their remark"; where- he was ; which did not much improve 

the temper of his adversaries. Bismarck had long since- be- 
come a privileged character, even to Emperor William, and, 

like all such, was often a trial to his friends and an aggrava- 
tion to others. No man could be more polite or considerate 
if one happened to catch that side of his nature, but when his 
thoughts were absorbed in great designs he paid little atten- 
tion to those about him. His sleeplessness was a national 
inconvenience, and the most important affairs were sometimes 
obliged to wait for days until he felt equal to the transaction 
of business. 

Thai. Bismarck was sometimes abusive in the heat of debate 
is not to be denied. He was in the habit of complaining that 
his opponents distorted the facts in their statements and mis- 
represented his own. lie sometimes complained of their 
mendacity, when the truth might be a matter of opinion. At 
the same time, his friends have always asserted that he never 
intentionally " struck below the belt," and his arguments in 
his speeches which have been published are not of the sophis- 
tical sort. On one occasion, when he animadverted on the 
Socialists for their vote upon the army bill, and one of them 
called " Pfui" (fie) to him, Bismarck rejoined, " Whoever says 
'pfui' to me is insulting. As a Christian I may pocket it, but 
as chancellor of the empire I must resent it, and inform my 
opponent that I can return insult for insult. We did not 
make war on France in order to be inoculated by fifteen or 
twenty Socialists in our own country. The member must 
understand that this assembly is a meeting of gentlemanly 
and orderly persons, and if he meets with different treatment 
here it is because he introduces it himself." 

This was called Bismarck's broadsword style, and it is one 
which he frequently resorted to. Plato, and not Menander 

381 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

as Goethe says, was the first to preach that it is better to 
endure insults than to return them, but it is to be feared that 
such an elevated code would hardly appeal to a class of men 
like the German Socialists. They would probably have looked 
upon it as a confession of weakness, and weakness in Bis- 
marck's position, either real or imaginary, was not to be 
thought of. He said himself, in regard to the behavior of the 
French troops in killing wounded Germans on the battle-field, 
that their wars against barbarians in Algeria, Mexico, and 
Cochin China had made them also semi-barbarous. So Bis- 
marck, in his long parliamentary warfare with the Socialists, 
had acquired something of the methods and manners of his 
antagonists. 

THE BATTENBERGER 

The organization of the Balkan or Christian-Turkish states, 
after the Congress of Berlin, proved a matter of unusual dif- 
ficulty. There was a conflict of Russian, Turkish, and Eng- 
lish interests in most of them which left the native population 
small chance to express its own wishes. The only one, how- 
ever, whose fortunes are directly connected with the life of 
Bismarck is Bulgaria, of which Prince Alexander of Batten- 
berg was chosen ruler by the national assembly, with the 
advice and consent of the signatory powers, in April, 1879, 
and in July he was crowned in the capital of Sofia, and com- 
menced his rule in a vigorous and conservative manner. As 
the national assembly proved too radical for his ideas he dis- 
solved it and required fresh elections. As this did not help 
the matter much he resorted to a coup d'etat, — supposed to 
have been instigated at St. Petersburg, — dissolved the assem- 
bly again and abolished the constitution. Thus we find him 
at the outset of his reign acting under Russian influences, 
and in direct opposition to the wishes of the Bulgarians, who 
are, however, an ignorant and uncultivated people, by no 
means well fitted for self-government. 

The war followed between Servia and Bulgaria in conse- 
quence of the annexation of East Roumelia, and the victo- 
rious Bulgarians, having arms in their hands, 'demanded the 

382 






LIFE OF BISMARCK 

restoration of the constitution, and, though this was opposed 
by a majority of the officers, especially those of higher grades, 
Prince Alexander concluded it was best to comply. This 
placed him, however, between two fires, and his position was 
certainly a difficult one. A foreigner, and separated from 
those about him by the gulf of authority, and perhaps also 
influenced by the Crown Princess of Prussia, it was inevitable 
that Alexander of Battenberg should seek encouragement 
against Panslavism in the direction where it was most easily 
obtained. Unfortunately, this was in a quarter whence he 
was likely to derive the least material support. It was soon 
rumored in St. Petersburg that Alexander was acting under 
English advice, and directing the policy of Bulgaria in the 
interests of Great Britain. That there was some truth in this 
is plainly apparent from the course of subsequent events. 
Alexander travelled about his principality in company with 
the English envoy in rather an ostentatious manner; and 
nothing could have been more imprudent, for it not only 
offended the Russians, but diminished the respect felt for 
him by his own people. It was considered undignified as 
well as impolitic. There can be no doubt that he listened 
to the advice of the English envoy, and received from him 
expectations of support which were not afterwards fulfilled. 
There was, in fact, little that the British cabinet could do to 
sustain him in his position, except through a tedious course 
of diplomatic manoeuvring. The blow which prostrated him 
was too sudden to be parried by diplomacy. Only Bismarck 
could have saved him, and he does not appear to have con- 
sulted the German chancellor at this juncture. Alexander 
of Battenberg was nephew to the Tsar Alexander, and that, 
in the strained relations between England and Russia, he 
should have permitted himself to be influenced by English 
interests in opposition to his own kindred exasperated the 
Tsar and helped to precipitate the events which followed. 

On the night of August 21, 1886, his prime minister Kar- 
aveloff entered the royal palace, accompanied by a delegation 
of other officials, and announced to Prince Alexander that 
Bulgarian opinion was dissatisfied with the policy he was 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

pursuing, and that his deposition was in order. The con- 
spiracy had been kept so perfectly secret that Alexander was 
astonished, and knew not how to help himself. " I see no 
friends here," he said ; " I cannot resist you." 1 This reply 
was dignified but conclusive. 

He was escorted by a detachment of Russian cavalry to 
Widdin, and thence on board ship to Severin in Roumauia, 
where he was set at liberty. Great indignation was expressed 
at this outrage in Vienna and London, but the indignation in 
German}' was of an unofficial character. The Roumanian 
people, and especially the citizens of Sofia, felt that the 
nation had been insulted by this clandestine removal of their 
chief magistrate, and expressed themselves accordingly. 
Under cover of this popular outcry Alexander returned from 
Austria in a few days, but he found that the conspiracy 
against him was so wide-spread, and implicated so many of 
the highest officials, that he decided to resign in a dignified 
manner and returned to Germany. He is reported to have 
said that to have punished the guilty would have involved a 
massacre, and was practically impossible. 

Immediately on the return of the Battenberger he was in- 
vited to Berlin by the Crown Prince of Prussia and enter- 
tained with every mark of distinction. 2 Upon this there were 
not wanting others to follow so illustrious an example, and 
newspapers, taking their cue from the heir to the imperial 
throne, raised a chorus of denunciation against the Bulgarian 
conspiracy, with slightly disguised insinuations concerning 
the Russian government. Bismarck, however, said gruffly 
that Alexander would have done better if he had not fished 
in troubled waters. The attention of the crown prince and 
princess plainly indicated the origin of a policy which, if it 
had been permitted to continue, might have taken a permanent 

1 Despatch to the Vienna Press, August 23, 1SS6. 

" The London Times was furious. It said : " The arrogance of Russia and 
the fall of Alexander were due directly to the cynical attitude of Germany and, 
in a less degree, of Austria- Hungary. . . . Prince Bismarck has been willing to 
give Russia a • free hand' in order to lessen the chances of a Russo-French 
alliance." 

3S4 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

root. Emperor William was now eighty-nine, and though 
apparently in robust health, so that he surprised his attend- 
ants by the slight assistance he required, it was equally certain 
that the crown prince, with his English wife and British pro- 
clivities, might any day be called to the throne. Lord Salis- 
bury had succeeded Gladstone, and wiseacres predicted that 
the Home-Rule agitation would give him a long lease of 
power. Then Bismarck would go out of office, and an anti- 
Russian alliance would be formed between England and Ger- 
many. That the crown prince should have been so destitute 
of political judgment as to lend himself to such an intrigue, 
which could only result in disasters to Germany, even if it 
brought advantage to Great Britain, seems almost incredible, 
but his subsequent course renders the fact incontestable. The 
old emperor, more and more devoted to his son, appeared to 
be oblivious of what was going forward right under his eyes, 
and Bismarck may have considered it the most prudent course 
not to call his attention to it. 

The demonstrations at Berlin in favor of the Battenberger, 
however, were too conspicuous not to attract attention in St. 
Petersburg, and they had even become the subject of diplo- 
matic correspondence before the surprising announcement 
was made that an alliance was in prospect between Prince 
Alexander and the daughter of the crown prince, Victoria's 
grand-daughter. Already two years previous the crown 
princess had attempted to bring this about, but William I. 
had set his foot down that it should not be done, for reasons 
of state expediency. Too much depends on alliances be- 
tween sovereign houses to permit personal inclination to 
have much of a share in them. Now the courtship was being 
renewed with better prospect of success. The crown prince 
did not oppose it, and Victoria encouraged it, but a murmur 
of dissatisfaction went through Germany from east to west. 
Bismarck perceived that a storm was coming and prepared 
himself to meet it. It appears to have been at this time 
that he promised the Tsar that so long as he remained 
chancellor the Battenberger should never marry into the 
Prussian royal family. The excitement suddenly subsided 
25 385 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

again, and nothing more was heard of the proposed match 
for nearly a year. 

Apart from its moral character the kidnapping of Prince 
Alexander was a stroke of genius. Bismarck and Count 
Kalnoky knew the situation perfectly, and would no doubt 
have interfered in favor of the Battcnberger if he had been the 
right man for Bulgaria. 1 They understood what the editor of 
the Times failed to consider, that the Tsar of Russia, though 
nominally an autocrat, was no more a free agent than an 
English schoolmaster is ; that there were two parties in 
Russia, the Panslavists and the party of peace, and that, 
although the Tsar belonged to the latter and supported it, 
he was also obliged to conciliate the former or have his way 
blocked for him in every direction. They realized that it 
was their duty to assist Alexander III. in this, so far as they 
could, for the good of Germany and Austria. The Tsar 
needed all the help he could get, and this fact sufficiently 
explains Bismarck's attitude towards the Bulgarian abduc- 
tion. Kalnoky's reticence is also significant. The Austrian 
government did not fail to interfere from lack of a bold policy, 
as was proved soon afterwards, but evidently because the 
emperor and Kalnoky did not consider it expedient. 

The following April Prince Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg was 
chosen by the signatory powers, and accepted by the Bulga- 
rian assembly, as the Battenberger's successor. He does not 
appear to have encountered the same difficulties as Alex- 
der, but proved, on the whole, an acceptable ruler to the 
Slavic population. 

In the summer of 1887 Emperor William resorted to Ems 
as usual, and visitors from foreign countries were astonished 
to see a sovereign of ninety years so bright in mind, erect in 
his carriage, and elastic in his step. Optimists predicted that 
he might yet become a centenarian ; but the man who had 

1 Minchin says: "He knew, no doubt, that English sympathy was with him, 
but that material aid was not forthcoming from that quarter. If he had only had 
Bismarck on his side he might have remained, but the German chancellor had 
become the colleague of the Russian chancellor." — The Balkan Peninsula, 
p. 296. 

3S6 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

never yet known misfortune was doomed to a severe disap- 
pointment in the last hour of his life. The crown prince was 
already troubled with a slight swelling in his throat, but this 
was not sufficiently advanced for the doctors to give a decided 
opinion in regard to it. Early in the autumn it began to be 
whispered in Berlin that the crown prince's trouble was of a 
malignant nature, but an English physician, Sir Morrell Mc- 
Kenzie, who had been sent for by the crown princess, made a 
public denial of this. The popular impression that if the 
prince was mortally ill he could not, by Prussian usage, suc- 
ceed to the throne if it became vacant, has been denied by 
Bismarck in his memoirs. Emperor William was not, appar- 
ently, deceived by this stratagem, and recognized the true 
nature of the malady with fearful clearness. His physical con- 
dition changed so much that it seemed as if he preferred not to 
live, in order that his son might at least leave his name upon 
the list of German emperors. Bismarck desired to have a 
regent appointed on account of the age of William and the 
invalid condition of the crown prince ; but William deferred 
the matter to his son, who either objected to the plan or post- 
poned its consideration. On the approach of cold weather 
the crown prince was advised by Dr. McKenzie to go to 
Mentone on the Gulf of Genoa, where he would not only enjoy 
a more favorable climate, but also his condition could be 
more easily concealed. It is said that from this time the old 
emperor did nothing but weep, until he finally died, on the 9th 
of March, within two weeks of his ninety-first birthday. He 
was interred in the royal church at Potsdam, where the dust 
of Frederick the Great rests in a metal casket. Never had 
Berlin beheld such funeral obsequies, for not only did the 
position of the man recall the grandeur of the Hohenstau- 
fens, but all Europe respected his character as one that would 
have distinguished him in a private station, and was the 
finest jewel in the imperial crown. It is with rather too much 
effort, however, that his successors attempt to designate him 
as William the Great. Such a title falls to the lot of few in 
history, and only by universal acclamation. Compared with 
Frederick, or Charlemagne, or Alexander he does not appear 

387 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

to such advantage as he does among the sovereigns of his 
own time. 

The crown prince was in a very low condition at Mentone, 
but he decided at once to return to Berlin and take the reins 
of government in hand for the short time that remained to 
him on earth. He signed himself Frederick, without the 
William, as if to designate that he was the true successor of 
Frederick II., and to this his military reputation gave him 
some title. King Humbert of Italy intercepted him en route y 
having made a day's journey for the purpose, and held an 
interview with him in the railway carriage. Frederick said 
to him, " I face my malady as I did the bullets of Koniggratz 
and Worth." The day after he arrived at Berlin, Frederick III. 
summoned Bismarck to his couch, received him cordially, and 
conversed eagerly on public affairs so long as he was able, the 
empress remaining in the chamber all the while. The fol- 
lowing day Bismarck called again, and finding the empress 
also with him, showed some embarrassment, and finally ex- 
plained to the emperor that he could not converse with such 
freedom as he would like in the presence of a third person. 
The empress accordingly withdrew. It is probable that the 
Battenberg marriage was brought forward by Frederick 
during these first days of his authority, and that Bismarck 
respectfully but firmly refused to consider it, so the matter 
remained in abeyance. 1 

On March 21 an imperial edict was issued, authorizing the 
Crown Prince William to act for his father in the considera- 
tion or settlement of such state affairs as the emperor should 
submit to his decision ; and a few days later the project of a 
marriage between Prince Alexander of Battenberg and the 
Princess Victoria was again brought forward. Now the 
storm broke, not only in the royal palace but throughout 
Prussia. Bismarck declared that he would resign before such 
a catastrophe should happen in the affairs of Germany. He 
argued that the marriage was particularly objectionable to the 



1 Bismarck alleges that Frederick III. was glad of his support at this critical 
moment, as against the pressure of his wife and her relatives. 

388 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

Tsar, and would be certain to disturb the good understanding 
between the two governments, which for so many years had 
rested on a most delicate balance, and required the greatest 
care for its preservation. " I should have been false to my 
old master and remiss in my duty to the Fatherland," he 
stated afterwards, " if I had not exercised all my influence 
against giving to the Battenberger the advantage of this dis- 
tinction." That he felt any personal animosity to the prince 
is quite improbable, but he considered the welfare of nations 
of more importance than the sentiments of individuals. 

Not only the ministry supported Bismarck, but most of 
the Prussian newspapers and members of the Reichstag. 
When he threatened to resign petitions were drawn up to 
Emperor Frederick, signed by notable members of the Con- 
servative and National Liberal parties, urging him to retain 
the chancellor in office. The people who conversed in beer- 
gardens, the soldiers on duty, even the newsboys in the street, 
were of one opinion in regard to the proposed marriage. 
Everybody seemed to understand the question at issue except 
Frederick himself. The Crown Prince William was inclined 
at first to support the cause of his sister, for whom he felt a 
great affection ; but Bismarck either satisfied him or talked 
him over, so that he also joined the opposition, though this 
brought him in conflict with his own mother. With a dying 
sovereign and a refractory heir apparent the idea of dispensing 
with Bismarck's services was not to be thought of. The situ- 
ation was too critical to permit of such a radical change in 
state affairs. Queen Victoria started for Berlin to assist the 
cause of her daughter, but her presence there only served to 
pour oil on the flames. No people conscious of their own 
dignity can brook foreign interference in their domestic affairs, 
and this only served to increase the odium which was now felt 
towards all the Guelfs. The papers openly declared that 
the empress was sacrificing Germany to English interests, and 
that though she had lived so long among them she still 
remained a foreigner, and could only be considered as a 
foreigner. 

To the emperor this seemed like personal abuse, and he 

389 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

blamed the ministry for not preventing it and prosecuting the 
editors, as they had a legal right to do. One of the last acts 
of his life was to remove Von Putkammer, who was Bis- 
marck's nephew-in-law, from the ministry on this ground. 
The day before his death, however, he performed an act of 
magnanimity for which he should always receive due credit: 
he summoned Bismarck again to his chamber, called for the 
empress, and, though speechless, joined their hands in his 
presence. Bismarck was the man to appreciate such an ac- 
tion, and accepted this reconciliation with his former enemy 
in his most gracious manner. 

Frederick III. reigned exactly ninety-nine days, and Ger- 
many lost two emperors within four months. After his death 
his widow retired to her castle at Kromberg, near Frankfort- 
on-the-Main, where she still continues to reside, with a yearly 
income of four hundred thousand marks from the German 
people, who have not yet forgotten the Battenberg intrigue, 
and pay it very unwillingly. So ended Bismarck's last great 
struggle. 

FREEDOM LIVES HENCE 

William II. commenced his reign on June 18, 1888, amid a 
lively journalistic agitation caused by the Battenberg affair in 
England and America. It was said that he and his father 
never could agree ; that he virtually imprisoned his mother 
after ascending the throne ; that he was very ambitious, and 
would certainly lead Germany into endless difficulties ; that 
he hated the English, and intended to make war on France ; 
that he intended to annex Denmark ; that he had a withered 
arm, and that there was an ancient prophecy in regard to this 
which boded no good. 

There was a certain coloring for these assertions in the fact 
that William had already shown himself a stubborn and self- 
willed young man, what the Germans call " starrkopf ;" but 
Maria Teresa used to call Joseph II. "starrkopf," and he 
was the best sovereign that Austria ever had. The true ex- 
planation for the condition of his arm is that when he was a 
baby his mother employed an English nurse, who dropped 

390 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

him on his right shoulder, and so injured the arm-socket that 
an operation was afterwards required, and his arm was ren- 
dered practically useless. Of course, German women of a 
certain class all believe that if the nurse had been a German 
this accident would not have happened, and it is thought 
that the servants about the prince during boyhood instilled 
this notion into his head. The suffering which it has caused 
him is apparent in the expression of his face, which other- 
wise is frank and manly. He has not, however, the intellec- 
tual breadth of his father, or the finely proportioned dignity 
of his grandfather. He looks like a person of more energy 
than brains. 

He was not long in giving proof that he intended to man- 
age his own affairs. No sooner was he crowned than he 
started on an iron-clad voyage to Cronstadt, for an interview 
with Alexander III. Immediately on his return to Berlin he 
went to visit the venerable Francis Joseph in Vienna. What 
did Francis Joseph think of him ? From Vienna he pro- 
ceeded to Rome for an interview with King Humbert, and to 
pay his respects to Leo XIII. If he treated the others in the 
same manner as the pope, there could not have been much 
satisfaction in these imperial visits. Leo afterwards stated : 
" I would have liked to have conversed with the Emperor of 
Germany on politics, but as soon as I entered on the subject 
he introduced me to his brother, and I did not see much more 
of him." His characteristics belong to the Guelfs rather 
than the Hohenzollerns, and in certain traits he resembles his 
uncle, the Prince of Wales. 

It is also true that, having been brought up amongst the 
most distinguished men of his time, and educated in great 
events, he has the kind of ambition which naturally arises 
from this. He wishes to do something to distinguish him- 
self, but does not quite know how. In fact, there is nothing 
at present of special importance for him to do, except to run 
the machine which Bismarck and others have constructed ; 
and this, with a corps of assistants who have been trained up 
at the court of William I., is by no means difficult. He has 
attempted some slight innovations, but most of them have 

39i 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

failed to pass the Reichstag, and have not been supported by 
public opinion. His desire to improve the physical condition 
of the German people, who so often suffer from over-study or 
from exclusive devotion to one employment, is a commend- 
able one. " I want able-bodied men for my army," he said, 
" and not invalids with spectacles." At the same time, Ger- 
many would not be Germany unless it were the best educated 
of nations ; and the most important reform in this direction — 
that of exchanging their mediaeval black-letter, which causes 
so much short-sightedness, for Roman type — does not seem 
to have occurred to him. 

The alarmists forgot — or probably never troubled them- 
selves to learn — that the Emperor of Germany has no consti- 
tutional right to declare aggressive war without the consent 
of the Kings of Saxony, Bavaria, and Wurtemberg ; so that 
William II., even if he desired to play the role of a conquering 
hero, would find himself shut off in this direction at the very 
commencement ; and he is, besides, too kindly and good- 
humored a man to deliberately sacrifice the lives of his people 
for personal glory. Whether he possesses the military genius 
which has appeared so frequently in the Hohenzollern family 
may never be known ; but he is endowed with one talent which 
is rare, if not unique, among persons born in his position, — the 
gift of speech-making. Under the most favorable circum- 
stances he might not become a great orator ; but there is no 
man like him to dedicate a statue, or to make an address 
to a delegation of citizens. His speeches are not eloquent, 
but nicely finished, and delivered with grace and facility. At 
first he showed a tendency to make injudicious statements, — 
as when he advised the Bavarian army that they should make 
up their minds to shoot at their fathers and brothers if he 
ordered them to do so, — but as he grows older he has be- 
come more prudent in this respect. 

Closely allied to this is his talent for dramatic situations — 
for grand public effects. Some people are born actors and 
actresses from the cradle, and in such cases it rarely happens 
that they discover the fact themselves. The nevvswriter who 
spoke of William II. as the Edward Irving of the political 

392 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

stage was not much out of the way. Neither is it difficult to 
see through these performances, and they give to the present 
emperor's actions an air of unreality which detracts from the 
dignity of his position. 

William II. sent fine-sounding telegrams from foreign courts 
to the government at Berlin, but these had the less value be- 
cause any information of real importance which he had to com- 
municate would not have been made public. After his return 
the wheels of state moved smoothly enough ; Bismarck and 
Moltke were treated with distinguished honors; the Bat- 
tenberg marriage was relegated to the limbo of unsuccess- 
ful intrigues, and the shrewdest weather-prophets could not 
discover a cloud on the political horizon. The only question 
seemed to be how many years longer could Bismarck's 
strength suffice for his arduous position. In October, 1889, 
Alexander III. paid William II. a return visit at Berlin, with 
mutual assurances of good-will and peaceable intentions. As 
a matter of fact, the peace of Europe was not in the slightest 
danger, but there is a continual change in the political pano- 
rama to which the minds of statesmen are obliged to adjust 
themselves. In January, 1890, there was an Industrial Con- 
gress held at Berlin to consider the condition of the laboring 
classes, which was largely attended by delegates from other 
countries, though not in an official manner. William II. ex- 
pressed a decided interest in this subject, and there is no reason 
for doubting his sincerity. Already, in the spring of 1889, when 
a widely extended strike of mill operatives took place, he sum- 
moned a delegation of the disaffected workmen to Berlin, in- 
quired into their grievances, and appointed a board of com- 
missioners to adjust their difficulties; but he also informed 
them that such independent demonstrations could not be per- 
mitted in the future, as they inflicted injury on too large a 
number of persons who were in no ways responsible for them. 
If the working-men had good cause for complaint they should 
apply to him and he would order an investigation. 

A council of state was convened at Berlin on February 14, 
1890, for a consideration of the labor question, and William 
II. presided in person. He made an excellent opening address, 

393 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

in which he reviewed the objects of the convention, and said 
especially : 

"The state council should endeavor to frame a scheme for the 
protection of working-men from the arbitrary systems and opera- 
tions of employers by which gross advantage is taken of their needs 
and their inability to help themselves by any other means than the 
desperate remedy of strikes. It should also attempt to protect 
women and children against protracted hours of labor. At the 
same time due regard should be given as to how tar German in- 
dustry will bear the increased burdens thus plaeed on the cost of 
production without jeopardy to Germany's position as a competitor 
in the markets of the world. If that is overlooked the changes I 
propose, instead of resulting in the improvement I desire, would 
lead to the deterioration of the working-men's position. To a\ ert 
this danger a great measure of wise reflection will be needed. The 
settlement of these questions is essential as bearing upon the agree- 
ment as ro labor questions, which, it is to be hoped, we shall estab- 
lish through an international conference." 

This is rather better than the average of convention ad- 
dresses. The young- emperor had evidently taken up the 
subject in earnest and in full confidence that he could im- 
prove the relations between the government and the Social 
Democrats by persuading the laboring classes that he was 
really their friend. He had yet to learn how impossible this 
is, and that what the socialists actually desire is not charity 
but power, and the subversion of society in order to obtain this. 

This convention was followed by an imperial rescript on 
the labor question, of which Bismarck disapproved, and, as 
the subsequent elections resulted unfavorably for the govern- 
ment, Bismarck was convinced that this action of the young 
emperor had produced an injurious effect on public opinion. 
Dr. Busch tells us that on the 24th inst. Bismarck's secretary 
came to him for the purpose of suggesting that he should 
write a letter to the London Daily TdegrapJi expressing this 
opinion and explaining the influence of the rescript accord- 
ing to the chancellor's theory. Although the letter was not 
published, and, if it had been, could hardly be considered 

394 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

in the light of an intrigue, it was an indirect proceeding 
which, if it had come to the emperor's knowledge, would cer- 
tainly have caused great indignation. Whether Bismarck was 
responsible for other proceedings of a like nature at this time, 
we do not know, but it is certain that William II. became 
suspicious that his chancellor was not dealing fairly with him. 

In April the anti-socialist law would come up for con- 
sideration in the Reichstag for the fourth time, and a definite 
government programme must be decided on previously. 
Whether the emperor desired to have it die a natural 
death, or wished for some modification of it which Bis- 
marck considered impracticable, still remains uncertain, but 
as soon as their disagreement became known in the ministry 
it suddenly called into existence an anti-Bismarck clique, the 
leader of which was Von Botticher, minister of the home 
department. 1 As already stated, Bismarck had for some 
years previously been practically emperor, and his colleagues 
often felt this severely. It had long been a saying that Bis- 
marck considered himself infallible ; and no wonder if he did. 
He had long passed the age when a general in the army 
would have been retired from active service. However, a 
majority of the ministry and of other high officials of the 
government still considered him indispensable, and were will- 
ing to endure much for the advantage which they supposed 
he might still be to the state. Others were of the opinion 
that he was already too old and could as well be dispensed 
with. 

"Suspicion," says Auerbach, "is a monster with a thou- 
sand eyes." About this time it also appears that Von Bot- 
ticher insinuated to his imperial highness that Bismarck was 
almost living upon morphia, — was obliged to use it all the 
time; a base and groundless calumny. Yet no evidence has 
come to light that Bismarck was dealing less frankly and 
sincerely with William II. than he always had with Wil- 
liam I. ; nor was there in his directions to Dr. Busch any- 
thing more than he had stated openly to the emperor himself. 

1 Same as secretary of the interior. 
395 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

It is significant that when he requested Dr. Busch to have 
some important documents copied for him, and the latter 
suggested that there was. danger that the copyist would 
retain copies of his own, Bismarck replied, "I care little if he 
does ; I have nothing to conceal." 

One of Bismarck's first requests of William II. had been 
to reinstate Von Putkammer in his former position in the 
ministry, and the emperor agreed to do so after a certain 
time had elapsed ; but when Bismarck mentioned the matter 
again William II. declined, to reinstate Von Putkammer, on 
the ground that he had become accustomed to his successor, 
Von Herrfurth, as under-secretary of state, and did not wish 
to part with him. It was not long after this before Bismarck 
discovered that Von Herrfurth was holding consultations 
with the emperor without making any report to the chan- 
cellor concerning them. This was contrary to the order of 
September 8, 1852, which made the minister-president re- 
sponsible for the policy of the ministry as a whole. It was 
not until February, 1890, however, that Bismarck considered 
it advisable to make a decided protest against this, and the 
immediate consequence was that William II. requested him 
to draft an order revoking the decree of 1852, by which the 
relations of the minister-president and his colleagues were 
regulated. . Bismarck declined to do this, and the emperor's 
next move was to substitute a request that Bismarck should 
resign his position in the Prussian ministry and retain that 
of foreign affairs for the German empire. This would have 
placed Bismarck in an embarrassing position in which he 
would have been deprived of all direct influence in govern- 
ment affairs. How far Bismarck had encroached upon the 
prerogatives of his fellow-ministers during his long term of 
office it is impossible to determine, but there can be no doubt 
that he had done so to some extent. 

For the events that followed only two explanations are 
possible : either that the emperor was suspicious of Bismarck 
and feared that he was secretly working to prevent the fulfil- 
ment of the agreement between them, or, what is more prob- 
able, that he had previously made up his mind to remove the 

396 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

chancellor, and deliberately forced a quarrel with him for that 
purpose. The motive in one case would be as little to his 
credit as was his method in the other. 

On or about the 15th of March Dr. Windhorst made a call 
at the Radziwill Palace. This was an exceptional occur- 
rence, but there was no reason why it should attract particular 
attention, for the two old antagonists had been on cordial 
terms for the past ten years, and entertained a mutual respect 
for each other's abilities. Whether William II. was suspicious 
that Bismarck intended to play false with him in regard to the 
anti-socialist bill, and wished to make Windhorst his accom- 
plice in the transaction, or whether he was merely seeking a 
pretext for a quarrel, he pretended to be highly displeased at 
this interview, and sent a peremptory request (as we may judge 
by Dr. Busch's statement) to the chancellor not to hold secret 
consultations with members of the Reichstag. 

Such a message was insulting and tyrannical. The emperor 
would seem to have thought that he was back in the age of 
Frederick the Great, instead of being the sovereign of con- 
stitutional Germany. He had no more right to deliver such 
an order than Bismarck had to make the same request of 
him. Would it have been wiser if the chancellor had taken 
no notice of this affront ? If it was suspicion by which Wil- 
liam II. was actuated, the thunderstorm might have passed 
over without taking effect; but if the emperor wished for 
a rupture with his prime minister the insult would certainly 
have been repeated. Bismarck acted with his customary 
frankness. He sent back word that it was impossible to 
comply with such a request ; and this was perfectly true, for 
if he declined all visits from members of the Reichstag it 
would certainly cause great offence and produce inextricable 
confusion among supporters of the government. 

William II. then sent a notification to Bismarck that his 
resignation would be acceptable ; and Bismarck replied to this 
with an inquiry for the reasons for his dismissal. Having 
received no reply to this request, after a proper interval Bis- 
marck tendered his resignation to the emperor with a state- 
ment of his own reasons for doing so. This was followed by 

397 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

an order from the emperor for him to leave Berlin and retire 
to his estates. 

The Countess von Krockrow states that the last interview 
between the emperor and his first chancellor was a stormy- 
one, and common report in Germany supports this opinion. 
Bismarck, however, has denied this, and there is no authentic 
testimony in its favor. The anonymous author of " Bismarck 
and the Emperor" declares that at no time previous to his 
writing had Bismarck learned what were the actual reasons 
for his dismissal. He continues : 

'• One can say, therefore, that Bismarck asked for the cause of 
his dismissal from a fourfold reason : first, out of respect for the 
German nation, which felt such heartfelt sympathy with all the 
important events in politics, and especially in Bismarck's life; sec- 
ondly, out of respect for the office itself, the dignity of which had 
become a part of himself; thirdly, out of regard to his successors; 
and, fourthly, out of regard for his personal susceptibility,— cer- 
tainly enough reasons to warrant his demanding for the cause. He 
never received an answer. 

" Considering, therefore, the absolutely n^sterious manner of his 
dismissal (forced resignation), it can easily be conceived that in 
Bismarck's head, as well as in the heart of the nation, all possible 
and impossible reasons were discussed in regard to an event of such 
deep import. Bismarck, at last, came to suspect intrigues and 
cabals, and probably still keeps to this idea. The people, on the 
other hand, showed a hankering for more dramatic motives, and 
thus it happened that not only at that time but even to-day, a("ter 
five years, those that made the most noise have the greatest chance 
of being believed." 

It would be surprising if some temper had not been dis- 
played on this occasion, for Bismarck must have been raging 
with indignation. Looked at from any point of view, it was 
outrageous treatment for a time-honored public servant, whose 
intentions had never once been mistrusted in an employment 
of nearly forty years. However, all that we know of the 
interview with certainty is Bismarck's expression, " The will 
of his Majesty the Emperor has its boundary at the door of 

398 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

my wife's drawing-room." ' This was a fitting reply, and 
ought to have brought William II. to his senses. The form 
of statement would indicate that the interview took place at 
the Radziwill Palace, — and that a request for the chancellor's 
resignation followed it. Bismarck in the letter published 
after his death by Dr. Busch gives his reasons in full for re- 
signing, and claims that the emperor had imposed limits on 
his official position which did not permit him either to retain 
a proper share in the transaction of state business and its 
supervision, or freedom of action in ministerial decisions, or 
for such communications with members of the Reichstag as 
his constitutional responsibility required. He also declares 
that it would be impossible for him to carry out the instruc- 
tions which the emperor had lately submitted to him with 
respect to foreign affairs. He finally concluded in this wise : 
"According to the impressions I have received during the last 
few weeks, as well as communications from your Majesty's 
military and civil household, I may assume that my request 
to resign agrees with your Majesty's wishes, and that I may, 
therefore, certainly rely upon its gracious acceptance." He 
was accordingly dismissed from office on March 20 with a 
request to retire to his- own estates. This was really the 
most politic course which Bismarck could have adopted, for 
it compelled William II. to place himself on record in a way 
which would be condemned throughout Prussia, if not all 
Germany. To counteract this again, and obviate the evil 
consequences to his popularity, William pretended to feel the 
deepest regret at the ex-chancellor's departure ; created him 
Herzog von Lauenburg and a major-general in the army. It 
was now Bismarck's turn to play his last trump by declining 
these empty honors and retiring to Friedrichsruhe in sullen 
indignation. As an old reader of Shakspeare he may have 
said, like Kent in " King Lear," — 

" Fare thee well, king: since thus thou wilt appear, 
Freedom lives hence, and banishment is here." 



1 Bismarck and the Emperor. 
399 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

It was well enough that Bismarck should also pass through 
this experience, and know something of the evil side of for- 
tune while he still lived on earth. Trouble enough he had 
met with before, — difficulties almost insuperable, — but here 
was a difficulty of a new order that he could not overcome. 
Looked at in its true light it was not a fall but a rise in life to 
him ; but it does not appear that he accepted his dismissal in 
a philosophical manner. 

When Von Beust was relieved by Francis Joseph from the 
highest position in the Austrian government, the emperor 
summoned him to his presence and merely said, " I am obliged 
to you for the assistance you have given me, but I shall no 
longer require your services." This was simple and dignified. 
If William II. had treated Bismarck in a similar manner they 
might always have continued to be friends. 

It was now that Bismarck discovered who his best friends 
actually were. The rumor of his resignation had created 
surprise in Berlin, but as no one knew the actual facts little 
indignation was expressed. When, however, it was positively 
affirmed that he would leave the Radziwill Palace an immense 
crowd collected in front of the building, and, although this 
was contrary to law, the police made no attempt to interfere 
with it. As soon as Bismarck appeared to take his carriage 
to the railway he was greeted with prolonged and deafening 
cheers. Never since the news of the battle of Sedan had such 
enthusiasm been seen in the city. The crowd followed Bis- 
marck's carriage to the station, where another great throng 
had collected ; men wept and ran to his carriage-windows 
begging leave to kiss his hand. Bismarck was everything, 
the emperor was nothing; and it is easy to believe that the 
ex-chancellor made his journey homeward with a lighter 
heart than any member of the German government felt that 
day. 

Bismarck's personal friends and political supporters re- 
ceived his dismissal in dignified silence. While the North 
German Gazette, which had always been Bismarck's stanch 
friend, spoke of the event as one which should not be consid- 
ered in the light of either good or bad fortune, for the great 

400 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

statesman had fairly accomplished the work of his life, and 
at his present age he could not be expected to guide the 
policy of the empire many years longer, the Kreuz Zeitung, 
which was the organ of the court, congratulated the people 
on the great things that had been accomplished by William I. 
and Bismarck for Germany, but believed that the time had 
come for a new departure. In the Reichstag, Count Stirum, 
after waiting until Richter and other Socialist jackals had 
vented their spite on the dead parliamentary lion, made a 
simple and dignified eulogy of the character and achieve- 
ments of the ex-chancellor in the name of the Conservatives 
and National Liberals. Professor Haeckel, of Jena, came 
out with an intrepid declaration, enough to show that free 
speech is still possible in Germany. He declared that the 
removal of Bismarck was a national calamity ; that his days 
of usefulness had by no means expired ; and that Germany 
never required his watchful eye and steady hand in its public 
affairs more than at that moment. 1 Bismarck had his well- 
wishers even in Paris, and a French count said of him at this 
time, " He was the capstone of the edifice which he had con- 
structed, and his retirement is a matter of serious concern 
to all who take an interest in German national unity." In 
America the event was looked upon of not so much im- 
portance in itself as indicative of the character and ambition 
of William II. The choice of his successor created hardly 
less surprise. General Caprivi had held the position, for some 
years, of minister of the navy, and was a fairly efficient par- 
liamentary speaker ; but he was not considered a man of ex- 
ceptional ability, nor had he acquired such experience as 
might render him capable and fit for his exalted position. 
Following after Bismarck, he was almost like a reductio ad 
absurdinii, and it was plain to many that the emperor's chief 
motive was to give the impression that he governed Germany 
himself, which he certainly could not do so long as Bismarck 

1 Haeckel also said, " It is deeply painful for us to find ourselves opposed in 
this view to the personal opinion of Emperor William II. But our estimate is 
the same as that which the emperor's grandfather had of Bismarck to the end 
of his life." 

26 401 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

remained at the head of affairs. It would have been better 
for his own reputation, however, as a man of sagacity, if he 
had continued Bismarck in office. How cutting to him must 
have been the silence of the ex-chancellor's friends ! 

From Berlin Bismarck went first to Potsdam, and entering 
the royal church of the Hohenzollern family, draped with the 
battle-flags captured by Frederick the Great, he knelt down 
before the sarcophagus of William L, and remained there 
several minutes in prayer or meditation ; then to Friedrichs- 
ruhe, to pass the remainder of his days with the aged wife 
who had been his faithful support in all the difficulties and 
vicissitudes of his turbulent life. She lived to witness the 
reconciliation between her husband and William II. ; and 
these last four years of peaceful retirement must have been a 
great satisfaction to her, whatever they may have been to 
Bismarck himself. " He who has been accustomed," says 
Goethe, in " Egmont," " to care for the welfare of millions, 
descends from the throne as into the grave." Bismarck's 
friends bear testimony that even at seventy-five he was as full 
of youthful ardor and as deeply interested in public affairs as 
thirty years before. The long-continued habit of masterful 
effort was fixed on him, and he could not, like Diocletian, re- 
linquish the cares of an empire for a vegetable garden. The 
energy within him, swelling like an Alpine flood, must find 
an outlet, and any accident might determine what direction 
this would take. 

Unluckily, Chancellor Caprivi, in his opening address to 
the Reichstag, had referred to his predecessor in no compli- 
mentary terms. The late chancellor had often neglected to 
appear in the Reichstag when his presence was desired there ; 
he had been remiss in suitable acts of courtesy to important 
members of the government ; he had not permitted sufficient 
independence to the heads of departments ; he had not treated 
his opponents with respect, nor his own party with considera- 
tion. " All these abuses," says Caprivi, " will be remedied in 
the new administration of affairs." 

Can we suppose that the emperor directed Caprivi to make 
this statement? Certainly it was most injudicious, and could 

402 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

not fail to give offence in many quarters ; and though there 
might be truth in it, Bismarck's venerable age would seem to 
require the mantle of palliation for his moss-grown faults. 
Immediately afterwards the Kreuz Zeitung published a suc- 
cession of editorial paragraphs in regard to the change in the 
ministry, in which various reasons were alleged for its neces- 
sity, — that a young emperor and an old chancellor could not 
well agree together ; that Bismarck was frequently absent at 
Friedrichsruhe, attending to a saw-mill which he had erected 
there, when public business required his presence in Berlin; 
that he had been endeavoring to bring the young sovereign 
entirely under his power, and prevent the youthful develop- 
ment of the emperor's personality. If there had been a com- 
plicated political problem on Bismarck's tablets at this time, 
he might have taken slight notice of these cutting animadver- 
sions ; but they came at a moment when he was least able to 
endure them with patience and had no means of distracting 
his mind from them. A warfare with Caprivi sprang up in 
this manner, which was continued in a number of news- 
papers ; and this, which had begun in self-defence, extended 
itself to the policy of the new administration, which Bismarck 
criticised unmercifully whenever it disagreed with the plans 
which he had himself laid down, until, finally, the emperor, in 
1892, felt himself called upon to interfere, and threatened 
Bismarck with prompt and earnest prosecution, 1 unless he 
controlled the force of his invective. 2 Perhaps it was only 
fair that Bismarck's own weapon against the socialists should 
be finally turned against him in this manner. He even 
thought of obtaining a seat in the Reichstag, or the electors 
of his district may have suggested it to him, so that he could 
combat his enemy face to face ; but either his friends or his 
own better judgment prevailed over this temptation, and he 
declined to permit the use of his name. Yet there was an 

1 Especially in regard to the publication of the secret treaty between Germany 
and Russia, in a Hamburg paper, which was considered a breach of state confi- 
dence ; though, as Bismarck was no longer in the government service, what he 
chose to divulge was a question of good judgment. 

2 Chancellor Caprivi's decree of May 23. 

403 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

honorable precedent for this course in the proceedings of the 
Earl of Chatham after his removal by George III. 

To a delegation of manufacturers, who called to obtain his 
opinion as to whether the expectation of continued peace on 
the part of European governments was sufficiently good to 
justify their making extensive improvements, he replied in a 
rather ironical vein : " Yes, every government is grasping at 
the latest offensive and defensive invention in firearms, and 
each feels too weak to attack its neighbor. I think you can 
depend on the present condition of political affairs lasting 
for a long time to come." He received a great many such 
delegations at Friedrichsruhe, and talked to every one of 
them as if he were thoroughly versed in their profession or 
business affairs. This was a new view of him to the German 
people, and naturally served to increase his popularity. An 
enthusiastic Teuton said of him in 1895 : " If the blows which 
the fiery hero has dealt right and left, from above and below, 
so that they whistled through the air the last five years, had 
hit their mark abroad instead of at home, Germany would 
have been infinitely better off than she is now." 

Caprivi's administration could not be called a success, 
though it was far from being disastrous. He allowed the 
anti-socialist law to go out of existence without gaining 
thereby any votes for the support of the government. In 
fact, the socialists appeared disappointed that their persecu- 
tion had come to an end, for it gave them the only real im- 
portance they had. He found favor in England by slight 
modifications of the tariff, and arranged commercial treaties 
with Switzerland, Belgium, and Russia, which was supposed 
to be a beginning towards a return to anti-Bismarck trade 
regulations ; but the German people as a whole did not wish 
for this, and the newspapers opposed any further reduction. 
A reactionary measure in regard to primary education, drafted 
by Caprivi according to the emperor's wishes, was laid before 
the Reichstag, but created such popular indignation that it 
never came to a vote. The hand of William II. was also 
visible in a measure to modify the organization of the army. 
He wished to reduce the number of years of military service, 

404 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

but in order to do so he would be obliged to increase the 
number of men in the standing army. This would have 
largely augmented the expense of the military budget, and 
was obstinately resisted on that account by the National Lib- 
erals. A majority of the German general staff officers were 
also opposed to it. Neither were his negotiations concerning 
the German territories in Africa and the Pacific such as gave 
satisfaction to the merchants who were interested in those 
new acquisitions. It was generally felt that the strong man 
was gone and a weak one had taken his place. 

Count Herbert von Bismarck was appointed secretary of 
legation at London in 1882, and, having resigned two years 
later, in March, 1885, he was appointed special ambassador 
to the British government for the purpose of defining the 
frontiers of the new colonial territories. He was a popular 
person in London society, which for a German in those times 
was quite remarkable. 1 We do not hear of him again until 
June, 1892, when he went to Vienna to marry the Hungarian 
Countess Margaret Hoyos. There is a certain significance in 
the union of Bismarck's eldest son to a lady of that race, who 
indirectly owe their present independence to him. The alli- 
ance between Prussia and Hungary was thus repeated again 
in domestic life. Prince Bismarck and the Furstin accompa- 
nied their boy, and were everywhere received, even in Dres- 
den and Vienna, with the highest enthusiasm by the people ; 
but the doors of government were closed against them. 
Mayors and deputations of prominent citizens waited on the 
Bismarck family with complimentary addresses, but there 
were no invitations from kings and princes. This may not 
have troubled the ex-chancellor very much, as seems likely 
when we recollect his remark to Abeken at the battle of 
Sedan, " For God's sake, let princes be princes." Even old 
Metternich, always subservient to royalty, could not help re- 
lieving his mind in regard to the ennui which his court life 
occasioned him. The wedding passed off happily, with any 
number of notable Magyars of the highest rank in attend- 

1 G. W. Smalley's letter to the Tribune. 
405 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

ance ; but the German people were displeased with the slight 
shown by the Vienna court to their national hero, and ar- 
ranged a celebration for him on his return, which must have 
done much to console his spirits, if he required consolation. 
His daughter, Maria Elizabeth Johanna von Bismarck, had 
been married to Count Kuno von Rantzau some years previ- 
ously. 

An affecting episode occurred at the celebration of Bis- 
marck's seventy-eighth birthday, when a delegation of friends 
and admirers called at Friedrichsruhe to congratulate him on 
the perfect completion of his life's work. In response to this 
compliment the prince attempted a eulogy of his former 
master, William I., but became completely unnerved in at- 
tempting to do his virtues justice. He wept bitterly when he 
said, " What could I have accomplished without him, and 
without our powerful army ?" As soon as he could master 
himself he continued: 

"Thanks to our Emperor William I. and his federated sovereigns, 
more was done than any diplomat could do. If the emperor had 
not ordered the mobilization of the armies of 1866-70, what would 
have become of Germany ? As long as we can rely upon this true 
national feeling of our princes I shall not be alarmed for the future 
of the empire. 

"I am not well enough to co-operate with you practically 
[hurrahs, and cries of 'Yes, you are'], but my ideas are with you, 
perhaps more than is proper for an old man like myself. You must 
hold fast to the national idea, and remember that in Prussia, also, 
we do not follow the Brandenburg or Prussian policy, but the im- 
perial German policy. In this sense I call upon you for three 
cheers for the Kaiser." 

The ex-chancellor retired for luncheon with the presidents 
of the bodies represented. The deputies departed for their 
homes on three special trains. 1 

Nothing could better indicate for us how Bismarck felt 
during this period of retirement. 

1 Despatch to the Associated Press. 
406 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

The most dangerous movement of Gen. Caprivi's term did 
not come to the surface of parliamentary affairs, but was whis- 
pered about in government circles, discussed at court enter- 
tainments, and hinted at in the Kreuz Zeitung and other 
official publications. It was to the effect that German unity 
could not become complete until all governments in the 
country were abolished but one ; that as France and Great 
Britain had but one capital, so Germany should have but one; 
that, Prussia having already absorbed Hanover, Cassel, and 
Nassau, there was nothing to prevent its taking possession of 
Saxony and the South German states in the same manner, 
and thus producing a truly homogeneous nation. That there 
were certain advantages to be derived from this, especially in 
the reduction of taxes, was not to be denied, and the old 
Prussian Particularist spirit revived under its influence. 

Did this plan also originate with William II. ? Was it one 
of the grand schemes by which he trusted to further civiliza- 
tion? It could only be accomplished by a violent revolu- 
tion ; and when a revolution once begins, who can predict 
the course it will take ? At best it would have required the 
abrogation of the imperial constitution, and would have been 
a breach of faith towards the rulers of the smaller German 
states. It would have divided northern and southern Ger- 
many into two hostile camps, and probably have provoked a 
war with Russia. Bismarck felt no inclination for such a 
programme. He frowned upon it, and his frown scattered its 
adherents as a blast from the northwest scatters the clouds of 
an incipient rain. He spent the summer of 1893, as usual, at 
Kissingen, and on the third Sunday in August a delegation 
of seven hundred Thuringians came to pay him their compli- 
ments and presented an address to him. 

In his reply the prince dwelt especially on the subject of 
German unity and the necessity of preserving the imperial 
constitution. He apprehended no further danger from France. 
The time was now past since the French regarded a campaign 
in Germany as a sort of pleasure excursion ; but there was 
always some danger in view, and the present one lay in the 
direction of new experiments and innovations. He said: 

407 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

" I refer to the semi-official utterances directed towards the at- 
tainment of a 'greater Prussia.' I am sorry to see in the decline 
of my life the principles of the constitution being undermined by 
people who are trying to procure the centralization of the imperial 
power. 

" My heart is no murderer's den. I have not learned to lie, even 
as a diplomat. The people now begin to see what I meant three 
years ago when I said here that the constitution ought to be the first 
object of care. The constitution is good. It cost hard work and 
blood and lives enough. I feel anxious lest it should be meddled 
with." 

The amiability with which Bismarck received these con- 
tinual deputations is not more remarkable than the manner 
in which he turned them to account. 

THE RECONCILIATION 

Bismarck had only three years and a half to wait for his 
revenge. At a banquet given at Konigsberg, in old Prussia, 
in September, 1893, at which the emperor and many impor- 
tant magnates were present (but Chancellor Caprivi signifi- 
cantly absent), William II. made a stirring speech, in which 
he attacked the attitude of the Socialists towards the govern- 
ment as ungrateful and unconciliatory, and hinted strongly 
that it might be necessary to restore .the penal code against 
them. This was a sufficient notification to Caprivi, as well as 
to the general public, that the emperor had gyrated, and a 
change of policy might be looked for. Count Eulenberg was 
requested by William II., at a meeting of the ministry, to 
draft a new set of anti-socialist laws ; and it was not long 
after that before a personal attack on Eulenberg and his family- 
appeared in the Cologne Gazette, and Eulenberg accused 
Caprivi to the emperor of having instigated it. Caprivi was 
requested by William II. to deny this if he could ; but, having 
the fate of Von Arnim before his eyes, he concluded it would 
be preferable to hand in his resignation ; and shortly after- 
wards (October, 1893) Eulenberg also resigned. Germany 
was electrified. 

William II. must have perceived before this that he had 

408 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

committed a blunder, and no doubt repented of his rashness. 
The Reichstag had refused to pass his new army bill, and had 
consequently been dissolved early in the summer. A fresh 
election had been ordered, but its prospects were not favor- 
able for the government. The ungrateful Socialists paid no 
regard to the emperor's moderation, or to his interest in the 
, Industrial Congress. What they evidently desired was to 
obtain possession of the government by force of numbers, 
and they would be content with nothing less. The National 
Liberals were disaffected, and would listen to no compromises. 
The emperor had come up against a blank wall, and found 
that he would have to take the back track. Bismarck's ill- 
ness at Kissingen in the autumn of 1893 afforded a favorable 
opening. The emperor telegraphed to him a sympathetic 
message, and advised him not to return to the cold, cloudy 
region of Friedrichsruhe, but to accept his imperial hospi- 
tality at some residence in a milder climate. His telegram 
closed with the words, " I will consult with my court-marshal 
to designate the most suitable chateau for your Highness." 
Bismarck, however, was not the fox to be caught in such a 
trap, and had no intention of endorsing the emperor's policy 
before he knew what it was going to be. He therefore de- 
clined the offer politely, alleging that his trouble was a ner- 
vous one, and that the quiet and repose of his own home 
would be more favorable for him than any new and strange 
location. 

There were many now who expected to see Bismarck re- 
called to the helm ; but this was practically impossible. His 
present illness precluded it for the time being ; he was seventy- 
nine, and the chances were that if reappointed he would have 
to be retired again in a year or two more. Old men are apt 
to forget that they are no longer equal to their former selves ; 
and Prince Kaunitz, of Austria, continued in office until he 
became so senile that his secretaries were accustomed to trace 
his signature on public documents ;* but that would not do for 
modern Germany. However, a chancellor might be found 

1 Annals of the Court of Austria, vol. ii. 
409 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

who would agree with Bismarck, and could consult with him 
on Important occasions. Prince Hohenlohe-Schillingsfurst 
would seem to be the man. tie had been trained foi the 
diplomatic service undei Bismarck's eye, and had 1 n -K 1 the 
two most important positions connected with t lu~ German 
government during the past twenty years, He had succeeded 
Count Henry von A.rnim as envoy -it Paris, and had assisted 
Bismarck in exposing A.rnim's misdemeanors, When old 
Manteuffel retired from his last post oi duty, Hohenlohe su< 
ceeded him as military governoi oi Elsass and Lothringen, 
and acquitted himseli in tint trying position with discretion 
and good judgment, There was no one else so well qualified 
to suc< eed to the chancellorship, a man oi rare ac< omplish 
m, Hi., .ukI with .1 face beaming with intellectual lit'-. The 
German people were delighted, foi they knew tli.u public 
.hi. in-, would now have tin- advantage oi Bismarck's sage 
counsel, although his hand might not appeal in theii man- 
agement! Hohenlohe has proved tin- good genius oi Wil- 
liam n. 

\. \ c\ there was no reconciliation, but an entering wedge 
had been driven in. Bismarck's face looked brighter, and the 
tone ol In. communications was more cheery, I te again had 
a hand in public affairs, foi members oi the Reichstag came 
to i'i i,,ii w h .miw t>> consult with linn on the army i>iii .mil 
the Socialist laws, He advised them to support the formei 
with some modifications, and especially advocated .i larger 
number of non-commissioned officers, "Victory," he said, 
"will rest with tiu- side which win-; tin - first battles, .mi' non- 
commissioned officers give the best suppqrt t*> the private 
soldier," in regard to the laws against So< ialists, he believed 
th.it .i long term oi years would in- required to give them a 
propei trial rhe trouble was a deep-seated our; but il the 
laboring » lasses could finally be iu.uk- to realise th.u no other 
organisation oi society was possible, and tint those who were 
more fortunate than themselves were willing to share with 
them, so fai as tin-, was ti-.i-.ihh-, the agitation would finally 
*iu- out oi it-; own inertia, He did not regret th.it Caprivi's 
experiment had been tried, foi it showed conclusively that no 

dIO 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

amount of toleration or magnanimity had much effect on the 
Socialists. 

It was reported all over the world that at his Christmas 
dinner Prince Bismarck proposed and drank the health of the 
German emperor. Following this, on the 26th of January, 
1894, William II. sent his aide-de-camp, Colonel von Moltke, 
to Friedrichsruhe with a bottle of Johannisberg, — called by a 
witty editor Lachryrna Caprivi, 1 — and with an invitation to 
attend the emperor's birthday celebration on the following 
day at Berlin. There could be no more friendly testimonial 
than this, and Colonel von Moltke reported that Bismarck 
had accepted the olive-branch which was thus proffered to 
him. On the 27th the emperor met Bismarck unceremoni- 
ously at the railway station, shook hands with him, kissed 
him on both cheeks, — not the most pleasant subject for that 
purpose, — and accompanied him to the imperial palace, where 
he was made honorary colonel of the Seventh Cuirassiers, a 
famous regiment in Prussian history. The Cuirassiers es- 
corted Bismarck back to the railway, amid the acclamation 
of thousands. The Berliners were delighted. 

This ovation was succeeded by a visit of the emperor to 
Friedrichsruhe in the following month, and birthday presents 
on the first of April. The reconciliation might now be called 
complete, but it is questionable whether Bismarck and Wil- 
liam II. were ever on wholly cordial terms again. The 
political capital which William II. made out of his visits to 
the ex-chancellor must have interfered with this, and Bis- 
marck was finally obliged to call public attention to the fact 
that Prince Hohenlohe had introduced a certain measure in 
the Reichstag immediately after one of them, as if to give the 
impression that it resulted from a consultation with him, 
whereas it was a proposition for which he felt no inclination. 

1 After the wine made from the grapes on Vesuvius, called Lachrymce 
Chiisti. 



411 



CHAPTER XVII 

NEARING THE GOAL 

Furstin von Bismarck lived to see the good understanding 
renewed between her husband and the emperor, to her very 
great joy, but her death followed soon after this. As Jules 
Simon says, " Bismarck always wore his heart upon his 
sleeve," — in private life one of the simplest and most unaf- 
fected men, — and he made no attempt to play the Spartan and 
disguise the irrevocable loss which he felt in the death of his 
life's companion. He hated publicity on such occasions, and 
the funeral ceremonies were only attended by the family and 
their nearest relatives. The emperor and empress sent mes- 
sages of condolence, which we can believe in this instance 
were devoid of political purpose or any interested motive. 

Bismarck, unlike Burleigh and many other statesmen, never 
attempted to advance his sons to positions beyond their true 
deserving. In 1895 his second boy, William, was appointed 
governor of East Prussia, and holds that position at the 
present date. The expectation that Herbert Bismarck would 
be employed in state affairs after his father's retirement has 
not been fulfilled, — and this, considering his training and ex- 
perience, would seem to be a loss to the diplomatic service. 

Bismarck's birthdays had now come to be affairs of European 
importance, and his eightieth, following so soon after the recon- 
ciliation, naturally became an exceptional occasion. There 
was even felt to be danger that his now fragile life would be 
crushed out of him by the accumulated attentions of inju- 
dicious admirers, and faithful Dr. Schweninger — the only man, 
it is said, whom Bismarck was ever afraid of — was on guard 
to protect him against the effects of over-exertion. The 
number of presents sent to him, not only from Germany but 
from all parts of the world (including a Chickering piano from 
the United States), filled three additional baggage-vans, and 

412 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

were considered sufficient to refurnish Friedrichsruhe from 
gable to foundation. The railway station at Friedrichsruhe 
was decorated with banners of all the German states, and 
with the flags of the allies of Germany, besides being orna- 
mented with boughs of evergreen. A company of infantry, 
a company of pioneers, a squadron of hussars, and a battery 
of artillery were ordered by the emperor to assemble at 
Ahmeule, the next station to Friedrichsruhe, where William 
II. himself alighted from a special train, and placing himself 
at the head of his small army marched with flying colors to 
Bismarck's residence. 

On March 24 previous a complimentary resolution to 
Prince Bismarck had been defeated in the Reichstag by a 
narrow majority, but the emperor telegraphed the resolutions 
to Friedrichsruhe on his own responsibility. The London 
Times remarked at this : " There can be no question that the 
emperor's telegram to Bismarck expressed the true sentiments 
of the German people. The vote injured none but the Reichs- 
tag." It is difficult to see how it could in any manner injure 
an old man of eighty, who had retired from public life, and 
whose bitterest enemies could accuse him of nothing worse 
than they were guilty of themselves. 

There is a noble kind of pathos in the gradual extinction 
of the powers of genius by the course of time, and we feel 
this especially in the old age of men like Michael Angelo 
and Bismarck. The hand moves on the dial, and the man 
changes with it irresistibly. As Emerson said at a much 
earlier period, — 

"I feel the hastening of the stream, 
I hear the roaring of the fall." 

Not only Bismarck himself felt this, and his family felt it, but 
all Germany was conscious of the same thing, and dreaded 
the sudden shock which would take their world-hero from 
them. All that a man lives after eighty is a free gift of nature, 
and, though Bismarck's constitution evidently intended him 
for a centenarian, Dr. Schweninger forgot his sleepless nights, 

413 



J 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

his late hours of concentrated work, his severe journeys, and 
mighty efforts in the Reichstag, when he opined that Bis- 
marck might yet see his ninetieth year. Happy is the man 
on this advanced stage of life whose faith in God and immor- 
tality remains unshaken. We know that Bismarck had this 
faith. He did not believe, like the German physicists and 
the English Darwinians, in an impersonal, scientific deity, but 
in the God of Moses, Isaiah, and Luther — the God of heroes 
and sages and poets, whom all truly great and noble men 
have reverenced in all centuries and countries. He believed 
also that he was accountable for his sins, but he must have 
been conscious that the main effort of his life (and such an 
effort as it was) had been for the good of his country, and 
through Germany for the good of mankind. Whatever he 
might be called to account for hereafter, he knew that the 
deadliest sin of the nineteenth century, the sin of cant, pre- 
tension, and hypocrisy, had left no stain upon his mantle. In 
fact, his whole public life had been a continual warfare against 
it. The constellation of great men of which he had formed 
the centre in middle life had all gone before him. William 
I., who had greeted him at court as " the young advocate of 
justice," and to whom he owed all his chances in life, was 
gone ; Von Moltke, Manteuffel, the Crown Prince Frederick, 
Prince Frederick Charles, and Von Roon were all gone. So 
were Louis Napoleon and Victor Emmanuel. Francis Joseph 
alone was left, after a long reign of nearly fifty years. Bismarck 
had outlived his best friends and fellow-workers, and all the 
delegations to Friedrichsruhe, all the plaudits of the Berlin 
streets could not make him forget this. 

In the autumn of 1897 complications between the Russian 
and the English governments in the China Seas assumed a 
threatening aspect, and Hohenlohe considered it necessary to 
send a German squadron to the scene of action for the pro- 
tection of German interests. Before the fleet sailed its com- 
mander went to Friedrichsruhe and held a lengthy consulta- 
tion with Bismarck in regard to the course he should pursue 
in the various contingencies which might arise through the 
uncertain proceedings of two such hostile governments. Sub- 

414 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

sequent events justified the wisdom of the ex-chancellor's 
advice, and the best proof of this is that the presence of the 
German iron-clads produced no irritation either to the Eng- 
lish, Russian, or Chinese. 

This was the last of Bismarck's services to Germany. On 
January 9 a report was telegraphed that he was dangerously 
ill : facial neuralgia and swelling of the veins, which caused 
him intense pain. Dr. Schweninger, however, succeeded in 
relieving the disorder in the course of some weeks, and on 
April 1 Bismarck was able to entertain his friends at dinner. 
As pleasant weather came on and he was able to obtain more 
air and exercise, he felt still better, but his family were aware 
that the sand in the hour-glass was running low. Dr. Schwen- 
inger spent the greater part of his time on the railway be- 
tween Berlin and Friedrichsruhe. It was thought that 
Bismarck would live through the summer, but another sud- 
den attack of neuralgia seized him on July 20 and confined 
him to his bed, from which he never rose again. His suffer- 
ings during the last ten days were like those of a man con- 
sumed in a fire, but he endured them with unwavering deter- 
mination. The final scene is said to have been distressing 
and very affecting, for not only his family but all his domes- 
tics were devotedly attached to him. He died July 30, at 
eleven p.m. He was eighty-three years and four months old, 
almost exactly the same age as Goethe. 

Bismarck's body was embalmed to await the erection of a 
mausoleum in Berlin, of which William II. had already noti- 
fied his family. This is an honor that has never before been 
conferred upon a German, or any modern except Napoleon. 
One of his last requests was that his remains should be 
spared what he called "the monkey show" of a state funeral. 
This was dignified and worthy of him. There was not a drop 
of vain blood in his body, and though the emperor made a 
request for it, as Bismarck may have expected, Prince Herbert 
Bismarck positively declined it as contrary to his father's ex- 
pressed wishes. 

The funeral services took place late in the afternoon of 
August 2. Only the emperor, the empress, and a few of the 

415 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

chancellor's most intimate friends were permitted to attend it, 
but an immense crowd, chiefly of Hamburgers, collected 
about the grounds and at the railway station, while the peas- 
ants of the neighborhood stood respectfully with uncovered 
heads in a group by themselves. Bismarck's two sons met 
the emperor at the station and were greeted by him with 
royal cordiality. Prince Herbert conducted the empress into 
the death-chamber, and the emperor followed with the Prin- 
cess von Bismarck, after whom came a few members of the 
emperor's suite and the rest of the Bismarck family, together 
with Dr. Schweninger. All knelt clown while Dr. Westphal, 
Bismarck's country pastor, offered a prayer; after which a 
hymn was sung and Dr. Westphal delivered a short discourse. 
Then a second hymn was sung, and the service was closed 
with a benediction. The emperor deposited a beautiful cross 
of flowers on the casket, and the empress a wreath of white 
f roses. On their return at the railway station the emperor 
kissed Prince Herbert Bismarck and shook hands with Count 
William, speaking to them both in a very sympathetic manner. 
The text of Dr. Westphal's discourse had been chosen by 
Bismarck himself in the last days of his illness. It was from 
Paul's First Epistle to the Corinthians, xv. 53-57, and ex- 
presses the most confident belief in a future life: "For this 
corruptible must put on incorruption, and this mortal must put 
on immortality. . . . O death, where is thy sting? O grave, 
where is thy victory ? . . . But thanks be to God, who giveth 
us the victory through our Lord Jesus Christ." Such was 
the end of Otto Edward Leopold von Bismarck, who ruled the 
continent of Europe for twenty years, moulded sovereigns to 
his will, and filled the earth with his fame. I think we may 
say of him, in the words of Schiller's apostrophe to Ajax, 

" Rest in peace, proud name thou /eavest." 

CONCLUSION 

The tendency of the present age, especially in England and 
America, is to judge of men rather by good intentions and 
the absence of faults than by positive virtues and actual accom- 

416 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

plishment. Such a measure can hardly be applied to Bis- 
marck in fairness and equity. Rather he reminds us of the 
Greek sculptor, who, when his guild were invited to compete 
for a colossal statue to be placed on the roof of the senate 
house, easily obtained the prize by requesting the commis- 
sioners to set up his strange-looking model in the position for 
which it was destined, and to consider how it would appear 
from that distance. At the base of the mountain its summit is 
obscured by foothills, and only those who ascend above these, 
or who retire to a distance from them, can see it in its beauty 
and in its grandeur. Thus it happens that only those whose 
lives have raised them to a more or less elevated position are 
now able to recognize Bismarck for what he was ; but as time 
goes on he will loom up more and more grandly in the rec- 
ords of the past as the mountain rises behind us while we are 
being hurried away from it. In the course of another century 
mankind will have changed its opinions, the echoes of party 
passion and the feeling of party antagonism will have died 
away. No one will care whether Bismarck made war on 
Austria, persecuted the Catholics, or domineered over the 
Reichstag ; but the question will be asked, was he a useful 
man in his time, and helpful to the human race ? To answer 
this now we have only to consider what he accomplished for 
Germany, and what Germany is to Europe, — the most sober, 
well-educated, and spiritual-minded of nations. It is only in 
Germany that an American chemist — to take a single instance 
— is able to publish the fruit of his labors and receive due 
credit for them. 

On hearing of Bismarck's death the secretary of the navy 
said, " He had a marvellous career, and reached a ripe old 
age." The secretary of war said, " In my estimation, he was 
the greatest man of his day." * Persons in their position 
know, much better than the average journalist, the difficulties 
which a great statesman has to contend with and the allow- 
ances which ought to be made for him ; as we have to allow 
also for the difficulties and temptations of journalism. The 

1 Mr. Long and Mr. Alger. 
27 417 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

most creditable witness to Bismarck's character is the French 
statesman, Jules Favre, one of the greatest of his political 
antagonists, and certainly the most high-minded. Among 
his German opponents in and out of the Reichstag — Wind- 
horst, Lasker, Eugene Richter, Von Beust, and others — there 
is not one who can be compared with Favre in the general 
estimation of Europe. In his report on the Government of 
the National Defence in 1870 he says : 

"Although fifty five years of age, Count Bismarck appeared in 
full vigor. His tall figure, his powerful head, his strongly-marked 
features gave him an aspect both imposing and severe, tempered, 
however, by a natural simplicity amounting to good-nature. His 
manners were courteous and grave, quite free from stiffness or affec- 
tation. As soon as the conversation commenced he displayed 
a communicativeness and good will which he preserved while it 
lasted. He certainly regarded me as a negotiator quite unworthy 
of him, but he had the politeness not to let this be seen, and ap- 
peared interested by my sincerity. For myself, I was immediately 
struck with the clearness of his ideas, his vigorous good-sense, and 
originality of mind. His. freedom from all pretension was no less 
remarkable. I consider him to be an extraordinary political busi- 
ness man, taking account only of what is, occupied with positive 
and practical solutions, indifferent to everything which does not 
lead directly to a useful end. Since then I have seen much of 
him ; we have treated numerous questions of detail together, and I 
have always found him the same. The great power he has causes 
him no illusion, neither is he haughty ; but he is tenacious of it 
and does not attempt to hide the sacrifices he makes to preserve it. 
Convinced of the worth of his talents, he continues to apply them 
to the work in which he has succeeded so well ; and if to accom- 
plish it he has to go further than he desires, he resigns himself to 
do so. For the rest, impressionable and nervous, he is not always 
master of his impetuosity. I have found in him repulsions and 
indigencies to me inexplicable. I had heard much of his great 
ability ; he has never disappointed me ; he has often wounded me, 
even revolted me, by his severity and exactions ; in everything I 
have always found him upright and correct. ' ' l 



1 Government of National Defence, p. 119. 
418 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

This is the typical Prussian character, and something more, 
and it corroborates Von der Pfordten's statement in 1866 
that Bismarck was simply the incarnation of Prussia. John 
Lothrop Motley combines the friend, the statesman, and the 
historian when he says of Bismarck : 

" Such enormous results were never before reached with so little 
bloodshed in comparison. They are national, popular, natural 
achievements, accomplished almost as if by magic, by the tremen- 
dous concentrated will of one political giant. . . . Intellect, sci- 
ence, nationality, popular enthusiasm are embodied in the German 
movement. They must unquestionably lead to liberty and a higher 
civilization. Yet many are able to see nothing in it but the triumph 
of military despotism." x 

Count von Beust also finally concluded that Bismarck was 
not such a bad sort of man. He says in relation to their 
last official interview with the two emperors at Gastein : 

"To those whom he likes Prince Bismarck is the most agreeable 
of companions. The originality of his ideas is only surpassed by 
his expression of them. He has a spontaneous and therefore pleas- 
ing bonhomie which mitigates the asperity of his judgment. One 
of his favorite sayings was, ' Er ist ein recht dummer Kerl' (he is a 
right stupid fellow), without meaning any offence to the person to 
whom he referred. 'What do you do when you are angry?' he 
once asked me ; ' I suppose you do get angry as often as I do.' ' I 
get angry,' was my answer, 'with the stupidity of mankind, but 
not with its malignity.' ' Do you find it a great relief,' he asked, 
' to smash things when you are in a passion ?' ' You may be thank- 
ful,' said I, 'that you are not in my place, or you would have 
smashed everything in the house.' " 2 

Great reformers, who stir human nature to its depths, are 
certain to receive a large share of the world's obloquy in 
return for it, even if they are still permitted to live. " Crom- 
well," said Bismarck, "was the first English ruler who made 
Great Britain a factor in European politics." He was the 

1 Curtis's Correspondence of Motley. 
3 Memoirs of Count Beust, ii. 257-258. 
419 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

greatest of English statesmen, and perhaps the greatest of 
English soldiers, and yet he was obliged to wait two centuries 
for his country to do him justice. Bismarck has already re- 
ceived justice in his own country, but it may be long before 
he obtains it in others. Yet he is fortunate in escaping the 
rather vulgar accusation, which is brought against Csesar, 
Cromwell, and Napoleon, of " having aspired to the sover- 
eignty." The most superficial examination of his life shows 
that whatever may have been his methods of dealing with 
others, he did not advance his own interests at the expense 
of his rivals, but by the royal appreciation of his ability and 
deserts. What are called ideal characters are never the ablest 
kind of men, for to reach the limit of one's capability requires 
a freedom of action which conscientious scruples too often 
interfere with. " To gain something," said Grant, " a general 
must risk something;" and it is the same in morals as in war. 
John Adams was a great man without being a genius; 
Hawthorne was a genius without being a great man. Bis- 
marck was both, and yet his genius was so inscrutable that it 
defies all analysis. How he accomplished what he did no one 
has told. We can study a chart of the battle of Austerlitz, 
and the manner in which the victory was won is made clear 
to us ; but how Bismarck gained his diplomatic victories may 
always remain a mystery. It would seem to have been an 
innate quality in the man which he did not even understand 
himself. We recognize the faculties of mind and character 
which might lead to such results, but they are the same traits 
which we perceive in other people, only in his case magnified 
to an exceptional degree. If his peculiar ability were to be 
described in one word it would be comprehensiveness, — the 
faculty of mentally grasping the largest number of facts at any 
one time. 1 The extent of his knowledge was enormous, and 
it always seemed to be available at the moment when he re- 
quired it. Add to this the faculty of recognizing any situa- 
tion or complicated series of events better than others could ; 



1 In his memoirs Bismnrck often embraces so many facts in a sentence that it 
is difficult to follow his reasoning. 

420 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

to decide more quickly than others; and to act always accord- 
ing to his thought. " The foolish think as they will ; the 
wise will as they think."* It cannot be doubted that Bis- 
marck acquired a Shakespearian knowledge of human nature. 
Even speculators like Jay Gould depend on that for their 
success. Given his man, Bismarck could always reckon how 
he would act under certain conditions. He knew just how 
far human nature could be trusted. The statesman who 
imagines people are better than they are becomes popular 
very readily, but is certain in the end either to miscalculate 
or be deceived. Even Bismarck was occasionally deceived in 
his man, — as happened in Von Arnim's case, — but the few 
errors he made he repaired in a masterly manner. Neither 
was he suspicious or sceptical of those with whom he dealt. 
Like Napoleon, he saw into a man at a glance, and watched 
the eye of his interlocutor. 

Bismarck's reasoning was of the topographical order, — a 
kind which is not yet taught in the universities. He placed 
his subject before him as if it were a chart, and studied the 
relations of its different facts to one another as he would 
countries on a map. The map of Europe was to him some- 
thing more than an outline, a drawing of cities, mountains, 
rivers, and seas ; it was filled with human life, and every 
nation on it was a special and a continuous study of which he 
had volumes already in his head. From 1862 to 1865, when 
William I. could see nothing before him but darkness and 
chaos, Bismarck never forgot that Hungary and Venetia were 
two swords pointed at the throat of Austrian absolutism, and 
that Napoleon III. could never afford to surrender Rome to 
the Italians. 

One evident cause of his success, which he noticed him- 
self, was his entire freedom from political theories. He ob- 
jected to theories as tending to dogmatism and the illusion 
of preconceived notions. Government was to him a growth, 
or rather a structure, to which every generation of men made 
additions or changes, and his study was to discover what 

1 David A. Wasson. 
421 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

were the most necessary and suitable additions he could 
make to it. He never troubled himself with Plato's Republic, 
Machiavelli's Prince, or Mill on Liberty, but went to the Muse 
of History for his instruction, and studied statesmanship in 
the lives of statesmen. A keen French journalist, who visited 
him in June, 1866, when all Germany was practically in a 
state of revolution, told Bismarck plainly that he treated the 
Prussian Landtag as Louis XIV. treated the French Parlia- 
ment, and yet at the same time he was declaring that the 
popular wish of Germany for political unity was the only 
foundation for a national government, and that the German 
Reichstag was the only cure for their present evils. Was 
this consistent, or was it even sincere? Bismarck was pleased 
with the frankness of his visitor, and explained the whole 
subject to him in an equally candid manner, 1 finally adding, 
" I am obliged to use such materials as I find ready at hand : 
I did not make Germany or Prussia as they are." The his- 
tory of the subsequent five years showed that Bismarck was 
consistent, and intended what he said. A theoretical mon- 
archist or republican would not have succeeded in dealing 
with the situation. It was a transition period, and required 
exceptional methods. 

Bismarck's death produced a flood of anecdotes in regard 
to him, many of which should be taken with due allowance, 
while others are no doubt apocryphal. The change of a 
single word in a sentence will often pervert its original 
meaning, and it should be remembered that these incidents 
were mostly written down some days, or perhaps years, after 
their narration. When history or biography gets into its an- 
ecdotage it deteriorates rapidly. Many statements, like Bis- 
marck's saying that " God made man in his own image, but 
Italy in the image of Judas," have a relative and temporary 
significance. He was probably thinking of La Marmora's un- 
principled calumnies against him, which might be described 
as the very essence of ingratitude. Likewise many of his 
French criticisms, reported by Dr. Busch, were made under 

1 Hesekiel's Biography, chap. iv. 
422 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

the influence of strong belligerent feeling. The most unique 
story that we have of him is that of the death of his mastiff 
Tyras, called the Reichshund, whom Bismarck refused to 
leave so long as there was life in him. His son Herbert at- 
tempted to draw him from the room, but one look from his 
faithful old companion decided the chancellor that he ought 
to remain, and so he did. He had a strong liking for mas- 
tiffs, and kept a succession of them. In fact, he was himself 
the mastiff of Germany. 

Professor Francis J. Child was fond of relating how the 
Iron Chancellor, once passing through Gottingen, noticed the 
old janitor of the University walking on the street, and im- 
mediately leaped from his carriage, ran after him, embraced 
him, and detained his escort some twenty minutes while 
he talked with this old friend of his youth on the sidewalk. 

Nothing better ever came from his pen than his tribute to 
the character of William I., — " my old master," — as expressed 
to General Grant at the time of Hodel's attempted assassina- 
tion. He said : 

"The man never lived who had a more simple, magnanimous, 
and humane character than the Kaiser. He is different in many- 
respects from those who are usually born to so high a position. 
Princes of the royal blood, as you may know, are accustomed to 
look upon themselves as made of different material from ordinary 
men, and they commonly pay little regard to the wishes and inter- 
ests of others. The Kaiser, on the contrary, is in all respects a 
man. I do not believe he has ever wronged another, or consciously 
injured any one, or treated any man with unnecessary severity. He 
is one of those persons whose kindness of nature attracts all other 
hearts, and the constant aim and occupation of his life is the wel- 
fare of his subjects and of those who surround him. I cannot im- 
agine a more high-minded, pure-hearted, more amiable or benefi- 
cent type of a sovereign, or a man, than he is." ' 

We hear a good deal of Bismarck's humor, but the 
specimens recorded of it are not very brilliant. Like many 
of his critical sayings, it may have had a local and charac- 

* Bismarck after the War. 
423 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

teristic value, which has now evaporated. It would seem to 
have been rather a kind of playfulness which pervaded his 
actions than penetrating wit. His enemies likened it to the 
playfulness of a cat who has caught a mouse ; but all who 
knew him admit that it added much to the pleasantness of 
the man. It indicated that Bismark was in his element and 
enjoyed his work. Louis Napoleon said of him : " What 
danger can there be in a person who thinks aloud ?" Dan- 
gerous enough to the French emperor, for it showed that Bis- 
mark was intellectually his master. No man was ever more 
capable of concealing the truth when necessary, even if he 
appeared to be thinking aloud. Such is the measure of the 
diplomat. 

The government of the future is evidently republican. The 
worldly extravagance and excessive magnificence of royal 
life, which kept nations in awe during the middle ages, is not 
in harmony with the modern idea of government. We wish 
to revert to Roman and Athenian simplicity during the best 
days of the classic epoch, but there are obstacles in the way. 
What was possible formerly in a single city is not so easily 
accomplished in many cities and over large tracts of country. 
Those who can appreciate the value of plain living and high 
thinking are still a minority in the most favored nations. The 
greater proportion either live plainly from necessity, or, having 
obtained riches, surround themselves with luxuries, and assert 
an aristocratic superiority over their fellow-men. Not until 
this order of affairs becomes the exception shall we have a 
genuine republic, in which men and women are respected for 
what they are worth morally and intellectually, not for the 
money they can spend or for the titles they inherit. In such 
a state the franchise will not become the right of every igno- 
rant loafer, simply because he is a man and walks on two 
legs, but rather the privilege of a good citizen, who has 
proved his capacity to decide in regard to public affairs by an 
efficient management of his own and a proper respect for the 
rights of his neighbors. 

The government of the future, therefore, will have to be 
exempt from socialism, or even from anything that appertains 

424 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

to the idea that the will of the people echoes the voice of 
God. Only right and justice have a divine emanation, and the 
question for the law-giver is how can we approximate to 
these as closely as possible ? The masses of mankind must 
learn that politics is not like a game of cards, which people 
play for their amusement, but an intensely serious matter, on 
which the fortunes of their posterity depend, and that it is not 
each man's individual interests that he is to consider and vote 
for, but the interest of the community as a whole. Until this 
becomes properly realized monarchical institutions will still 
have a kind of justification, and a large portion of the sensible 
and thinking classes of Europe will continue to give them 
support. France has finally become a republic, after eighty 
years of revolution and reaction and the loss of a million 
human lives. No wonder if Austria, Germany, and Italy 
dread such a change ; nor is it certain that the French have 
yet escaped the worst consequences of it, although the signs 
are more favorable now than they were twenty years ago. 

It will be noticed that geographical position has much to 
do with the form of government in Europe. Russia and 
Turkey are military despotisms. Germany, Austria, Italy, 
Spain, and the smaller central states are constitutional mon- 
archies. France is a republic, and so is England, practically, 
at all events, when the Liberal party is in power. There is 
good reason for this in the fact that a liberal form of govern- 
ment would be hardly possible in close contact with Asia. 
So, likewise, the form of government in Germany and Austria 
is affected by the contact of those empires with Russia. If 
the revolution of 1848 had succeeded in transforming Ger- 
many to a republic, it would have been crushed while in the 
process of formation, as the Hungarian revolution was crushed 
by Russian bayonets. It is only through German national 
unity that Germany can ever become a republic. So long as 
the nation was divided into a number of independent states, 
each with a sovereign of its own, an attempt at revolution 
might succeed in some of them, but would be quite as likely 
to fail in others ; and even if it succeeded in all, there would 
be no central organization by means of which the different 

425 



LIFE OF BISMARCK 

states and provinces could act in concert. One part of the 
country would soon place itself in antagonism to another, and 
such confusion would prevail that orderly and sensible people 
would soon be glad to return to the previous condition of 
affairs. The national government which Bismarck has created 
and the military system which Moltke has perfected are the sure 
foundation on which the future republicanism of Germany will 
rest. A revolution that gains possession of the central gov- 
ernment of Berlin would control the whole of Germany and 
be well prepared to resist foreign interference. A nation of 
soldiers is a nation of freemen : witness Rome in the time of 
Scipio, and Athens in the time of Pericles. When the Ger- 
man army shall decide that a republic is preferable to a mon- 
archy they can obtain it without a blow ; but the great middle 
class of Germans will never come to that conclusion so long 
as the Social Democrats set themselves in opposition to all 
constituted authority and oppose the right of holding and 
inheriting private property. 



426 



INDEX 



Abdul Aziz, deposed, 308 

Abeken, Privy Counsellor, 207 

Afghanistan, 362 

African annexations, 365 

Alexander II., Tsar of Russia, 161, 
311 ; assassinated, 354 

Alexander III., 360 

Alexander of Battenberg, 382; his 
downfall, 384 

Altona, mass meeting at, 114 

Andrassy, Austrian premier, 259; de- 
mands reform, 306, 347 

Arnim, Count Henry von, 272 et seq. ; 
intrigues against Bismarck, 277; is 
sent to jail, 278 

Augusta, Queen and Empress, 69, 91 

Augustenburg, Duke of, 105 

Austrian diplomacy, 97 

Austro-German alliance, 344 

Battle of Sedan, 209 

Bavarian politics, 119, 233 

Belfort, battle of, 236 

Benedek, Austrian general, 134 

Benedetti, French envoy, 149, 166; 
interviews William I., 193 

Bernard, Duke of Weimar, 13 

Beust, Von, reforms Austria,, 146 ; de- 
nounces Bismarck, 152; distrusts 
Napoleon, 176 ; judges Bismarck, 

325 
Bismarck, Carl Wilhelm von, 14 
Bismarck, Colonel von, 13 
Bismarck, Herbert von, 202, 405, 412 
Bismarck, Louisa Menken von, 14 
Bismarck, Nicholas von, 12 



Bismarck, Otto von, his birth, 15 ; his L 
education, 16; his conduct at school, 
18 ; serves at a duel, 21 ; as a law- 
yer, 24; as a soldier, 25 ; as a far- 
mer, 26; his melancholy, 27; his 
marriage, 30; elected to the White 
Chamber, 34; his children, 40; cir- 
cular note of 1863, 55 ; faith in 
God, 58; letters to his wife, 59; 
opposes English alliance, 66 ; his 
ill health, 74 ; life in St. Petersburg, 
75 ; as a hunter, 77 ; his moral char- 
acter as a man, 78; his proposed 
modification of the Diet, 97 ; his 
nullification of the Diet, 98 ; nego- 
tiates with the Danes, 103 ; nego- 
tiates with Count Mensdorff, 108; 
intrigues with Napoleon III., 11 1; 
made a count, 113; his despatch 
to Goltz, 118; his character, 122; 
his circular to the German princes, 
128; his sovereignty, 130; opposes 
annexation of Bohemia, 139; ab- 
sorbs Hanover and Cassel, 143 ; ob- 
tains constitutional government for 
Hungary, 147; treats with the Ba- 
varian government, 151 ; concludes 
a commercial treaty, 164; school- 
master of the Reichstag, 168; inter- 
feres in Roumania, 186; wishes for 
peace, 190 ; outwits Gramont, 194; 
publishes the king's telegram, 195 ; 
talks philosophy, 207 ; favors repub- 
licanism, 215 ; negotiates with Bava- 
ria, 234 ; protests against Gambetta, 
242 ; his small tricks, 244; his severe 



427 



INDEX 



exactions, 244; on the Paris Com- 
mune, 250; created a prince, 251 ; 
secularizes German schools, 265 ; 
will not go to Canossa, 267 ; his 
wrath at Von Arnim, 275 ; his dis- 
interestedness, 279; asserts the su- 
premacy of the state, 283 ; recog- 
nizes the Spanish republic, 295 ; 
proposes a conference, 309 ; explains 
his policy on the Eastern question, 
313; as the honest broker, 317; 
speaks on socialist bill, 330 ; wants 
a tobacco monopoly, 337 ; his argu- 
ment for protection, 340 ; buys Po- 
lish estates, 35X ; opposes Semitic 
persecution, 353 ; on state charities, 
356; his yellow pencils, 363; sev- 
entieth birthday, 364; the Bismarck 
gift, 365 ; the Bismarck archipelago, 
366 ; last great speech, 376 ; a privi- 
leged character, 381 ; " has nothing 
to conceal," 396; his resignation, 
397. 39 s 5 drinks the health of 
William II., 411 ; his religion, 414; 
his death, 415 ; his funeral, 416 ; bis 
genius, 420 ; his anecdotes, 422 

Bismarck, the name of, 12 

Bismarck, Wilhelm von, 202, 412 

Black Sea restrictions, 230, 240 

Bombardment of Paris, 237 

Bonn, professors at, 264 

Bosnia, revolution in, 303 ; transfer to 
Austria, 320 

Boulanger, French general, 374; his 
downfall, 379 

Bourbaki, French general, 237 

Brahmans, 284 

Bratianu Joan, of Roumania, 185 

Bulgarian massacres, 308 

Burnside, American general, 224 

Cameroons, 366 

Caprivi, German chancellor, 401, 404, 

408 
Carlists, 296 
Castelar, 296 
Cavour, Count, 65, 67 



Chambord, Count de, 275 

Charles Anthony, Prince of Hohen- 
zollern-Sigmaringen, 184 

Chassepot rifle, 173 

Christian IX., King of Denmark, 100 

Civil and religious marriages, 285 

Cohen, the assassin, 124 

Convention of Erfurt, 46 

Convention of Frankfort, 43 

Coronation of Emperor William, 239 

Cretan insurrection, 179 

Cretan revolution, 186 

Crimean War, 63 

Crown Prince of Prussia, his marriage, 
82; interviews Bismarck, 86; his 
indiscretion, 92 ; opposes Von 
Moltke, HO; leads a flank move- 
ment, 136; supports Bismarck, 141, 
201, 211; his diary, 223, 226; his 
inconsistency, 227, 231 ; shakes 
hands with Bismarck, 235 ; acts as 
regent, 325, 385 

Crown Prince of Saxony, 200 

Danish and German law, 100 

Danish war, 104 

Darboy, Archbishop of Paris, 249 

Delbrook, Prussian envoy, 226 

De l'Huys, Drouyn, French minister, 

138 
Disraeli, supports the Sultan, 305 ; 

encourages Sultan, 307 ; threatens 

war on Russia, 315 ; created Lord 

Beaconsfield, 319 
Dollinger and the Old Catholics, 292 
Duke de Morny, 65 

Edinburgh Reviewer, the, 60 

Ems telegram, 196 

Eugenie, Empress, 125, 193, 220 

Falk, Dr. and Minister of Public Wor- 
ship, 281, 282 

Favre, Jules, 214; interviews Bismarck, 
217; his opinion of Bismarck, 418 

Ferry, French premier, 373 

Francis Joseph, 108, 145, 258, 414 



428 



INDEX 



Frankfort Convention, 256 
Frankfort Diet, 52, 61 
Fransecky, Prussian general, 137 
Frederick Charles, prince and field 

marshal, 103; attacks the Austrians, 

133 ; defeats Bazaine, 224 
Frederick the Great, 49, 112, 245 
Frederick William IV., 30, 37, 44, 54, 

67 
Free trade and protection, 333, 338, 

342 
Freedom of speech, 172 
French ecclesiastics, 276 
French fashions, 255 
French politics and Catholicism, 174 
French religion, 175 
French republic, 214 

Gablenz, Baron, 121 

Gablenz, General, commands in Hol- 
stein, 114 

Gagern, Henry, 43, 45 

Gambetta, French politician, 241 ; in- 
creasing influence of, 295, 372 

Garibaldi's attack on Rome, 180; joins 
the French, 215 

Gastein convention, III 

German Catholic bishops, 289 

German gymnasia, 1 6 

German military system, 183 

German national unity, 125 

German navy, 98 

German soldier murdered, 261 

Giers, De, Russian premier, 261 

Gladstone, 73, 361 

Goethe, 22 

Gortchakoff, Russian chancellor, 162; 
intrigues, 302, 318, 346 

Gottingen, University of, 19 

Granville, Earl, 363 

Gravelotte, battle of, 203 

Hamilton, Alexander, 50, 163 

Hanover, the King of, 168 

Hazen, General, interviews Bismarck, 

192 
Hesekiel's biography, 34 



Hesse, Electoral prince of, 56, 94 
Hodel, the assassin, 324 
Hohenlohe, Cardinal, 266 
Hohenlohe, prince and chancellor, 410 

Industrial Congress at Berlin, 393 
Isabella, Queen of Spain, 181 
Italian politics, 140 

Jesuits in Germany, 268 
Jewish traits, 353 
John, King of Saxony, 145 
Junker party, 35 

Kapp, Dr. Frederick, 162 
Karoly, Austrian premier, 95 
Kings, divine right of, 38 
Krementz, Bishop of Ermland, 263 
Kullman, the assassin, 286 
Kulturkampf, or religious conflict, 262 

Laborers' insurance, 358 
La Marmora's intrigues, 1 16 
Lasker, a socialist, 294 
Ledochowski, Archbishop of Posen, 

290 
Legislation in the Reichstag, 190 
Leo XIII. , Pope, 322; presents Order 

of Jesus Christ, 372 
Leopold, King of Belgium, 367 
Leopold, Prince of Hohenzollern-Sig- 

maringen, 187; candidate for the 

Spanish throne, 188 
Levinstein, Jew banker, 70 
Linton, an English engraver, 249 
Louis XIV., his invasions, 49 
Lowell, James Russell, 123 

MacMahon, French president, 274 
Majunke, Paul, a rebellious priest, 

288 
Manteuffel, Edwin, 82 
Manteuffel, minister, 68; general, 114; 

visits the Tsar, 150 
May Laws, 281, 293, 370 
Mensdorff-Pouilly, count and Austrian 

minister, 107 



429 



INDEX 



Metternich, 32, 50 

Moltke, Count von, 72, 200, 203 ; his 
strategy, 208, 212; opposes Bis- 
marck, 301 ; his eloquence, 326, 
378 

Mommsen, the historian, 332 

Motley, John L., 21, 419 

Miiller, professor of Tubingen, 96, 
166, 193 

Napoleon I., 206, 246 

Napoleon III., his life of Csesar, 64, 
73 ; his plans, 84 ; his intrigues, 
118; his duplicity, 125; intrigues, 
147; seeks Austrian alliance, 176; 
hissed at Augsburg, 177; hood- 
winked by the Tsar, 199, 205 ; cap- 
tive of war, 211 ; at Chiselhurst, 271 

Napoleon, Prince Jerome, 148 

Nelson, English admiral, 243 

Nicholas, the Tsar, 57 

Nicolsburg, peace of, 142 

Niel, French marshal, 173; reorgan- 
izes French army, 182 

Nobeling, the assassin, 327 

Paris exposition, 161 ; capitulation of, 
240; Commune, 248 

Persecution of the Jews, 352 

Pfordten, Von der, 152 

Phillips, Wendell, 127 

Pius IX., 32, 48; his intrigues, 228; 
uses dangerous language, 269; ap- 
pears ridiculous, 291 ; attempts revo- 
lution, 292 

Poland, 231, 350 

Polish independence, 253 

Pomerania, II, 15 

Progressists, the, 87, 88, 90, 137, 

357 

Prussian constitution, 42 

Prussian House of Peers, 89 

Prussian officers, their haughty behav- 
ior, 189 ; impartiality, 204 



Rechberg, Austrian count, 98 



Riot at Salonica, 297 

Roon, Minister of War, 82 ; serves 

Bismarck, 85 
Russell, Lord Odo, 230 
Russian government, 355 
Russian intrigues, 345 

Saarbriicken, battle of, 202 
Sadowa, battle of, 136 
Salazar, Spanish minister, 187 
Salisbury, Marquis of, 316 
Salzburg, meeting of emperors, 177; 

convention of, 259 
Schlager duelling, 20 
Schleswig and Holstein, 57 ; question, 

101, 164 
Schouvaloff, Russian count, 316 
Schurz, Carl, 36 
Schwarzenberg, Prince, 47 ; his policy, 

53 
Secessionists, 343 
Servians defeated, 310 
Socialism, 33, 359 
Socialists, law against, 329, 331 
Spanish revolution, 1S1 
Spencer, Herbert, 76 
Spicheren, battle of, 202 
Statistics of Franco-German War, 247 
Stohrmann, a Magdeburg priest, 287 
Strasburg, Bishop of, 264 

Talleyrand's predictions, 51 

Thiers, French historian, 126; goes on 

a circular tour, 222, 231 ; president, 

260, 270 
Todleben, Russian general, 314 
Treaty of Paris, 229 -"■*"" 
Triumphal procession in Berlin, 257 
Tunis occupied by the French, 321 
Turkish character, 298 
Twesten, deputy, sued for libel, 172 

Ultramontanes, 200, 295 

Victor Emmanuel, his honesty, 120; 
deserts Napoleon, 139; dies, 322 



43° 



INDEX 



Victoria, Queen, 169; sends a message 

to the Tsar, 312 
Vionville, battle of, 202 
Vizthum, count and Saxon envoy, 102 



Waltz, a quack doctor, 80 
War, genesis of, 131 
Wellington, Duke of, 149 
William I., of Prussia, 23, 70, 71 ; 
holds a grand council, 109; writes 



to the Tsar, 143 ; bargains with the 
Tsar, 196 ; his address to the Reichs- 
tag, 25 1 ; opposes Austrian alliance, 
348 

William II., of Prussia, his character, 
390; insults Bismarck, 396; is rec- 
onciled with Bismarck, 408 

Wimpfen, French general, 2IO 

Windhorst, Dr., 170, 254, 265, 316 

Worth, battle of, 202 

Wiiitemberg politics, 165 



THE END. 



431 



LRcJaVfi 



